Ashish Kakkar Vs UT of Chandigarh (Punjab and Haryana High Court)
Summary: The Punjab and Haryana High Court, in Ashish Kakkar Vs UT of Chandigarh, dismissed a petition challenging the legality of the petitioner’s arrest and police remand in a cybercrime case involving alleged extortion through digital loan applications. The principal question was whether the investigating agency was required to issue a notice under Section 41A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 before arresting a person accused of offences punishable with imprisonment extending up to seven years. Justice Rajesh Bhardwaj held that Section 41A notice is not mandatory in every such case. Where the investigating officer records satisfaction that arrest is necessary under Section 41(1) CrPC, the requirement to issue a prior appearance notice under Section 41A does not arise. The Court found no illegality in the arrest or the remand order dated 30 December 2024.
The proceedings originated from FIR No. 33 of 2022, registered on 3 September 2022 at Police Station Cyber Cell, Chandigarh, under Sections 384, 420, 468, 471, 509 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code. The complainant, Arvind Kumar, alleged that he received an SMS containing a link to a loan application called Hugo Loan. After opening the application and allowing access to his mobile phone, he discovered that his eligibility was only ₹3,500 and uninstalled it. Subsequently, unknown persons allegedly threatened him through WhatsApp calls, claiming possession of his contacts and photographs. Morphed obscene photographs were circulated, and demands for money continued. The complainant paid ₹2,045 on 24 August 2022 and two further amounts of ₹3,500 each on 30 August 2022, but the threats allegedly persisted.
During investigation, the police traced an alleged organised network operating through digital loan applications. According to the prosecution, the applications obtained access to users’ mobile contacts and galleries, which were subsequently misused for blackmail and extortion. The investigation allegedly disclosed connections with persons operating from China and financial transactions involving several entities. Following the arrest of co-accused Manoj Rathore on 29 December 2024, the investigating agency received information allegedly implicating Puneet Kumar and Ashish Kakkar. The petitioner was arrested on 30 December 2024 from Hotel Jaypee Siddharth, New Delhi, and produced before the jurisdictional Magistrate, who granted three days’ police custody.
Challenging his arrest under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, the petitioner alleged violations of Article 22 of the Constitution of India and Sections 41, 41A and 50 CrPC. He contended that the police had failed to communicate the specific grounds of arrest, issue the mandatory appearance notice or provide an adequate opportunity to consult legal counsel. Reliance was placed on Arnesh Kumar Vs State of Bihar and Another, (2014) 8 SCC 273, Prabir Purkayastha Vs State (NCT of Delhi), (2024) 8 SCC 254, and Satender Kumar Antil Vs Central Bureau of Investigation and Another, (2022) 10 SCC 51. The petitioner particularly emphasised the distinction between general reasons for arrest and individualised grounds of arrest, submitting that failure to communicate the latter rendered his detention unconstitutional.
The Chandigarh Administration opposed the petition, asserting that the petitioner was allegedly involved in a serious organised cybercrime operation and had attempted to evade investigation. The prosecution relied upon the case diary, which recorded that the petitioner had changed locations, switched off his mobile phone and avoided accepting notices. His mother had allegedly refused to receive a notice on his behalf. The State submitted that the investigating officer had recorded reasons demonstrating the necessity of arrest under Section 41(1) CrPC. It further pointed out that the petitioner had signed the arrest memo, his wife had been informed of his arrest, and the remand application contained the relevant grounds. Subsequent remand orders dated 2 January 2025 and 5 January 2025 had also been passed when the petitioner was represented by counsel.
The High Court examined Article 22 and Sections 41, 41A and 50 CrPC, together with the principles established by the Supreme Court. It acknowledged the constitutional importance of communicating the grounds of arrest and the distinction recognised in Prabir Purkayastha between general reasons for arrest and grounds personal to the accused. However, on examining the case diary and arrest documents, the Court accepted that the investigating agency had recorded the circumstances necessitating the petitioner’s arrest. The Court also noted that the petitioner had refused to accept a notice under Section 35(3) BNSS, that his arrest had been communicated to his wife and that the Magistrate had examined the material before granting police custody.
Interpreting Sections 41 and 41A CrPC, the High Court held that the obligation to issue a notice under Section 41A arises where arrest is not required under Section 41(1). It rejected the proposition that every accused facing an offence punishable with imprisonment of seven years or less must invariably receive a prior notice, irrespective of the necessity of arrest. Referring to Arnesh Kumar, the Court explained that an investigating officer must assess whether arrest is necessary for purposes such as preventing further offences, ensuring proper investigation, preventing tampering with evidence or securing the accused’s presence. The Court found that the investigating agency had recorded the necessity of arrest and therefore held that non-issuance of a Section 41A notice did not invalidate the proceedings in the circumstances of this case.
