The fact that the Assessing Officer in the assessment proceedings under section 143(3) of the Act did not give any opinion regarding the allowability or otherwise of deduction u/s 80IB (10) of the Act is not a ground of invoking Section 147 of the Act.
A bare perusal of section 469 CrPC makes it amply clear that the period of limitation commences from the day the offence comes to the knowledge of the complainant. In the present case the “offence” of non-compliance with the order came to the knowledge of Respondent/ Complainant when the petitioners defaulted in furnishing the details to the Respondent/ Complainant at the expiry of the compliance period of the Order dated 20.11.2006 u/s 234 (3A).
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Now, Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act deals with the modes of determination of the lease and vide clause (e) thereof provides that a lease can be determined by express surrender and vide clause (f) by an implied surrender. Clause (h) deals with the notice of intention to determine the lease. It is true that as per clause (q) of Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act, the lessee is bound to put the lessor in possession of the property leased, but this would mean that it is inherent that the landlord should accept the possession of the property whenever it is delivered and cannot claim a right to receive the possession only upon the lessee paying dues or otherwise
For the assessment year 2006- 07, the Assessing Officer vide order dated 23rd March, 2009 had imposed penalty of Rs. 10,70,000/- under Section 271D of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (Act, for short). This penalty was levied on account of Rs. 21,97,500/- received in cash by the respondent- assessee from Pradeep Aggarwal and Kaveri Aggarwal. The Assessing Officer, in this connection, has referred to the assessment order in the quantum proceedings wherein the nature and character of the aforesaid deposit/ transaction has been discussed in detail and the terms loan and deposit were examined. The Assessing Officer has recorded that the authorized share capital of the respondent assessee company was Rs. 1,00,000/- only.
Supreme Court in Vodafone International (dated 20 January 2012) considered its decisions in the matters of McDowell reported in (1985) 3 SCC 230, Azadi Bachao reported in (2004) 10 SCC 1 and the Mathuram Agarwal reported in (1999) 8 SCC 667 and concluded that where the transaction is not genuine but a colourable device there could be no question of tax planning. Supreme Court makes it very clear that a colourable device cannot be a part of tax planning.
An order of assessment in case of ICICI bank Ltd (ICICI) was passed in March 1999 u/s 143(3) wherein deduction claimed u/s Section 36(1)(vii) and 36(1)(viia) and in respect of foreign exchange rate difference was allowed. The first reassessment was carried out in February 2000 for reworking a deduction under Sec 80M. Thereafter, a second reassessment was carried out in March 2001 for reworking of the deduction under Section 36(1)(viii). In March 2003, the Commissioner u/s 263 sought to revise assessment to disallow deduction u/s 36(1 )(vii) and 36(1 )(viia) and in respect of foreign exchange rate difference.
HC held that the benefit of Sec 80IB was not available where the assessee had not applied for Factory License before April 1st 2004. How¬ever, HC also clarified that in other cases where the assessee had applied for Factory License before April 1st 2004 but was granted the same later, deduction shall be allowable and such cases shall be treated as mere technical default.
HC, ruling in favour of the assessee held that it was eligible to set off a loss incurred in tax holiday unit against the income arising from other units, under the same head of ‘profits and gains of business or profession’. HC observed that there was no specific prohibition in Sec 10B for such setting off of a loss. Under Sec 70, the assessee was eligible to set off loss from one source against income from any other source under the same head of income.
There is no doubt that the correspondence between the parties in April, 2009 gives the impression that the company admitted and acknowledged that the company owed money to the petitioner. Yet, on the basis of the mail exchanged at the relevant time, the exact quantum of the company’s indebtedness to the petitioner cannot be assessed.
