Deloitte Haskins & Sells LLP. Vs Union of India (NCLAT)
Conclusion: Various acts of IL&FS like over borrowing were prejudicial to the public interest which had cascading impact on various sectors of the economy and the red signals were raised against the IL&FS by the country and even by the department of economic affairs of the country, therefore, before passing any appropriate order in public interest and to save the economy of the Country from collapse, if the Tribunal was of the opinion that it required to give appropriate hearing to the concerned parties, including those who audited ‘IL&FS’ and/ or those who have managed or were concerned with ‘IL&FS’ or its Group Companies, it could not be held to be illegal.
Held: Infrastructure Leasing and Financial Services Limited’ (‘IL&FS’), was a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956. Over the years the IL&FS had inducted institutional shareholders to include Life Insurance Corporation of India (LIC), ORIX Corporation- Japan (ORIX), State Bank of India and Abu Dhabi Investment Authority. Besides the above, the ‘IL&FS Employees Welfare Trust’ also held significant shares in 1st Respondent. The company admitted total debt across the IL&FS Group was approximately Rs. 91,000 crore as on March 31, 2018 and the company had not even been making enough profits to take care of its interest expense leading to the default. It had to be kept in mind that out of the Rs. 91,000 crore debt obligations of the IL&FS, Rs. 57,000 crore had been borrowed from the Public Sector Banks. That subsequent to spreading defaults by the IL&FS Group, credit rating agencies CARE and ICRA had downgraded the credit rating of the IL&FS. The over exposure of loans and borrowings had been without prudent commercial practices and without any application of mind by the management of IL&FS over the several years. IL&FS and Ors. members of the Board of Directors, Promoters, Auditors, etc. were privy to the inner working of their respective businesses, and as such–could not evade responsibility for the fraudulent activities, misfeasance, persistent negligence and continuous defaults in carrying out their duties. The only question arose in these appeals was as to whether this Appellate Tribunal should interfere with the impugned order dated 9th August, 2019 whereby Auditors had been impleaded as party of IL&FS. Assessee contended that Tribunal had no jurisdiction to pass orders against an auditor under Section 241 or Section 242 of the Companies Act, 2013. An auditor was not involved in the management of the affairs of a company and, therefore, could not be covered within the ambit of Sections 241 and 242 of the Companies Act, 2013. It was held that as rules of natural justice were to be followed, if any order was passed against one or other, including investigation, it was always open to the Tribunal to ask such party to be impleaded. Tribunal was empowered to pass order under Section 242 of the Companies Act, 2013 in a petition under Section 241(2) if it forms opinion that the affairs of the company have been conducted in a manner prejudicial to the public interest. Once such opinion is formed by the Tribunal, it may pass any order as it deem fit and proper. The allegations showed that the ‘IL&FS Group Companies’ had suffered majority debt obligation of ‘IL&FS’. Rs. 57,000 Crores out of Rs.91,000 Crores, was from public sector banks and institutions. The ‘Life Insurance Corporation of India’, ‘State Bank of India’, ‘Central Bank of India’ besides ‘UTI AMC’ etc. in whose favour the fund was payable could not be paid. There were number of funds including ‘Army Pension Fund’, ‘Provident Fund’ etc. who had invested in the Group Companies will suffer. In effect, the public in general might suffer as the ‘Army Pension Fund’, ‘Provident Fund’ etc. were not the Government money but of the public in general. Department of Economic Affairs which was responsible for the financial stability of economy and in the Country too had raised Red Signals of the likely collapse of ‘IL&FS’ and had expressed its deep concern on the impact of Indian Economy. If Tribunal was of the opinion that it required to give appropriate hearing to the concerned parties, including those who audited ‘IL&FS’ and/ or those who had managed or were concerned with ‘IL&FS’ or its Group Companies, it could not be held to be illegal.
FULL TEXT OF ORDER OF NATIONAL COMPANY LAW APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, DELHI
The Central Government on its opinion that the affairs of ‘Infrastructure Leasing and Financial Services Limited’ (“IL&FS”) and its Group Companies are conducted in a manner prejudicial to the public interest applied to the National Company Law Tribunal (“Tribunal” for short), Mumbai Bench, Mumbai for issuance of orders and directions as sought for and as the Tribunal deemed fit.
2. In Company Petition No. 3638 of 2018, Miscellaneous Application No.2071 of 2019 was filed by the Central Government for impleadment of various persons, including the Appellant(s) herein, as parties to the said Petition. By way of an order dated 18th July, 2019, the Tribunal allowed the Miscellaneous Application and directed impleadment of inter alia the Appellant(s) as parties to the said Company Petition.
3. Miscellaneous Application No. 2258 of 2019 was filed by ‘Deloitte Haskins & Sells LLP’ and its partners challenging the maintainability of the Company Petition. By impugned order dated 9th August, 2019, the Tribunal rejected the Miscellaneous Application.
