It is most vital to note that in a significant move with far-reaching consequences, the Supreme Court in a most learned, laudable, landmark, logical and latest judgment titled Sadashiv Dhondiram Patil Vs The State of Maharashtra in Criminal Appeal No. 1718 of 2017 and cited in Neutral Citation No.: 2025 INSC 93 in the exercise of its criminal appellate jurisdiction that was pronounced as recently as on January 9, 2025 has minced just no words to hold in no uncertain terms that an extra-judicial confession should be found to be true and trustworthy before it is relied upon by the court to hold the accused guilty in a criminal case. It was also made indubitably clear by the top court that beside such a statement should be of free will and made on volition without any inducement and coercion. It also merits mentioning that a Bench of Apex Court comprising of Hon’ble Mr Justice JB Pardiwala and Hon’ble Mr Justice R Mahadevan allowed an appeal that had been filed by Sadashiv Dhondiram Patil against the Bombay High Court’s judgment of July 3, 2015 which reversed his acquittal by the Trial Court in 1993 of the offence of killing his wife on October 20, 1990.
We thus see that the top court held unambiguously that the Bombay High Court committed error in holding the appellant guilty of the offence of murder. It may be recalled that in “Balwinder Singh Vs State of Punjab (1995) had held that an extra-judicial confession by its very nature is rather a weak type of evidence and requires appreciation with a great deal of care and caution. It was also pointed out by the Bench that where extra-judicial confession is surrounded by suspicious circumstances, its credibility becomes doubtful and would lose its importance. Very rightly so!
At the very outset, this brief, brilliant, bold and balanced judgment authored by a Bench of Apex Court comprising of Hon’ble Mr Justice JB Pardiwala and Hon’ble Mr Justice R Mahadevan sets the ball rolling by first and foremost putting forth in para 1 that, “This appeal arises from the Judgment and Order passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay dated 3-7-2015 in Criminal Appeal No.70/94 by which the High Court allowed the acquittal appeal filed by the State of Maharashtra and thereby set aside the Judgment of the Additional Sessions Judge, Kolhapur dated 13-7-1993 in Sessions Case No.48/91 acquitting the appellant – herein (original accused) for the offence punishable under Sections 302 and 201 respectively of the Indian Penal Code (for short, the “IPC”).”
To put things in perspective, the Bench envisages in para 2 that, “The case of the prosecution may be summarized as under:-
The deceased by name Lata was married to the appellant herein. A son was born in the wedlock. However, it appears that marital life was not happy. The appellant – herein was entertaining a doubt in his mind as regards the chastity of his wife. One day all of a sudden, the deceased went missing.”
As we see, the Bench then discloses in para 3 that, “In such circumstances, the maternal uncle of the deceased by name – Yashwant Ganpati Patil (PW 5) went to the house of Village Police Patial by name Mr. Vasant Dattu Bhosale & informed him that his niece had gone missing.”
To recapitulate, the Bench recalls in para 4 that, “It appears that on 20-10-1990 at about 9.30 p.m. PW 5 brought to the notice to PW 2 that his niece Lata was missing.”
While elaborating further, the Bench then discloses in para 5 mentioning that, “The PW – 2, being the Village Police Patil, visited the house of the appellant – herein and found that the dead-body of the deceased lying in one corner of the house. The materials on record further indicate that the brother of the appellant – herein by name Madhukar and his wife Laxmi (PW 4) along with their daughter Mangal (PW 3) were also residing in the same house but separately in one part.”
Simply put, the Bench then observes in para 6 stating that, “Upon recovery of the dead-body of the deceased, the inquest panchnama was drawn. The body of the deceased was sent for postmortem examination. The postmortem examination report noted that the cause of death was asphyxia due to strangulation. It is the case of the prosecution that the appellant – herein strangulated his wife to death with the help of an iron rod.”
As things stands, the Bench then reveals in para 7 that, “This iron rod is also stated to have been discovered from the place of the incident itself by way of a discovery panchnama drawn by the Investigating Officer in the presence of the panch witnesses.”
Truth be told, the Bench then discloses in para 8 stating that, “The appellant was arrested in connection with the First Information Report that came to be lodged by the PW-2 himself at the concerned Police Station for the offence of murder.”
Do note, the Bench notes in para 16 that, “The Trial Court upon appreciation of the oral as well as the documentary evidence on record came to the conclusion that the prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The Trial Court accordingly acquitted the appellant – herein.”
It cannot be lost sight of that the Bench notes in para 17 that, “It may not be out of place to state that at this stage that the Trial Court looked into only one piece of circumstance, i.e., the extra judicial confession alleged to have been made by the appellant – herein before the (PW 2), i.e., the village Police Patil in the presence of his sister-in-law (PW 4) – Laxmi.”
Do further note, the Bench then notes in para 18 that, “It is also important to note that Madhukar (brother of the accused) passed away during the course of trial and he could not have been examined as one of the prosecution witnesses.”
Briefly stated, the Bench states in para 19 that, “The Trial Court took the view that the extra-judicial confession alleged to have been by the appellant – herein before (PW 2) could not be said to be admissible in evidence being hit by Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act.”
It must be taken into account that the Bench notes in para 20 that, “The Trial Court also disbelieved the discovery of the iron rod under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act.”
As it turned out, the Bench enunciates in para 21 that, “The State, being dissatisfied with the Judgment and Order of acquittal passed by the Trial Court, went in appeal before the High Court.”