The Court further relied upon Arnab Manoranjan Goswami Vs State of Maharashtra and Others, (2021) 2 SCC 427, emphasising the need to balance constitutional liberty with effective criminal investigation. It observed that courts must remain vigilant against misuse of criminal proceedings while exercising restraint in interfering with lawful investigations. Considering the overall facts, the recorded reasons for arrest, the material placed before the Magistrate and the subsequent remand proceedings, the High Court found no illegality in the arrest or the order dated 30 December 2024. Accordingly, the petition was dismissed. The Court expressly clarified that its observations would not be construed as an opinion on the merits of the criminal case.
Read SC Judgment in this case: Arrest Memo Cannot Replace Grounds of Arrest: Supreme Court – The requirement to communicate grounds of arrest is distinct from the requirement to issue a pre-arrest notice under Section 41A of the CrPC.
Cases Discussed
- Arnesh Kumar Vs State of Bihar and Another (Supreme Court); (2014) 8 SCC 273; 02/07/2014; AY: Not Applicable. The Supreme Court laid down safeguards against unnecessary arrests in offences punishable with imprisonment up to seven years. The High Court relied upon paragraph 7.1 to explain that arrest requires satisfaction of the statutory necessity conditions and that Section 41A applies where arrest is not required.
- Prabir Purkayastha Vs State (NCT of Delhi) (Supreme Court); (2024) 8 SCC 254; 15/05/2024. The petitioner relied upon this decision concerning the distinction between reasons for arrest and grounds of arrest. The High Court reproduced paragraph 48 and examined the requirement that an arrested person be informed of the grounds personal to the accused.
- Pranav Kuckreja (In Police Custody) Vs State (NCT of Delhi) (Delhi High Court); W.P.(CRL) No. 3476/2024; 18/11/2024. Cited by the petitioner in support of the constitutional requirement to communicate grounds of arrest and protect the rights of an arrested person.
- Hem Prabhakar Shah Vs The State of Maharashtra (Bombay High Court); 2024 SCC OnLine Bom 3006. Relied upon by the petitioner regarding communication of grounds of arrest and the consequences of non-compliance with constitutional safeguards.
- Satender Kumar Antil Vs Central Bureau of Investigation and Another (Supreme Court); (2022) 10 SCC 51; 11/07/2022. The High Court reproduced paragraph 100 containing directions to investigating agencies and courts concerning compliance with Sections 41 and 41A CrPC, arrest safeguards and bail procedures.
- Siddharth Vs State of Uttar Pradesh and Another (Supreme Court); (2022) 1 SCC 676; 16/08/2021. Mentioned within the reproduced directions in Satender Kumar Antil concerning compliance with the Supreme Court’s safeguards relating to arrest.
- Bhim Singh Vs Union of India and Others (Supreme Court); W.P.(Crl.) No. 310 of 2005; Mentioned within the reproduced directions in Satender Kumar Antil concerning undertrial prisoners and compliance with Section 436A CrPC.
- Arnab Manoranjan Goswami Vs State of Maharashtra and Others (Supreme Court); (2021) 2 SCC 427; 27/11/2020 The High Court reproduced paragraph 60 addressing the constitutional importance of personal liberty, the public interest in criminal investigation and the cautious exercise of inherent jurisdiction to prevent abuse of criminal process.
FULL TEXT OF THE JUDGMENT/ORDER OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA HIGH COURT
1. Present petition has been filed under Section 528 of Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 seeking quashing of impugned arrest order of the petitioner dated 30.12.2024 in FIR No.33/2022, dated 03.09.2022, registered under Sections 384, 420, 468, 471, 509 and 120-B IPC, at Police Station Cyber Cell, Chandigarh and all the consequential proceedings arising therefrom including the impugned order dated 30.12.2024 passed by the Court of learned JMIC, Chandigarh remanding the petitioner to three days police custody.
2. Succinctly, facts of the case are that the FIR in the present case has been lodged on the statement of the complainant, namely, Arvind Kumar. It was alleged that he received an SMS on his mobile phone No.9216020505 for loan, which contained a link. Upon clicking, an application of Hugo loan was opened, which requested his access and he allowed. He filled up his details and his loan eligibility was shown as of Rs.3,500/-. He did not require the loan and hence, he uninstalled the application, but thereafter, he received a whatsapp call from numbers +37125218379, +6283146262636, +919910429137 and was threatened by demanding money. He was told that access of his gallery and contact was with them. Thereafter, they started sending his and his family members nude photos after morphing through whatsapp and started demanding money. Thereafter, he received a call from phone No.7015153485 that if he would not give the money, then his photos would be made viral. The payment link was sent to him. Out of fear, he sent Rs.2,045/- on 24.08.2022 and Rs.3,500/-, Rs.3,500/- on 30.08.2022. Despite that, threat of making his photos viral kept on coming and demand of money continued. He prayed that as he was being blackmailed, action be taken against the culprits. On registration of the FIR, the investigation commenced. During the investigation, the Investigating Agency found complicity of various accused and arrested them. On 29.12.2024, co-accused Manoj Rathore was arrested and during his interrogation, he made disclosure about the complicity of one Puneet Kumar and Ashish Kakkar (petitioner). Thus, the petitioner was arrayed as an accused. Investigating Agency arrested the accused petitioner on 30.12.2024 from Hotel Jaypee Siddharth, Rajender Nagar, New Delhi. He was produced before learned Illaqa Magistrate on 30.12.2024 at 6:00 p.m. Learned Magistrate remanded the petitioner to the police custody for 3 days vide impugned order dated 30.12.2024. Aggrieved by the same, the petitioner is before this Court by way of filing the present petition.