4. In another Company Petition No. 02 of 2014, the Union of India sought to debar the then present Directors (Appellants herein) from managing the affairs of the Company (M/s. Megacity Bangalore Developers and Builders Limited’) and further to permit to nominate five Directors to manage the affairs of the Company while several Civil and Criminal cases were pending against the Company and its Directors. In the said Petition, the Tribunal vide impugned order dated 14th March, 2019 disposed of the said Company Petition by removing and debarring the Directors from managing the affairs of the Company and allowing the prayer of Union of India to appoint Directors.
5. In these appeals as similar question of law is involved, they were heard together and disposed of by this common judgment.
6. For the said reasons, we have noticed only the main ground taken and the arguments advanced by learned Senior Counsel in “Deloitte Haskins & Sells LLP v. Union of India─ Company Appeal (AT) No. 190 of 2019”.
Company Appeal (AT) No. 190 of 2019
7. According to Appellant- ‘Deloitte Haskins & Sells LLP’, it was an Auditor of ‘IL&FS Financial Services Limited’ until 2017-2018 when they rotated out as the auditors of the Company (‘IL&FS’) on account of operation of law. It also acted as joint auditor for ‘IL&FS Financial Services Limited’ together with ‘BSR and Associates LLP’ in the Financial Year 2017-18.
8. It was submitted that by impugned order dated 18th July, 2019 in Miscellaneous Application No. 2071 of 2019, the Appellant has been wrongly impleaded as a party Respondent in Company Petition No. 3638 of 2018 as it was neither a necessary nor a proper party for adjudication of the said Company Petition and further, there was no cause of action to implead the Appellant as a party Respondent.
9. It was further submitted that impleadment on the basis of criminal complaint which was not taken cognizance by Special Court was wrong.
Company Appeal (AT) No. 193 of 2019
10. In the present appeal, the Appellant- ‘Mr. Kalpesh J. Mehta’ who is a partner in ‘Deloitte Haskins & Sells LLP’ which was acting as an Auditor of ‘IL&FS Financial Services Limited’., a 100% subsidiary of ‘Infrastructure Leasing & Financial Services’ (‘IL&FS’), until F.Y. 20172018 and also acted as a Joint Auditor of ‘IL&FS Financial Services Limited’ with ‘BSR & Associates LLP’.
11. It was submitted that by impugned order dated 18th July, 2019 in Miscellaneous Application No. 2071 of 2019, the Appellant has been wrongly impleaded as a party Respondent in Company Petition No. 3638 of 2018 as the Appellant during the F.Y. 2017-2018 was not at all concerned with the management and day-to-day affairs of ‘IL&FS’ and was only a Partner of ‘Deloitte Haskins & Sells LLP’, therefore, neither a necessary nor a proper party for adjudication of the said Company Petition.
Company Appeal (AT) No. 194 of 2019
12. The Appellant- ‘Mr. Udayan Sen’ is a partner in ‘Deloitte Haskins & Sells LLP’ which was acting as an Auditor of ‘IL&FS Financial Services Limited’., a 100% subsidiary of ‘Infrastructure Leasing & Financial Services’ (‘IL&FS’), until F.Y. 2017-2018 and also acted as a Joint Auditor of ‘IL&FS Financial Services Limited’ with ‘BSR & Associates LLP’.
13. It was submitted that by impugned order dated 18th July, 2019 in Miscellaneous Application No. 2071 of 2019, the Appellant has been wrongly impleaded as a party Respondent in Company Petition No. 3638 of 2018 as the Appellant during the F.Y. 2017-2018 was not related to ‘IL&FS’ or its management and affairs and was only a Partner of ‘Deloitte Haskins & Sells LLP’, therefore, neither a necessary nor a proper party for adjudication of the said Company Petition. Further, it was submitted that no final reliefs were claimed in the Company Petition against the Appellant and, therefore, there was no question of any interim protective orders being granted against the Appellant.
Company Appeal (AT) No. 195 of 2019
14. The 1st Appellant- ‘Mr. Shrenik Baid’ is a partner and the remaining Appellants in this appeal are employees of ‘Deloitte Haskins & Sells LLP’ which was acting as an Auditor of ‘IL&FS Financial Services Limited’., a 100% subsidiary of ‘Infrastructure Leasing & Financial Services’ (‘IL&FS’), until F.Y. 2017-2018 and also acted as a Joint Auditor of ‘IL&FS Financial Services Limited’ with ‘BSR & Associates LLP’.
15. It was submitted that by impugned order dated 18th July, 2019 in Miscellaneous Application No. 2071 of 2019, the Appellants have been wrongly impleaded as a party Respondent in Company Petition No. 3638 of 2018 as the Appellants were not related to ‘IL&FS’ or its management and affairs and only connection was that they were partner/ employees of the statutory auditor, therefore, neither a necessary nor a proper party for adjudication of the said Company Petition. Further, it was submitted that no final reliefs were claimed in the Company Petition against the Appellant and, therefore, there was no question of any interim protective orders being granted against the Appellant.
It was further submitted that impleadment on the basis of criminal complaint which was not taken cognizance by Special Court was wrong.
