In the present case we find that the petitioner had changed his registered office w.e.f. 4th November, 1989 from first floor and 6376 Naya Bans Delhi to Y-192, Loha Mandi, Naraina, New Delhi, and thereafter w.ef. 3rd October, 2000 from Y-92 Loha Mandi, Naraina, Delhi to Room No.9, Y-3C, Loha Mandi, Naraina, Delhi. The principal place of business is at Agra, where he has a floor mill.
Rule 2BA is in the form of guidelines for the purpose of section 10(10C), which relates to taxation of income/amount received by an employee under VRS scheme. The said rule does not deal with the expenditure incurred by the employer when the assessee makes payment under the VRS scheme formulated by them.
It is stated by them that insofar as the revamping the system and giving better assistance to the court is concerned, all necessary action as they would take has been taken. We would thus naturally expect that now there would no lack of proper assistance to the court.
The petitioner who was serving as the Secretary of the Avinashi Co-operative Housing Society Limited, Avinashi was charged with offences punishable under section 7 and 13(2) r/w. 13( 1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.
The assessee had wrongly taken the benefit of Section 80IA on the gross total income by reducing the loss of Unit-II from Unit-I and thereby declaring the return at Nil and carried forward the loss of Rs. 23,94,827/-, which was not permissible.
Given the fact that the Settlement Commission order was made on 11.6.2002 and as on the date of insertion to Explanation 1(iv) with effect from 1.6.2002 the applications were pending before the Settlement Commission, we have no hesitation in rejecting the assessees’ contention that the Explanation should not be given retrospective effect.
Section 271(1)(c) empowers the Assessing Officer to impose penalties wherever the assessee does not furnish accurate particulars, in the form of returns, such as concealing the sources of income, or withholding true and full information. This duty was spelt out by the Supreme Court as one cast on the assessee to disclose all facts, including every potential income.
Having regard to the facts noted above as well as explanation adduced by the assessee in respect of the payments and the suspicious approach of the DGIT(E) towards the evidence adduced by the assessee without noticing the crucial facts such as payment by cheques etc., it seems that the DGIT(E) was not justified in law in readily inferring that assessee manipulated and fabricated its books of account and vouchers and also debited personal, bogus and exaggerated expenses.
During the course of the proceedings before the Tribunal the revenue contended that the borrowings on which the interest has been claimed as a deduction are in fact capital of the assessee and brought only under the nomenclature of loan for tax consideration. It was the case of the appellant-revenue before the Tribunal that debt capital is required to be re-characterized as equity capital.
In the present case, therefore, the fact that the assessee had completed the construction well before 31st March, 2008 is not in doubt. It is, of course, true that formally BU permission was not granted by the Municipal Authority by such date. It is equally true that explanation to clause (a) to section 80-IB(10) links the completion of the construction to the BU permission being granted by the local authority.
