We find that when a person was allowed to act as sub broker, he was initially allowed to issue even a contract note to his clients. Moreover, such sub broker could receive payments from clients and make payments to clients from his accounts. This position was changed vide Circular No. 9 (SEBI/MRD/MIRSD/DPS-1/CIR-31/2004) dated 26th August, 2004 as noted by the AO. But by this change assessee could still act as a remisier and the only restriction is that now he cannot issue the contract note for any transaction which has to be issued by the main broker. Even the payments were to be received and made by the main broker. However, assessee still remained entitled to his commission which was to be shared by the main broker with such remisier. Therefore, the assessee even after the change of regulation could have still acted and could have shared the commission with the main broker i.e. Sharekhan or he could have changed his broker or even he could have himself become a member of the stock exchange because he had a large client basis. Simply because assessee preferred to sell his business along with tangible assets would not mean that the agreement would become that of an agency. It still remained an agreement between a principal to principal. Therefore, in our opinion, it is a clear case of sale of assets and the Ld. CIT(A) has correctly decided the issue and accordingly we confirm his order.
Claim for deduction under Section 80IB cannot be denied in this year based on the findings given by the Assessing Officer or by the virtue of surrender of claim before the Assessing Officer. It is a duty casts upon the Assessing Officer or to the appellate court to see that if a deduction or a claim for exemption is statutory allowable, then the same has to be allowed, if the assessee fulfils the prescribed conditions required under the statute.
In the instant case, the property in question is residential house, which has not been let out or used for the purpose other than residential. Therefore, even though the assessee did not stay in the house so long, this house is exclusively for residential purpose. Therefore, the conditions as enumerated in the third proviso to rule 3 are satisfied.
In this case, the right to receive the brokerage and commission always remained outside India and what was received by the assessee in his Indian bank account is a subsequent remittance of funds from foreign accounts to Indian accounts. As far as the assessee is concerned, the right to receive the income did not arise in India.
Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of CIT v. Alagendran Finance Ltd. [2007] 293 ITR 1/162 Taxman 465, has considered the period of limitation for the purpose of section 263 in a case where a series of orders were passed by the assessing authority in the case of that assessee. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the period of limitation commenced from the date of the original assessment order, in which the issues sought to be revised by the Commissioner of Income-tax, have been discussed. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the subsequent orders passed by the lower authorities on different dates cannot be relied on by the Commissioner of Income-tax for reckoning the period of limitation. It is, therefore, necessary to see that for the purpose of computing the period of limitation, the date of that order is to be considered in which the disputed issues have been considered by the lower authorities, at the latest. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the period of limitation begins from the original assessment in respect of those items.
When the assessee is not in the business of leasing out of the property and the intention of letting out the premises in question was not to exploit the business assets in relation to the business of the assessee then the said property would not fall under the exception as provided u/s 2(ea)(i)(5) of the W T Act being commercial establishment or complex.
The Assessee’s claim for deduction u/s.80-IB(10) of the Act for AY 2009-10, in so far as it relates to the profit derived from developing housing project, cannot be regarded as income of a charitable trust or institution within the meaning of Sec.11(1)(a) of the Act, because carrying on of the housing project was not a charitable purpose even in AY 2009-10 in view of the first proviso to Section 2(15) of the Act. The income from developing housing project by virtue of the provisions of Sec.13(8) of the Act would become part of the total income under the Act.
When a notification is issued exercising the powers conferred under sub-section (3) of Section 90A of the Act, it can have effect only on those types of agreement mentioned in sub-section (1) thereof. If such a notification goes beyond that mandate, it will have to be ignored to the extent it goes overboard. Even if the term may be taxed has been given a meaning by the Government through a Notification No. 90A(3) of the Act, so as to extend such meaning to terms used in a Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement, it will have to be ignored.
From decision in case of CGG Veritas Services, SA (supra) it is clear that (i) fee for technical services having business PE or fixed place of profession will be assessable under section 44DA, (ii) fee for technical services without having business PE or fixed place of profession will be assessable under section 115A. The Tribunal has further held that fee for technical services from assessment year 2011-12, whether rendered in connection with prospecting for or extraction or production of mineral oil, will be assessable either under section 44DA or under section 115 depending upon the fact whether such receipts are effectively connected with PE or fixed place of profession or not.
In the case of Hyundai Heavy Industries Ltd. v. Union of India [2011] 12 taxmann.com 309/201 Taxman 237 of Uttarakhand High Court (Uttarakhand), it has been observed that a jurisdictional Commissioner is not to be nominated as a member of the DRP under rule 3(2) of the Rules. By doing this, the principle that justice must not only be done but seen to be done would be ensured. In the instant case, there was no dispute that one of the members of DRP was the DIT (TP-I)/jurisdictional Commissioner of the assessee when the draft assessment order was passed. Therefore, there was merit in the submissions of the assessee that the order passed by the DRP is liable to be set aside as the same is contrary to the observations of the High Court of Uttarakhand.