Company Appeal (AT) No. 196 of 2019
16. The Appellant- ‘N. Sampath Ganesh’ is a partner of ‘BSR & Associates LLP’ which was appointed as Joint Statutory Auditor of ‘IL&FS Financial Services Limited’ (‘IFIN’)., subsidiary of ‘Infrastructure Leasing & Financial Services’ (‘IL&FS’) for the F.Y. 2017-2018 along with ‘Deloitte Haskins & Sells LLP’. During the period of audit, the Appellant was the engagement partner on behalf of ‘BSR & Associates LLP’ for the audit of ‘IFIN’.
17. It was submitted that by impugned order dated 18th July, 2019 in Miscellaneous Application No. 2071 of 2019, the Appellant has been wrongly impleaded as a party Respondent in Company Petition No. 3638 of 2018 on an incorrect interpretation of Order 1 Rule 10 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 and Section 245 of the Companies Act, 2013, and was neither a necessary nor a proper party for adjudication of the said Company Petition. It was further submitted that the Appellant was never in-charge of nor responsible for the management and operations of ‘IFIN’ and was only the engagement partner of ‘BSR & Associates LLP’.
Company Appeal (AT) No. 197 of 2019
18. The Appellant- ‘BSR & Associates LLP’ was the Joint Statutory Auditor of ‘IL&FS Financial Services Limited’ (‘IFIN’) for the F.Y. 20172018 along with ‘Deloitte Haskins & Sells LLP’. It was submitted that the Appellant had never been Statutory Auditors of ‘IL&FS’ while ‘Deloitte Haskins & Sells LLP’ had been the sole auditors of IFIN for nine years prior to that i.e., for the period F.Y. 2007-2008 to 2016-2017. On May, 2018, the Statutory Auditors of ‘IFIN’ (including the Appellant) rendered their Audit Report on the financial statement of IFIN for the F.Y. 20172018.
19. It was submitted that by impugned order dated 18th July, 2019 in Miscellaneous Application No. 2071 of 2019, the Appellant has been wrongly impleaded as a party Respondent in Company Petition No. 3638 of 2018 as it was neither a member of ‘IL&FS’ or ‘IFIN’, nor in any manner involved in the carrying on of business of ‘IL&FS’ or ‘IFIN’ and, therefore, neither a necessary nor a proper party for adjudication of the said Company Petition. It was further submitted that the Appellant was never in-charge of nor responsible for the management and operations of ‘IFIN’ and had issued only one Joint Audit Report for F.Y. 2017-18, along with ‘Deloitte Haskins & Sells LLP’, who had been Auditors of ‘IFIN’ for 10 years. Furthermore, it was submitted that there was no material against the Appellant for any fraudulent activity.
Company Appeal (AT) No. 205 of 2019
20. The Appellant- ‘Mr. Milind Patel’ was an Employee Director of ‘IL&FS Financial Services Limited’ (‘IFIN’) till 31st March, 2018, though he tendered his resignation on 5th February, 2018.
21. It was submitted that by impugned order dated 18th July, 2019 in Miscellaneous Application No. 2071 of 2019, the Appellant has been wrongly impleaded as a party Respondent in Company Petition No. 3638 of 2018 as it was neither on the Committee of Directors, nor had ever been on the Board of Directors of ‘IL&FS’ and, therefore, neither a necessary nor a proper party for adjudication of the said Company Petition. It was further submitted that the Appellant had no decision or policy making role in the ‘IFIN’ organization and only followed the instructions of the Committee of Directors and the Uniform Approval Framework. Furthermore, the Appellant submitted that the impugned order was entirely based on the criminal complaint and the allegations contained therein which was a separate and distinct proceeding in law and merely because such a complaint had been filed against the Appellant, the Appellant could not have been joined as a party to the Company Petition, which was for relief on the basis of allegations of oppression and mismanagement on the part of the company’s management.
Company Appeal (AT) No. 206 of 2019
22. The Appellant- ‘Neera Saggi’ served as an Independent Director of ‘IFIN’ between 18th March, 2015 and 25th July, 2016 for a period of 16 months.
23. It was submitted that by impugned order dated 18th July, 2019 in Miscellaneous Application No. 2071 of 2019, the Appellant has been wrongly impleaded as a party Respondent in Company Petition No. 3638 of 2018 as the Appellant had resigned from ‘IFIN’s Board on 25th July, 2016 and prior to that was an Independent Director of ‘IFIN’ and was not at all concerned with the management and day-to-day affairs of ‘IL&FS’. Therefore, Appellant was neither a necessary nor a proper party for adjudication of the Company Petition filed for alleged oppression and mismanagement of ‘IL&FS’.
24. It was further submitted that the Appellant was not a part of ‘IFIN’s audit committee and, therefore, could not have been equated with those independent directors who were on the Audit Committee.
Further, it was submitted that no final reliefs were claimed in the Company Petition against the Appellant and, therefore, there was no question of any interim protective orders being granted against the Appellant.
Company Appeal (AT) No. 207 of 2019
25. The Appellant- ‘Mr. Rajesh Kotian’ was the ex-director of the ‘IL&FS Financial Services Limited’ (‘IFIN’) and had resigned on 3rd July, 2019. It was submitted that by impugned order dated 18th July, 2019 in Miscellaneous Application No. 2071 of 2019, the Appellant has been wrongly impleaded as a party Respondent in Company Petition No. 3638 of 2018 as no final reliefs were claimed in the Company Petition against the Appellant nor any allegations were made and, therefore, it was neither a necessary nor a proper party for adjudication of the said Company Petition.
