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Section 153C Assessments Quashed for Three AYs: ITAT Delhi Applies Ten-Year Block and April 2021 Cut-off

Case Law Details

TaxGuru Citation
2026 taxguru.in 19092
Case Name
Ashutosh Agarwal Vs DCIT (ITAT Delhi)
Appeal Number
Premium Access
Date of Judgement/Order
Premium Access
Related Assessment Year
2014-15
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Ashutosh Agarwal Vs DCIT (ITAT Delhi)

Summary: The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Delhi Bench ‘B’, in Ashutosh Agarwal Vs DCIT, decided on 30 April 2026, allowed three appeals concerning Assessment Years 2014-15, 2015-16 and 2016-17 and quashed the assessments framed under Section 153C of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The Tribunal applied two distinct jurisdictional principles. For AY 2014-15, it held that the assessment year fell outside the permissible ten-year block calculated with reference to the satisfaction recorded on 31 May 2023. For AYs 2015-16 and 2016-17, it held that proceedings under Section 153C were invalid because the relevant satisfaction had been recorded after 1 April 2021, when the statutory restriction under Section 153C(3) had become operative. The Tribunal followed the Delhi High Court’s decision in PCIT Vs Ojjus Medicare Pvt. Ltd., the Madras High Court’s decision in Harigovind Vs ACIT, and the Delhi Tribunal’s decision in Smt. Geetanjali Bhayana Vs DCIT.

The proceedings originated from a search and seizure operation under Section 132 conducted on 18 October 2019 against the Alankit Group and its associates. During the search, documents allegedly connected with Ashutosh Agarwal were found at one of the searched premises. Consequently, the assessee’s case was centralised with Central Circle-28, New Delhi. The Assessing Officer issued notices under Section 153C on 12 June 2023 and completed the assessments in March 2024. The Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals)-25, New Delhi, dismissed the assessee’s appeals by a common order dated 9 October 2025, prompting the assessee to approach the Tribunal.

For AY 2014-15, the assessee had originally filed his return on 13 August 2014 declaring income of ₹4,27,520. The Assessing Officer subsequently completed the assessment under Section 153C at ₹41,16,150 by order dated 9 March 2024. The grounds of appeal challenged, among other matters, additions of ₹36,66,880 and ₹21,117 under Section 69A and ₹633 under Section 69C. The assessee also questioned the existence of incriminating material, compliance with principles of natural justice, approval under Section 153D, limitation and the validity of the satisfaction recorded for initiating proceedings. However, the decisive contention before the Tribunal was that AY 2014-15 fell outside the statutory block of ten assessment years.

The authorised representative submitted that the satisfaction under Section 153C was recorded on 31 May 2023, making AY 2024-25 the relevant assessment year for determining the ten-year block. Accordingly, the permissible block extended from AY 2024-25 backwards to AY 2015-16. AY 2014-15 therefore fell beyond the statutory period. Reliance was placed on the Delhi High Court judgment in PCIT Vs Ojjus Medicare Pvt. Ltd., (2024) 465 ITR 101 (Delhi), which explained the operation of the first proviso to Section 153C and the method for identifying the relevant assessment years in the case of a person other than the searched person. The Tribunal accepted this argument and held that both the notice and assessment order for AY 2014-15 were invalid.

The Tribunal reproduced the ten-year computation from paragraph 95 of the Delhi High Court judgment. On the facts of the case, the block began with AY 2024-25 as the first year and concluded with AY 2015-16 as the tenth year. The Tribunal observed that AY 2014-15 was beyond the scope of Section 153C and consequently quashed the assessment without adjudicating the individual additions on their merits. This finding was independent of the separate issue concerning the statutory restriction introduced with effect from 1 April 2021.

For AY 2015-16, the assessee had filed the original return on 12 March 2016 declaring income of ₹4,80,100. Following the search, the Assessing Officer issued the Section 153C notice on 12 June 2023 and assessed total income at ₹15,80,100 by order dated 9 March 2024. The assessee challenged an addition of ₹11,00,000 under Section 69A and also questioned the jurisdictional validity of the proceedings. The authorised representative contended that, after the statutory amendment effective from 1 April 2021, proceedings based on the relevant post-amendment date could not be initiated under Section 153C. Instead, any permissible reassessment action would have to follow the applicable provisions of Section 148.

In support, the assessee relied upon Harigovind Vs ACIT, (2025) 180 taxmann.com 197 (Madras), and Smt. Geetanjali Bhayana Vs DCIT. These authorities addressed the relevance of the date on which seized material is received by the jurisdictional Assessing Officer of the other person and the operation of Section 153C(3). The Tribunal reproduced substantial extracts from these decisions, including the Madras High Court’s discussion of the Supreme Court ruling in CIT Vs Jasjit Singh. The quoted reasoning explained that the statutory deeming provision concerning the other person could not be confined merely to the abatement of pending assessments.

Respectfully following the Madras High Court and the coordinate Bench, the Tribunal held that since the satisfaction had been recorded after 1 April 2021, proceedings under Section 148 ought to have been initiated instead of Section 153C. It therefore quashed the Section 153C proceedings for AY 2015-16. As the jurisdictional issue disposed of the appeal, the remaining grounds, including those concerning the substantive additions, were treated as academic and were not adjudicated.

The Tribunal applied the same conclusion to AY 2016-17, observing that the issues involved were identical and that its ruling for AY 2015-16 would apply mutatis mutandis. In that appeal, the assessee had challenged additions including ₹14,10,000 under Section 68, ₹42,300 and ₹60,000 under Section 69C, and ₹5,90,000 and ₹20,00,000 under Section 69A. These additions were not independently examined because the underlying assessment proceedings were quashed on jurisdictional grounds. Ultimately, the Tribunal allowed all three appeals, reinforcing the importance of the correct ten-year block computation and the statutory restriction governing Section 153C proceedings after 1 April 2021.

Ten-Year Assessment Block Applied by the Tribunal

Assessment Year Position in Ten-Year Block
2024-25 1
2023-24 2
2022-23 3
2021-22 4
2020-21 5
2019-20 6
2018-19 7
2017-18 8
2016-17 9
2015-16 10

Result: AY 2014-15 falls outside the ten-year block computed by the Tribunal.

Cases Discussed

1. PCIT Vs Ojjus Medicare Pvt. Ltd. (Delhi High Court); (2024) 465 ITR 101. Relied upon for the determination of the relevant date and computation of the ten-year block under Section 153C. The Tribunal applied this decision to hold that AY 2014-15 fell outside the permissible period.

2. Harigovind Vs ACIT (Madras High Court); (2025) 180 taxmann.com 197; 28/10/2025; AY: 2012-13 and connected assessment years. Followed for the interpretation of the statutory restriction in Section 153C(3) and the deemed date relevant to a person other than the searched person.

3. Smt. Geetanjali Bhayana Vs DCIT (ITAT Delhi); ITA Nos. 2227, 2228 & 2252/Del/2025; [2026] 183 taxmann.com 95; AYs: 2018-19 and connected years. Followed for the conclusion that proceedings under Section 153C could not be sustained where the relevant satisfaction date fell after 1 April 2021.

4. CIT Vs Jasjit Singh (Supreme Court). Discussed within the Madras High Court judgment reproduced by the Tribunal. The Supreme Court’s reasoning concerned the interpretation of the first proviso to Section 153C and rejected the contention that its operation was confined to abatement of pending proceedings.

Related TaxGuru Judgments

The interpretation of Section 153C and the deemed date of search has also been examined in Delayed Transfer of Seized Material Invalidates Seven Section 153C Assessments: ITAT Delhi, ITAT Chennai Quashes Section 153C Notices as Seized Material Received After 1st April 2021, and ITAT Quashes Section 153C Assessments as Satisfaction Note Was Recorded After 1st April 2021.

FULL TEXT OF THE ORDER OF ITAT DELHI

The above captioned three appeals in ITA Nos. 6624, 6625 & 6626/Del/2025 are preferred by the assessees against the order dated 09.10.2025, passed by Ld. CIT(A)-25, New Delhi u/s 250 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”) for A.Ys. 2014-15, 2015-16 & 2016-17, respectively.

2. The assessees has raised following grounds of appeal:

ITA No. 6624/Del/2025

“1. That having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, ld. CIT(A) has erred in law and on facts in confirming the action of Ld. AO in passing the impugned assessment order u/s 153C and that too without assuming jurisdiction as per law and without recording mandatory ‘satisfaction’ in accordance with law and without complying/following with the other mandatory conditions/procedure as laid down u/s 153C in accordance with law.

2. That in any case and in any view of the matter, action of ld. CIT(A) in confirming the action of Ld. AO in passing the impugned assessment order u/s 153C, is illegal, bad in law and against the facts and circumstances of the case and the same is not sustainable on various legal and factual grounds.

3. That having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, Ld. CIT(A) has erred in law and on facts in confirming the action of Ld. AO in making addition of Rs.36,66,880/- by treating it as alleged unexplained money u/s 69A and that too without there being any incriminating material found as a result of search and by recording incorrect facts and findings and without following the principles of natural justice and without confronting the adverse material on record and without providing the opportunity of cross examination.

4. That in any case and in any view of the matter, action of ld. CIT(A) in confirming the action of Ld. AO in making addition of Rs.36,66,880/- u/s 69A, is bad in law and against the facts and circumstances of the case.

5. That having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, Ld. CIT(A) has erred in law and on facts in confirming the action of Ld. AO in making addition of Rs.21,117/- by treating it as alleged unexplained money u/s 69A and that too without there being any incriminating material found as a result of search and by recording incorrect facts and findings and without following the principles of natural justice and without confronting the adverse material on record and without providing the opportunity of cross examination.

6. That having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, Ld. CIT(A) has erred in law and on facts in confirming the action of Ld. AO in making addition of Rs.633/- by treating it as alleged unexplained expenditure u/s 69C and taxing the same u/s 115BBE and that too without there being any incriminating material found as a result of search and by recording incorrect facts and findings and without following the principles of natural justice and without confronting the adverse material on record and without providing the opportunity of cross examination.

7. That in any case and without prejudice to the above grounds, additions made in the impugned assessment order is beyond jurisdiction and illegal, also for the reason that such order could not have been made since no incriminating material has been found as a result of search.

8. That having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, Ld. CIT(A) has erred in law and on facts in confirming the action of Ld. AO in passing the impugned assessment order dated 17-03-2024 without there being requisite approval in terms of section 153D and in any case approval, if any, is mechanical without application of mind and is no approval in the eyes of law.

9. That having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, Ld. CIT(A) has erred in law and on facts in confirming the action of Ld. AO in passing the impugned assessment order dated 17-03-2024 which is barred by limitation.

10. That having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, Ld. CIT(A) has erred in law and on facts in confirming the action of Ld. AO in assuming jurisdiction u/s 153C and passing the impugned reassessment order u/s 153C dated 09-03-2024 is illegal, and bad in law for the reason that the satisfaction recorded by Ld. AO of the searched person and AO of the assessee and the approval u/s 153D does not contain the DIN in the body of the satisfaction note as per the mandate of CBDT circular no. 19/2019 dated 14-08-2019.

11. That having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, Ld. CIT(A) has erred in law and on facts in confirming the action of Ld. AO in charging interest u/s 234B and 234D of Income Tax Act, 1961.”

ITA No. 6625/Del/2025

“1. That having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, Ld. CIT(A) has erred in law and on facts in confirming the action of Ld. AO in passing the impugned assessment order u/s 153C and that too without assuming jurisdiction as per law and without recording mandatory “satisfaction” in accordance with law and without complying/following with the other mandatory conditions/procedure as laid down u/s 153C in accordance with law.

2. That in any case and in any view of the matter, action of Ld. CIT(A) in confirming the action of Ld. AO in passing the impugned assessment order u/s 153C, is illegal, bad in law and against the facts and circumstances of the case and the same is not sustainable on various legal and factual grounds.

3. That having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, Ld. CIT(A) has erred in law and on facts in confirming the action of Ld. AO in making addition of Rs.11,00,000/- by treating it as alleged unexplained money u/s 69A and that too without there being any incriminating material found as a result of search and by recording incorrect facts and findings and without following the principles of natural justice and without confronting the adverse material on record and without providing the opportunity of cross examination.

4. That in any case and in any view of the matter, action of Ld. CIT(A) in confirming the action of Ld. AO in making addition of Rs.11,00,000/- u/s 69A, is bad in law and against the facts and circumstances of the case.

5. That in any case and without prejudice to the above grounds, addition made in the impugned assessment order is beyond jurisdiction and illegal, also for the reason that such order could not have been made since no incriminating material has been found as a result of search.

6. That having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, Ld. CIT(A) has erred in law and on facts in confirming the action of Ld. AO in passing the impugned assessment order dated 17-03-2024 without there being requisite approval in terms of section 153C and in any case approval, if any is mechanical without application of mind and is no approval in the eyes of law.

7. That having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, Ld. CIT(A) has erred in law and on facts in confirming the action of Ld. AO in passing the impugned assessment order dated 17-03-2024 which is barred by limitation.

8. That having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, Ld. CIT(A) has erred in law and on facts in confirming the action of Ld. AO in assuming jurisdiction u/s 153C and passing the impugned reassessment order u/s 153C dated 09-03-2024 is illegal, and bad in law for the reason that the satisfaction recorded by Ld. AO of the searched person and AO of the assessee and the approval u/s 153D does not contain the DIN in the body of the satisfaction note as per the mandate of CBDT circular no. 19/2019 dated 14-08-2019.

9. That having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. Ld. CIT(A) has erred in law and on facts in confirming the action of Ld. AO in charging interest u/s 234B of Income Tax Act, 1961.”

ITA No. 6626/Del/2025

“1. That having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. Ld. CIT(A) has erred in law and on facts in confirming the action of Ld. AO in passing the impugned assessment order u/s 153C and that too without assuming jurisdiction as per law and without recording mandatory “satisfaction” in accordance with law and without comply/following with the other mandatory conditions/procedure as laid down u/s 153C in accordance with law.

2. That in any case and in any view of the matter, action of Ld. CIT(A) in confirming the action of Ld. AO in passing the impugned assessment order u/s 153C is illegal, bad in law and against the facts and circumstances of the case and the same is not sustainable on various legal and factual grounds.

3. That having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, Ld. CIT(A) has erred in law and on facts in confirming the action of Ld. AO in making addition of Rs.14,10,000/- by treating it as alleged unexplained cash credit u/s 68 and that too without there being any incriminating material found as a result of search and by recording incorrect facts and findings and without providing the adverse material on record and without observing the principles of natural justice and by disregarding the submissions, evidences an material placed on record by the assessee and without providing the opportunity of cross examination of the deponents.

4. That having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. Ld. CIT(A) has erred in law and on facts in confirming the action of Ld. AO in making addition of Rs.42,300/- (i.e. 3% of Rs.14,10,000/-) by treating it as alleged unexplained expenditure u/s 69C and that too without there being any incriminating material found as a result of search and by recording incorrect facts and findings and without providing the adverse material on record and without observing the principles of natural justice and by disregarding the submissions, evidences an material placed on record by the assessee and without providing the opportunity of cross examination of the deponents.

5. That having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case, Ld. CIT(A) has erred in law and on facts in confirming the action of Ld. AO in making addition of Rs.5,90,000/- by treating it as alleged unexplained money u/s 69A and that too without there being any incriminating material found as a result of search and by recording incorrect facts and findings and without providing the adverse material on record and without observing the principles of natural justice and by disregarding the submissions, evidences an material placed on record by the assessee and without providing the opportunity of cross examination of the deponents.

