Case Law Details
Lalitadevi N. Tibrewala Vs PCIT (ITAT Ahmedabad)
The issue in the present case relates whether the assessment order has been passed by Ld. AO without making inquiries or verification with respect to the deduction/exemption claimed under section 54 of the Act as discussed above and hence the assessment is erroneous insofar prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue and thus requiring revision by Pr. CIT u/s 263 of the Act.
An inquiry made by the Assessing Officer, considered inadequate by the Commissioner of Income Tax, cannot make the order of the Assessing Officer erroneous. In our view, the order can be erroneous if the Assessing Officer fails to apply the law rightly on the facts of the case. As far as adequacy of inquiry is considered, there is no law which provides the extent of inquiries to be made by the Assessing Officer. It is Assessing Officer’s prerogative to make inquiry to the extent he feels proper. The Commissioner of Income Tax by invoking revisionary powers under section 263 of the Act cannot impose his own understanding of the extent of inquiry.
FULL TEXT OF THE ORDER OF ITAT AHMEDABAD
The captioned two appeals have been filed at the instance of the Assessee against the separate orders of the Learned Principal Commissioner of Income Tax and Learned Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)-5, Ahmedabad, dated 17/03/2017 & 26/02/2019. ITA No. 318/Ahd/2018 is arising in the matter of the assessment order passed under s. 263 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (here-in-after referred to as “the Act”) and ITA No. 670/Ahd/2019 is arising in the matter of assessment order passed under s. 143(3) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 relevant to the Assessment Year 2012-2013.
First, we take up ITA No. 318/Ahd/2018 an appeal by the assessee for the AY 2012-13.
2. The assessee has raised the following grounds of appeal:
1. That the Ld.Pr.CIT erred in law and in the facts of the case in assuming jurisdiction u/s.263 of the act and passing the impugned order thereto.
2. That the Ld.Pr. CIT erred in law and in the facts of the case in holding that deduction u/s.54 of the act is not allowable.
Any other ground which may be urged before or during the hearing of the appeal.
3. At the outset we note that there was a delay in filing the appeal by the assessee for 262 days. The assessee vide affidavit dated 13/02/2018 has submitted the detailed reasons for delay in filing the appeal which is reproduced as under:
I, Lalitadevi N. Tibrewala, the applicant, do solemnly affirm on oath whatever is stated in the below paras are true to the best of my information and that I have not suppressed any material fact.
1. There is a delay of 262 days caused in filing the aforesaid appeal before the Hon’ble ITAT owing to the set of events which happened prior to filing of the aforesaid appeal as set out in the following paras.
2. The order of the CIT(A) against which the aforesaid appeal is filed, was passed on 1703-2017. The certified copy was received only on 23-03-2017 whereas the aforesaid appea l was filed on 08-02-2018. The appellant is a lady aged 63 years. All her income tax related issues are handled by her husband Mr. Navalkishor Tibrewala aged 67 years. Mr. Navalkishor’s mother aged 81 years, suffered spine fracture on around 03-03-2017 due to which she was hospitalized. She was completely bed ridden even after being discharged from the hospital. Thereafter Mr. Navalkishor too suffered from Neurological disorder in April 2017. Owing to his mother’s and his illness, he had to completely abstain from all his office work. Moreover, on 22-11-2017 he suffered from a major Neurological disfunction due to which he lost vision in one of his eyes. His mother suffered from severe lung infection in December, 2017 and as a result of which she expired on 03-01-2018. Thereafter Mr. Navalkishor was occupied in the last rituals and chautha. Hence the resultant delay occurred in filing the appeal. A copy of the relevant doctor’s certificates of Mr. Navalkishor Tibrewala and his mother including her death certificate are annexed hereto.
3. Therefore in the interest of justice and subject to satisfaction of the Hon’ble Bench, the aforesaid delay may be condoned.
3.1 The learned AR in view of the above submitted that there was sufficient cause which prevented the assessee from filing the appeal in time and therefore the delay deserves to be condoned.
3.2 On the other hand, the learned DR submitted that there is inordinate delay in filing the appeal by the assessee and reasons given by the assessee for the delay have not been supported by the documentary evidence. Accordingly, the learned DR opposed to condone the delay occurred in filing the appeal by the assessee.