26. It was further submitted that the Appellant could have been joined as a party Respondent only after guilt of the Appellant had been proved beyond doubt on the basis of the Serious Fraud Investigation Office Second Interim Report and the Criminal Complaint filed before Special Court.
Company Appeal (AT) No. 211 of 2019
27. The Appellant – ‘Manu Kochhar’ was an employee of ‘IL&FS’ from 23rd April, 1990 and retired on 31st August, 2018. The Appellant was appointed as Nominee Director of ‘IL&FS Financial Services Limited’ (‘IFIN’) in the year 2004 and resigned in March, 2015.
28. It was submitted that by impugned order dated 18th July, 2019 in Miscellaneous Application No. 2071 of 2019, the Appellant has been wrongly impleaded as a party Respondent in Company Petition No. 3638 of 2018 as no final reliefs were claimed in the Company Petition against the Appellant and therefore, neither was a necessary nor a proper party for adjudication of the said Company Petition.
29. It was further submitted that the Appellant had neither any executive position in ‘IFIN’, nor had ever been part of the Audit Committee and it was never involved in day-to-day affairs of ‘IFIN’. It was also submitted that the Appellant was not assigned with or responsible for the task of verifying the viability, legality and veracity of the loans/ investments made by ‘IL&FS’.
30. Furthermore, the Appellant submitted that the Tribunal had on an erroneous interpretation of Order 1 Rule 10 of Civil Procedure Code, 1908 impleaded the Appellant. Also, it was submitted that impleadment by the Tribunal on the basis of criminal complaint, when the charges therein were unproven, was wrong.
Company Appeal (AT) No. 212 of 2019
31. The Appellant- ‘Mr. Deepak Jagdish Pareek’ was employed with ‘IL&FS’ since May, 1988 and was transferred from ‘IL&FS’ to ‘IFIN’. He was promoted as Assistant Vice President and designated to head the Finance and Accounts Department in August, 2006. Thereafter the Appellant was designated as CFO by the Board in April 2014 as per the mandate under Companies Act, 2013. It was submitted that the Appellant was neither a member of Audit Committee nor had any special privilege.
32. It was submitted that by impugned order dated 18th July, 2019 in Miscellaneous Application No. 2071 of 2019, the Appellant has been wrongly impleaded as a party Respondent in Company Petition No. 3638 of 2018 as no final reliefs were claimed in the Company Petition against the Appellant who did not have any control over management and operations of lending business of ‘IFIN’.
33. It was also submitted that the Tribunal had failed to consider that the Appellant had a subordinate delegated authority and limited role as an employee of the Company.
Company Appeal (AT) No. 214 of 2019
34. The Appellant- ‘Surinder Singh Kohli’ was an Independent Director of ‘IFIN’ between 21st October, 2011 and 19th September, 2018. He was a part of ‘IFIN’s Audit Committee but was not a member of any committee of Directors of ‘IFIN’. The Appellant was only a non-executive Independent Director of ‘IFIN’ and held no other position, save as aforesaid being a part of its Audit Committee. The Appellant was not involved in ‘IFIN’s day-to-day affairs and management and had no executive powers.
35. It was submitted that by impugned order dated 18th July, 2019 in Miscellaneous Application No. 2071 of 2019, the Appellant has been wrongly impleaded as a party Respondent in Company Petition No. 3638 of 2018 as the Appellant during the F.Y. 2017-2018 was not related to ‘IL&FS’ or its management and affairs, therefore, not a proper party for adjudication of the Company Petition filed for alleged oppression and mismanagement of ‘IL&FS’. Further, it was submitted that no final reliefs were claimed in the Company Petition against the Appellant and, therefore, there was no question of any interim protective orders being granted against the Appellant.
Company Appeal (AT) No. 215 of 2019
36. The Appellant- ‘Mr. Uday Ved’ served as an Independent Director of ‘IFIN’ between 31st March, 2015 and 20th September, 2018.
37. It was submitted that by impugned order dated 18th July, 2019 in Miscellaneous Application No. 2071 of 2019, the Appellant has been wrongly impleaded as a party Respondent in Company Petition No. 3638 of 2018 as the Appellant was an Independent Director of ‘IFIN’ and was not at all concerned with the management and day-to-day affairs of ‘IL&FS’. Therefore, Appellant was neither a necessary nor a proper party for adjudication of the Company Petition filed for alleged oppression and mismanagement of ‘IL&FS’.
38. It was further submitted that the Appellant was not a part of ‘IFIN’s audit committee and, therefore, could not have been treated similarly with those independent directors who were on the Audit Committee.
39. Further, it was submitted that no averments have been made against the Appellant by way of the Miscellaneous Application and there was no cause of action to implead the Appellant as a party Respondent.
Company Appeal (AT) No. 221 of 2019
40. The Appellant- ‘Subhalakshmi Panse’ was an Independent Director of ‘IFIN’ between 5th February, 2015 and 20th September, 2018. It was submitted that by impugned order dated 18th July, 2019 in Miscellaneous Application No. 2071 of 2019, the Appellant has been wrongly impleaded as a party Respondent in Company Petition No. 3638 of 2018 as there were no allegation of fact against the Appellant and no relief sought against the Appellant in the said petition.
