While making assessment of any returns any deduction is sought for it is the duty of the revenue official to examine not only the account but also substantive right of claiming deduction under the Act on the facts and circumstances of this case. It is not a case that the said assets and properties do not belong to the appellant, therefore depreciation in any assets and properties is a regular phenomenon and deduction on this account is allowable under Section 32 automatically.
In the present case, the expenditure is incurred for the purpose of sub-division of the shares. However, we do not see how the observations made by the Apex Court in the ratio laid down in case of General Insurance Corporation (supra) can be distinguished in view of such difference in facts. In case of sub-division of the shares also, there is no increase in the share capital of the company.
Assessee participated in the enquiry conducted under Section 131 of the Income Tax Act and had also made a statement confirming the purchase of the land. Subsequent thereto, the assessee had participated in the enquiry and on 15.5.2002, in response to the notice under Section 142(1)
The assessee received a donations which was not anonymous donations within the meaning of Section 11(3) of the Act because the receipts issued by the assessee trust were still in the custody of the department as the receipt books were impounded in the course of the survey and no confirmations were required to be filed by the assessee.
In proceedings under Article 226, and that whether the presumption of liability can be rebutted under Section 179 has to be gone into before the tax authorities. Nonetheless, the Court here has to deal with the assessee’s fundamental argument that he is not liable to pay anything more than the tax (i.e. not liable to pay penalty or interest).
It is to be noted that a settlement is an admixture of gift or partition or trust. In law, a family arrangement/settlement is accepted as a transfer of interest in the property in favour of an individual between whom the family arrangement or settlement is so made. Just because a deed/instrument answers the description of a ‘Trust Deed’, it does not cease to be a ‘settlement’ for the purpose of stamp duty, if it answers the description of ‘settlement’ also. As a matter of fact, a deed of trust/trust deed can also be a settlement deed.
The statutory provision of section 92CA does provide for an approval by the Commissioner and the original record produced before this Court establishes that there was an approval by the Commissioner in the matter of reference to the Transfer Pricing Officer. In the instant case, the impugned order has been passed by (Additional Commissioner) an authority who is jurisdictionally competent to pass such an order and it can never be said that the order passed by him without jurisdiction.
The assessee had filed and furnished all details and particulars relating to the royalty payment including agreements, calculation and the approval. There was no failure on the part of the assessee to furnish true and correct all material facts. The facts were available before and were within the knowledge of the Assessing Officer. The new Assessing Officer as per the reasons recorded on the basis of the same facts, has observed that royalty payment should have been disallowed as it was capital in nature. This is a question of legal inference or interpretation which has been drawn from the same material facts on record. There is no allegation that there was failure or omission on the part of the assessee to furnish and state all material facts.
When an order passed by this Court it is to be considered by the public at large and the same concluded at the instance of this Court. Then it is the duty of this Court to give respect to its order by giving sanctity more than, over and above the highest bid.
The validity of a provision cannot be considered or adjudicated upon by the Tribunal constituted under the Act. Section 260A provides for an appeal from every order passed by the Appellate Tribunal. If it involves a substantial question of law, such question of law should arise from the order of the Tribunal. If the Tribunal cannot consider the validity of a retrospective amendment, no doubt such question does not arise from its order and the jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under section 260A cannot also enable the High Court to consider such validity or otherwise.