3. Learned Senior counsel for the petitioner while opening his arguments, has vehemently contended that arrest of the petitioner is a travesty of justice and same has been made in gross violation of the Article 22 of the Constitution of India and statutory provisions of Cr.P.C. viz Sections 50, 41 and 41-A Cr.P.C. etc. He has assailed the impugned order primarily on the following grounds:-
(i) The maximum punishment for the offence, for which the petitioner has been arrested, is 07 years and hence, his arrest is in violation of the law laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Arnesh Kumar Vs. State of Bihar and another, (2014) 8 SCC 273.
(ii) There is a gross violation of the provisions of Article 22 of the Constitution of India and Sections 41 and 41-A Cr.P.C.
(iii) The impugned remand order has been passed by learned Magistrate in a highly mechanical and cavalier manner totally ignoring the law of land as held by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Arnesh Kumar’s case (supra).
(iv) The petitioner has not been apprised with the grounds of arrest on the basis of which he was arrested by the Investigating Agency.
(v) The petitioner was produced before the Magistrate on 30.12.2024 at 6:00 p.m. without having been granted any opportunity to seek the legal assistance from his Advocate.
4. Learned Senior counsel for the petitioner has vehemently contended that as per fundamental right enshrined under Article 22 of the Constitution of India, no person who is arrested, shall be detained in custody without being informed the grounds of arrest and he cannot be denied the right to consult and to be defended by a legal practitioner of his choice. He submits that relevant provisions enshrined in the Cr.P.C. are Section 50, 41 and 41-A Cr.P.C. It has been submitted that as per the provisions of Section 41-A Cr.P.C., it is mandatory for the police officer to issue notice to a person before his arrest as per the settled proposition of law, however, neither the petitioner was apprised of grounds of arrest nor he was provided any opportunity to seek legal assistance and thus, he was arrested in blatant violation of law of land. While relying upon the law settled by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Prabir Purkayastha vs. State (NCT of Delhi), (2024) 8 SCC 254; Pranav Kuckreja (in Police Custody) vs. State (NCT of Delhi), passed in W.P.(CRL) No.3476/2024 on 18.11.2024; Hem Prabhakar Shah vs. The State of Maharashtra, 2024 SCC OnLine Bom 3006 and Satender Kumar Antil vs. Central Bureau of Investigation and another, (2022) 10 SCC 51, he has submitted that requirement to communicate the ground of arrest or the grounds of detention in writing, to a person arrested in connection with an offence as provided under Article 22 (1) and 22 (5) of the Constitution of India is sacrosanct and cannot be breached in any situation. Non-compliance of this constitutional requirement and statutory mandate would lead to the custody or the detention being rendered illegal. He has laid emphasis on the observations made by Hon’ble Supreme Court in para 48 of Prabir Purkayastha’s case (supra) that there is a significant difference in phrase ‘reasons for arrest’ and ‘grounds of arrest’. He has submitted that as both are distinct phrases, then simply giving reasons of arrest was not sufficient and it was mandatory for the Investigating Agency to disclose the grounds of arrest to the petitioner but the same has not been done at the time of arrest of the petitioner. He has further relied upon the ratio of the law laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Satender Kumar Antil’s case (supra) and has submitted that Hon’ble Supreme Court has concluded by giving various directions wherein the Investigating Agency and their officers were held duty bound with the mandate of Section 41 and 41-A Cr.P.C. He further submits that it was directed that Courts have to satisfy themselves about the compliance of Section 41 and 41-A Cr.P.C. and any non-compliance would entitle the accused to be released forthwith. To buttress his argument, he has submitted that in pursuance to the directions given by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, this Court had issued notification dated 22.09.2023, wherein, it had been notified that notice of appearance in terms of Section 41-A Cr.P.C. should be served on the accused within two weeks from the date of institution of the case. It has been submitted by learned Senior Counsel that the Investigating Agency had issued notice under Section 41-A Cr.P.C. to the co-accused, namely, Puneet Kumar on 07.05.2023, however, no such notice was ever issued to the petitioner and thus, his arrest is totally in violation of his fundamental rights as enshrined under Article 22 of the Constitution of India and the provisions of Section 50, 41 and 41-A Cr.P.C. He has further submitted that learned Illaqa Magistrate was duty bound to record his satisfaction before granting the police remand of the petitioner, however, the impugned order is totally in violation of the law settled. He thus, submits that the arrest of the petitioner and the impugned order dated 30.12.2024 granting his police remand being unsustainable in the eye of law deserves to be set aside and the petitioner deserves to be set at liberty.
5. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for UT, Chandigarh has vehemently opposed the submissions made by learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner. He has submitted that the case in hand is of sensitive nature and the petitioner before this Court is the master mind of the offence committed. He submits that the offence in the present case was committed with deep rooted conspiracy with the handlers located in China. He submits that after registration of the FIR, the Investigating Agency recorded statement of the complainant and the Customer Acquisition Form (CAF) and Call Detail Record (CDR) of mobile number 7015153485 were obtained and these were found to be in the name of Gyandeep son of Sukbir Singh resident of Rewari. He submits that letter was sent to Google to obtain information about the Hugo Loan application and on receiving the information, it led to the discovery that the Hugo Loan application was registered in China with the IP detail also traced to Singapore and China. He submits that based on the calling number 7015153485, six persons were found at the location engaged in calling operations with laptops open in front of them. Gyandeep disclosed that he alongwith other suspects was working for ‘Jituloan’ with team leaders included Sidarth @ Manish Rai and other accused. He also identified that their top boss was a Chinese person, who provided them with work under the Jituloan scheme and thus, Gyandeep was arrested. Thereafter, five other accused were arrested and they revealed details about the operation, stating that they were blackmailing people after getting access to their mobile phones, contacts and gallery via loan applications such as Hugo Loan, A.K. Loan, Cash Loan and others. He further submits that on 07.09.2022, a raid was conducted and suspect Sidarth @ Manish Rai was arrested. He further submits that during further investigation, on conducting raid at Flat No.9061, Tower No.9, ATS Paradise, Greater Noida, UP, one Chinese person, namely, Wan Chengua was arrested, who was identified by co-accused Anshul. It is submitted by learned Senior Counsel that on the arrest of co-accused, transaction in various accounts were analyzed, which revealed that funds were transferred into accounts held by companies as such Malista Forwarding Freight Limited and Sky Bird Traders. Thus, co-accused Manoj Rathore was arrested on 29.12.2024. It was his arrest which led to disclosure of involvement of Punit Kumar and Ashish Kakkar (petitioner). Thus, petitioner Ashish Kakkar was arrested for his role in the scam on 30.12.2024. It has been further submitted by learned Senior Counsel that the petitioner is a habitual offender and apprehending action against him, he started changing his locations, switching off his mobile phone and tried to flee from the Investigating Agency. Learned Senior Counsel has produced on record the case diary as well, wherein, the Investigating Agency recorded the conduct of the petitioner and thus, recorded their satisfaction that the petitioner adopted all the methods to escape from the clutches of law. He produced the case diary pertaining to 29.12.2024 and 30.12.2024. He submits that the Investigating Agency on receiving information went to Delhi, however, the petitioner switched off his mobile phone, kept on changing his locations and one of the locations was found to be near Airport as well. The petitioner’s mother refused to accept any notice by saying that she has been stopped by her son from accepting any notice. He has further submitted that the petitioner alongwith his wife was staying in Jaypee Siddharth Hotel, where his wife was communicated the grounds of arrest of the petitioner through notice. Learned Senior Counsel has submitted that the argument raised by learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner that mandatory notice under Section 41-A Cr.P.C. was not served upon the petitioner, is totally misconceived. He has drawn the attention of this Court to the provisions of Sections 41 and 41-A Cr.P.C. It has been submitted that as per mandate of Section 41-A Cr.P.C., where arrest of a person is not required under the provisions of Sub Section (1) of Section 41, it is then the provisions of Section 41-A Cr.P.C. are to be invoked. However, as per the provisions of Section 41 Cr.P.C., the Police has the power to arrest a person without warrant subject to conditions as enshrined under Section 41(1)(b) Cr.P.C. He submits that all the conditions enshrined in the aforesaid mentioned Sections, were fulfilled and thus, arrest of the petitioner was essential in this case. He, thus, submits that as the arrest of the person was required under Sub Section (1) of Section 41 Cr.P.C., hence, Section 41-A Cr.P.C. is not at all applicable in the present case. To buttress his arguments, he relied upon the findings given by Hon’ble Supreme Court in Arnesh Kumar’s case (supra), wherein, it has been held that the Police Officer before arrest in such cases has to be further satisfied that such arrest is necessary to prevent such person from committing any further offence. He has submitted that Hon’ble Supreme Court has specifically held that provisions of Section 41-A Cr.P.C. makes it clear that in all cases where arrest of a person is not required under the provisions of Sub Section (1) of Section 41, the Police Officer is required to issue notice directing the accused to appear before him at the specified place and time. However, as evident from the facts and circumstances of the case, the Investigating Agency in the present case recorded their satisfaction that arrest of the petitioner is required under Section 41(1) Cr.P.C. and thus, as per law settled, the provisions of Section 41-A Cr.P.C. are not applicable in the present case. He submits that at the time of arrest, arrest memo dated 30.12.2024 was prepared, which was duly signed by the petitioner. This arrest memo specifically contained that the petitioner was arrested on the disclosure of accused Manoj Rathore and Puneet Kumar. He submits that after having been arrested, the petitioner was duly produced before learned Illaqa Magistrate, Chandigarh and application for obtaining his remand was filed. It is submitted that learned Magistrate after perusing the material produced before it, duly recorded its satisfaction as per mandate of the law laid down and granted judicial remand. The petitioner was also allowed to inspect the record by the Court and after having been granted remand, he duly engaged his counsel. He has also submitted that after having been passed the impugned order dated 30.12.2024, two more remand orders dated 02.01.2025 and 05.01.2025 have been passed and the same have not been challenged by the petitioner. He submits that the petitioner was duly represented by his counsel at the time of passing of these orders. He submits that presently the petitioner is in judicial custody. It is submitted by learned Senior Counsel that the respondent-State had duly complied with the constitutional and statutory provisions and the law settled by Hon’ble Supreme Court. It is further submitted that there being no illegality whatsoever in the arrest and the remand order of the petitioner, the present petition being devoid of any merit deserves to be dismissed.
