Preference for Chartered Accountants as Director (Finance): Valid & Constitutional

Ruchir Agrawal Vs Public Enterprises Selection Board & Ors. (Delhi High Court)

Delhi High Court held that preference to Chartered Accountants over Cost Accountants for the post of Director (Finance) cannot be treated as arbitrary or violative of the Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.

Facts- The Appellant before this Court was serving as an employee at Indian Oil Corporation Limited (respondent no. 2)) on the post of Chief General Manager (Corporate Finance & Treasury) which is a post below Board Level, since 21.07.2021. He filed the underlying writ petition being aggrieved by the advertisement dated 25.11.2022 issued by the Public Enterprises Selection Board (respondent no. 1) inviting applications for the post of Director (Finance) in IOCL. The advertisement provided preference to persons who were qualified Chartered Accountants over those who were qualified Cost Accountants.

Conclusion- The Director (Finance) has the responsibility of overall in charge of finance, accounts and funds management of the organization and is also responsible for evolving and formulating policies relating to finance and accounts as well as implementation thereof. Therefore, the conscious decision was taken to give preference to Chartered Accountants to promote all aspects of finance, accounts and funds management of the CPSEs and also to enable CPSEs to formulate policies which optimize the well-being of their business, finance and accounts. Hence, there is rational nexus between the basis of classification and the object intended to be achieved.

Held that the Cost Accountant and Chartered Accountant are not at all similarly placed as argued by the Appellant before this Court. They are governed by two independent statutes, and it is for the employer to arrive at a conclusion in respect of qualifications for posts, keeping in view the nature of job for which the advertisement has been issued. In the present case, the experts have formed an opinion to give preference to Chartered Accountants over Cost Accountants, and, therefore, the decision taken by the Respondents cannot be treated as arbitrary or violative of the Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India as argued by the Appellant.

Held that the prescription of qualification for a particular post is the sole domain of the employer/expert bodies. The Court cannot substitute its view in place of the view taken by the expert bodies which is based upon deliberation, thorough research and with application of mind. The nature of job, the duties and responsibilities of particular qualification for a post is the sole domain of the employer/authorities who are empowered to carry out the process of selection, and, therefore, in the considered opinion of this Court, in respect of policy matters, the question of interference by a Court in exercise of its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India does not arise.

FULL TEXT OF THE JUDGMENT/ORDER OF DELHI HIGH COURT

1. The present LPA is arising out of an order dated 24.08.2023 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P.(C) No. 3259/2023 titled Ruchir Agrawal Vs. Public Enterprises Selection Board & Ors.

2. The facts of the case reveal that the Appellant before this Court was serving as an employee at Indian Oil Corporation Limited (“Respondent No. 2” or “IOCL”) on the post of Chief General Manager (Corporate Finance & Treasury) which is a post below Board Level, since 21.07.2021. He filed the underlying writ petition being aggrieved by the advertisement dated 25.11.2022 issued by the Public Enterprises Selection Board (“Respondent No. 1” or “PESB”) inviting applications for the post of Director (Finance) in IOCL. The advertisement provided preference to persons who were qualified Chartered Accountants over those who were qualified Cost Accountants.

3. The facts further reveal that the Appellant started his career in the IOCL in 1994 and as stated has worked with sincerity devotion at the company. He states he has contributed in major decisions which affect the functioning of IOCL with loyalty and sincerity.

4. The Appellant who was eligible for appointment to the post of Director (Finance) came up with a case before this court vide the underlying writ petition, stating that the eligibility criteria for appointment of Director (Finance) prior to 19.08.2021 provided that a candidate who possess the qualification of being a Chartered Accountant or Cost Accountant or a full time MBA/PGDM Courses with good academic record from a recognized University/Institution besides holding other qualification also including experience, would be eligible to be appointed to the post of Director (Finance).

5. The Appellant contended that prior to 19.08.2021, the qualification of Chartered Accountant and Cost Accountant were treated at par. However, an internal meeting took place on 19.08.2021 by the members of the PESB for discussing the qualifications required for appointment to the post of Director (Finance). In the said meeting the qualification criteria for the post was discussed at length and the committee arrived at a conclusion that preference would be given to Chartered Accountants over and above the Cost Accountants. The Petitioner further contended that based upon the recommendations of the PESB, an advertisement was issued on 25.11.2022, and in the qualification clause therein, it was categorically mentioned that persons who are Chartered Accounts shall be given preference for appointment to the post.

6. The Appellant further stated that after holding an internal meeting, the vacancy qua the appointment of Director (Finance) was advertised as stated earlier and the Appellant being aggrieved by the decision taken in the meeting submitted various representations and protested the alleged arbitrary and illegal decision of the PESB. However, at the same time, the Appellant preferred a writ petition before this Court challenging the advertisement and his exclusion from the shortlisted candidates from the post of Director (Finance).

7. During the pendency of the writ petition, by an interim order dated 22.03.2023, the Learned Single Judge directed the Respondents to permit the Petitioner/Appellant herein to appear in the interview process which was scheduled on 24.03.2023 for the post of Director (Finance), even though the Appellant was not shortlisted. However, the said order made it clear that the Appellant’s participation in the interview was subject to the final outcome of the writ petition. The Appellant did appear in the process of interview and the PESB was directed to keep the result of the interview in a sealed cover.

8. The learned Single Judge vide interim order dated 25.05.2023 permitted the Respondents to open the aforesaid seal cover and the result in the sealed covered revealed that the Appellant herein was not selected for the post in question. Meaning thereby, in spite of the fact that the qualifications prescribed for the post of were providing preference to the Chartered Accountant, and the Appellant was not a shortlisted candidate, on account of an interim order in his case, he was considered for merit and he was not able to find a berth in the selected list.

9. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition. The operative paragraphs i.e., Paragraph Nos. 65 to 76 of the judgment passed by the learned Single Judge read as under:

“65. Having dealt with both the issues in the earlier paragraphs, it is crystal clear that the petitioner cannot be granted the relief. However, he has relied upon the decision of the Coordinate bench of this Court in Geeta Sharma v. Public Enterprises Selection Board & Anr (Supra) and vehemently argued that the said case deals with the similar issues and can be relied upon by this Court to allow the prayer sought by the petitioner. Therefore, it is pertinent to analyse whether the decision given by the Coordinate bench in the said case is binding on the cases dealing with the similar issues and if the said case be held as the settled position of law with regards to the preference given to the Chartered Accountants. In the aforesaid case, this Court interpreted a similar advertisement preferring Chartered Accountants over Cost Accountants for the post of Director (Finance) in a CPSE and held that the preference given to the Chartered Accountants cannot be read alone while ignoring the other factors. The relevant paragraphs of the said judgment are reproduced herein:

“18. Learned counsel for the petitioner has vehemently urged that the phrase „preference would be given to Chartered Accountant‟ as used in the advertisement, cannot imply that all other factors, including the post on which the applicant is presently working as also his/her payscale, must be ignored. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent nos. 1 and 3 have urged that once, sufficient number of Chartered Accountants were available in the external category, from which category only two candidates were required to be shortlisted, the respondents were justified in giving preference to the two Chartered Accountants, who have been placed at serial nos. 6 and 7, even though they are drawing lower payscale vis-à-vis the petitioner, who is admittedly not a Chartered Accountant. The short question before this Court, therefore, is as to what is the implication of the term „preference‟ as used in the advertisement. Does it imply that every applicant who is a Chartered Accountant will be given preference vis-à-vis a nonchartered accountant, irrespective of the post held, or the payscale drawn by the applicant?