Truth be told, the Bench then lays bare in para 22 stating that, “The High Court reversed the acquittal and held the appellant – herein guilty of the offence of murder and accordingly sentenced him to undergo life imprisonment.”
Quite ostensibly, the Bench then points out in para 23 that, “In such circumstances, referred to above, the appellant is here before this Court with the present appeal.”
Most significantly, what encapsulates the cornerstone of this notable judgment is then laid bare in para 36 postulating that, “We proceed on the footing that PW 2 – Vasant Dattu Bhosale, Police Patil of the Village cannot be termed as a Police Officer for the purpose of Section 25 of the Evidence Act. We also proceed on the footing that the extra-judicial confession alleged to have been made by the accused before PW 2 is admissible in evidence and is not hit by Section 25 of the Evidence Act. However, such extra-judicial confession should be found to be true & trustworthy before it is relied upon by the Court to hold the accused guilty.”
Equally significant is what is then propounded in para 37 holding that, “Besides, the above such extra-judicial confession should also be found to be free of any inducement, coercion etc. and it should be shown to have been made by the accused on his own free will and volition.”
Most forthrightly, the Bench pointed out in para 39 that, “We on our own also looked into and are convinced that what is alleged to have been conveyed cannot be said to be an extrajudicial confession. A very omnibus & vague statement seems to have been made as deposed by both the witnesses in their oral evidence.”
In this context, it must be noted that while citing a relevant and remarkable case law, the Bench hastens to add in para 40 stating that, “This Court in “C.K. Ravindra vs. the State of Kerala” AIR 2000 SC 369 had held that before placing reliance upon the extra-judicial confession, the Court must be convinced as regards the exact words or even the words as nearly as possible. This Court took the view that it would be difficult to rely upon the extra-judicial confession if the exact words or even the words as nearly as possible have not been reproduced, the said statement cannot be said to be voluntary. In such circumstances, the same may have to be excluded from the purview of consideration.”
While citing yet another relevant case law, the Bench states in para 41 that, “This Court in “Balwinder Singh vs. State of Punjab” (1995) Supplementary 4 SCC 259 had held that an extra-judicial confession by its very nature is rather a weak type of evidence and requires appreciation with a great deal of care and caution. Where extra-judicial confession is surrounded by suspicious circumstances, its credibility becomes doubtful and would lose its importance.”
As a corollary, the Bench then holds in para 42 that, “In such circumstances, referred to above, we are of the view that the High Court fell in error in relying upon the extra-judicial confession even while rightly holding that the same was admissible in evidence as Village Police Patil cannot be said to be a Police Officer.”
Be it noted, the Bench while commenting on the two independent witnesses who went in form of panchas along with the Investigating Officer notes in para 47 that, “In this regard, we may only say that panch witnesses have not supported the case of the prosecution. They failed to prove the contents of the discovery panchnama.”
It would be worthwhile to mention that the Bench observes in para 48 that, “If the panch witnesses are declared hostile then the prosecution is obliged to prove the contents of the said discovery panchnama through the evidence of the Investigating Officer. The question is how is the I.O. expected to prove the contents of the panchnama.”
Needless to say, the Bench states in para 49 that, “The position of law in this regard is very clear. Just because the panch witnesses have turned hostile does not mean that such discovery should be disbelieved. From the plain reading of the oral evidence of the Investigating Officer if the discovery is believable and inspires confidence, the same can definitely be looked into as one of the incriminating pieces of evidence against the accused.”
It is worth noting that the Bench notes in para 50 that, “However, unfortunately in the case on hand, all that the I.O. did was to depose that he had drawn the panchnama and in the end identified his signature on the same and that of the panch witnesses. This cannot be said to be proving the contents of the panchnama in accordance with law. In such circumstances, the circumstance of discovery also cannot be relied upon.”
It would be instructive to note that the Bench notes in para 51 that, “We are now left with motive. Motive is a double-edged weapon. Motive cannot be the sole basis for convicting the accused and that too for a serious offence like murder. Motive may be considered along with other pieces of reliable evidence in the form of incriminating circumstances.”
What’s more, the Bench mentions in para 53 that, “The learned counsel appearing for the State submitted that the dead body of the deceased was recovered from the house itself, i.e., the place where the family was residing. He would submit that in normal circumstances, the husband could be said to be the best person to explain as to what had happened to his wife on the date of the incident.”
In this regard, the Bench then propounds in para 55 that, “The law in the aforesaid regard is well-settled. Prosecution has to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt & that too on its own legs. The initial burden of proof is always on the prosecution. However, in cases where husband is alleged to have killed his wife in the night hours & that too within the residential house, then undoubtedly the husband has to offer some explanation as to what had actually happened and if he fails to offer any plausible explanation, this can go against him. However, Section 106 of the Evidence Act is subject to one well-settled principle of law. The prosecution has to first lay the foundational facts before it seeks to invoke Section 106 of the Evidence Act. If the prosecution has not been able to lay the foundational facts for the purpose of invoking Section 106 of the Evidence Act, it cannot straightaway invoke the said Section and throw the entire burden on the accused to establish his innocence.”
Resultantly, the Bench then holds in para 56 that, “In the overall view of the matter, we are convinced that the High Court committed error in holding the appellant guilty of the offence of murder.”
In addition, the Bench then states in para 57 that, “In the result, this appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed.”
Still more, the Bench then directs in para 58 stating that, “The impugned Judgment and Order passed by the High Court is hereby set aside.”
Finally, the Bench then very rightly concludes by holding in para 59 that, “We are informed that the appellant has been enlarged on bail by this Court. His bail bonds stand discharged.”
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