6. The Court has heard Senior counsel for both the sides and perused the record with their able assistance. The precise issue involved in the present case is whether the arrest of the petitioner on 31.12.2024 and remand order, are sustainable in the eyes of law or not. To answer the same, relevant provision for the appreciation is Article 22 of the Constitution of India, which reads as under:-
“22. Protection against arrest and detention in certain cases:-
(1) No person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds for such arrest nor shall he be denied the right to consult, and to be defended by, a legal practitioner of his choice.
(2) Every person who is arrested and detained in custody shall be produced before the nearest magistrate within a period of twenty-four hours of such arrest excluding the time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the court of the magistrate and no such person shall be detained in custody beyond the said period without the authority of a magistrate.
(3) Nothing in clauses (1) and (2) shall apply—
(a) to any person who for the time being is an enemy alien; or
(b) to any person who is arrested or detained under any law providing for preventive detention.
(4) No law providing for preventive detention shall authorise the detention of a person for a longer period than three months unless—
(a) an Advisory Board consisting of persons who are, or have been, or are qualified to be appointed as, Judges of a High Court has reported before the expiration of the said period of three months that there is in its opinion sufficient cause for such detention:
Provided that nothing in this sub-clause shall authorise the detention of any person beyond the maximum period prescribed by any law made by Parliament under sub-clause (b) of clause (7); or
(b) such person is detained in accordance with the provisions of any law made by Parliament under sub-clauses (a) and (b) of clause (7).
(5) When any person is detained in pursuance of an order made under any law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order shall, as soon as may be, communicate to such person the grounds on which the order has been made and shall afford him the earliest opportunity of making a representation against the order.
(6) Nothing in clause (5) shall require the authority making any such order as is referred to in that clause to disclose facts which such authority considers to be against the public interest to disclose.
(7) Parliament may by law prescribe—
(a) the circumstances under which, and the class or classes of cases in which, a person may be detained for a period longer than three months under any law providing for preventive detention without obtaining the opinion of an Advisory Board in accordance with the provisions of sub-clause (a) of clause (4);
(b) the maximum period for which any person may in any class or classes of cases be detained under any law providing for preventive detention; and
(c) the procedure to be followed by an Advisory Board in an inquiry under sub-clause (a) of clause (4).”
7. Sections 50 Cr.P.C. reads as under:-
“50. Person arrested to be informed of grounds of arrest and of right to bail.
(1) Every police officer or other person arresting any person without warrant shall forthwith communicate to him full particulars of the offence for which he is arrested or other grounds for such arrest.
(2) Where a police officer arrests without warrant any person other than a person accused of a non-bailable offence, he shall inform the person arrested that he is entitled to be released on bail and that he may arrange for sureties on his behalf.”
8. The main thrust of learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner is to the effect that the petitioner was not made aware with the grounds of arrest on the basis of which he has been arrested. He has submitted that as per law settled, reasons of arrest and grounds of arrest are two different terms and the same have been answered by Hon’ble Supreme Court in para No.48 of Prabir Purkayastha’s case (supra), which reads as under:-
48. It may be reiterated at the cost of repetition that there is a significant difference in the phrase ‘reasons for arrest’ and ‘grounds of arrest’. The ‘reasons for arrest’ as indicated in the arrest memo are purely formal parameters, viz., to prevent the accused person from committing any further offence; for proper investigation of the offence; to prevent the accused person from causing the evidence of the offence to disappear or tempering with such evidence in any manner; to prevent the arrested person for making inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the Court or to the Investigating Officer. These reasons would commonly apply to any person arrested on charge of a crime whereas the ‘grounds of arrest’ would be required to contain all such details in hand of the Investigating Officer which necessitated the arrest of the accused. Simultaneously, the grounds of arrest informed in writing must convey to the arrested accused all basic facts on which he was being arrested so as to provide him an opportunity of defending himself against custodial remand and to seek bail. Thus, the ‘grounds of arrest’ would invariably be personal to the accused and cannot be equated with the ‘reasons of arrest’ which are general in nature.