It was submitted that the Tribunal is jurisdictionally barred from adjudicating on matters in a petition under Section 241 on the basis of any material other than what is introduced in the petition.
Company Appeal (AT) No. 222 of 2019
41. The Appellant- ‘Mr. Udayan Sen’ is a partner in ‘Deloitte Haskins & Sells LLP’ which was acting as an Auditor of ‘IL&FS Financial Services Limited’., a 100% subsidiary of ‘Infrastructure Leasing & Financial Services’ (‘IL&FS’), until F.Y. 2017-2018 and also acted as a Joint Auditor of ‘IL&FS Financial Services Limited’ with ‘BSR & Associates LLP’.
42. It was submitted that by impugned order dated 9th August, 2019, the Tribunal had failed to appreciate that the Appellant being an erstwhile auditor and ceasing to act as an Auditor of IFIN from F.Y. 201718 could not be covered within the ambit of Section 140 (5) of the Companies Act, 2013.
43. It was submitted that Section 140(5) only applies to existing auditors and the Tribunal could not have by way of a deeming fiction interpreted the said Section to include erstwhile Auditors.
Company Appeal (AT) No. 223 of 2019
44. In the present appeal, the Appellant- ‘Mr. Kalpesh Mehta’ who is a partner in ‘Deloitte Haskins & Sells LLP’ which was acting as an Auditor of ‘IL&FS Financial Services Limited’., a 100% subsidiary of ‘Infrastructure Leasing & Financial Services’ (‘IL&FS’), until F.Y. 20172018 and also acted as a Joint Auditor of ‘IL&FS Financial Services Limited’ with ‘BSR & Associates LLP’.
45. It was submitted that by impugned order dated 9th August, 2019, the Tribunal had failed to appreciate that the Appellant being an erstwhile auditor and ceasing to act as an Auditor of IFIN from F.Y. 201718 could not be covered within the ambit of Section 140 (5) of the Companies Act, 2013. It was further submitted that the Tribunal has failed to consider that the functioning of the auditor at the time when the petition under Section 140(5) is initiated being a jurisdictional fact in the absence of powers under the said Section cannot be resorted to at all.
46. It was submitted that Section 140(5) only applies to existing auditors and the Tribunal could not have by way of a deeming fiction interpreted the said Section to include erstwhile Auditors. Also, such a construction would be violative of Article 20(1) of the Constitution of India.
Company Appeal (AT) No. 224 of 2019
47. According to Appellant, ‘Deloitte Haskins & Sells LLP’, it was an Auditor of ‘IL&FS Financial Services Limited’ until 2017-2018 when they rotated out as the auditors of the Company (‘IL&FS’) on account of operation of law. It also acted as joint auditor for ‘IL&FS Financial Services Limited’ together with ‘BSR and Associates LLP’ in the Financial Year 2017-18.
48. It was submitted that by impugned order dated 9th August, 2019, the Tribunal had failed to appreciate that the Appellant being an erstwhile auditor and ceasing to act as an Auditor of IFIN from F.Y. 201718 by operation of law could not be covered within the ambit of Section 140 (5) of the Companies Act, 2013. It was further submitted that the Appellant has vacated its office as an auditor of ‘IFIN’ w.e.f. the date of the date of the Annual General Meeting of ‘IFIN’ as relevant for the end of the F.Y. 2017-2018 on account of rotation and has since then ceased to be an auditor of ‘IFIN’ and consequently, Section 140(5) was inapplicable.
49. It was submitted that Section 140(5) only applies to existing auditors and the Tribunal could not have by way of a deeming fiction interpreted the said Section to include erstwhile Auditors.
Company Appeal (AT) No. 225 of 2019
50. The Appellant- ‘Mr. Shahzaad Dalal’ was a Non-executive Director of ‘IFIN’ from 26th October, 2006 and resigned from the Directorship on 26th March, 2015.
51. It was submitted that by impugned order dated 18th July, 2019 in Miscellaneous Application No. 2071 of 2019, the Appellant has been wrongly impleaded as a party Respondent in Company Petition No. 3638 of 2018 as there were neither any allegations made against the Appellant in the 2nd Interim Report of SFIO nor any final reliefs were claimed in the Company Petition against the Appellant giving rise to any interim protective orders being granted against the Appellant.
52. Furthermore, the Appellant submitted that the impugned order was entirely based on the criminal complaint and the allegations contained therein which was a separate and distinct proceeding in law and merely because such a complaint had been filed against the Appellant, the Appellant could not have been joined as a party to the Company Petition, which was for relief on the basis of allegations of oppression and mismanagement on the part of the company’s management.
Company Appeal (AT) No. 230 of 2019
53. The Appellant- ‘Mr. C. Sivasankaran’ was Ex-Chairman of ‘Siva Industries and Holdings Limited’ (‘SIHL’) until 19th March, 2017. It was submitted that ‘SIHL’ and its subsidiaries always had individual Directors, Shareholders, Board Members and Independent Auditors and he had no legal capacity in any of the companies that obtained loans from ‘IL&FS’ subsequent to his leaving from India and SIHL Group.