3.3 We have heard the rival contentions of both the parties and perused the materials available on record. Under the provisions of the Act, there is a time limit specified under the respective section of the Act for filing the appeal against the finding of the specified authority. However, the provisions of the Act also provides relaxation to the parties, if failed to file the appeal within the stipulated time, if there was the sufficient cause which prevented the assessee/party in doing so. It is the trite law that the Hon’ble Courts time and again in the series of cases have held that the expression “sufficient cause” should be interpreted to advance substantial justice. Therefore, advancement of substantial justice is the prime factor while considering the reasons for condoning the delay. In this regard we note that the Hon’ble Madras High Court in the case of Sreenivas Charitable Trust v. Dy. CIT reported in 280 ITR 357 has held that :
“3. The Supreme Court in Vedabai v. Shantaram Baburao Patil [2002] 253 ITR 798held as under :
“In exercising discretion under section 5 of the Limitation Act the Courts should adopt a pragmatic approach. A distinction must be made between a case where the delay is inordinate and a case where the delay is of a few days. Whereas in the former case the consideration of prejudice to the other side will be a relevant factor so the case calls for a more cautious approach but in the latter case no such consideration may arise and such a case deserves a liberal approach. No hard and fast rule can be laid down in this regard. The Court has to exercise the discretion on the facts of each case keeping in mind that in construing the expression ‘sufficient cause’, the principle of advancing substantial justice is of prime importance.” (p. 799)
4. The Calcutta High Court in CIT v. Orissa Concrete & Allied Industries Ltd. [2003] 264 ITR 186 held as under :
“. . .what is really indicated in the various decisions cited and in section 5 of the Limitation Act itself, is that a litigant would be required to explain why the appeal and/or application could not be filed within the period prescribed by limitation and explain the delay for such period for the purpose of linking up the circumstances which had caused the delay during the period of limitation and thereafter.” (p. 192)
5. Recently, the Allahabad High Court in Ganga Sahai Ram Swarup v. ITAT [2004] 271 ITR 512 has taken the view that liberal view ought to have been taken by the authority as the delay was only of a very short period and the appellant was not going to gain anything from it.
6. Applying the ratio laid down by the Apex Court as well as various High Courts, we find, it is stated in the petition filed by the assessee for condonation of delay that the order copy was misplaced and thereafter it was found and sent to counsel for preparing the appeal and then, the appeal was prepared and filed before the Tribunal and in that process, the delay of 38 days occurred. As held by the Apex Court, no hard and fast rule can be laid down in the matter o f condonation of delay and the Courts should adopt a pragmatic approach and the Courts should exercise their discretion on the facts of each case keeping in mind that in construing the expression “sufficient cause” the principle of advancing substantial justice is of prime importance and the expression “sufficient cause” should receive a liberal construction. We are, therefore, o f the opinion that the Appellate Tribunal ought to have condoned the delay in filing the appeal, considering the reasons given by the assessee for the delay. ”
3.4 It is also important to note that Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition v. Mst. Katiji and Ors. (167 ITR 471) laid down certain principles for considering the condonation petition for filing the appeal which are reproduced hereunder:
(1) Ordinarily, a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late (2) Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this, when delay is condoned, the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.
(3) ‘Every day’s delay must be explained’ does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour’s delay, every second’s delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational, commonsense and pragmatic manner.
(4) When substantial justice and technical consideration are pitted against each other, the cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred, for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.
(5) There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact, he runs a serious risk.
(6) It must be grasped that the judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.
3.5 From the above judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court, we note that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred rather than deciding the matter on the basis of technical defect.
3.6 We also note that there is no allegation from the Revenue that the appeal was not filed within the time deliberately. Therefore, we are inclined to prefer substantial justice rather than technicality in deciding the issue.
3.7 The next controversy arises whether the delay of 262 days was excessive or inordinate. There is no question of any excessive or inordinate when there was reasonable cause which prevented the assessee in filing the appeal. As such we need to consider the cause for the delay and not the length of the delay. Accordingly in our considered view when there was a reasonable cause, the period of delay may not be relevant factor. We find support from the judgment of the Hon’ble Madras High Court in the case of CIT v. K.S.P. Shanmugavel Nadai and Ors reported in 153 ITR 596 wherein it was held as under :
“Since in this case the assessee had been prosecuting other remedies, the time taken by those proceedings should naturally be taken while determining the question whether the assessee had sufficient cause for not presenting the appeal in time. Therefore, the revenue was not right in submitting that the appeal filed under section 17 was an appeal against the original order of assessment under the Act, which was passed about 20 years ago, as it was evident that the appeal was against an order of rejection of relief by the assessing authority. Thus, though the Tribunal’s view that there was no question of limitation in such cases, was not correct yet the AAC was right in condoning the delay and entertaining the appeal. ”
3.8 From the above, we note that the Hon’ble Madras High Court in the above case was pleased to condone delay for 20 years approximately by holding that there was sufficient and reasonable cause on the part of the assessee for not filing the appeal within the period of limitation. The delay in the instant case is just of 262 number of days which cannot be considered to be inordinate or excessive in comparison to the delay of 7330 days approximately.
3.9 In view of the above we are of the opinion that when there is sufficient cause for not filing the appeal within the period of limitation, the delay has to be condoned irrespective of the duration/period of the delay. In this case, the non-filing of an affidavit by the Revenue for opposing the condonation of delay itself is sufficient for condoning the delay of 262 number of days. Thus, we condone the delay of 262 days in filing the appeal and proceed to hear the appeal on merit for the adjudication.
4. The only issue raised by the assessee is that the learned Principal CIT erred in holding the assessment framed by the AO under section 143(3) of the Act as erroneous insofar prejudicial to the interest of revenue under the provisions of section 263 of the Act.
5. The facts in brief are that the assessee in the present case is an individual and deriving her income from House property. The assessee in the year under consideration has sold the house property dated 27th May 2011 for a sum of ₹ 50 lakhs which was valued for the purpose of the stamp duty at ₹ 92,29,700/- only. The assessee on the sale of such property has earned capital gain of Rs. 72,74,184/-against which the deduction was claimed under section 54 of the Act on account of construction of another house property. As Such, the assessee has shown NIL taxable capital gain which was accepted by the AO in the assessment framed under section 143(3) of the Act.
6. However, the learned PCIT found that assessee has filed application for BU permission for newly constructed house on 4th March 2011, thus assumed that the construction of the house was completed by the assessee on or before 4th March 2011 in the financial year 2010-11. Thus the construction of new property was completed by the assessee much before the transfer of the property in dispute. According to the ld. PCIT, the exemption/deduction under section 54 of the Act is available if a new house is constructed within a period of 3 years after the date of the transfer of the property. However in the case on hand, the new house was constructed on or before 4th March 2011, a date much before the transfer of the property in dispute i.e. 27-05-2011. Accordingly, the PCIT was of the view that the assessee is not eligible for exemption/deduction under section 54 of the Act against the sale of the property dated 27th of May 2011. However, the AO without carrying out the necessary verification on this aspect has allowed the claim of the assessee in the assessment framed under section 143(3) of the Act. Thus, the assessment order was held by the learned PCIT under section 263 of the Act as erroneous insofar prejudicial to the interest of revenue.
7. Being aggrieved by the order of the learned PCIT, the assessee is in appeal before us.
8. The learned AR before us contended that all the necessary details about the sale of properties and the deduction/exemption claimed under section 54 of the Act were duly furnished to the AO at the time of assessment. Therefore, the assessment order cannot be held as erroneous insofar prejudicial to the interest of revenue.
8.1 The learned AR in support of his contention drew attention on pages 8 of the paper book where the notice under section 142(1) of the Act was placed. Likewise, the learned AR also drew our attention on pages 9 to 33 of the paper book where the reply of the assessee in response to the notice issued under section 142(1) of the Act and annexure thereto was placed. Thus, the learned AR contended that there cannot be said that the assessment order is erroneous and causing prejudice to the interest of revenue in the given facts and circumstances.
9. On the contrary, the learned DR vehemently supported the order of the authorities below.
10. We have heard the rival contentions of both the parties and perused the materials available on record. The issue in the present case relates whether the assessment order has been passed by Ld. AO without making inquiries or verification with respect to the deduction/exemption claimed under section 54 of the Act as discussed above and hence the assessment is erroneous insofar prejudicial to the interest of the Revenue and thus requiring revision by Pr. CIT u/s 263 of the Act.
10.1 An inquiry made by the Assessing Officer, considered inadequate by the Commissioner of Income Tax, cannot make the order of the Assessing Officer erroneous. In our view, the order can be erroneous if the Assessing Officer fails to apply the law rightly on the facts of the case. As far as adequacy of inquiry is considered, there is no law which provides the extent of inquiries to be made by the Assessing Officer. It is Assessing Officer’s prerogative to make inquiry to the extent he feels proper. The Commissioner of Income Tax by invoking revisionary powers under section 263 of the Act cannot impose his own understanding of the extent of inquiry. There were a number of judgments by various High Courts in this regard.
10.2 Delhi High Court in the case of CIT Vs. Sunbeam Auto 332 ITR 167 (Del.), made a distinction between lack of inquiry and inadequate inquiry. The Hon’ble court held that where the AO has made inquiry prior to the completion of assessment, the same cannot be set aside u/s 263 of the Act on the ground of inadequate inquiry. The relevant observation of Hon’ble Delhi High Court reads as under:
“12…… There are judgments galore laying down the principle that the Assessing Officer in the assessment order is not required to give detailed reason in respect of each and every item of deduction, etc. Therefore, one has to see from the record as to whether there was application of mind before allowing the expenditure in question as revenue expenditure. Learned counsel for the assessee is right in his submission that one has to keep in mind the distinction between “lack of inquiry” and “inadequate inquiry”. If there was any inquiry, even inadequate, that would not by itself, give occasion to the Commissioner to pass orders under section 263 of the Act, merely because he has different opinion in the matter. It is only in cases of “lack of inquiry”, that such a course of action would be open. ———
From the aforesaid definitions it is clear that an order cannot be termed as erroneous unless it is not in accordance with law. If an Income-tax Officer acting in accordance with law makes a certain assessment, the same cannot be branded as erroneous by the Commissioner simply because, according to him, the order should have been written more elaborately. This section does not visualise a case of substitution of the judgment of the Commissioner for that of the Income-tax Officer, who passed the order unless the decision is held to be erroneous. Cases may be visualised where the Income-tax Officer while making an assessment examines the accounts, makes enquiries, applies his mind to the facts and circumstances of the case and determines the income either by accepting the accounts or by making some estimate himself. The Commissioner, on perusal of the records, may be of the opinion that the estimate made by the officer concerned was on the lower side and left to the Commissioner he would have estimated the income at a figure higher than the one determined by the Income-tax Officer. That would not vest the Commissioner with power to reexamine the accounts and determine the income himself at a higher figure. It is because the Income-tax Officer has exercised the quasi-judicial power vested in him in accordance with law and arrived at conclusion and such a conclusion cannot be termed to be erroneous simply because the Commissioner does not feel satisfied with the conclusion. There must be some prima facie material on record to show that tax which was lawfully exigible has not been imposed or that by the application of the relevant statute on an incorrect or incomplete interpretation a lesser tax than what was just has been imposed.
15. Thus, even the Commissioner conceded the position that the Assessing Officer made the inquiries, elicited replies and thereafter passed the assessment order. The grievance of the Commissioner was that the Assessing Officer should have made further inquires rather than accepting the explanation. Therefore, it cannot be said that it is a case of ‘lack of inquiry’. ”
10.3 The Hon’ble Bombay High Court in case of Gabriel India Ltd. [1993] 203 ITR 108 (Bom), discussed the law on this aspect in length in the following manner:
“The consideration of the Commissioner as to whether an order is erroneous in so far as it is prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue, must be based on materials on the record of the proceedings called for by him. If there are no materials on record on the basis o f which it can be said that the Commissioner acting in a reasonable manner could have come to such a conclusion, the very initiation of proceedings by him will be illegal and without jurisdiction. The Commissioner cannot initiate proceedings with a view to starting fishing and roving enquiries in matters or orders which are already concluded. Such action will be against the well-accepted policy of law that there must be a point of finality in all legal proceedings, that stale issues should not be reactivated beyond a particular stage and that lapse of time must induce repose in and set at rest judicial and quasi-judicial controversies as it must in other spheres of human activity.
10.4 The Mumbai ITAT in the case of Sh. Narayan Tatu Rane Vs. ITO, I.T.A. No. 2690/2691/Mum/2016, dt. 06.05.2016 examined the scope of enquiry under Explanation 2(a) to section 263 in the following words:-
“20. Further clause (a) of Explanation states that an order shall be deemed to be erroneous, if it has been passed without making enquiries or verification, which should have been made. In our considered view, this provison shall apply, if the order has been passed without making enquiries or verification which a reasonable and prudent officer shall have carried out in such cases, which means that the opinion formed by Ld Pr. CIT cannot be taken as final one, without scrutinising the nature of enquiry or verification carried out by the AO vis-à-vis its reasonableness in the facts and circumstances of the case. Hence, in our considered view, what is relevant for clause (a) of Explanation 2 to sec. 263 is whether the AO has passed the order after carrying our enquiries or verification, which a reasonable and prudent officer would have carried out or not. It does not authorise or give unfettered powers to the Ld Pr. CIT to revise each and every order, if in his opinion, the same has been passed without making enquiries or verification which should have been made. In our view, it is the responsibility of the Ld Pr. CIT to show that the enquiries or verification conducted by the AO was not in accordance with the enquries or verification that would have been carried out by a prudent officer. Hence, in our view, the question as to whether the amendment brought in by way of Explanation 2(a) shall have retrospective or prospective application shall not be relevant.”
10.5 The Hon’ble Supreme Court in recent case of Principal Commissioner of Income-tax 2 v. Shree Gayatri Associates*[2019] 106 taxmann.com 31 (SC), held that where Pr. CIT passed a revised order after making addition to assessee’s income under section 69A in respect of on-money receipts, however, said order was set aside by Tribunal holding that AO had made detailed enquiries in respect of such on-money receipts and said view was also confirmed by High Court, SLP filed against decision of High Court was liable to be dismissed. The facts of this case were that pursuant to search proceedings, assessee filed its return declaring certain unaccounted income. The Assessing Officer completed assessment by making addition of said amount to assessee’s income. The Principal Commissioner passed a revised order under section 263 on ground that Assessing Officer had failed to carry out proper inquiries with respect to assessee’s on money receipt. In appeal, the Tribunal took a view that Assessing Officer had carried out detailed inquiries which included assessee’s on-money transactions and Tribunal, thus, set aside the revised order passed by Commissioner. The Hon’ble High Court upheld Tribunal’s order. The Hon’ble Supreme Court while dismissing the SLP filed by the Department held as under:-
“We have heard learned counsel for the Revenue and perused the documents on record. In particular, the Tribunal has in the impugned judgment referred to the detailed correspondence between Assessing Officer and the assessee during the course of assessment proceedings to come to a conclusion that the Assessing Officer had carried out detailed inquiries which includes assessee’s on-money transactions. It was on account of these findings that the Tribunal was prompted to reverse the order of revision. No question of law arises. Tax Appeal is dismissed ”
10.6 The Supreme Court in the another recent case of Principal Commissioner of Income-tax-2, Meerut v. Canara Bank Securities Ltd[2020] 114 taxmann.com 545 (SC), dismissed the Revenue’s SLP holding that 263 proceedings are invalid when AO had made enquiries and taken a plausible view in law, with the following observations:
“Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having perused the documents on record, we see no reason to interfere with the view of the Tribunal. The question whether the income should be taxed as business income or as arising from the other source was a debatable issue. The Assessing Officer has taken a plausible view. More importantly, if the Commissioner was of the opinion that on the available facts from record it could be conclusively held that income arose from other sources, he could and ought to have so held in the order of revision. There was simply no necessity to remand the proceedings to the Assessing Officer when no further inquiries were called for or directed ”
10.7 An analysis of the above judicial precedents, the principle which emerges is that the phrase ‘prejudicial to the interests of the revenue’ has to be read in conjunction with an erroneous order passed by the Assessing Officer. Every loss of revenue as a consequence of an order of the Assessing Officer cannot be treated as prejudicial to the interests of the revenue, for example, when an Assessing Officer adopts one of the course permissible in law and it has resulted in loss of revenue; or where two views are possible and the Assessing Officer has taken one view with which the Commissioner of Income-tax does not agree, it cannot be treated as an erroneous order prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue unless the view taken by the Assessing Officer is unsustainable in law, or the AO has completely omitted to make any enquiry altogether or the order demonstrates non-application of mind.
