So far as the first difference of age and formation is concerned, there is no merit in the contention of the assessee, as the age and formation of the company cannot be the criteria for rejecting the company for comparability analysis. If that is the criteria, then most of the companies which have been included by the assessee are also substantially old companies. The age and formation of the company cannot be the criteria or a relevant factor for excluding or rejecting the company for comparability analysis. This reason based on age and formation is not accepted.
In the instant case, no where the assessee-firm is considered as the tenant. In the partnership deed dated 4-4-1990 also, it is stated that all rights over trade name, goodwill license and permits shall belong to the partners. It is the legal heirs of ‘A’ and ‘V’, who have continued to hold the tenancy rights and have used the name of the business only for the sake of convenience, which had been continuance from the pre-partition days.
In the instant case, the fact of purchase of land, commencing of the construction of residential house on the said land and the sale of land is not in dispute. The only dispute is whether the land was an ‘asset’ within the meaning of section 2(ea) and, therefore, liable to wealth-tax or the land along with the superstructure can be considered as ‘residential house’ and, therefore, can be considered to be an exempted asset under section 5(vi).
As rightly pointed out by the Commissioner (Appeals), there was a mistake of taking number of days. Therefore, according to Assessing Officer’s own method it should be 186 days. If the date of arrival was excluded as it was not a complete day, the stay of assessee was less than 182 days. Accordingly, there was no merit in the revenue appeal. The case law relied was in support of the contention that day of arrival, particularly late in the day should be excluded. If that day was excluded the stay in India by assessee was less than 180 days. Therefore, assessee’s salary was not taxable in India.
The learned CIT(A) has tried to give a meaning to the definition as given in the Statute u/s. 194-I vis-à-vis the agreement for wagons investment scheme as has been perused in his order. Having reproduced the agreement and the definition of rent, he has not been to correlate the same for the simple reason that rent or arrangement has to be understood from the point of view of ownership.
As is apparent from the aforesaid facts, the AO disallowed the claim of bad debts in the absence of any evidence as to when the amount was offered as income and there was nothing to show as to whether this amount had been actually written off in the books of account. On appeal, the ld. CIT(A) admitted the additional evidence in this regard while observing that though the basic information and requisite details regarding bad debts/advances written off
As per order passed by the ITO (TDS), he has issued show cause notice to know the reason why the assessee has not quoted the PAN of the deductee in Form No. 16 and 16A. But the assessee had not given any explanation before the ITO (TDS), even the assessee has also failed to appear before him on the date fixed.
Therefore, it emerges that MAT payable u/s 115JB is only income tax and does not include surcharge or education cess. Therefore, if only income tax is paid under the provisions of section 115JB it is natural that tax credit u/s 115JAA will only be of income tax and not of surcharge and education cess.
Since the assessee only distributed the income in terms of the agreement and this did not amount to incurring of an expenditure nor the assessee claimed any, there was no infirmity in the findings of the Commissioner (Appeals) in deleting the disallowance under section 40(a)(ia).
It is settled law that suspicion howsoever strong, it cannot take place of actual evidence and, hence, the contention of the revenue that assessee was in possession of cash throughout the period of six assessment years has to be rejected.
