Introduction
One cannot control oneself from crying in joy to see how Supreme Court in a most learned, laudable, landmark, logical and latest judgment titled Union of India & Ors vs Saroj Devi in Civil Appeal No. 13730 of 2024 (Arising out of Diary No. 20250 of 2021) and cited in Neutral Citation No. NC: 2024 INSC 921 and so also in 2024 LiveLaw (SC) 942 that was pronounced as recently as on December 3, 2024 in the exercise of its civil appellate jurisdiction has while striking the right chord taken the right step to dismiss the appeal of the Union of India against the order of the Armed Forces Tribunal (AFT) in August 2019 granting a Liberalised Family Pension (LFP) and other benefits to the widow of a soldier who died while on Area Domination Patrol along the Line of Control. Interestingly enough, we need to note that the Apex Court Bench comprising of Hon’ble Mr Justice Abhay S Oka and Hon’ble Mr Justice Augustine George Masih not just dismissed the appeal but also went a step ahead and imposed a cost of Rs 50,000 on the appellant and while taking potshots at the most arbitrary, atrocious, arrogant and so also antithetical to respecting the most priceless sacrifice rendered by the soldiers on borders by such a whimsical decision of Union of India did not mince any words to observe that the widow of Naik Inderjeet Singh (deceased) should not have been dragged to court in such a case. This is nothing but an “open and worst insult” of our brave martyrs who willingly sacrifice their whole life for our nation! The top court thus most commendably dismissed the appeal by the Union of India and firmly directed that the AFT’s direction be implemented within three months. It also directed clearly the appellant that is the Union of India to pay costs of Rs 50,000 to the respondents within two months. It is high time and the Union of India definitely must be more considerate and compassionate to the families of brave martyrs instead of spending and investing billions of rupees in some few countries like Bangladesh where we all are witnessing how Hindus are now being most mercilessly slaughtered even though lakhs of Bangladeshis Muslims have been rehabilitated most humanely by India just like Rohingya Muslims and we all witnessed how India spent so much amount in inviting the master mind of aborted Siachen Glacier attack in 1987 and more famously Kargil war in 1999 – Late Gen Pervez Musharraf in which we lost so many of our officers and soldiers yet he was accorded a princely welcome just few months after Kargil war!
At the very outset, this brief, brilliant, bold and balanced judgment authored by Hon’ble Mr Justice Abhay S Oka for a Bench of the Apex Court comprising of himself and Hon’ble Mr Justice Augustine George Masih sets the ball in motion by first and foremost putting forth in para 1 that, “Leave granted.”
Factual Aspect
To put things in perspective, the Bench envisages in para 2 while elaborating on the factual aspects observing that, “The respondent is the widow of late Naik Inderjeet Singh (for short, ‘the deceased’). The deceased was employed in the Indian Army on 27th February 1996. He was part of an Area Domination Patrol. The Area Domination Patrol was launched from Manjit Main to Rangwar Post for domination of the Rangwar gap in the proximity of the Line of Control (for short, ‘LC’) along the Anti Infiltration Obstacle System (for short, ‘AIOS’). A fence built by the Indian Army to prevent cross-border infiltration is known as AIOS. He complained of breathlessness during duty in extreme climatic conditions from 1.00 a.m. to 3.30 a.m. on 23rd January 2013. He was taken to the nearby Rangwar Post. The regimental medical officer found the condition of the deceased very critical. He could not be air-evacuated due to bad weather. Therefore, he was evacuated on foot. When he was taken to Chowkibal’s MI room, he was declared dead. The cause of death was cardiopulmonary arrest. His death was initially classified as a ‘battle casualty’ but was later classified as a ‘physical casualty’ attributable to military service. The respondent was granted all terminal benefits, including a special family pension. As she was denied a Liberalised Family Pension (LFP), she filed an original application before the Armed Forces Tribunal (for short, ‘the Tribunal’). The respondent sought quashing of the order dated 10th February 2016, by which the benefit of LFP was denied to her. She prayed for a direction to grant her LFP with interest. The appellants opposed the original application. Ultimately, by the impugned judgment dated 23rd August 2019, the Tribunal allowed the application and directed that the respondent be granted LFP and ex- gratia lump sum amount payable in case of battle casualties dying in harness. The present appeal takes exception to the said judgment and order.”
Do note, the Bench notes in para 5 that, “We must deal with the factual aspects. In paragraph 4.3 of the original application filed by the respondent, the following are the averments made:
“4.3 That while the husband of the applicant was posted in J&K and was part of Area Domination Patrol which was launched from Manjit Main to Rangwar Post for domination of Rangwar Gap in the proximity of LC and along the AIOS in extreme climatic condition on 23/01/2013 from 0100 Hrs to 0330 Hrs. The husband of the applicant complained of breathlessness and was taken to Rangwar Post where he was given First Aid. The condition of the husband of the applicant deteriorated and was required for immediate evacuation, but due to the inclement weather, air evacuation could not be done and husband of the applicant was taken on foot to Chowkibal where he was declared dead. The Commanding Officer of the Unit has issued a Battle Casualty Certificate on 23/01/2013 whereby the death of the husband of the applicant has been treated as Battle Casualty.”
In the reply filed to the original application, the appellants did not dispute the correctness of the averments made in paragraph 4.3. The appellants could not have disputed the said facts as they were also mentioned in the certificate issued by the Commanding Officer.”