19. Having given my thoughtful consideration to this issue, I am of the opinion that, while determining what the term „preference‟ as used in the advertisement would mean, it would be also necessary to consider the guidelines issued by the respondent no. 1 itself for determining the inter-se seniority of the applicants in the same pay scale for purposes of shortlisting. I may, therefore, now refer to the PESB guidelines regarding Board Level Appointments in CPSEs. The relevant extract of the PESB guidelines titled as “Revision of policy of determination of inter-se seniority amongst candidates of sectoral and external category of CPSE”, reads as under:

“Revision of policy of determination of inter-se seniority amongst candidates of sectoral and external category of

CPSE

The practice in the PESB for determining inter-se seniority of the applicants in the same pay scale for the purposes of shortlisting in external and sectoral categories of CPSEs that amongst eligible candidates under each category, preference is given to number of years of working in a higher pay scale. After reviewing this practice, with effect from 31.05.2017, the following practice was adopted:

a. Preference will be given to applicants holding a higher pay-scale.

b. If pay scale of the applicants is same then –

(i) Board level applicants will be given preference over applicants who are below the Board level.

(ii) If two Board level applicants are holding the same pay scale then Chairman/CMD/MD would get preference over the Director. The inter-se- seniority between two or more Chairman/CMD/MD or two or more Directors will be determined with respect to date of holding the same pay scale.

c. Similarly, if pay scale of two or more applicants is same then applicants working just below the Board (e.g. Executive Director in a schedule ^„A‟ CPSE) would get preference over the applicants working at other levels. If two just below Board level executives are holding the same pay scale then inter-se seniority will be determined with respect to date of holding the same pay scale.

d. The inter-se seniority of below the Board level executive holding same pay scale would continue to be determined with respect to date of holding the same pay scale.

2. The policy (para c above) was put in place to give preference to senior-most candidates in the below Board level but while implementing the provision, it has been observed that information of candidates working at ranks just below the Board is not available with the PESB as also that ranks at below Board varies from CPSEs to CPSEs. Difficulties are also being encountered in receiving timely and accurate information in this regard from CPSEs leading to delays and ambiguity in shortlisting.

3. The policy regarding determination of the inter-se seniority of the applicants for the purpose of shortlisting of executives holding the same pay scale in the sectoral/external category have now been revisited and it was decided that-

a. Preference will be given to applicants holding a higher pay-scale.

b. If pay scale of the applicants is same then –

(ii) Board level applicants will be given preference over applicants who are below the Board level.

(ii) If two Board level applicants are holding the same pay scale then Chairman/CMD/MD would get preference over the Director. The inter-se-

seniority between two or more Chairman/CMD/MD or two or more Directors will be determined with respect to date of holding the same pay scale.

c. The inter-se seniority of below the Board level executive holding same pay scale would continue to be determined with respect to date of holding the same pay scale. If date of holding pay scale is same, then the inter-se seniority will be determined w.r.t. date of birth i.e. older getting preference over the younger applicant.”

20. A perusal of paragraph ^„a‟ of the aforesaid guideline clearly shows that preference has to be given to the applicants drawing a higher pay scale. Similarly, paragraph ^„b (i)‟ of these guidelines clearly prescribes that, if payscale of the applicants under consideration is same, then Board level applicants will be given preference over the applicants who are below the Board level. Thus, these guidelines also envisage granting of preference to applicants in certain situations. Firstly, preference is to be given to candidates having higher pay scale and, secondly, preference is to be given to board level applicants vis-à-vis applicants who are below the board level.

21. In the present case, it is undisputed that the petitioner is not only drawing the payscale of Rs. 1,60,000/- to Rs. 2,90,000/- which is higher than the payscale of both the other candidates in the external category, who are drawing the pay scale of Rs. 1,20,000/- to Rs. 2,80,000/-. It is also admitted that, while the petitioner is holding a Board level post of Director in a Schedule-B CPSE, the two shortlisted candidates in the external category are working as General Managers, one in the Noida Metro Rail Corporation Limited, and the other in Electronics Corporation of India Ltd. Thus, if the preference as envisaged in the guidelines, which the respondents do not deny are equally applicable for shortlisting of candidates for the post of Member (Finance) in respondent no. 2, are applied to the present case, it is evident that the petitioner was entitled to get preference not only by the virtue of her higher payscale, but also by virtue of her holding a Board level position since August 2018.

22. In the light of this position, while candidates at serial nos. 6 & 7 of the impugned list of shortlisted candidates may be entitled to get preference on account of their qualifications, the petitioner was clearly entitled to get preference on two counts, one on account of her higher payscale, and the other on account of her Board level position, as the other two candidates are admittedly holding the post of a General Manager in two other CPSEs. When these aspects are cumulatively considered, the only plausible interpretation which can be given to the term ^„preference would be given to Chartered Accountant‟ must be read to imply “an added advantage”. The ^„preference would be given to a Chartered Accountant‟ could not be read in such a manner to ignore the higher payscale and the Board level position of the petitioner, which position the other candidates do not hold. I, therefore, find merit in Mr. Mehta’s submission that the question of giving preference to candidates at serial nos. 6 & 7, who are Chartered Accountants, would arise only if they were otherwise equally placed as the petitioner in all other aspects. Once, the petitioner in terms of PESB guideline, was entitled to get preference not only on account of her higher payscale, but also on account of her Board position, these two candidates could not be allowed to steal a march over her and that too, by excluding her even from the interview for the selection process.

23. In my considered view, the respondent nos. 1 and 3 have clearly misinterpreted the clause envisaging preference to be given to Chartered Accountants, as laid down in the advertisement, by ignoring all other relevant and material factors. The petitioner is a highly qualified professional who has been holding a Board level position since August 2018 in a scheduled-B CPSE, and she also holds a doctorate degree. It will indeed be a travesty of justice if she is altogether excluded even from consideration for selection for the post of Member (Finance) in respondent no. 2, and that too by giving preference over her to two ^„below Board level officers‟ in the impugned list under the external category.”

24. On perusal of the aforesaid paragraphs, it is clear that the petitioner in the aforesaid case was Director (finance) in another CPSE and was ignored despite the fact that the other selected candidates were below board level employees. While interpreting the preference clause in that case, the coordinate bench of this Court had relied upon the internal meeting decision dated 31st January, 2018 whereby it was decided by the committee to prefer board level employees while filling up vacancies to be taken by the external and sectoral candidates.

66. At this stage, it is established that the aforesaid case relied upon by the petitioner revolves around different circumstances all together and there exist stark differences in both the cases. Firstly, the above reproduced judgment is related to vacancy for external candidates and nowhere discusses the aspect of vacancies arising for the internal candidates in the organizations. Secondly, the petitioner in the referred case was a board level employee drawing a salary similar to the grade pay of the post for which she had applied. However, in the instant case, the petitioner is a below board level employee.

67. In the instant petition, it is clear that the issue is limited to the vacant position for insiders. The petitioner applied for the said position in the internal vacancy and not the external one. Furthermore, it is placed on record that there are 7 eligible candidates above him against 6 slots allotted under internal category and there are 2 non-chartered accountant candidates senior to the petitioner. Thus, the petitioner cannot rely upon the judgment given in context of external vacancy arising in the CPSEs.

68. At last, it is pertinent to mention that even though the petitioner‘s plight is regarding the qualification clause of the said advertisement/JD, he still chose to apply for the vacant position but challenged the preference clause only after not getting shortlisted in the interviews.