9. Learned Senior counsel for the petitioner has submitted that power of arrest flows from Article 22 of the Constitution of India. It had also been agitated that no notice under Section 41-A Cr.P.C. was issued to the petitioner. However, from the perusal of the record produced by the State, it is deciphered that name of the petitioner surfaced in the present case on the disclosure statement made by co-accused Manoj Rathore on 29.12.2024. On recording of this disclosure, the Investigating Agency reached Delhi i.e. place of residence of the petitioner, however, he kept on changing his locations. He did not use his driver and the car, in which he used to travel. Perusal of the case diary produced by the State would substantiate the submissions made by learned Senior Counsel for the State. The petitioner refused to accept the notice under Section 35(3) of BNSS, 2023 issued by the Investigating Officer on the ground that he did not want to take any kind of notice as instructed by his Advocate. His mother Asha Kakkar also refused to accept any notice/summon in the name of her son Ashish Kakkar, as he had stopped her to accept the same. Thus, on his arrest from Jaypee Siddharth Hotel, an intimation of his arrest was given to his wife Akanksha. Arrest memo dated 30.12.2024 was duly signed by the petitioner and it read that he has been arrested as per the disclosure of accused Manoj Rathore and Puneet Kumar. The petitioner was produced before learned Illaqa Magistrate on 30.12.2024 and the remand application with details of the grounds were duly mentioned. Learned Magistrate on drawing his satisfaction granted the police remand of three days vide impugned order dated 30.12.2024. As submitted by learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, Hon’ble Supreme Court in Satender Kumar Antil’s case (supra) had given directions, which are as follows:-
“Summary/Conclusion
100. In conclusion, we would like to issue certain directions. These directions are meant for the investigating agencies and also for the courts. Accordingly, we deem it appropriate to issue the following directions, which may be subject to State amendments.:
100.1. The Government of India may consider the introduction of a separate enactment in the nature of a Bail Act so as to streamline the grant of bails.
100.2. The investigating agencies and their officers are duty-bound to comply with the mandate of Section 41 and 41-A of the Code and the directions issued by this Court in Arnesh Kumar (supra). Any dereliction on their part has to be brought to the notice of the higher authorities by the court followed by appropriate action.
100.3. The courts will have to satisfy themselves on the compliance of Section 41 and 41-A of the Code. Any non-compliance would entitle the accused for grant of bail.
100.4. All the State Governments and the Union Territories are directed to facilitate standing orders for the procedure to be followed under Section 41 and 41-A of the Code while taking note of the order of the High Court of Delhi dated 07.02.2018 in Writ Petition (C) No. 7608 of 2018 and the standing order issued by the Delhi Police i.e. Standing Order No. 109 of 2020, to comply with the mandate of Section 41-A of the Code.
100.5. There need not be any insistence of a bail application while considering the application under Section 88, 170, 204 and 209 of the Code.
100.6. There needs to be a strict compliance of the mandate laid down in the judgment of this court in Siddharth (supra).
100.7. The State and Central Governments will have to comply with the directions issued by this Court from time to time with respect to constitution of special courts. The High Court in consultation with the State Governments will have to undertake an exercise on the need for the special courts. The vacancies in the position of Presiding Officers of the special courts will have to be filled up expeditiously.
100.8. The High Courts are directed to undertake the exercise of finding out the undertrial prisoners who are not able to comply with the bail conditions. After doing so, appropriate action will have to be taken in light of Section 440 of the Code, facilitating the release.
100.9. While insisting upon sureties the mandate of Section 440 of the Code has to be kept in mind.
100.10. An exercise will have to be done in a similar manner to comply with the mandate of Section 436-A of the Code both at the district judiciary level and the High Court as earlier directed by this Court in Bhim Singh (supra), followed by appropriate orders.
100.11. Bail applications ought to be disposed of within a period of two weeks except if the provisions mandate otherwise, with the exception being an intervening application. Applications for anticipatory bail are expected to be disposed of within a period of six weeks with the exception of any intervening application.
100.12. All State Governments, Union Territories and High Courts are directed to file affidavits/ status reports within a period of four months.”
