Deloitte Tax Services India Private Limited Vs DCIT (ITAT Hyderabad)
Summary: The Hyderabad Bench “B” of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal disposed of ITA-TP Nos. 341/Hyd/2023 and 342/Hyd/2023 through a common order dated 19 June 2024 for Assessment Year 2018-19. The appeals were filed by Deloitte Tax Services India Private Limited and Deloitte & Touche Assurance & Enterprise Risk Services India Private Limited against orders dated 2 May 2023 passed by the CIT(A)-10, Hyderabad. The hearing took place on 21 May 2024.
The principal issue common to both appeals concerned the allowability of deduction under Section 80G of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for donations forming part of Corporate Social Responsibility expenditure. In ITA No. 342/Hyd/2023, the assessee also challenged denial of refund of excess Dividend Distribution Tax (DDT) paid by mistake.
According to the assessees, during financial year 2018-19 they made donations in discharge of their CSR obligations. Since CSR expenditure was not allowable as business expenditure under Section 37, the assessees suo moto disallowed the expenditure while computing business income and subsequently claimed the contribution under Section 80G. Their case was that Section 37 and Section 80G operated independently and that there was no general statutory prohibition against claiming a deduction under Section 80G merely because the donation also formed part of CSR expenditure.
The authorities below rejected the claim. They considered the CSR contributions to lack voluntariness because the expenditure was made pursuant to the statutory obligation under Section 135 of the Companies Act, 2013. The CIT(A) also relied upon the restriction contained in the proviso to Section 37(1), under which CSR expenditure referred to in Section 135 of the Companies Act was not deemed to have been incurred for purposes of business or profession.
Before the Tribunal, the learned AR submitted that the assessees were not claiming CSR donations as business expenditure. They had already disallowed the amounts in compliance with Section 37(1), and their subsequent claim was under Chapter VI-A, specifically Section 80G. The AR further contended that CSR expenditure could qualify for deduction under other provisions where the statutory conditions were satisfied. Reliance was placed on CBDT Circular No. 01/2015 dated 21 January 2015, which, according to the submission, did not impose a restriction on Section 80G deductions, and on FAQ No. 6 of General Circular No. 01/2016 dated 12 January 2016 issued by the Ministry of Corporate Affairs. The AR also relied upon First American (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. ACIT, Allegis Services (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. ACIT, FNF India Private Ltd. v. ACIT, JMS Mining (P.) Ltd. v. Pr. CIT, P.C. Chandra Holding Pvt. Ltd. v. Pr. CIT-2 and Naik Seafoods Pvt. Ltd. v. Pr. CIT-2.
The Revenue opposed the claim on the ground that CSR expenditure was compulsory rather than voluntary. It submitted that allowing the Section 80G deduction would enable an assessee to obtain a benefit both for complying with Section 135 of the Companies Act and for claiming a deduction under Section 80G.
The Tribunal first considered the effect of Explanation 2 to Section 37(1). It recorded that the assessees did not claim the CSR expenditure as a deduction under Sections 30 to 36 and had suo moto disallowed the expenditure by adding it back to the profit and loss account. The Tribunal observed that whether the assessees had actually made such disallowance was a verifiable fact.
The Tribunal then examined whether donations made in compliance with Section 135 of the Companies Act to institutions covered by Section 80G(2) could nevertheless qualify for deduction under Section 80G. It noted that the Income-tax Act did not contain an express provision supporting the Revenue’s contention that the Section 80G benefit was exhausted merely because the donation also satisfied a CSR obligation.
Particular significance was given to Section 80G(2)(iiihk) and Section 80G(2)(iiihl), which specifically deal with contributions to the Swachh Bharat Kosh and Clean Ganga Fund and exclude amounts spent in pursuance of CSR under Section 135(5) of the Companies Act. The Tribunal reasoned that, among the various entries covered by Section 80G(2), the Legislature had expressly imposed CSR-related restrictions in respect of those two donations but had not imposed a similar restriction on other eligible donations.
The Tribunal reproduced and agreed with the reasoning of the Kolkata Bench in JMS Mining (P.) Ltd. v. Pr. CIT, [2021] 190 ITD 702 (Kolkata – Trib.). That decision had considered the specific exclusions concerning Swachh Bharat Kosh and Clean Ganga Fund and applied the maxim “expressio unius est exclusio alterius” in concluding that the absence of a similar restriction for other eligible Section 80G donations supported their allowability, subject to satisfaction of the statutory conditions.
The Tribunal in the present case expressly stated that it was in agreement with those observations and findings and, while respectfully following the same, held that where the assessees satisfied the conditions of Section 80G, they were entitled to claim deduction under Section 80G in respect of donations forming part of their CSR spend. The relevant grounds in both appeals were therefore decided in favour of the assessees.
The second issue in ITA No. 342/Hyd/2023 concerned refund of excess DDT. The authorities had refused the refund on the reasoning that the Income-tax Act did not envisage refund of DDT and that, in the absence of a specific provision, no refund could be granted.
The Tribunal held that the issue was no longer res integra. It referred to Torrent (P.) Ltd. v. CIT, [2013] 35 taxmann.com 300 (Gujarat), where the Gujarat High Court held that Section 237 entitled a person to refund where the tax paid exceeded the amount properly chargeable under the Act, and that the provision covered refund of excess DDT. The Tribunal also referred to Vedanta Ltd. v. ACIT, ITA No. 5367/Del/2019, dated 2 February 2023, which, while referring to the order dated 17 November 2021 in ITA No. 5368/Del/2019, distinguished a claim for refund of DDT itself from a claim for refund of excess DDT credit and ordered refund of excess DDT paid.
Following that legal position, the Tribunal directed the Assessing Officer to grant refund of the excess DDT paid by the assessee, after due verification. The relevant grounds were allowed.
Ultimately, both appeals were allowed. The order was pronounced in the open court on 19 June 2024. The operative relief on the DDT issue was expressly subject to verification by the Assessing Officer. The Tribunal’s Section 80G ruling likewise proceeded on the basis that the assessees satisfied the statutory conditions applicable to the deduction.
Cases Discussed
- First American (India) Pvt. Ltd. Vs ACIT, ITA No. 1762/Bang/2019 — referred to among the Coordinate Bench decisions relied upon by the assessees in support of the Section 80G claim.
- Allegis Services (India) Pvt. Ltd. vs. ACIT, ITA No. 1693/Bang/2019 — referred to as a Coordinate Bench decision supporting the claim that payments forming part of CSR could qualify for deduction under Section 80G.
- FNF India Private Ltd. vs. ACIT, ITA No. 1565/Bang/2019 — referred to as a Coordinate Bench decision concerning the Section 80G treatment of CSR payments.
- JMS Mining (P.) Ltd. vs. Pr. CIT, [2021] 190 ITD 702 (Kolkata – Trib.) — considered in detail on whether CSR donations otherwise satisfying Section 80G conditions could qualify for deduction, including the significance of the specific exclusions for Swachh Bharat Kosh and Clean Ganga Fund.
- P.C. Chandra Holding Pvt. Ltd. vs. Pr. CIT-2, ITA No. 256/Kol/2022 — referred to among the Coordinate Bench decisions relied upon by the learned AR in support of the Section 80G claim.
- Naik Seafoods Pvt. Ltd. vs. Pr. CIT-2, ITA No. 490/Mum/2021 — referred to among the Coordinate Bench decisions relied upon by the learned AR in support of the Section 80G claim.
- Deloitte & Touche Assurance & Enterprise Risk Services India Private Limited vs. DCIT, ITA No. 342/Hyd/2023 — connected appeal disposed of by the common order; the Tribunal allowed the Section 80G grounds and, in this appeal, also directed refund of excess DDT after verification.
- Torrent (P.) Ltd. v. CIT, [2013] 35 taxmann.com 300 (Gujarat) — followed on the applicability of Section 237 to refund of excess DDT paid by an assessee.
- Vedanta Ltd. vs. ACIT, ITA No. 5367/Del/2019, dated 02/02/2023 — referred to as a Tribunal decision which ordered refund of excess DDT paid by the assessee after distinguishing refund of DDT per se from refund of excess DDT credit.
FULL TEXT OF THE JUDGMENT/ORDER OF ITAT HYDERABAD
Aggrieved by the order(s) dated 02/05/2023 passed by the learned Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)-10, Hyderabad (“Ld. CIT(A)”), in the cases of M/s. Deloitte Tax Services India Private Limited and M/s. Deloitte & Touche Assurance & Enterprise Risk Services India Private Limited (“the assessees”) for the assessment year 2018-19, both the assessees preferred these appeals.
2. The issue relating to the claim of the assessees under section 80G of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (‘the Act’) is common in both these appeals, whereas in ITA No. 342/Hyd/2023, assessee is aggrieved against the denial of refund of excess Dividend Distribution Tax (DDT) paid by the assessee by mistake. We, therefore, find it just and convenient to dispose of these two appeals, by way of this common order.
3. In respect of the claim of the assessees in both these appeals, under section 80G of the Act is concerned, brief facts of the case are that during the financial year 2018-19, the assessees, in discharge of their obligation towards Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), made donations. According to the assessees, since the expenditure was not allowable under section 37 of the Act, the assessees suo moto disallowed the same while computing the income from business incompliance with the requirement of proviso to section 37(1) of the Act. Later on, assesses claimed the contribution under section 80G of the Act. Assessees pleaded before the authorities below that in compliance with section 37(1) of the Act, they suo moto disallowed the same while computing the business income, but since there is no bar or restriction on deduction under section 80G of the Act, the assessee is entitled to claim such contribution as deduction under section 80G of the Act.
4. Both the authorities below rejected the contention of the assessees. According to them there is no element of voluntariness of this contribution, because it was paid under the compulsion of law under section 135 of the Companies Act, the assessees are not entitled to claim the contribution as a deduction under section 80G of the Act. According to the learned CIT(A) also the specific bar contained in the proviso to section 37(1) of the Act says that for the purpose of the section, any expenditure incurred by the assessees on the activities relating to CSR referred to in section 135 of the Companies Act, 2013 shall not be deemed to be an expenditure incurred by the assessees for the purposes of business or profession, and therefore, once having with the obligation under section 135 of the Companies Act, the assessees cannot claim the very same amount as a deduction under section 80G of the Act.
5. Aggrieved, the assessees filed these appeals, stating that the assessees are not claiming the contribution to the trust as business expenditure and in compliance with the proviso to section 37(1) of the Act, the assessees suo moto disallowed the same, but since there is no bar in the Act, from claiming this expenditure as deduction under section 80G of the same, such a claim cannot be denied.
6. Learned AR further argued that there is no bar on claiming CSR expenditure as deduction if it falls within the scope of section 30 to 36 of the Act or qualifies for deduction under Chapter VI-A. CBDT Circular No. 01/2015 dt. 21/01/2015 in fact supports the position of assessees inasmuch as it specifically provides that there is no estoppel to claim CSR expenditure as deduction if it is of the nature described in section 30 to 36 of the Act; that neither Explanation 2 nor the Circular cast any restriction qua allowability of CSR expenditure as deduction under section 80G of the Act; that Section 80G and section 37 of the Act are independent; that only in case of specific exclusion provided under clauses (iiihk) and (iiihl) of section 80G(2) of the Act stipulate that such contributions shall be other than the sums spent by the assessees in pursuance of CSR under section 135(5) of the Companies Act.
7. Learned AR placed reliance on FAQ No. 6 in the General Circular No. 01/2016 dated 12/01/2016 issued by Ministry of Corporate Affairs. Lastly, he placed reliance on the decisions of the Co-ordinate Benches of the Tribunal in the cases of First American (India) Pvt. Ltd. vs. ACIT: ITA No. 1762/Bang/2019, Allegis services (India) Pvt. Ltd. vs. ACIT: ITA No. 1693/Bang/2019, FNF India Private Ltd. vs. ACIT: ITA No.1565/Bang/2019, JMS Mining (P.) Ltd. vs. Pr. CIT: [2021] 190 ITD 702 (Kolkata – Trib.), P.C. Chandra Holding Pvt. Ltd. vs. Pr. CIT-2: ITA No. 256/Kol/2022 and Naik Seafoods Pvt. Ltd. vs. Pr. CIT-2: ITA No. 490/Mum/2021 in support of his argument.
8. Per contra, learned DR vehemently opposed the argument advanced by the learned AR and submitted that as rightly pointed out by the authorities below, when the assessees spent some amount in discharge of their CSR, such spending cannot be said as voluntary and it is only under the compulsion of law. Since the element of voluntariness is missing in this case, the said spending does not fall in the ambit of section 80G of the Act. He further submitted that the assessees cannot claim compliance of the provisions under section 135 of the Companies Act and also as donations under section 80G of the Act. If such a plea is accepted, the purpose and philosophy behind the CSR under section 135 of the Companies Act will be defeated and every assessee will claim double benefit of the same amount spent, showing it under compliance with section 135 of the Companies Act and also claiming benefit under section 80G of the Act. Learned DR further submitted that when the letter of law is clear and does not warrant any interpretation, no aid need be sought from any external source.
9. We have gone through the record in the light of the submissions made on either side. According to the learned Assessing Officer, by showing such an amount as spending incompliance with section 135 of the Companies Act, the assessee had the benefit of compliance with such a provision and, therefore, the matter ends there insofar as such payments are concerned. Except the business expenditure covered by section 30 to 36 of the Act as stipulated under section 37(1) of the Act, no other expenditure is allowable and this position is made amply clear by insertion of Explanation-2 to section 37(1) of the Act. It says that any expenditure incurred towards the activities relating to CSR, shall not be deemed to be an expenditure incurred for the purpose of business.
10. It is, therefore, clear that the question that is relevant to be answered on this issue is whether the donations given for compliance with the provisions under section 135 of the Companies Act, to the institutions mentioned in section 80G(2) of the Act are qualified for deduction under section 80G of the Act also.
11. Explanation-2 to section 37(1) of the Act says that any expenditure relatable to the discharge of CSR, is not a business expenditure and cannot be allowed as such. On this aspect, there is no dispute that in compliance with this requirement, the assessee does not claim any deduction of such amount spent as CSR under any of the provisions between 30 and 36 of the Act, and sue moto disallowed the same by adding it back to the P&L account. It is only thereafter the business income of the assessee is computed in accordance with the principles laid down for computation of the profits and gains of business or profession in sections 28 to 44DB of the Act. With this assessees report compliance with Explanation-2 of section 37 of the Act and, therefore, the Revenue shall not have any grievance. Above all, whether or not the assessees sue moto disallowed the spend towards the CSR while computing the business income is a verifiable fact.
12. At the time of computing the business income, while computing the total income of the assessees, the assessees are invoking the benefit under chapter-VIA by claiming deduction of the sums under section 80G of the Act. According to the Revenue, when once such sum went to satisfy the requirement of section 135 of the Companies Act, the benefit gets exhausted and such an amount is no more available for the purpose of claiming deduction under section 80G of the Act.
13. Coming to the Income Tax Act, 1961, there is no express provision to support the contention of the Revenue. On the other hand, section 80G(2)(iiihk) and (iiihl) of the Act expressly refer to the sums donated for Swatch Bharath Kosh and Clean Ganga Fund shall be the amounts other than the sums spent by the assessee in pursuance of CSR, meaning thereby the donations made towards Swatch Bharath Kosh and Clean Ganga Fund spent as a part of CSR are not qualified for deduction under section 80G of the Act. Out of so many entries under section 80G(2) of the Act, only donations in respect of two entries are restricted if such payments were towards the discharge of the CSR. The Legislature could have put a similar embargo in respect of the other entries also, but such a restriction is conspicuously absent for other entries. The irresistible conclusion that would flow from it, therefore, is that it is not the legislative intention to bar the payments covered by section 80G(2) of the Act which were made pursuant to the CSR, and other than covered by section 80G(2)(iiihk) and (iiihl) of the Act. As stated above, clue can be had from the restrictions by way of section 80G(2)(iiihk) and (iiihl) of the Act.
14. This aspect has been dealt with by successive Co-ordinate Benches in the cases relied upon by the assessee. While elaborately discussing this issue in the case of JMS Mining (P.) Ltd. (supra), the Kolkata Bench of the Tribunal discussed this issue in the following manner:
“22. From a bare reading of the section 80G of the Act we note that deduction under this section has to be made in accordance with and subject to the provisions of this section i.e. section 80G of the Act. As per this section i.e. section 80G of the Act, an amount equal to fifty percent (50%) of the aggregate of the sums specified in sub-section 2 [refer sub-clause (iv) of Clause (a) of Sub-section 2 of section 80G of the Act read with section 80G (1) (ii)] which allows the donation given to any other Fund or any institution to which this section applies and if it satisfies the requirement of sub-section (5) of section 80G of the Act, then 50% of the donation is allowable expenditure [refer section 80G (1) (ii)]even if the assessee has included the expenditure as CSR Expenditure because there is no prohibition or restriction placed by the Parliament on such a donation even if shown as CSR expenditure. The reason for saying so is that in section 80G of the Act certain restrictions in respect of deduction in respect of two (2) donations are expressly seen in this Section. So the Parliament has expressed its intention clearly by bringing in restriction in respect of expenditure classified by an assessee company while claiming deduction u/s. 80G of the Act i.e. CSR expenditure related to Swachh Bharat Kosh and Clean Ganga Fund. So if an assessee makes some donation to these projects and include/classify it as CSR expenditure while claiming deduction u/s. 80G of the Act then it will be allowed only the amount that is other than the sums spent by the assessee in pursuance of CSR u/s. 135 of the Companies Act. In other words, if an assessee company spends only the mandatory expenditure of 2% of net profit for CSR activity, which includes the amount of donation to Swachh Bharat Kosh & Clean Ganga Fund (iiihk) and (iiihi) of clause (a) of sub-section (2) of section 80G of the Act, then deduction u/s. 80G of the Act is not allowable, which can be illustrated by giving certain examples (infra). However, in a case scenario, wherein the assessee expends the mandatory expenditure and gives donation to these two projects i.e. over and above the mandatory CSR expenditure u/s. 135 of Companies Act, that sum donated to Swach Bharat Kosh & Clean Ganga Fund will be eligible for 100% deduction u/s 80G of the Act [refer section 80G (1)(i) and subject to section 80G (4)]. However, such a restriction in respect of expenditure made by an assessee to any other fund or institution as referred to in sub clause (iv) of clause (a) of sub-section 2 of section 80G of the Act had not been placed by the Legislature. And if the Parliament desired, it could have been made such kind of restriction or any restriction like in the case of donation to Swach Bharat Kosh & Clean Ganga Fund. So the assertion of Ld. PCIT that AO could not have allowed deduction u/s 80G of the Act to an assessee on the CSR expenditure/donation to an institution u/s 80G(2)(a)(iv) which is enjoying certificate 80G(5)(vi) of the Act, is erroneous and therefore cannot be accepted. For this, we rely on the interpretation maxim “Expressio Unius Esl Exclusio Alterius” which is a Latin phrase that means “express mention of one thing excludes all others. This is one of the rules used in interpretation of Statutes. The phrase indicates that items not on the list are assumed not to be covered by the Statute. When something is mentioned expressly in a Statute, it leads to the presumption that the things not mentioned are excluded. This is an aid to the construction of Statutes. Applying the legal maxim ‘expressio unius est exclusio alterius’, it can be safely inferred that when the Legislature in particular has provided for only the above referred two specific exceptions in Section 80G, then it is the implied intent of the Legislature to permit deduction u/s 80G in respect of CSR contributions made to funds/organizations referred to in all other sub-clauses of Section 80G [other than (iiihk) and (iiihl)] of the Act. The above analysis made by us, can be cumulatively illustrated by the following examples for ease of understanding purpose only and should not be cited for making claim which should be made subject to the facts and law involved in each case and also subject to section 80G(4) of the Act:
Example: A company has reported eligible net profit u/s 135 of Companies Act, 2013 at Rs.100 crores. The minimum CSR contribution of 2% under Section 135(5) of the Act works out to be Rs. 2 crores.
Situation 1 : The company has been spent the required minimum CSR contribution of Rs 2 crores towards construction of roads & schools in the vicinity of the backward area where the factory is located.
Tax Treatment: The entire CSR expenditure of Rs.2 crores is to be disallowed and added back in terms of Explanation 2 to Section 37(1) of the Act.
Situation 2 : The company has contributed Rs.3 crores to Swach Bharat Kosh.
Tax Treatment: The entire CSR expenditure of Rs.3 crores is to be disallowed and added back in terms of Explanation 2 to Section 37(1) of the Act. In terms of Section 135(5) of the Act read with Section 80G(iiihk) only the excess sum paid amounting to Rs. 1 crores [ 3 crores – 2% of 100 crores] can be availed as deduction u/s 80G of the Act.
Situation 3 : The company has contributed Rs.l crore to Swach Bharat Kosh and Rs.1 crore to any other charitable trust registered u/s 80G(5) of the Act.
Tax Treatment: The entire CSR expenditure of Rs.2 crores is to be disallowed and added back in terms of Explanation 2 to Section 37(1) of the Act. In terms of Section 135(5) of the Act read with Section 80G(iiihk) the donation of Rs.l crores made to Swach Bharat Kosh is not eligible for deduction u/s 80G of the Act. The company can claim deduction of fifty percent of the donation of Rs. 1 crores paid to any other registered charitable trust u/s 80G(2)(iv) read with Section 80G(1)(ii) of the Act.
Situation 4 : The company has contributed Rs.1 crore to Prime Minister’s National Relief Fund and Rs. 1 crore to any other charitable trust registered u/s 80G(5) of the Act.
Tax Treatment: The entire CSR expenditure of Rs.2 crores is to be disallowed and added back in terms of Explanation 2 to Section 37(1) of the Act.
The company can claim deduction for hundred percent of the donation of Rs. 1 crores paid to Prime Minister’s National Relief Fund u/s 80G(2)(iiia) read with Section 80G(1)(i) of the Act.
The company claim deduction to the extent of fifty percent of the donation of Rs. 1 crores paid to any other registered charitable trust u/s 80G(2)(iv) read with Section 80G(1)(ii) of the Act.
23. As discussed supra, we concur with the contention of the assessee that since Parliament intended certain restrictions to only CSR expenditure in respect of two donations included by an assessee as CSR expenditure i.e. [Swachh Bharat Kosh and Clean Ganga Fund] has impliedly not made any prohibition/restriction in respect of claim of CSR expenses in other cases if it is otherwise eligible under Section 80G of the Act. In this context we find that the assessee has made donation of Rs. 1.25 crores on 20.01.2016 by RTGS dated 19.01.2016 through UCO Bank which is evident from page 18 of PB which is received by Shree Charity Trust which was 80G(5)(vi) certificate of the Department dated 15.01.2009 placed at page 17 of PB. The assessee has also made payment of Rs. 10 Lakhs to Pt. Jashraj Music Academy Trust which is found placed at page 22 & 23 and the approval u/s 80G (5)(vi) of the Act in respect of Pt. Jashraj Music Academy Trust is found placed at page 19 of PB dated 30.03.2012 given by Director of Income Tax (Exemption). Therefore, since the assessee satisfies the condition u/s. 80G of the Act of the donees, the assessee’s claim for deduction of CSR expenses/contribution u/s 80G of the Act was allowed after enquiry by the AO. Thus we are of the opinion that the action of the AO allowing the claim u/s. 80G of the Act is a plausible view and is in line with the ratio of the decision of Tribunal cited (supra). Therefore we find that the Ld. PCIT has not been able to make out a case that on this issue raised by him, the AO’s order is erroneous as well as prejudicial to the revenue. So the jurisdictional fact as well as law is absent for invoking revisional jurisdiction. Therefore, the usurpation of jurisdiction by Ld. PCIT u/s 263 of the Act is bad in law and therefore need to be quashed and we order accordingly”.
15. We are in agreement with such observations and findings of the Co-ordinate Bench of the Tribunal and while respectfully following the same, we hold that inasmuch as the assessees satisfied the conditions of section 80G of the Act, the assessees are entitled to claim deduction under section 80G of the Act in respect of such donations which formed part of the spend towards CSR. Accordingly, we hold the relevant grounds in favour of the assessees in both the appeals.
16. The other issue involved in ITA No. 342/Hyd/2023 is in respect of the refusal of both the authorities to order refund the excess DDT on the ground that the Income Tax Act does not envisage the refund of DDT and in the absence of any provision, no refund could be granted.
17. As a matter of fact, this issue is no longer res integra. In the case of Torrent (P.) Ltd. v. CIT [2013] 35 taxmann.com 300 (Gujarat), the Hon’ble Gujarat High Court held that Section 237 provides that if any person satisfies the Assessing Officer that the amount of tax paid by him or on his behalf or treated as paid by him or on his behalf for any assessment year exceeds the amount with which he is properly chargeable under the Act for that year, he shall be entitled to a refund of the excess amount, and, therefore, the case of the assessee would, thus, for refund of the excess DDT paid by it be clearly covered under the said statutory provisions. This decision has been followed by the Tribunal in many cases. In the case of Vedanta Ltd., vs. ACIT, in ITA No. 5367/Del/2019, dated 02/02/2023 while referring to the order dated 17/11/2021 of the Co-ordinate Bench of the Tribunal in ITA No. 5368/Del/2019 distinguished the claim for refund of DDT per se and the claim for refund of excess credit of DDT and ordered refund of excess DDT paid by the assessee.
18. In view of the above settled legal position and while respectfully following the same, we direct the learned Assessing Officer to grant refund of the excess DDT paid by the assessee, after due verification. Relevant grounds are allowed accordingly.
19. In the result, both the appeals are allowed.
Order pronounced in the open court on this the 19th day of June, 2024.