69. This Court vide interim order dated 25th May, 2023, allowed the petitioner to appear for the interview, but the petitioner was not selected for the further process. Therefore, it can be said that earlier, the petitioner had conveniently ignored the preference clause but decided to challenge the same after non-selection for the said post. The judicial dicta related to the similar issue is amply clear. In the case of Om Prakash Shukla v. Akhilesh Kumar Shukla, 1986 Supp SCC 285, the Hon‘ble Supreme Court has dealt with the issue in following manner:

“24. Moreover, this is a case where the petitioner in the writ petition should not have been granted any relief. He had appeared for the examination without protest. He filed the petition only after he had perhaps realised that he would not succeed in the examination. The High Court itself has observed that the setting aside of the results of examinations held in the other districts would cause hardship to the candidates who had appeared there. The same yardstick should have been applied to the candidates in the district of Kanpur also. They were not responsible for the conduct of the examination.”

71. In Madan Lal v. State of J&K, (1995) 3 SCC 486, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court discussed the issue of selection process challenged by the parties once they fail in getting selected for the vacant posts and held as follows:

“9. Before dealing with this contention, we must keep in view the salient fact that the petitioners as well as the contesting successful candidates being respondents concerned herein, were all found eligible in the light of marks obtained in the written test, to be eligible to be called for oral interview. Up to this stage there is no dispute between the parties. The petitioners also appeared at the oral interview conducted by the Members concerned of the Commission who interviewed the petitioners as well as the contesting respondents concerned. Thus the petitioners took a chance to get themselves selected at the said oral interview. Only because they did not find themselves to have emerged successful as a result of their combined performance both at written test and oral interview, they have filed this petition. It is now well settled that if a candidate takes a calculated chance and appears at the interview, then, only because the result of the interview is not palatable to him, he cannot turn round and subsequently contend that the process of interview was unfair or the Selection Committee was not properly constituted. In the case of Om Prakash Shukla v. Akhilesh Kumar Shukla [1986 Supp SCC 285: 1986 SCC (L&S) 644 : AIR 1986 SC 1043] it has been clearly laid down by a Bench of three learned Judges of this Court that when the petitioner appeared at the examination without protest and when he found that he would not succeed in examination he filed a petition challenging the said examination, the High Court should not have granted any relief to such a petitioner.”

72. On perusal of the aforesaid cases, it is amply clear that the parties cannot impugn the rules of the game where they had already chosen to take the fair chance by applying to the said vacant position. Therefore, it is crystal clear that the petitioner took a fair chance by applying for the position and has approached this Court when he failed to get appointed.

73. Therefore, in light of the application of the settled principle of law as enunciated in the above discussed cases, it is made out that the petitioner did not come to this Court with clean hands, rather only preferred the instant petition when his application was rejected by the respondents.

74. Furthermore, this Court vide interim order dated 25th May, 2023 had allowed the petitioner to appear for the interview, but the petitioner was still not selected for the said position. Therefore, the petitioner cannot be granted relief and appointed to the post as the principle of estoppel is attracted which precludes the petitioner from questioning the selection process.

CONCLUSION

75. The foregoing paragraphs clearly establishes the case in favour of the respondents. Firstly, the respondent Body has not violated the fundamental right of the petitioner by creating separate classification for better qualification. Secondly, even though the scope of issuance of mandamus under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is wide, the same cannot be issued to grant a relief not prayed by the petitioners. Thirdly, it is a well settled principle that the respondent Body being an expert committee need not be questioned on the aspects of decision taken, rather can only be reconstituted or looked into whenever there is material irregularity with the decision or constitution of the said expert committee. At last, the judgment relied upon by the petitioner cannot be relied upon for deciding the instant case as the facts and circumstances of both the cases are materially different and the said referred judgment does not hold binding value of any nature in the present case.

76. The CPSEs are entrusted to work efficiently and generate profits for the government. For the same, the respondent Body needs to appoint better qualified candidates to run and oversee the operations of the said entities. Therefore, in view of the above said discussion on facts as well as law, this Court does not find any cogent reasons for granting relief to the petitioner.”