Be it noted, the Bench notes in para 6 that, “There is no dispute that the grant of LFP is governed by the order dated 31st January 2001 issued by the Director (Pensions). The said order applies to those who were in service as of 1st January 1996 or joined service thereafter. Clause 6.1 of the order dated 31st January 2001 reads thus:
“6. Liberalised Family Pension (LFP)
6.1 In case of death of an Armed Forces Personnel under the circumstances mentioned in category “D” & “E” of Para 4.1 above, the eligible member of the family shall be entitled to Liberalised Family Pension equal to reckonable emoluments last drawn as defined in Para 3.1 above, both for officers and PBOR. Liberalised Family Pension at this rate shall be admissible to the widow in the case of officers and to the nominated heir in the case of PBOR until death or disqualification. ……………………………………………………….””
As it turned out, the Bench enunciates in para 7 stipulating that, “In the present case, the respondent has not contended that the case of the deceased falls in category D. The tribunal accepted that the case falls in category E, which reads thus: “Category E Death or disability arising as a result of:- (a) Enemy action in international war.
(b) Action during deployment with a peacekeeping mission abroad.
(c) Border skirmishes.
(d) During laying or clearance of mines including enemy mines as also minesweeping operation.
(e) On account of accidental explosions of mines while laying operationally oriented mine-field or lifting or negotiating minefield laid by enemy or own forces in operational areas near international borders or the line of control.
(f) War like situations, including cases which are attributable to/aggravated by :-
(i) Extremist acts, exploding mines etc. while on way to an operational area.
(ii) Battle inoculation training exercises or demonstration with live ammunition.
(iii) Kidnapping by extremists while on operational duty.
(g) An act of violence/attack by extremists, anti-social elements, etc.
(h) Action against extremists, antisocial elements, etc. Death/disability while employed in the aid of civil power in quelling agitation, riots or revolt by demonstrators will be covered under this category.
(i) Operations specially notified by the Govt. from time to time.” (emphasis added)
A perusal of the reply filed to the original application shows that the stand of the appellants is that clause (f) of category E is not applicable as the death of the deceased was attributable to military service and was classified as a ‘physical casualty’. It was contended that the death was not treated as a ‘battle casualty’. The stand taken is that the case of the deceased was not covered by clause (f) of category E as it was not a case of ‘battle casualty’ as the deceased died due to cardiopulmonary arrest. Therefore, the only question to be decided is whether the case will be covered by the category of ‘battle casualty’.”
Do further note, the Bench notes in para 8 that, “It is brought on record that initially, the Commanding Officer had categorised the death as a ‘battle casualty’, and later on, it was changed to a ‘physical casualty’. To the counter filed by the respondent, a copy of Army Order 1 of 2003 has been annexed as Annexure R-6. The circumstances for the classification of physical/battle casualties have been incorporated in Appendix ‘A’. In Appendix ‘A’, category 1 is of battle casualties. Clause (g) thereto reads thus:
“(g) Casualties occurring while operating on the International Border or Line of Control due to natural calamities and illness caused by climatic conditions.””
Notably, the Bench notes in para 9 that, “Coming to the facts of the case, it is not disputed that on the date of the death, the deceased was posted with his battalion in Jammu and Kashmir as part of Operation Rakshak. He was part of an Area Domination Patrol for domination of the Rangwar gap in the proximity of LC. He was doing duty from 1.00 a.m. to 3.30 a.m. The certificate issued by the Commanding Officer records the following facts:
a) The deceased was working in extreme climatic conditions on the date of his death;
b) He was part of Operation Rakshak, and he was also part of the routine Area Domination Patrol close to LC. There were extreme climatic conditions at that place; and
c) When the deceased became breathless, his condition was such that he needed immediate evacuation. However, immediate evacuation by air could not be done due to bad weather conditions. Ultimately, he was taken on foot, and when the team carried him to Chowkibal’s MI room, he was declared dead.”
Quite significantly, the Bench points out in para 10 that, “Thus, the death can be attributed to illness caused by extreme climatic conditions. Hence, as per clause 1 (g) of Appendix ‘A’ of the Army Order 1 of 2003, the case will fall in ‘Battle Casualties’. The reason is that the deceased was operating near LC in extreme climatic conditions. He was part of Operation Rakshak and was on duty near LC. The casualty caused by illness due to climatic conditions is covered by clause 1 (g). In this case, the respondent’s husband was a victim of illness caused by extreme climatic conditions. Therefore, the case of the deceased will fall in the category of ‘Battle Casualties’.”
Most significantly, the Bench encapsulates in para 11 what constitutes the cornerstone of this notable judgment postulating that, “Clause (f) of category E is attracted when death arises as a result of war-like situations. The definition of death as a result of war-like situations is an inclusive definition, and the case cannot remain confined to sub-clauses (i) to (iii) of category E (f). In this case, the death has occurred as a result of a war-like situation prevailing near LC. Therefore, we concur with the view taken by the Tribunal that clause (f) of category E was applicable.”
Conclusion
Most rationally and most forthrightly, the Bench mandates in para 13 holding that, “In our view, in a case like this, the respondent ought not to have been dragged to this Court, and the decision making authority of the appellants ought to have been sympathetic to the widow of a deceased soldier who died in harness. Therefore, we propose to impose costs quantified as Rs.50,000/-, which will be payable to the respondent.”
Finally, the Bench then concludes by directing in para 14 that, “Accordingly, the appeal is dismissed. The directions contained in paragraph 13 of the impugned judgment shall be implemented within a maximum period of three months from today. We direct the appellants to pay the costs quantified as Rs.50,000/- to the respondent within a period of two months from today.”
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