P. Singaravelan & Ors. Vs The District Collector Tiruppur and DT & Ors (Supreme Court)
It is useful to recall that it is well-settled that the dismissal of an SLP against an order or judgment of a lower forum is not an affirmation of the same. If such an order of this Court is non-speaking, it does not constitute a declaration of law under Article 141 of the Constitution, or attract the doctrine of merger.
“(i) Where an appeal or revision is provided against an order passed by a court, tribunal or any other authority before superior forum and such superior forum modifies, reverses or affirms the decision put in issue before it, the decision by the subordinate forum merges in the decision by the superior forum and it is the latter which subsists, remains operative and is capable of enforcement in the eye of law.
(ii) The jurisdiction conferred by Article 136 of the Constitution is divisible into two stages. The first stage is upto the disposal of prayer for special leave to file an appeal. The second stage commences if and when the leave to appeal is granted and the special leave petition is converted into an appeal.
(iii) The doctrine of merger is not a doctrine of universal or unlimited application. It will depend on the nature of jurisdiction exercised by the superior forum and the content or subject-matter of challenge laid or capable of being laid shall be determinative of the applicability of merger. The superior jurisdiction should be capable of reversing, modifying or affirming the order put in issue before it. Under Article 136 of the Constitution the Supreme Court may reverse, modify or affirm the judgment-decree or order appealed against while exercising its appellate jurisdiction and not while exercising the discretionary jurisdiction disposing of petition for special leave to appeal. The doctrine of merger can therefore be applied to the former and not to the latter.
(iv) An order refusing special leave to appeal may be a non-speaking order or a speaking one. In either case it does not attract the doctrine of merger. An order refusing special leave to appeal does not stand substituted in place of the order under challenge. All that it means is that the Court was not inclined to exercise its discretion so as to allow the appeal being
(v) If the order refusing leave to appeal is a speaking order i.e. gives reasons for refusing the grant of leave, then the order has two implications. Firstly, the statement of law contained in the order is a declaration of law by the Supreme Court within the meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution. Secondly, other than the declaration of law, whatever is stated in the order are the findings recorded by the Supreme Court which would bind the parties thereto and also the court, tribunal or authority in any proceedings subsequent thereto by way of judicial discipline, the Supreme Court being the Apex Court of the country. But, this does not amount to saying that the order of the court, tribunal or authority below has stood merged in the order of the Supreme Court rejecting the special leave petition or that the order of the Supreme Court is the only order binding as res judicata in subsequent proceedings between the parties.
(vi) Once leave to appeal has been granted and appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court has been invoked the order passed in appeal would attract the doctrine of merger; the order may be of reversal, modification or merely affirmation.
(vii) On an appeal having been preferred or a petition seeking leave to appeal having been converted into an appeal before the Supreme Court the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain a review petition is lost thereafter as provided by sub-rule (1) of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC.
FULL TEXT OF THE SUPREME COURT JUDGEMENT
Leave granted.
2. These appeals have been filed against the common final judgment and order dated 08.07.2015 passed by the High Court of Judicature at Madras allowing writ appeals filed by the Respondents herein, being state authorities, and dismissing writ petitions filed by the Appellants herein, being drivers in various departments of the Government of Tamil Nadu, with respect to the Selection Grade and Special Grade scales of pay applicable to them.
3. The Appellants, in a nutshell, are claiming the grant of Selection Grade and Special Grade scales of pay in the bracket of Rs. 5000-8000 and Rs. 5500-9000 respectively in terms of G.O. Ms. No. 162, Finance (Pay Cell) Department dated 13.04.1998 (for short “G.O. Ms. No. 162”), which has been granted to around 3000 similarly placed employees. The Appellants place reliance on various decisions rendered by this Court and the High Court of Madras in several writ petitions and appeals granting similar pay scales to the petitioners therein. Thus, it is argued that the impugned judgment of the High Court has erroneously differed from the consistent view taken in these decisions.
4. On the other hand, the Respondents argue in favour of the impugned judgment, claiming that the initial grant of the claimed pay scale to some drivers (out of which the entire cluster of litigations arose) was merely on account of an error on the part of officials in some government departments. Thus, it is submitted that the applicable scales of pay are Rs. 4000-6000 and Rs. 4300-6000 respectively for the Selection Grade and Special Grade.
5. It has come to our attention that several Benches of this Court have dismissed SLPs against decisions of the High Court fixing pay scales of the concerned drivers therein at Rs. 5000-8000 for the Selection Grade and Rs. 5500-9000 for the Special Grade in terms of G. O. Ms. No. 162. We deem it fit to refer to the orders passed by this Court in this respect:
