We have noted that the Assessing Officer’s observations to the effect that ‘business’ under section 28 has a very broad meaning and may be used in different connotations” and that it includes adventure in the nature of trade, as also his reliance on Hon’ble Supreme Court’s judgment in the case of Rajputana Textiles (Agencies) Ltd. v. CIT 42 ITR 743 (SC), wherein it was held that where from the very beginning, purchase of shares is made with the intention of selling them, at a profit, it is an adventure in the nature of trade. However, we are unable to see any merits in these arguments either.
In this case, AO, made an addition of Rs.28,00,000/-, in respect of advances received from M/s Jot Agro Processors Pvt. Ltd. at Rs. 25 lacs and M/s Madura Agro Food Industries at Rs. 3 lacs/-. The main addition made by the AO pertains to non-furnishing of PAN and bank account number. However, in the course of appellate proceedings, appellant filed detailed submission which was found plausible explanation within the meaning of provisions of Section 68 and having regard to the factual matrix of the case.
A plausible manner in which WDV of an asset, thus, may be reckoned for the purpose of r. 14 is to reduce the depreciation at the rate as prescribed for the relevant block of the assets, i.e., under which the said asset falls, for the years for which depreciation has actually been allowed since its acquisition (though on the relevant block), to arrive at its’ WDV as at the relevant year-end, and which incidentally brings us to the second aspect of the matter.
There was no search carried out on the appellant. The seized papers were found in the possession of Shri Vikas A. Shah. The third person evidence cannot be base for addition on the basis of any entries therein.
We find that we are bound to follow the judgment of the Income-tax Appellate Tribunal, Chennai ‘B’ Special Bench rendered in the assessee’s own case for the assessment years 1998-99 to 2002-03. In the said decision rendered in the case of Mahindra Holidays & Resorts (India) Ltd. (supra), the Special Bench has held that 40 percent of deferment of membership fee resorted to by the assessee is justified. The said decision of the Special Bench is rendered in the assessee’s own case in exactly similar circumstances. Therefore, the rule of precedence demands that the decision of the Special Bench must prevail.
In the present case, the Fly Ash Handling System, even though classified under plant and machinery as a general item, is still qualified as a different class under the heading ‘Air pollution control equipment’ entitled for higher amount of depreciation. Therefore, the special category, under which air pollution control equipment is placed, applies to the Fly Ash Handing System installed by the assessee. Its eligibility for higher amount of depreciation will not be shadowed by the general rate provided for plant and machinery.
Oil and natural gas and its exploration are a field of specialized technical knowledge and not for the use of public at large. A specific training is required in the field. The information obtained by the assessee are also of technical nature. Therefore, the contention of the assessee that it contains general information is without any justification.
Bare perusal of the scheme of Chapter XVII-B shows that it mandates the person responsible for paying any sum out of which tax is required to be deducted at source to deduct the requisite amount of tax at source out of the amounts paid/credited by him. Deduction of tax is made out of the amounts paid/credited by the person responsible for paying/crediting the same.
Under the Transfer Pricing Regulations, the number of comparables may be one or more than one; but there is no upper limit prescribed u/s 92C of the I T Act. However, the first proviso to se.92(2) indicates that more than one price can be considered for determination of ALP and in such a case, the ALP shall be taken to be arithmetic mean of such price.
One of the contention of the ld. Departmental Representative that Section 12AA(3) has been amended w.e.f. 01.06.2010 wherein power has been given to cancel registration under section 12A(1) of the Act. In that case the CIT cancelled registration under section 12A of the Act after 01.06.2010, therefore, the fact is different than case under consideration. This contention of the ld. Departmental Representative is not acceptable in the light of above discussions that the CIT cancelled registration under section 12A w.e.f. 2009-10 which is the period prior to 01.06.2010. The C.B.D.T. has also clarified that the amendment in section 12AA(3) is applicable from A.Y. 2011-12.