54. It was submitted that by impugned order dated 18th July, 2019 in Miscellaneous Application No. 2071 of 2019, the Appellant has been wrongly impleaded as a party Respondent in Company Petition No. 3638 of 2018 as vague allegations were alleged on him by 2nd SFIO Report.
Company Appeal (AT) No. 285 of 2019
55. The Appellant- ‘Mrs. Renu Challu’ was appointed as an Independent Director of ‘IFIN’ on 27th September, 2017 and resigned on 17th July, 2018.
56. It was submitted that by impugned order dated 18th July, 2019 in Miscellaneous Application No. 2071 of 2019, the Appellant has been wrongly impleaded as a party Respondent in Company Petition No. 3638 of 2018 as the Appellant was an Independent Director of ‘IFIN’ and was not at all concerned with the management and day-to-day affairs of ‘IL&FS’. Therefore, Appellant was neither a necessary nor a proper party for adjudication of the Company Petition filed for alleged oppression and mismanagement of ‘IL&FS’.
57. The main plea taken by the Appellants is that they are not related to ‘IL&FS’ or its management and affairs and nor they are associated in past and present and, therefore, they are not a proper or necessary party.
Case of the Appellant- ‘Deloitte Haskins & Sells LLP’
58. According to Appellant- ‘Deloitte Haskins & Sells LLP’, it ceased to be the auditor of ‘IFIN’ at the end of the Annual General Meeting held for F.Y. 2017-18 on account of operation of law on expiry of its term under Section 139 of the Companies Act, 2013 and was not the statutory auditor of the company on the date of filing of the said Company Petition or at the time of filing of the Miscellaneous Application No. 2071 of 2019.
Necessary and/ or proper party
59. It was submitted by the Appellant- ‘Deloitte Haskins & Sells LLP’ that whereas the Impugned Order has directed the Appellant to be impleaded as a party to the said Company Petition, the Impugned Order does not in fact render a finding that the Appellant is a necessary or a proper party to the said Company Petition. [See “Ramesh Hirachand
Kundanmal v. Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay (1992) 2 SCC 524”-Para 61] Even otherwise, it may be noted:
(a) the said Company Petition does not contain any statements, averments, allegations against the Appellant or its partners /employees and further no such averments have been sought to be added to the said Company Petition by way of the said Miscellaneous Application No. 2071 of 2019;
(b) the Appellant’s presence is not necessary to effectually and completely adjudicate the real controversy, which pertains to the management of the affairs of ‘IFIN’- with which the Appellant in its capacity as a statutory auditor (now rotated out0 has never been concerned; and
(c) the final reliefs originally sought in the said Company Petition were limited to replacement of the Board of Directors of ‘IL&FS’ and its subsidiaries including ‘IFIN’ (of which the Appellant was a statutory auditor), which has been done by way of order dated 1st October, 2018. Though the said Company Petition has been amended from time to time, at the time of passing of the Impugned Order no further final prayers or reliefs had been added. In fact, even in the said Miscellaneous Application, there is no mention of any final reliefs being sought against the Appellant. It is submitted that it is only on the touchstone of reliefs sought that it can be determined whether a person is a necessary or proper party to a proceeding.
Jurisdiction under Sections 241-242 vis-à-vis past auditors
60. The Tribunal has no jurisdiction to pass orders against an auditor under Section 241 or Section 242 of the Companies Act, 2013. The provision contained in Sections 241 and 242 of the Companies Act, 2013 pertain to oppression and mismanagement of the affairs of the company. An auditor is not involved in the management of the affairs of a company and, therefore, cannot be covered within the ambit of Sections 241 and 242 of the Companies Act, 2013. A reference to Section 242 (a) to (l) of the Companies Act, 2013 will demonstrate that none of the actions contemplated therein can be ordered against past statutory auditors of a company. Insofar as the general powers under Section 242(m) of the Companies Act, 2013 are concerned, it is submitted that the same must be read ejusdem generis with the remainder of Section 242 of the Companies Act, 2013 and not de hors the same.
61. The power of the Central Government under Section 241(2) of the Companies Act, 2013 is limited to cases of on-going oppression and/or mismanagement inasmuch as the said sub-section states that the Central Government may appeal to the Tribunal for reliefs where it is of the opinion that the affairs of the company “are being carried out in a manner prejudicial to the public interest”. The words ‘are’ in Section 241 (2) of the Companies Act, 2013 denotes in praesenti and, therefore, the said provision cannot apply to a past auditor. Given that the Appellant rotated out as the auditor of ‘IFIN’ at the end of the Annual General Meeting for F.Y. 2017-2018, there can be no question of the Appellant being concerned with how the affairs of the company are being run.
62. The jurisdictional fact required to invoke the Tribunal’s jurisdiction under Sections 241 and 242 of the Companies Act, 2013 are entirely absent in this case and the Appellant ought not to be impleaded as a party in the said Company Petition.
