It is the case of the assessee that since it has mortgaged its property with the bank to enable the company to avail finance facilities from the bank, the advance by the company is not a gratuitous loan or advance, but in return for an advantage which the company has already availed on account of mortgaging of properties done by the assessees.
There is no dispute with regard to the fact that the assessee herein is a IATA agent and it is authorised to sell air tickets at a price range that are usually fixed by the airline companies. It is also a fact that the competition between different airline companies has increased due to presence of a number of airline companies and the same has resulted in fixation of ticket rates at different levels at different points of time. Accordingly, it appears that the IATA agents are given option to fix the ticket rates within the maximum and minimum range that are fixed by the airline companies.
The provisions of Rent Control Act can be applied only in case of bonafide letting out of properties and not in case of colourable transactions which are only an arrangement to reduce tax liability. In this case the company had let out the property to the daughter of the director who controlled the company and is responsible for taking all decisions Instead of letting out the property at market rate which is very high, the director had let out property to her daughter at a very low rent, obviously to reduce tax liabilities. Therefore, in our view, the provisions of Rent Control Act can not be applied to such arrangements.
It is obvious that when the assessee revised its return and claimed deduction under section 44C at higher level than that claimed in the original return, it was the duty of the Assessing Officer to consider the higher claim under section 44C and not to restrict himself to the claim made in original return. Any absurdity in the direction of the Commissioner (Appeals) to the Assessing Officer to consider deduction under section 44C on the basis of revised return subject to verification of the correctness of the revised return.
The assessee’s prime grievance is the non-examination by the Assessing Officer of the material adduced before Commissioner (Appeals) for the first time. At the same time, there has been, without doubt, a clear violation of rule 46A. The question of consideration of the additional evidence/s by the Commissioner (Appeals) comes only subsequent to first qualifying for admission in terms of rule 46A, which is mandatory in nature.
Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that the assessee-firm filed its return of income (ROI) on 29.09.2009 declaring total income at Rs. ‘NIL’. The books of accounts of the firm are duly audited u/s 44AB and the report in form No 3 CA and 3CB dated 26/09/2009 were filed alongwith the ROI. The assessee-firm derives its income from sale of Petrol and Diesel and also from transport business. The A.O has completed his order u/s 143(3) on 7.1.2011.
Section 37(2) inter alia provided for disallowance of entertainment expenses. The said provision has been omitted with effect from 01.04.1998. The fact of this omission is that from assessment year 1998-99 no disallowance in respect of entertainment can be made if the expenses are otherwise incurred for the business purposes.
Land which does not fall under the provisions of section 2(14)(iii) of the IT Act and an assessee who is engaged in agricultural operations in such agricultural land and also being specified as agricultural land in Revenue records, the land is not subjected to any conversion as non-agricultural land by the assessee or any other concerned person,
When the objections filed by the assessee were allowed to be withdrawn on the ground that the assessee intend to exercise the option to proceed to file appeal before the Commissioner of Income Tax(Appeals), then there cannot be any direction under sub-sec. (5) in the absence of any objection as required under sub-Sec. (2) of sec. 144C of the Act.
The fact situation in respect of the necessity for having the issue of software expenditure examined to ascertain whether it is capital or revenue in nature in the case of Amway India Enterprises (supra) is similar to that of the present case of the assessee. We, therefore, respectfully following the decision in the case of Amway India Enterprises (supra), hold that since the examination of whether software expenditure incurred is
