. The dearness relief is neither compensation received in lieu of termination of the employment, nor any amount due paid in lumpsum or otherwise after cessation of the employment.
Only primary fact was that the assessee had earned interest income. We are, however, of the opinion that in the context of the close connection between the petitioner and Aditya Medisales, the fact that the assessee was eligible for deduction under section 80IA of the Act and the interest income received from the sister concern had relevance to the provisions of section 80IA(10) of the Act, primary facts were not on record.
Deemed payment could not be treated as actual payment to qualify for deduction under Section 43B of the Income Tax Act, we do not agree with the submission of the learned counsel appearing for the assessee herein that depositing the amount in a bank, even if it be in a separate account, would satisfy the provisions of Section 43 B as actual payment. Reading the decision in Sri Venkatesa Mills Ltd. (supra) along with the decision in McDowell & Co. Ltd. (supra), one can only observe that the law declared in both the above judgments are one and the same, in the sense, that both the decisions held that under Section 43 B only actual payment and not any notional or deemed payment that would be relevant for considering the deduction.
The question then, would be; on facts what is discernible? As noticed above, every loan granted to a subsidiary company was preceded by the receipt of money by the assessee as loan from other entities. Undisputedly, even going by the assessee’s contention that the loans to subsidiary companies were from its internal resources; if such interest-free loans were not made, then at least to that extent the assessee need not have borrowed from other entities.
Learned counsel for the respondent submits that Assessing Officer on fact after having examined accounts and accompanying documents found that total funds available with the assessee on 31st March, 1999 was Rs. 1,44,82,000/- out of which an amount of Rs. 22.75 lakhs was given as loans as on 31st March, 1999 representing 15.70% of the funds available with the assessee.
The parties are not to blame for this creditor’s winding-up petition having lingered for an unnecessary length of time and there being a more protracted hearing than is ordinarily called for in a matter of this kind. It was only an observation of the court that led to a relatively innocuous matter being blown out of proportion upon the court considering it to be significant that subsequent to the present petition
Since no agricultural operations were carried on, the income tax authorities rightly concluded that the capital asset was converted into stock-in-trade, and that sales of plots in the case of such land would be treated to be business activity to make profits.
It is not in dispute that the petitioner had placed all the relevant records, including the construction agreement, before the passing of the original assessment order. Further, it is not the case of the respondent that the petitioner had suppressed certain material facts, due to which the original assessment order, passed by the respondent is liable to be re-assessed.
Assessee held a bona fide belief that it was liable to pay customs duty on the drawings and designs imported by it as the same were goods. Under the circumstances, no mala fide intention could be attributed to it in not discharging the service tax liability under the category of Intellectual Property Rights Services.
In the instant case, the amendment under Section 260A (2A) has been introduced retrospectively w.e.f. 01.10.1998 by the Finance Act, 2010. But fact remains that the cases already settled before the said amendment cannot be re-opened, as per the ratio laid down in the case of Babu Ram v. C. C. Jacob and others; AIR (1999) SC 1845, where it was observed that the prospective declaration of law is a devise innovated by the apex court to avoid reopening of settled issues and to prevent multiplicity of proceedings.