63. Reliance was placed on the report of the Serious Fraud Investigation Office (‘SFIO’). It was submitted that the application for the impleadment of inter alia the Appellant is based solely on the 2nd Interim Report of the SFIO dated 28th May, 2019. In the impugned order, the Tribunal has referred extensively to some of the allegations contained in the report against the Appellant and has held that, “The SFIO report clearly reveals prima facie evidence of involvement of proposed respondents.”. In this regard, it is submitted as under:
a. The SFIO investigation and the 2nd Interim Report prepared in pursuance thereof form part of an entirely separate and distinct proceeding in law and the 2nd Interim Report cannot automatically justify impleadment of the Appellant as a parry in a Petition under Sections 241-242 of the Companies Act, 2013;
b. The contents of the 2nd Interim Report, are only allegations and the same must be proven by means of trial and by leading evidence before the Special Court (and the persons against whom allegations are raised are presumed ‘innocent until and unless proven guilty’); and
c. Under Section 223 of the Companies Act, 2013, reports under Section 212 of the Companies Act, 2013 (such as the 1st and 2nd Interim Reports) are specifically excluded and as such the 1st and 2nd Interim Reports would not be admissible in any legal proceeding as evidence in relation to any matter contained in the report.
Section 339 of the Act:
64. It has been contended that the provisions of Section 339 of the Companies Act, 2013 are applicable in the facts of the present case in view of Section 246 of the Companies Act, 2013 and thus the Appellant is a necessary and/or a proper party. The said contention is baseless in view of the following:
a. Section 339 of the Companies Act, 2013 cannot apply to auditors at all and applies only to a director, manager or officer of the company or persons who are knowingly party to the carrying on of business of the company. It is submitted that an auditor, by definition, is not party to the carrying on of the business of a company. Nor is it anybody’s case that the auditor was carrying on the business of the company;
b. In any event, there is no pleading in the said Company Petition or the said Miscellaneous Application No.2071 of 2019 that there have been any unlawful gains by the Appellant that would attract the provisions of Section 339 of the Companies Act, 2013 read with Section 246 of the Companies Act, 2013; and
c. Without prejudice to the aforesaid, even the 2nd Interim Report of the SFIO, which is the entire basis for the impleadment application, does not contain any allegation against the Appellant of any unlawful gains and thus there is no question of any disgorgement under Section 339 read with Section 246 of the Companies Act, 2013.
Section 213 of the Companies Act, 2013:
65. Section 213 of the Companies Act, 2013 provides that on an application being made if the Tribunal is satisfied that the business of a company is being conducted with an intent to defraud creditors or members; or in a manner oppressive to any of its members; or that the company was formed for any fraudulent or unlawful purpose or for the other reasons stated therein, the Tribunal may direct that the affairs of the company be investigated by an inspector or officer by the Central Government.
66. However, Section 212 (2) of the Companies Act, 2013 provides that where a case has been assigned to the SFIO for investigation under Section 212 of the Companies Act, 2013, no other agency or officer of the Central government or any State Government can initiate or continue any other investigation in this behalf. As an investigation under Section 212 of the Companies Act, 2013 is continuing in the present case, no other investigation can be initiated/proceeded with.
Section 245 of the Companies Act, 2013:
67. In the Impugned Order, the Tribunal has erroneously equated a Petition filed under Section 241 (2) of the Companies Act, 2013 with Petitions filed under Section 245 of the Companies Act, 2013 with a view to supporting their application for impleadment. In this regard it is submitted as under:
a. Whilst the Tribunal has rightly observed that Section 245 was not in operation at the time of the filing of the present Petition under Section 241(2) of the Companies Act, 2013, the Tribunal erroneously holds that Section 245 having been notified after the filing of the Petition, Respondent No. 1 “was authorised to initiate action under this Chapter, which is also class action suit /petition.” It may be notified that the thresholds under Section 245 were notified on 8th May, 2019, i.e. prior to the filing of the said Miscellaneous Application.
b. The Tribunal has failed to appreciate that there were neither any averments not any reliefs in the impleadment application, which correspond to Section 245 or seek to incorporate the provisions of Section 245 into the present impleadment application; and
c. It is submitted that the very fact that Section 245 specifically makes reference to auditors makes it all the more evident that auditors are excluded from the ambit of proceedings under Sections 241-242 of the Companies Act, 2013, which make no reference to auditors or any relief being sought against them.
Special and specific remedies available against auditors:
68. The role of an auditor, whether it be in the nature of negligence or misconduct or fraud, can be investigated by, as Regulator, the National Financial Reporting Authority established under Section 132 of the Companies Act, 2013 or by the Institute of Chartered Accountants established under the Chartered Accountants Act, 1949 or under Section 447 of the Companies Act, 2013 by a Special Court established under Section 435 of the Companies Act, 2013. In view of the specific and special alternate remedies available against auditors, there is no question of invoking the jurisdiction under Sections 241 and 242 of the Companies Act, 2013 to seek any remedy or relief against the Appellant.
69. Almost similar plea has been taken by other Appellants including the partners of ‘Deloitte Haskins & Sells LLP’, Employees, Directors of ‘IL&FS’, the person who has renounced its Indian Citizenship, Independent Directors of ‘IL&FS’, Auditors and the Executive Directors of ‘IL&FS’ etc.