10. Learned Counsel for the Appellant has vehemently argued before this Court that the learned Single Judge has ignored to consider the fact that the Respondent No. 4, 5 & 6 who were junior to the Appellant, were included in the shortlist for the interview ignoring the claim of the Appellant only because the Respondent No. 4, 5 & 6 were Chartered Accountants and the Appellant was a Cost Accountant and, therefore, the inclusion of Respondent No. 4, 5 & 6 in the list dated 10.03.2023 of shortlisted candidates was bad in law.

11. Learned Counsel for the Appellant has vehemently argued before this Court that a specific relief was sought by him in the Writ Petition to do away with the qualification whereby preference was given to Chartered Accountants over Cost Accountants and the aforesaid relief has not been granted by the learned Single Judge, and, therefore, the judgment given by the learned Single Judge is bad in law.

12. Learned Counsel for the Appellant has vehemently argued before this Court that the decision of the PESB for giving preference to Chartered Accountants over and above the cost accountants was bad in law and the internal minutes of the meeting have no binding effect and such a qualification could not have been included in the advertisement issued by the Respondents based upon the internal meeting dated 19.08.2021.

13. Learned Counsel for the Appellant has vehemently argued before this Court that the reliance placed by the learned Single Judge upon Section 288 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 is misplaced. He has vehemently argued before this Court that the definition of the term “Accountants” under Section 288 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, from 1961 till 2021, considered Chartered Accountants and Cost Accountants at par for the subject post for almost 6 decades, and, therefore, there was no justification for bringing in the impugned qualification clause. He has further stated that there was no reasonable classification done by the Respondent No.1 and heavy reliance has been placed upon the judgment delivered in the case of Ashik Abbasi & Ors. Vs. Govt. of NCT of Delhi & Ors. ILR (1999) II Delhi 151 to support this argument.

14. He has further argued that the learned Single Judge has failed to consider applicant’s application i.e., C.M. No. 36265/2023 under Order 11 Rule 1(4) CPC dated 05.07.2023 by which the Appellant placed on record other documents showing that various entities have placed Chartered Accountants and Cost Accountants at par for the post of inter alia

15. Learned Counsel for the Appellant further contended that the learned Single Judge has wrongly placed reliance on State of Mysore Vs. P. Narasinga Rao, (1968) 1 SCR 407; T. R. Kothandaraman and Others Vs. T. N. Water Supply & Drainage Board and Others, (1994) 6 SCC 282; Chhattisgarh Rural Agriculture Extension Officers Assn. Vs. State of M. P., (2004) 4 SCC 646. He has further stated that all the aforesaid judgments have nothing to show that Chartered Accountancy is a better/higher qualification than Cost Accountant.

16. Learned Counsel has raised another ground stating that the learned Single Judge has wrongly placed reliance on Government of W. B. Vs. Tarun K. Roy and Others, (2004) 1 SCC 347. It has been stated that the Appellant was fulfilling all the eligibility criteria and on the contrary Respondent No.4 was not fulfilling the eligibility criteria and Respondent Nos. 5 & 6 were juniors to the Appellant. Therefore, the shortlisting of the Respondent Nos. 4, 5 and 6 was violative of Appellant’s constitutional right under Article 14 and 16 of the Constitution of India.

17. Learned Counsel for the Appellant has further argued before this Court that the Respondent No. 5 & 6 were juniors to the Appellant, and they were preferred only because they were Chartered Accountants, and such a preference clause is against the settled principles of law. Reliance has been placed upon a judgment delivered in the case of P. Public Service Commission Vs. Y.V.V.R. Srinivasulu and Others, (2003) 5 SCC 341.

18. Learned Counsel has further argued before this Court that the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge holding the Chartered Accountants are best suited persons for the post of Director (Finance) is erroneous.

