What is ACES? The Central Board of Excise and Customs has developed a new software application called Automation of Central Excise and Service Tax (ACES), which aims at improving tax-payer services, transparency, accountability and efficiency in the indirect tax administration in India. This is a Mission Mode project (MMP) of the Prime Minister under the […]
The partnership firm was formed on 5.7.1990 and on 7.7.1990 Master Shishir Garg deposited Rs. 1,90,000/- and Rs. 72,000/- as capital money with the Firm through bank clearance of two bank drafts. The accounting period being financial year i.e. ending on 31st of March, 1991, the Firm could not have any income at the time of its formation. The identity of the depositor i.e. Master Shishir Garg was not in issue at any point of time before the Income Tax Authorities. They treated the said deposit by Master Shishir Garg. This being so, if for one reason or the other, they were not satisfied with the financial capability of Master Shishir Garg, the amounts could have been added at the hands of Master Shishir Garg and not at the hands of Firm.
Tribunal by the impugned order followed its order in the matter of WNS North America Inc rendered on 25th November, 2011. The Tribunal while upholding the order of the CIT(A) held that the amount of Rs. 2.93 Crores was received by the Respondent-Assessee as reimbursement of lease line charges and would not classify either as royalty or as income attributed to a Permanent Establishment in India.
Insofar as the absence of any other business or source of income is concerned, first of all, respondents themselves have no case that the petitioner had any other business or source of income. It is also the admitted case of the respondents that the entire properties of the petitioner are under attachment and that the interest liability of the petitioner was satisfied from out of the compensation amount remitted by the Corporation of Cochin. These facts, in my view, prima facie substantiate the case of the petitioner that he had no business or source of income and that payment of interest as demanded, would cause genuine hardship.
This is not denied that the assessee is engaged in the business of providing credit facilities to its members. The credit facilities cannot be provided until and unless the assessee receives the deposits. It cannot always be provided out of its own capital. Receiving of the deposit is necessary and essential for advancing the money on credit and earning the interest income. The deposits may not have been derived from the income for providing the credit facilities to the members.
Now we come to argument of the assessee that there is no change in the operating model or the business activity of the assessee company, hence, rule of consistency should be followed and hence no adjustment is warranted. In this regard we are of the opinion the res judicata is not applicable to taxation cases. Moreover, as held by Apex Court in Distributors (Baroda) (P.) Ltd. (supra) that to perpetuate an error is no heroism. To rectify is the compulsion of the judicial conscience.
Absence of an appeal does not necessarily render the legislation unreasonable as only because no appeal is provided under the Act against the order passed under section 14 of the Securitisation Act will not render section 14 ultra vires the provisions of the Constitution of India.
We agree with the view taken by the Tribunal; and the appeal is devoid of any merits. Both the substantial questions raised by the appellant do not involve any substantial question of law and therefore, the appeal is dismissed.
The Regulations now do not require a notice to be filed for acquisition of shares or voting rights of companies if the acquisition is less than five percent of the shares or voting rights of the company in a financial year, where the acquirer already holds more than twenty five percent but less than fifty percent of the shares or voting rights of the company.
Insofar as question (b) is concerned, it becomes academic as if the eight comparables selected by the TPO are found not to be functionally comparable then the difference between the operating margin of the respondent at 15.05% as against the 18.97% of comparable companies being within the range of +/ – 5% the amounts received by the respondent – assessee is within the statutory limits. Therefore, we see no reason to entertain question (b).
