From the fact that the income of the society comprised of receipts from the activity of letting out a kalyana mantapa owned by it on rent, fees received from the members on sale of liquor in the bar run by the assesse, it does not follow that the activities of the Assessee are not genuine or that the activities are not being carried out in accordance with the objects of the Assessee.
The other point considered by the authorities below marring the benefit u/s 72A(1) is that the assessee company failed to lead evidence that the amalgamation was to ensure the revival of the business of the amalgamating company. Objections of the AO in points nos. (iii) and (iv) of para 3 of this order about the violation of the conditions prescribed in Rule 9C are also related to this very aspect of the matter. The case of the AO is that the assessee failed to substantiate the steps taken by it to revive business of BTPU and further it did not satisfy the twin conditions as per rule 9C, being, achieving the stipulated level of production of at least fifty percent of the installed capacity of BTPU and furnishing certificate in Form no. 62.
After considering the rival submissions and perusing the relevant material on record it is observed that the due date for filing the return of income by the assessee under section 139(1) for the relevant year is 30.11.2006. The AO has drawn a chart at page-4 of the assessment order showing the dates of actual deposits and due dates for the said contributions of EPF and ESIC.
A perusal of the assessment order clearly shows that Smt. Madhumita Paul, had been summoned under section 131 of the Act and her statements have been recorded. It is shown in the statements recorded that Smt. Madhumita Paul did do work at the business premises of the assessee firm.
Assessee, in fact, was enjoying possession of the impugned property and for peaceful vacation thereof it had received the impugned amount which was described by both parties as amount paid for surrender of tenancy rights. The assessee had acquired the said right long back and the licensor to the assessee also had recognised the said right of the assessee.
In the instant case, it is not in dispute that the demolition of the building took place at the behest of the assessee and it is not an act of God in which event, it has to be said that demolition of house would fall within the definition of ‘transfer’. This aspect was not properly analysed by the ITAT in the case of co-owner since the subsequent decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Grace Collis (supra) was not brought to the notice of the Co-ordinate Bench. Since this aspect was not looked into by learned CIT(A), we deem it fair and reasonable to set aside the matter to the file of learned CIT(A) who is directed to reconsider the matter in accordance with law in the light of our above observations.
We further note that in this case the loan agreement was for fixed rate of interest. The LIBOR has been accepted in decision referred above as the most suitable bench mark for judging Arms’ length price in case for foreign currency loan. Hence, adjustment as made by the TPO is not warranted.
This is not denied that the assessee is engaged in the business of providing credit facilities to its members. The credit facilities cannot be provided until and unless the assessee receives the deposits. It cannot always be provided out of its own capital. Receiving of the deposit is necessary and essential for advancing the money on credit and earning the interest income. The deposits may not have been derived from the income for providing the credit facilities to the members.
Now we come to argument of the assessee that there is no change in the operating model or the business activity of the assessee company, hence, rule of consistency should be followed and hence no adjustment is warranted. In this regard we are of the opinion the res judicata is not applicable to taxation cases. Moreover, as held by Apex Court in Distributors (Baroda) (P.) Ltd. (supra) that to perpetuate an error is no heroism. To rectify is the compulsion of the judicial conscience.
That apart, the learned counsel for the assessee has rightly contended that the provisions of section 80IA(5) of the Act applies in computing the profits of an eligible business for the purposes of working out the quantum of deduction for the initial assessment year and for every subsequent year thereafter. The incentive deductions both under section 80 IA and 80 IB of the Act have the concept of initial assessment year in respect of almost all eligible business.