70. The Central Government has highlighted the brief background and circumstances necessitating the filing of the petition under Sections 241242 of the Companies Act, 2013 and the proceedings thereafter, as under:
70.1. Due to the continuous failure of ‘IL&FS’ to service its debts and the imminent possibility of contagion effect on the financial market, the Department of Economic Affairs vide its Office Memorandum dated 30th September, 2018, requested the Ministry of Corporate Affairs to take action against the then Board of Directors of ‘IL&FS’ and its Group Companies under the Companies Act, 2013.
70.2. In view of the above, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs, the very same day, directed the Serious Fraud Investigation Office (“SFIO”) by way of an Office Order, to investigate the affairs of ‘IL&FS’ and its group companies.
70.3. On 1st October, 2018, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs filed Company Petition No. 3638 / 2018 under Sections 241 and 242 of the Companies Act, 2013 before the Tribunal. The reliefs sought were, inter-alia, (i) suspension of the then Board of Directors of IL&FS and subsequent appointment of a new Board of Directors in terms of Section 242(2)(k) of the Companies Act, 2013 (ii) that such Board of Directors be authorized to replace directors of subsidiaries etc. of IL&FS (iii) seeking leave of the Tribunal, Mumbai to file supplement/ enlarge / amend / modify the scope of the reliefs sought and prayers made in the petition by filing any other documents or application in view of the extraordinary nature of the circumstances.
70.4. It is submitted that the Ministry of Corporate Affairs approached the Tribunal by way of an application seeking a moratorium on creditor proceedings against IL&FS and its group companies and to enable formation of an orderly resolution plan in light of the current circumstances facing the IL&FS group. The Tribunal declined to grant such reliefs by way of an order dated 12th October, 2018.
70.5. It was submitted that this Appellate Tribunal in an appeal from the order dated 12th October, 2018 passed by the Tribunal, while recognising the exigent and extraordinary circumstances that had arisen due to the financial irregularities within the IL&FS group that became apparent, granted an order protecting the whole IL&FS Group against any potential coercive action by creditors and other parties, in larger public interest on 15th October, 2018.
70.6. On 31st November, 2018, in pursuance to the Office Order, the SFIO submitted its first report in respect of the involvement of the Committee of Directors of IL&FS and an Employee Welfare Trust associated with IL&FS.
70.7. On the basis of the 1st SFIO Report and a prima-facie opinion of the Institute of Chartered Accountants dated 4th December, 2018 (which categorically holds the auditors of IL&FS, IL&FS Financial Services Limited (“IFIN”) and ‘IL&FS Transportation Networks India Limited’ (“ITNL”) guilty of professional misconduct), the Ministry of Corporate Affairs filed an application under Section 130 of the Companies Act, 2013 before the Tribunal, Mumbai praying, inter-alia, that the books of accounts of IL&FS, IFIN and ITNL for the past five years be reopened and recast.
70.8 By an order dated 1st January, 2019, the Tribunal, Mumbai directed that the accounts of IL&FS, IFIN and ITNL for the past 5 years, be re-opened and recast, observing that the affairs of these companies had indeed been mismanaged, casting a doubt on the reliability of their financial statements and accounts.
70.9 By an order dated 31st January, 2019, this Appellate Tribunal dismissed an appeal filed by one of the ex-directors against the order of the Tribunal, Mumbai allowing the re-opening and recasting of accounts.
70.10 Thereafter, on 22nd March, 2019, the Reserve Bank of India (“RBI”) submitted an inspection/investigation report on IFIN to the IFIN Board, pursuant to an investigation conducted by it under Section 45N of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934.
70.11 On 4th April, 2019, the ICAI, after giving the auditors a due hearing, passed a reasoned order holding the auditors of IL&FS, IFIN and ITNL guilty of professional misconduct.
70.12 Pursuant to the Office Order, the SFIO submitted its second report on 28th May, 2019, specifically in respect of IFIN (“2nd SFIO Report”).
70.13 Based on the 2nd SFIO Report, a sanction order bearing reference number Legal-35/16/2019 was issued by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs to the Regional Director (Western Region) and SFIO, requesting them to initiate appropriate proceedings.
70.14 In pursuance thereof, the SFIO, on 20th May, 2019 filed a Criminal Complaint before the Special Judge, Mumbai, against and amongst others, the parties sought to be impleaded.
71. Learned counsel for the Central Government submitted that the Tribunal has wide powers under Section 241(2) read with Section 242 of the Companies Act, 2013.
72. With regard to the former statutory auditors of ‘IL&FS Financial Services Limited’ (‘IFIN’) and its partners, it is submitted that the Central Government has not formed opinion on the basis of the SFIO Report as has been alleged by the Appellant(s). There are other facts, including ‘RBI Inspection Report’, ‘ICAI Report’ etc. which have also been taken into account while filing the application for impleading, inter alia, the Appellants.
73. Learned counsel for the Central Government has highlighted certain allegations as reported in the ‘2nd SFIO Report’/ ‘RBI Inspection Report’/ ‘ICAI Report’ based on which the opinion is formed by the Central Government and placed in a tabular form:
