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AYUSH Research Doctors Cannot Claim Retirement at 65 Automatically: Supreme Court

Case Law Details

TaxGuru Citation
2026 taxguru.in 19165
Case Name
Central Council for Research in Ayurvedic Sciences & Anr. Vs Bikartan Das & Ors. (Supreme Court of India)
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Central Council for Research in Ayurvedic Sciences & Anr. Vs Bikartan Das & Ors. (Supreme Court of India)

Summary: The Supreme Court, in Central Council for Research in Ayurvedic Sciences & Anr. Vs Bikartan Das & Ors., examined whether an employee appointed as a researcher in an autonomous institution functioning under the Ministry of AYUSH could claim enhancement of the retirement age from 60 to 65 years on the same footing as AYUSH doctors directly employed under the Central Government. The appeal was preferred by the Central Council for Research in Ayurvedic Sciences (CCRAS) and its Director General against the judgment dated 17 December 2020 of the Orissa High Court in W.P.(C) No. 30620 of 2020. The High Court had set aside the Central Administrative Tribunal’s decision denying the benefit of enhanced retirement age to Dr. Bikartan Das. The principal controversy concerned the applicability of the Union Government’s decision extending the retirement age of specified medical professionals, the legal status of autonomous research councils, the interpretation of CCRAS Bye-Laws and the constitutional principles governing equality in public employment. The Supreme Court considered whether professional qualifications and the actual performance of clinical duties could override the service conditions applicable to an employee appointed under a separate institutional framework. The judgment also addressed the limits of judicial intervention in service policies and the scope of the High Court’s supervisory jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.

Dr. Bikartan Das was appointed as a Research Assistant (Ayurveda) with effect from 7 October 1985 at the Central Research Institute (Ayurveda), Bhubaneswar, under an appointment order dated 11 October 1985. His appointment was initially subject to two years’ probation and the prescribed pay scale and service conditions of the Council. During his employment, he progressed through the research establishment and eventually held the position of Assistant Director (AYUSH). The Government of India had earlier approved enhancement of the retirement age of Council employees from 58 to 60 years, effective from 31 May 1998, following the Department of Personnel and Training’s memorandum dated 13 May 1998. This enhancement was implemented through the institutional framework governing CCRAS employees. Dr. Das was born on 4 April 1958 and was accordingly scheduled to retire on 30 April 2018 upon completing 60 years of age. Following the Central Government’s subsequent decision to enhance the retirement age of certain doctors to 65 years, he submitted a representation dated 22 March 2018 requesting continuation in service until 30 April 2023. However, CCRAS rejected his request and issued a retirement notification dated 4 April 2018 confirming his superannuation at 60 years. The dispute arose from his contention that the Government’s enhanced retirement policy should apply to him because he possessed the qualifications of an AYUSH doctor and performed medical duties in addition to research work.

On 27 September 2017, the Union Cabinet approved enhancement of the retirement age to 65 years for specified categories of doctors, including AYUSH doctors working under the Ministry of AYUSH and doctors serving in the Central Government Health Scheme. The Ministry of AYUSH subsequently issued a clarification dated 31 October 2017 explaining that the decision applied to AYUSH doctors directly working under the Ministry and in CGHS establishments, but not to employees of autonomous institutions such as research councils and national institutes. This distinction became central to the dispute because CCRAS was an autonomous body registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, although it functioned under the administrative control of the Ministry. By an order dated 24 November 2017, the Ministry implemented the enhanced retirement age for the covered AYUSH doctors with effect from 27 September 2017. Thereafter, the Department of Personnel and Training issued Notification G.S.R. 27(E) dated 5 January 2018, amending Rule 56(bb) of the Fundamental Rules, 1922, under the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution. The amendment prescribed 65 years as the age of superannuation for specified categories of doctors, subject to restrictions concerning administrative positions after attaining 62 years. CCRAS circulated the Ministry’s clarification to its institutions through a communication dated 25 January 2018. Significantly, the Supreme Court observed that this Council communication was never independently challenged by Dr. Das, although it reflected the employer’s acceptance of the Ministry’s position.

Challenging the denial of enhanced retirement age, Dr. Das approached the Central Administrative Tribunal, Cuttack Bench, through Original Application No. 210 of 2018. He sought declarations that the Ministry’s clarification dated 31 October 2017 and the Council’s retirement notification dated 4 April 2018 were illegal, arbitrary and discriminatory. He also requested permission to continue in service until attaining 65 years. The Tribunal issued notice on 17 April 2018 but declined interim protection. Dr. Das consequently approached the Orissa High Court through W.P.(C) No. 6663 of 2018, where an interim order dated 25 April 2018 permitted him to continue in service pending adjudication by the Tribunal, expressly without acquiring any equity from such continuation. On 2 November 2020, the Tribunal dismissed his original application, holding that the applicable service regulations did not automatically extend the enhanced retirement age to employees of CCRAS. Dr. Das again approached the High Court, which allowed his writ petition on 17 December 2020. The High Court emphasised that he regularly treated patients in outpatient and inpatient departments and discharged duties substantially similar to those of AYUSH doctors. It considered Clauses 34 and 35 of the CCRAS Bye-Laws supportive of his entitlement and set aside the Tribunal’s order. The Council then approached the Supreme Court, contending that the High Court had disregarded the legal distinction between government medical services and autonomous research institutions.

The appellants submitted that CCRAS was an autonomous research institution possessing its own recruitment rules, service conditions and governing body. They emphasised that Dr. Das had been recruited as a Research Assistant rather than appointed to a medical service directly controlled by the Central Government. According to the appellants, Clauses 25(b), 34, 35 and 47 of the CCRAS Bye-Laws governed recruitment, retirement and the applicability of government service regulations. They argued that Clause 34 permitted the Governing Body to determine the applicable retirement rules and that the Council had adopted 60 years as the retirement age, a decision subsequently ratified at its Governing Body meeting on 27 January 2000. The appellants maintained that neither the Cabinet decision nor the amendment to Fundamental Rule 56(bb) automatically extended the retirement age of employees of autonomous institutions. They relied on judicial precedents distinguishing government employees from employees of autonomous bodies and contended that constitutional courts could not rewrite service conditions merely because two categories of employees performed similar functions. They further distinguished the Supreme Court’s earlier decision in North Delhi Municipal Corporation Vs Dr. Ram Naresh Sharma, arguing that the employer in that case had adopted the enhanced retirement policy, whereas CCRAS had not done so. The appellants also disputed reliance on the retirement provisions applicable to the Institute of Teaching and Research in Ayurveda, pointing out that the latter institution was governed by separate statutory provisions.

Dr. Das contended that he was a duly qualified Bachelor of Ayurvedic Medicine and Surgery practitioner and therefore fell within the category of AYUSH doctors covered by the Government’s retirement policy. He argued that the Ministry exercised pervasive administrative control over CCRAS and that the Cabinet decision did not expressly exclude qualified doctors working in autonomous research institutions. According to him, the Ministry’s clarification dated 31 October 2017 improperly narrowed the scope of the Cabinet decision and created an artificial distinction between equally qualified doctors performing substantially similar duties. He relied on Articles 14, 16 and 21 of the Constitution and maintained that the classification lacked a rational nexus with the objective of enhancing the availability of experienced medical professionals. He also submitted that he regularly treated patients in OPDs and IPDs and received Non-Practicing Allowance, supporting his claim that he performed clinical functions. Regarding Clause 34 of the Bye-Laws, he argued that Central Government retirement rules, as amended from time to time, automatically applied to Council employees and that the Governing Body’s power was limited to granting further retention beyond the prescribed retirement age. He additionally relied on Clause 35, which incorporated Fundamental and Supplementary Rules mutatis mutandis. Intervenors associated with the Central Council for Research in Unani Medicine advanced similar arguments concerning their medical qualifications, clinical responsibilities and the Ministry’s administrative control. They submitted that the outcome would affect pending litigation involving doctors employed in other AYUSH research institutions.

The Supreme Court examined the institutional character of CCRAS and observed that it was an autonomous body registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, established to undertake and promote research in Ayurvedic sciences. Although the Council operated under the administrative control of the Ministry of AYUSH, its recruitment procedures and employment conditions were governed by its Memorandum of Association and Bye-Laws. Clause 25(b) provided for recruitment, appointment and promotion through rules prescribed by the Governing Body or designated competent authority. Clause 34 specifically dealt with superannuation and contemplated the application of Central Government retirement rules as amended from time to time or as desired by the Governing Body. Clause 35 generally provided for the application of Fundamental Rules, Supplementary Rules and General Financial Rules to Council employees mutatis mutandis. Clause 47 dealt with other conditions of service not specifically provided for in the institutional regulations. Reading these provisions together, the Supreme Court held that the specific provision governing retirement could not be displaced by general provisions concerning the applicability of government service rules. The Court accepted that the Governing Body had fixed the retirement age at 60 years and that the subsequent enhancement applicable to specified Central Government doctors had not automatically altered that institutional decision. Accordingly, administrative control by the Ministry did not, by itself, establish that every government service benefit was directly applicable to employees of the autonomous Council.

A central aspect of the judgment concerned the interpretation of Clause 34, particularly the expression providing for government retirement rules as amended from time to time or as desired by the Governing Body. Dr. Das argued that the first part of the clause made government retirement rules automatically applicable, while the second part merely empowered the Governing Body to retain employees beyond the normal retirement age in appropriate circumstances. The Supreme Court rejected this interpretation, holding that the word or was disjunctive and separated the two alternatives contemplated by the Bye-Law. The Court explained that the Governing Body possessed an independent role in determining the applicable retirement framework and was not necessarily bound to adopt every enhancement introduced for Central Government employees. Referring to established principles of statutory interpretation, including the treatment of the words and and or, the Court observed that these expressions ordinarily carry conjunctive and disjunctive meanings respectively. Their meanings may be interchanged only where the legislative intention or context clearly requires such construction. The language of Clause 34 did not justify the interpretation proposed by Dr. Das. The Court further held that Clause 35 did not override Clause 34 and that Clause 47 could not be invoked to displace an express provision governing superannuation. Consequently, the general incorporation of Central Government service rules did not establish an unconditional right to retire at 65 years.

The Supreme Court emphasised that determining the age of superannuation is fundamentally a matter of service policy, subject to applicable statutory provisions, regulations and constitutional limitations. Courts may examine such policies where they are arbitrary, discriminatory or otherwise unconstitutional, but they cannot ordinarily substitute their own preferred retirement age for that prescribed by the competent authority. The Court rejected the argument that similarity in provident fund benefits, pension arrangements, gratuity, leave rules, pay scales and other employment conditions necessarily required identical retirement ages. It observed that retirement policy stands on a distinct footing from matters relating to remuneration and allowances. Dr. Das had knowingly accepted appointment as a Research Assistant under a separate recruitment and service framework. The fact that he possessed medical qualifications and treated patients did not alter the legal character of his appointment or automatically place him in the same service category as doctors directly employed by the Ministry. The Court relied on decisions concerning teachers, prosecutors, nursing personnel and other public employees to demonstrate that similarity of functions does not invariably establish equality of service conditions. Differences in recruitment methods, governing statutes, service regulations and institutional structures may justify different retirement ages. The Court therefore found no sustainable basis for extending the enhanced retirement age to Dr. Das solely on the ground that his clinical responsibilities resembled those performed by other AYUSH doctors.

The respondent placed substantial reliance on North Delhi Municipal Corporation Vs Dr. Ram Naresh Sharma & Ors., 2021 SCC OnLine SC 540, in which the Supreme Court had considered the differential treatment of AYUSH doctors and doctors belonging to the Central Health Service. In that case, the retirement age of allopathic doctors had been enhanced earlier, while the corresponding benefit for AYUSH doctors was implemented from a later date. The Supreme Court had found that the distinction between the two groups, based on the system of medicine practised, did not justify different effective dates for the retirement benefit when the doctors performed the common function of treating patients. However, the Supreme Court distinguished that precedent from the present dispute. It explained that the earlier controversy concerned the differential implementation of retirement benefits for medical professionals within the relevant employment framework, whereas the present case involved an autonomous research council with its own service regulations. In the earlier case, the enhanced retirement policy had been adopted by the employer concerned; CCRAS had not similarly adopted the enhancement for its employees. The question was therefore not merely whether Ayurvedic and allopathic doctors performed comparable medical functions, but whether an employee governed by separate autonomous-body service rules could claim the benefit of a government policy that did not extend to his institution. The Court held that the earlier judgment did not assist Dr. Das and could not be treated as authority for automatic extension of retirement benefits across legally distinct employment establishments.

The Supreme Court expressed serious concern regarding the interim relief granted by the Orissa High Court permitting Dr. Das to continue in service beyond his prescribed retirement age. The Court observed that he was originally due to retire on 30 April 2018 but continued in employment pursuant to the High Court’s interim protection until the Supreme Court stayed the operation of the impugned judgment in April 2021. It cautioned courts and tribunals against routinely granting interim orders extending public employment where the legal entitlement to continued service remains disputed. Such relief may create an irreversible practical advantage for an employee who ultimately fails to establish a right to remain in service. It may also prejudice the promotional or employment opportunities of the employee’s immediate junior. Conversely, where an employee succeeds in establishing an entitlement, appropriate monetary or consequential relief may be considered in accordance with law. The Court therefore stated that interim continuation beyond the prescribed retirement age should be approached with considerable caution and ordinarily require strong prima facie material. It also criticised the High Court’s reliance on Dr. Das’s dedication to patient care as a reason for extending his service. Professional commitment, however commendable, could not itself determine the age of retirement in disregard of the applicable statutory rules and institutional service conditions. The Court found that the High Court had substituted considerations of fairness and similarity of work for the governing legal framework.

The judgment devoted substantial attention to the principles governing judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution, particularly the distinction between supervisory jurisdiction and appellate reconsideration. The Supreme Court reiterated that a writ of certiorari is intended to ensure that inferior courts and tribunals act within the limits of their jurisdiction and observe the essential requirements of law and natural justice. It is not ordinarily available merely because a superior court considers another interpretation of the facts or law preferable. Referring to decisions including T.C. Basappa Vs T. Nagappa, Syed Yakoob Vs K.S. Radhakrishnan, Surya Dev Rai Vs Ram Chandra Rai, Ebrahim Aboobakar Vs Custodian General of Evacuee Property, and G. Veerappa Pillai Vs Raman and Raman Ltd., the Court examined the circumstances in which jurisdictional errors, errors apparent on the face of the record, violations of natural justice or manifest injustice may justify intervention. It explained that a tribunal possessing jurisdiction to decide a dispute also possesses authority to determine questions of fact and law arising within that jurisdiction, even though its conclusions may subsequently be challenged through appropriate legal remedies. The High Court cannot convert supervisory review into an unrestricted appeal on the merits. Applying these principles, the Supreme Court found that the Tribunal had considered the relevant Bye-Laws, government decisions and employment conditions and had reached a legally sustainable conclusion. The High Court’s disagreement with that conclusion, founded principally on the similarity of clinical duties, did not justify setting aside the Tribunal’s decision in the circumstances of the case.

The Supreme Court ultimately allowed the appeal filed by CCRAS and its Director General and set aside the Orissa High Court’s judgment dated 17 December 2020 in W.P.(C) No. 30620 of 2020. The Court concluded that the High Court had erred in extending the retirement age of Dr. Bikartan Das to 65 years despite the specific service conditions applicable to employees of the autonomous Council. The decision of the Central Administrative Tribunal rejecting his claim was thus left undisturbed. The Supreme Court held that the general applicability of Central Government service rules to employees of an autonomous institution does not necessarily override a specific provision regulating superannuation and that the interpretation of Clause 34 supported the Council’s authority to determine the applicable retirement framework. The Court further clarified that professional qualifications, performance of similar duties, receipt of allowances and administrative supervision by a government ministry do not, without the necessary legal foundation, establish an enforceable right to identical retirement benefits. The Court made no order as to costs and disposed of the intervenors’ interim application. The judgment, delivered on 16 August 2023 by a Bench comprising Chief Justice Dr. D.Y. Chandrachud and Justice J.B. Pardiwala, reinforces the importance of institutional service regulations, lawful classification between different employment establishments, judicial restraint in matters of retirement policy and the limited supervisory function of High Courts when reviewing decisions of administrative tribunals.

Cases Discussed

1. Colonial Bank of Australasia Vs Willan (Privy Council); (1874) LR 5 PC 417. The decision was referred to while examining the limits of certiorari jurisdiction and the distinction between jurisdictional defects and errors committed by a tribunal acting within its lawful authority.

2. R Vs Commissioners for Special Purposes of Income Tax (Court of Appeal, England); (1888) LR 21 QBD 313. The decision explains the distinction between jurisdictional conditions and questions entrusted to a tribunal for determination. An erroneous decision on a question within jurisdiction does not necessarily invalidate the proceedings.

3. Board of Education Vs Rice (House of Lords); 1911 AC 179. The authority was discussed in relation to the duty of public authorities to exercise their statutory powers lawfully and the circumstances in which mandamus may be granted.

4. King Vs Nat Bell Liquors Ltd. (Privy Council); (1922) 2 AC 128. The decision was considered in the discussion of supervisory jurisdiction and the limits of certiorari where an inferior tribunal has acted within the jurisdiction conferred upon it.

5. R Vs Brighton and Area Rent Tribunal (King’s Bench); (1950) 1 All ER 946. The judgment was referred to in connection with the circumstances in which judicial review may be exercised against decisions of statutory tribunals.

6. Rai Brij Raj Krishna Vs S.K. Shaw and Brothers (Supreme Court); AIR 1951 SC 115. The decision distinguishes between an error committed in the exercise of jurisdiction and an error affecting the existence or lawful exercise of jurisdiction.

7. Ebrahim Aboobakar and Hawabai Aboobakar Vs Custodian General of Evacuee Property (Supreme Court); (1952) 1 SCC 798. The decision was considered while explaining that certiorari cannot ordinarily be employed to correct every erroneous conclusion of a competent tribunal.

8. Parry and Company Limited Vs Commercial Employees’ Association, Madras (Supreme Court); (1952) 1 SCC 449; AIR 1952 SC 179. The authority was discussed for the principle that the supervisory jurisdiction of a High Court cannot be converted into appellate jurisdiction merely because another conclusion may be possible.

9. G. Veerappa Pillai Vs Messrs Raman and Raman Ltd. (Supreme Court); (1952) 1 SCC 334. The judgment explains the limited grounds on which constitutional courts may interfere with decisions of subordinate tribunals and statutory authorities.

10. T.C. Basappa Vs T. Nagappa (Supreme Court); AIR 1954 SC 440. The Supreme Court considered this landmark decision concerning the nature and scope of certiorari. Jurisdictional errors, violations of natural justice and patent errors of law may justify interference, but the writ is not intended to correct every wrong decision.

11. Hari Vishnu Kamath Vs Ahmad Ishaque (Supreme Court); AIR 1955 SC 233. The decision was considered while identifying the recognised grounds for issuing certiorari, including errors of jurisdiction and errors apparent on the face of the record.

12. Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde Vs Mallikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale (Supreme Court); AIR 1960 SC 137. The decision explains that an error requiring elaborate examination or permitting more than one reasonable interpretation cannot ordinarily be treated as an error apparent on the face of the record.

13. K.M. Shanmugam Vs S.R.V.S. (P) Ltd. (Supreme Court); AIR 1963 SC 1626. The authority was discussed in relation to the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction and the need to establish sufficient grounds for judicial intervention.

14. Syed Yakoob Vs K.S. Radhakrishnan (Supreme Court); AIR 1964 SC 477. This Constitution Bench decision was considered for the established limitations of certiorari jurisdiction. Findings of fact cannot ordinarily be reopened as though the High Court were hearing an appeal. Judicial interference is permissible on recognised grounds such as jurisdictional defects, errors apparent on the record and specified evidentiary irregularities.

15. Anisminic Ltd. Vs Foreign Compensation Commission (House of Lords); (1969) 2 AC 147. The decision was discussed in connection with jurisdictional errors and the circumstances in which a determination may be legally defective notwithstanding the apparent exercise of statutory authority.

16. Tamil Nadu Education Department Ministerial and General Subordinate Services Association Vs State of Tamil Nadu (Supreme Court); (1980) 3 SCC 97. The judgment was considered in relation to judicial restraint in administrative policy and service matters. The determination of service conditions primarily falls within the competence of the appropriate authority, subject to constitutional and statutory limitations.

17. V.M. Gadre Vs M.G. Diwan (Supreme Court); (1996) 3 SCC 454. The appellants relied upon this decision to submit that constitutional courts cannot substitute existing service conditions without a sufficient legal foundation.

18. UT, Chandigarh Vs Krishan Bhandari (Supreme Court); (1996) 11 SCC 348. The decision was discussed in connection with equality claims made by employees governed by different service conditions. It demonstrates that a claim for parity must be supported by an appropriate legal and factual basis.

19. Union of India Vs Lieut (Mrs) E. Iacats (Supreme Court); (1997) 7 SCC 334. The Court considered this decision concerning different retirement ages applicable to nursing personnel under separate service arrangements. Similar professional functions do not necessarily establish a right to identical retirement conditions.

20. State of Bihar Vs Teachers’ Association of Govt. Engineering College (Supreme Court); (2000) 10 SCC 527. The decision was considered while explaining that employees governed by distinct recruitment and service rules cannot automatically claim retirement benefits applicable to employees of another establishment.

21. Indian Overseas Bank Vs I.O.B. Staff Canteen Workers’ Union (Supreme Court); AIR 2000 SC 1508. The authority was discussed in relation to the limited scope of judicial review and the circumstances in which findings of fact may be examined in writ proceedings.

22. Surya Dev Rai Vs Ram Chandra Rai (Supreme Court); (2003) 6 SCC 675. The judgment was referred to in the discussion of certiorari and supervisory jurisdiction. The relevant principles concern the limits of intervention in decisions of subordinate courts and tribunals.

23. Zee Telefilms Ltd. Vs Union of India (Supreme Court); (2005) 4 SCC 649. The decision was considered in relation to the legal character of autonomous institutions and the proposition that governmental funding or administrative connections do not, by themselves, conclusively determine constitutional status.

24. Kerala SRTC Vs K.O. Varghese (Supreme Court); (2007) 8 SCC 231. The judgment was discussed in connection with the distinction between employees of autonomous institutions and government employees for purposes of service conditions and equality claims.

25. DDA Vs Joint Action Committee, Allottee of SFS Flats (Supreme Court); (2008) 2 SCC 672. The Central Administrative Tribunal relied upon this decision concerning the recognised grounds on which policy decisions may be subjected to judicial review. A court cannot interfere with a policy merely because another approach appears preferable.

26. Census Commissioner Vs R. Krishnamurthy (Supreme Court); (2015) 2 SCC 796. The appellants cited this decision to contend that courts cannot ordinarily direct the executive to frame or implement a policy in a particular manner. Policy formulation remains primarily within the competence of the executive, subject to judicial review on recognised legal grounds.

27. T.M. Sampath Vs Secretary, Ministry of Water Resources (Supreme Court); (2015) 5 SCC 333. The decision was relied upon for the proposition that employees of autonomous institutions are governed by their applicable service rules and cannot automatically claim all benefits available to Central Government employees. The separate legal status and service framework of an institution are relevant considerations.

28. State of Himachal Pradesh Vs Rajesh Chander Sood (Supreme Court); (2016) 10 SCC 77. The appellants relied on this judgment concerning the limitations on imposing financial obligations upon State instrumentalities through judicial directions unsupported by established legal rights.

29. Kerala Assistant Public Prosecutors Association Vs State of Kerala (Supreme Court); AIR 2018 SC 2652. The Supreme Court discussed this judgment in relation to retirement-age parity between employees governed by different service conditions. Similarity in the nature of work does not automatically establish identical retirement entitlements.

30. Central Council for Research in Unani Medicine Vs Dr. Salma Khatoon (Supreme Court); 2020 SCC OnLine SC 1332. The appellants distinguished proceedings concerning doctors employed by another AYUSH research council. The interim proceedings in that matter did not establish an automatic entitlement for CCRAS employees to retire at 65 years.

31. North Delhi Municipal Corporation Vs Dr. Ram Naresh Sharma (Supreme Court); 2021 SCC OnLine SC 540. The respondent relied upon this decision concerning discriminatory implementation dates for enhanced retirement benefits applicable to AYUSH and allopathic doctors. The present case was distinguished because CCRAS was governed by separate service regulations and had not adopted the enhanced retirement policy.

32. New Okhla Industrial Development Authority Vs B.D. Singhal (Supreme Court); AIR 2021 SC 3457. The Court considered this decision concerning enhancement of retirement age under applicable statutory and service regulations. Retirement benefits must arise from the governing legal framework rather than an assumed right to parity.

33. State of Maharashtra Vs Bhagwan (Supreme Court); (2022) 4 SCC 193. The appellants relied upon this judgment concerning the service conditions of employees of autonomous institutions. The Supreme Court had held that employees of autonomous bodies cannot automatically claim parity with government employees in service benefits when the applicable institutional rules and policy decisions provide otherwise. The decision was relevant to the separate service framework governing CCRAS employees.

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CA Sandeep Kanoi
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