10. Perusal of the record would show that the Investigating Agency has duly taken care of the compliance of the directions issued by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Regarding the issue raised by learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner for violation of Section 41-A Cr.P.C., both the Sections 41 and 41-A Cr.P.C. are relevant, which read as under:-
41. When police may arrest without warrant.
(1) Any police officer may without an order from a Magistrate and without a warrant, arrest any person –
(a) who commits, in the presence of a police office, a cognizable offence;
(b) against whom a reasonable complaint has been made, or credible information has been received, or a reasonable suspicion exists that he has committed a cognizable offence punishable with imprisonment for a term which may be less than seven years or which may extend to seven years whether with or without fine, if the following conditions are satisfied, namely :-
(i) the police has reason to believe on the basis of such complaint, information, or suspicion that such person has committed the said offence;
(ii) the police officer is satisfied that such arrest is necessary –
(a) to prevent such person from committing any further offence; or
(b) for proper investigation of the offence; or
(c) to prevent such person from causing the evidence of the offence to disappear or tampering with such evidence in any manner; or
(d) to prevent such person from making any inducement, threat or promise to any person acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the Court or to the police officer; or
(e) as unless such person is arrested, his presence in the Court whenever required cannot be ensured,
and the police officer shall record while making such arrest, his reason in writing;
[Provided that a police officer shall, in all the cases where the arrest of a person is not required under the provision of this sub-section, record the reasons in writing for not making the arrest.]
(ba) against whom credible information has been received that he has committed a cognizable offence punishable with imprisonment far a term which may extend to more than seven years whether with or without fine or with death sentence and the police officer has reason to believe on the basis of that information that such person has committed the said offence;]
(c) who has been proclaimed as an offender either under this Code or by order of the State Government; or
(d) in whose possession anything is found which may reasonably be suspected to be stolen property and who may reasonably be suspected of having committed an offence with reference to such thing; or
(e) who obstructs a police officer while in the execution of his duty, or who has escaped, or attempts to escape, from lawful custody; or
(f) who is reasonably suspected of being a deserter from any of the Armed Forces of the Union; or –
(g) who has been concerned in, or against whom reasonable complaint has been made, or credible information has been received, or a reasonable suspicion exists, of his having been concerned in, any act committed at any place out of India which if committed in India, would have been punishable as an offence, and for which he is, under any law relating to extradition, or otherwise, liable to be apprehended or detained in custody in India; or
(h) who, being a released convict, commits a breach of any rule, made under sub-section (5) of section 356; or
(i) for whose arrest any requisition, whether written or oral, has been received from another police officer, provided that the requisition specifies the person to be arrested and the offence or other cause for which the arrest is to be made and it appears therefrom that the person might lawfully be arrested without a warrant by the officer who issued the requisition.
[(2) Subject to the provisions of Section 42, no person concerned in a non-cognisable offence or against whom a complaint has been made or credible information has been received or reasonable suspicion exists of his having so concerned, shall be arrested accept under a warrant or order of a Magistrate.]
[41A. Notice of appearance before police officer –
(1) The police officer shall, in all cases where the arrest of a person is not required under the provisions of sub-section (1) of Section 41, issue a notice directing the person against whom a reasonable complaint has been made, or credible information has been received, or a reasonable suspicion exists that he has committed a cognisable offence, to appear before him or at such other place as may be specified in the notice.
(2)Where such a notice is issued to any person, it shall be the duty of that person to comply with the terms of the notice.
(3)Where such person complies and continues to comply with the notice, he shall not be arrested in respect of the offence referred to in the notice unless, for reasons to be recorded, the police officer is of the opinion that he ought to be arrested.
(4) Where such person, at any time, fails to comply with the terms of the notice or is unwilling to identify himself, the police officer may, subject to such orders as may have been passed by a competent Court in this behalf, arrest him for the offence mentioned in the notice.”
11. Reading of the statutory provisions of Sections 41 and 41-A Cr.P.C. would make it clear that the police officer can arrest any person without warrant subject to the condition as mentioned in above-said Section as (a) to (e) of Clause of Section 41 Cr.P.C. So far as Section 41-A Cr.P.C. is concerned, reading of the same would clarify that the same is to be invoked when the arrest of a person is not required under the provisions of Sub Section (1) of Section 41 Cr.P.C. However, from the voluminous record produced by the State in the present case, it is apparent that the Investigating Agency was satisfied that arrest of the petitioner was required under Section 41 Cr.P.C. Thus, when the Investigating Agency required the arrest of a person under Section 41 Cr.P.C., then there was no occasion for invoking the provisions of Section 41-A Cr.P.C. Hon’ble Supreme Court in Arnesh Kumar’s case (supra) has held in para No.7.1, which reads as under:
“7.1 From a plain reading of the aforesaid provision, it is evident that a person accused of offence punishable with imprisonment for a term which may be less than seven years or which may extend to seven years with or without fine, cannot be arrested by the police officer only on its satisfaction that such person had committed the offence punishable as aforesaid. Police officer before arrest, in such cases has to be further satisfied that such arrest is necessary to prevent such person from committing any further offence; or for proper investigation of the case; or to prevent the accused from causing the evidence of the offence to disappear; or tampering with such evidence in any manner; or to prevent such person from making any inducement, threat or promise to a witness so as to dissuade him from disclosing such facts to the Court or the police officer; or unless such accused person is arrested, his presence in the court whenever required cannot be ensured. These are the conclusions, which one may reach based on facts.”
