In the instant case, learned counsel for the Revenue is not in a position to demonstrate or satisfy us that due to the change of accounting method adopted by the respondent/assessee , which is permissible in law as per the ratio laid down in (i) CIT v. Matchwell Electricals (I.) Ltd. (2003)263 ITR 227 (Bom) and (ii) Hela Holdings Pvt. Ltd. v. CIT (2003) 263 ITR 129 (Cal), the Revenue suffered any loss or such a change of methodology attracts tax evasion. Concededly, there is no finding to that effect in the assessment order or in the order of the Commissioner of Income-tax (Appeals).
Provision of Section 143 (2) of Income Act viz-aviz section 36(1)(vii) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 read with section 36(1) both would be harmonized to give purposeful meaning to both the statutory provisions, as one extends benefit to the respondent-assessee of deduction for their debt or part thereof becoming bad and other authorizes Assessing Officer to see that provision of Income Tax Act are not flouted by any means.
There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of malafides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk. The approach of the authorities should be justice oriented so as to advance cause of justice. If refund is legitimately due to the applicant, mere delay should not defeat the claim for refund.
We find from the scheme of the Customs Act, 1962 and the Foreign Trade (Development and Regulation) Act, 1992 that whenever a dispute may arise as to the classification of the goods, other than its description, quantity and FOB value, the customs authorities have to refer the dispute for adjudication to DGFT under Section 13 of the Act. It is only if the DGFT as the licensing and also adjudicating authority decides against the licensee, that the customs authorities will get jurisdiction to confiscate and levy penalty on such goods.
The short question that arises for consideration is whether blending and packing of tea for export in the industrial unit in the Special Economic Zone amount to manufacture or production of an article qualifying for exemption under Section 10A of the Act, that is, during the period prior to introduction of “blending” as “manufacture” with effect from 10.2.2006.
. From the various judgments of the Supreme Court above referred to and other High Courts, it is clear that the Tribunal’s power under Section 254(2) is not to review its earlier order but only to amend it with a view to rectify any mistake apparent from the record. What can be termed as “mistake apparent?”. “Mistake” in general means to take or understand wrongly or inaccurately; to make an error in interpreting; it is an error; a fault, a misunderstanding, a misconception. Mistake in taxation laws has a special significance. It is mostly subjective and the dividing line is thin and indiscernible. “Apparent” means visible, capable of being seen, easily seen, obvious plain, open to view, evident, appears, appearing as real and true, conspicuous, manifest, seeming. The plain meaning of the word “apparent” is that it must be something which appears to be ex-facie and incapable of argumen
This article summarizes recent ruling of the Madras High Court (HC) in the case of CIT v M/s Hi Tech Arai Limited (Taxpayer) [Tax Case (Appeal) Nos. 670 and 671 of 2009] on the issue of allowability of additional depreciation on newly set-up windmills, under the Indian Tax Law (ITL),
This ruling provides guidance that withdrawal from a revaluation reserve is permitted to be reduced from the book profit, computed under the MAT provisions, only in a case where the book profit was increased by the amount of revaluation reserve in the year of creation.
Brief facts relevant for the purpose of deciding this issue are that the defendant no.1 company was a tenant in property no. 3 Amrita Shergill Marg, New Delhi. This property was leased by defendant no.5 M/s H.G.Gupta & Sons (HUF) to defendant No. 1 Company for residence of its officers. The company by a resolution in the meeting of Board of Directors held on 27.2.1974 allotted this property to late Lala Hansraj Gupta in his capacity as CEO/Chairman of the company. Late Lala Hansraj Gupta was father of plaintiff no. 2 and defendants no. 2-4 and grandfather of plaintiff no. 1.
In the event of a reasonable doubt about the applicability of Chapter XVII-B, Section 40(a)(ia) cannot be invoked, would be stretching our jurisdiction beyond the permissible limit which cannot be done. In as much as we have reached a conclusion that the object sought to be achieved while enacting Section 40(a)(ia) was for augmenting the provision of TDS, with which object we do not find any impermissibility or lack of constitutionality and hence there is no scope for applying the doctrine of Reading Down to the said provision.