19. He has further contended that the post of the Director (Finance) is to look after the financial accounts, event management of the organization and is responsible for evolving and formulating policy relating to finance and accounts as well as implementation thereof, and, therefore, a Cost Accountant can also been said to be eligible to apply for the post and in case Cost Accountants were not eligible, the advertisement would not have included Cost Accountants also as eligible to apply for the post. It has been vehemently argued that the Chartered Accountants and Cost Accountants are equally placed, and the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge are conflicting and erroneous.

20. Learned Counsel for the Appellant has further stated that the minutes of the internal meeting dated 19.08.2021 lack appropriate approval by competent authority. It is a settled law that internal minutes of meetings are unenforceable unless approved by competent authority. Learned Counsel for the Appellant has placed reliance upon a judgment delivered in the case of Delhi International Airport Ltd. Vs. International Lease Finance Corpn. and Others, 2015 SCC OnLine SC 224.

21. Learned Counsel for the Appellant has raised another ground stating that the amendment for granting preference to Chartered Accountants vis-à-vis Cost Accountants came into force only in 2021 and it is having retrospective effect on individuals who became Cost Accountant almost 20­30 years from the said date, and, therefore, deprive Cost Accountants from holding the post of Director (Finance).

22. Learned Counsel for the Appellant has further argued before this Court that the learned Single Judge has erroneously held that recommendations of the expert committee cannot be interfered with in normal circumstances. He has contended that expert committees are subject to judicial review if they are in abrogation of certain principles of law and in the present case the report of the expert committee is certainly arbitrary and is in abrogation of settled principles of law, depriving the Cost Accountants for the post of Director (Finance) as preference has been given to Chartered Accountants over Cost Accountants.

23. Learned Counsel for the Appellant has further argued that the reliance placed by the learned Single Judge in case of Geeta Sharma Vs. Public Enterprises Selection Board & Anr., 2022 SCC Online Del 3600 is again misplaced as the said judgment was delivered on 31.10.2022 i.e., prior to the date on which the impugned list of shortlisted candidates was published by Respondent No. 1.

24. Learned Counsel for the Appellant has further argued before this Court that the learned Single Judge has erroneously held that parties cannot impugn the rules of the game, especially when they have taken a chance to participate in the process of selection. He has further contended that a Writ Petition was immediately filed in the matter challenging the preferential treatment, which was being given to Chartered Accountants, and, merely because the Appellant has participated in the process of selection, it does not mean he is estopped from challenging the same.

25. Learned Counsel for the Appellant has further argued that the findings arrived at by the learned Single Judge that the Appellant did not come with the clean hands, is again erroneous and no material fact was suppressed by the Appellant.

26. Learned Counsel for the Appellant has lastly argued before this Court that the preferential treatment which was being given to the Chartered Accountants by Respondent Nos. 1 & 2 is arbitrary, illegal and violative of the constitutional rights guaranteed to the Appellant as the Appellant has been deprived of his legitimate right of selection only on the ground that he is a Cost Accountant and preference is being given to Chartered Accountant.

27. Heard Learned Counsel for the Parties at length, and perused the record, the matter is being disposed of at admission stage itself with the consent of the parties.

28. The undisputed facts of the case reveal that the Appellant before this Court is serving with IOCL as the Chief General Manager (Corporate Finance & Treasury) which is a post below Board Level since 21.07.2021 and is aggrieved by the advertisement issued by the PESB inviting applications for the post of Director (Finance) in the Respondent no. 2 company.

29. The Appellant is aggrieved only with the condition mentioned in the advertisement which provides that the Chartered Accounts will be given preference over the Cost Accountant.

30. The undisputed facts of the case reveal that for the post of Director (Finance) prior to 19.08.2021, the eligibility criteria provided that a candidate should be a Chartered Accountant or Cost Accountant or a full time MBA/PGDM Courses with good academic record from a recognized University/ Institution. The relevant extract of the advertisement issued on 18.06.2021 in respect of the aforesaid post is reproduced as under:

“III. ELIGIBIILTY

1. AGE: On the date of occurrence of vacancy (DOV)