12. The requirement of arrest of the petitioner was recorded by the Investigating Officer in the case diary, thus, there was no occasion for the Investigating Agency to issue any notice to the petitioner under Section 41-A Cr.P.C. It is apposite to note that counsel for the petitioner was allowed to inspect the record and after having been granted the police remand on 30.12.2024, two more remand orders dated 02.01.2025 and 05.01.2025 were passed, wherein remand of 3 days and 5 days respectively, were granted by learned Magistrate. While granting these two remands, the petitioner was duly represented by his counsel. The record further shows that complicity of the petitioner is not only in the present case, but he is involved in many other cases as well.
13. There is no dispute regarding the law relied upon by learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner, however, on a combined reading of Article 22 of the Constitution of India with the provisions of Sections 41, 41-A and 50 Cr.P.C., it is apparent that for every case where the sentence is seven years or less than seven years, it is not mandatory for the Investigating Agency to issue notice under Section 41-A Cr.P.C. The legislature has duly laid the condition that only when the Investigating Officer is satisfied that the arrest of the accused is not required under Section 41(1) Cr.P.C., it is only then notice under Section 41-A Cr.P.C. can be given. Even otherwise, the investigation lies in the domain of the Investigating officers and the Courts have to be circumspect in issuing direction that how and in what manner, the investigation is to be conducted. Ho’nble Supreme Court in Arnab Manoranjan Goswami vs. State of Maharashtra and others, 2021(2) SCC 427 has held as under:-
“60. Human liberty is a precious constitutional value, which is undoubtedly subject to regulation by validly enacted legislation. As such, the citizen is subject to the edicts of criminal law and procedure. Section 482 recognizes the inherent power of the High Court to make such orders as are necessary to give effect to the provisions of the Cr.P.C. “or prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice”. Decisions of this court require the High Courts, in exercising the jurisdiction entrusted to them under Section 482, to act with circumspection. In emphasising that the High Court must exercise this power with a sense of restraint, the decisions of this Court are founded on the basic principle that the due enforcement of criminal law should not be obstructed by the accused taking recourse to artifices and strategies. The public interest in ensuring the due investigation of crime is protected by ensuring that the inherent power of the High Court is exercised with caution. That indeed is one – and a significant – end of the spectrum. The other end of the spectrum is equally important: the recognition by Section 482 of the power inhering in the High Court to prevent the abuse of process or to secure the ends of justice is a valuable safeguard for protecting liberty. The Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 was enacted by a legislature which was not subject to constitutional rights and limitations; yet it recognized the inherent power in Section 561A. Post- Independence, the recognition by Parliament, of the inherent power of the High Court must be construed as an aid to preserve the constitutional value of liberty. The writ of liberty runs through the fabric of the Constitution. The need to ensure the fair investigation of crime is undoubtedly important in itself, because it protects at one level the rights of the victim and, at a more fundamental level, the societal interest in ensuring that crime is investigated and dealt with in accordance with law. On the other hand, the misuse of the criminal law is a matter of which the High Court and the lower Courts in this country must be alive. In the present case, the High Court could not but have been cognizant of the specific ground which was raised before it by the appellant that he was being made a target as a part of a series of occurrences which have been taking place since April 2020. The specific case of the appellant is that he has been targeted because his opinions on his television channel are unpalatable to authority. Whether the appellant has established a case for quashing the FIR is something on which the High Court will take a final view when the proceedings are listed before it but we are clearly of the view that in failing to make even a prima facie evaluation of the FIR, the High Court abdicated its constitutional duty and function as a protector of liberty. Courts must be alive to the need to safeguard the public interest in ensuring that the due enforcement of criminal law is not obstructed. The fair investigation of crime is an aid to it. Equally it is the duty of courts across the spectrum – the district judiciary, the High Courts and the Supreme Court – to ensure that the criminal law does not become a weapon for the selective harassment of citizens. Courts should be alive to both ends of the spectrum – the need to ensure the proper enforcement of criminal law on the one hand and the need, on the other, of ensuring that the law does not become a ruse for targeted harassment. Liberty across human eras is as tenuous as tenuous can be. Liberty survives by the vigilance of her citizens, on the cacophony of the media and in the dusty corridors of courts alive to the rule of (and not by) law. Yet, much too often, liberty is a casualty when one of these components is found wanting.”
14. While weighing the overall facts and circumstances on the anvil of law settled, this Court does not find any illegality in the arrest of the petitioner and the impugned remand order dated 30.12.2024. Thus, finding no merit in the present petition, the same is hereby dismissed.
15. Nothing said herein shall be construed as an expression of opinion on the merits of the case.