10.8 Now in the facts before us, the AO during the course of assessment proceedings, made enquiries on this issue and after consideration of written submissions filed by the assessee and documents / evidence placed on record, the Ld. AO framed assessment under section 143(3) accepting the return of income. This fact can be verified from the notices under section 142(1) of the Act by the AO and submission in reply of such notices.
i. Notice dated 29-12-2014:
In connection with assessment proceedings for A.Y. 2012-13, you are required to furnish the following further particulars/details:
1. Please furnish the documentary evidence for claiming exemption u/s.54 of the IT Act of Rs.76,20,508/-
Reply of the assessee vide letter dated 12-01-2015
With reference to your notice dated 29/12/2014 we are submitting herewith the following details with reference to the claim of exemption us.54 of the Act.
1. The assesse has claimed exemption u/s.54 of the Act as the assessee has constructed a residential house. She had purchased a land and constructed a residential house on it. A copy of Land Purchased Deed, Stamp Duty Payment, registration Fees payment receipt and bills for construction of house are being enclosed herewith.
Annexure-1
2. The construction of the above referred residential house was completed in AY 201213 and Building Use permission was granted on 29/09/2011 by AUDA. A copy o f Building Use permission is being enclosed herewith. As the assessee has completed the house within 3 years of the sale of the assets she is entitled to exemption u/s.54 of the Act.
Annexure-2
Hope you will find the above in order.
10.9 From the above it is revealed, it is not the case that the AO has not made enquiry. Indeed, the Pr. CIT initiated proceedings under section 263 of the Act on the ground that the AO has not made enquiries or verification which should have been made in respect of exemption claimed under section 54 of the Act. It is not the case of the Pr. CIT that the Ld. AO did not apply his mind to the issue on hand or he had omitted to make enquiries altogether. In the instant set of facts, the Ld. AO had made enquiries and after consideration of material placed on record accepted the genuineness of the claim of the assessee. We thus find no error in the order of Ld. AO so as to justify the initiation of 263 proceedings by the Ld. Pr. CIT. assessee’s contention is thus allowed.
10.10 In addition to the above, we find that the AO based on the BU permission from Ahmedabad Urban Municipal Corporation dated 29-09-2011 has concluded that the construction was completed for the property after the date of transfer of the property. Admittedly, the BU permission is issued by the local authority which evidences that the construction of the building is within the parameters laid down by the government agencies and therefore the same can be used for the object for which it was constructed. To our understanding, the BU permission appears to be of significant document which is necessary to reach to the conclusion that the construction of the building has been completed in all respects. Thus, we deemed it fit to hold that the AO has taken one of the possible view which cannot be termed as erroneous insofar prejudicial to the interest of revenue in the manner as provided under section 263 of the Act.
10.11 In view of the above and after considering the facts in totality, we hold that there is no error in the assessment framed by the AO under section 143(3) causing prejudice to the interest of revenue. Thus, the revision order passed by the learned PCIT is not sustainable and therefore we quashed the same. Hence the ground of appeal of the assessee is allowed.
Coming to the ITA 670/Ahd/2019 an appeal by the assessee
11. The assessee has raised the following grounds of appeal:
1. That on facts, and in law, the learned CIT(A) has grievously erred in confirming the addition of Rs.72,74,184/- made by AO disallowing claim of deduction of LTCG u/s.54 of the Act.
2. That on facts, in law, and on evidence on record, the entire addition ought to have been deleted, as prayed for.
3. The appellant craves to add, alter or amend any ground of appeal.
12. At the outset, we note that the proceedings in the case on hand are arising in consequence to the revision order passed by the learned Principal CIT under section 263 of the Act which has been quashed by us vide paragraph number 10 of this order. Once the revision order has been quashed, then the consequential proceedings do not require any separate adjudication. As such these proceedings become infructuous. Accordingly we hold that the assessment framed under section 143(3) read with section 263 of the Act is not maintainable for the reason as discussed above. Hence the ground of appeal of the assessee is dismissed as infructuous.
12.1 In the result, the appeal of the assessee is dismissed as infructuous.
13. In the combined result, the appeal filed by the assessee bearing ITA No.318/Ahd/2018 for A.Y. 2012-13 is allowed whereas ITA No.670/Ahd/2019 for A.Y. 2012-13 is dismissed as infructuous.
Order pronounced in the Court on 31/05/2022 at Ahmedabad.