6. That in any case and in any view of the matter, action of Ld. CIT(A) in confirming the action of Ld. AO in making addition of Rs.5,90,000/- by treating it as alleged unexplained money u/s 69A, is illegal, bad in law and against the facts and circumstances of the case.

7. That having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. Ld. CIT(A) has erred in law and on facts in confirming the action of Ld. AO in making addition of Rs.20,00,000/- by treating it as alleged unexplained money u/s 69A and that too without there being any incriminating material found as a result of search and by recording incorrect facts and findings and without following the principles of natural justice and without confronting the adverse material on record and without providing the opportunity of cross examination.

8. That in any case and in any view of the matter, action of Ld. CIT(A) in confirming the action of Ld. AO in making addition of Rs.20,00,000/- u/s 69A, is bad in law and against the facts and circumstances of the case.

9. That having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. Ld. CIT(A) has erred in law and on facts in confirming the action of Ld. AO in making addition of Rs.60,000/- on account of alleged commission expenditure by treating it as alleged unexplained expenditure u/s 69C and that too without there being any incriminating material found as a result of search and by recording incorrect facts and findings and without following the principles of natural justice and without confronting the adverse material on record and without providing the opportunity of cross examination.

10. That in any case and without prejudice to the above grounds, additions made in the impugned assessment order are beyond jurisdiction and illegal, also for the reason that such order could not have been made since no incriminating material has been found as a result of search.

11. That having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. Ld. CIT(A) has erred in law and on facts in confirming the action of Ld. AO in passing the impugned assessment order dated 17-03-2024 without there being requisite approval in terms of section 153C and in any case approval, if any is mechanical without application of mind and is no approval in the eyes of law.

12. That having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. Ld. CIT(A) has erred in law and on facts in confirming the action of Ld. AO in passing the impugned assessment order dated 17-03-2024 which is barred by limitation.

13. That having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. Ld. CIT(A) has erred in law and on facts in confirming the action of Ld. AO in assuming jurisdiction u/s 153C and passing the impugned reassessment order u/s 153C dated 09-03-2024 is illegal, and bad in law for the reason that the satisfaction recorded by ld. AO of the searched person and AO of the assessee and the approval u/s 153D does not contain the DIN in the body of the satisfaction note as per the mandate of CBDT circular no. 19/2019 dated 14-08-2019.

14. That having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case. Ld. CIT(A) has erred in law and on facts in confirming the action of Ld. AO in charging interest u/s 234A, 234B and 234C of Income Tax Act, 1961.”

ITA No. 6624/Del/2025 for A.Y. 2014-15

3. Brief facts of the case are that the original return was filed by the assessee on 13.08.2014 declaring income of Rs.4,27,520/-. Subsequently, a search and seizure proceedings u/s 132 was carried out on the Alankit Group and its associates on 18.10.2019, during the course of which some incriminating documents were found from one of the premises in the name of the assessee. Accordingly, case of the assessee was centralized in Central Circle-28, New Delhi and a notice u/s 153C dated 12.06.2023 was issued by the ld. AO asking him to file his return of income. Assessment was completed u/s 153C at an income of Rs.41,16,150/- vide order dated 09.03.2024. Aggrieved the assessee filed an appeal before the ld. CIT(A) which was dismissed vide order dated 09.10.2025.

3.1 Aggrieved with the order of the ld. CIT(A), the assessee is in appeal before the Tribunal. The assessee has taken several grounds of appeal including the validity of the proceedings u/s 153C for A.Y. 2014-15 on the ground that it falls outside the block of 10 years. Ld. AR has submitted at the outset, that this issue is covered by the decision of the Hon’ble jurisdictional High Court in the case of PCIT vs. Ojjus Medicare Pvt. Ltd. (2024) 465 ITR 101 (Del.). It has been explained by him that the satisfaction u/s 153C was recorded on 31.05.2023 making A.Y. 2024-25 as the relevant assessment year. Thereafter, the ld. AO could have gone back till A.Y. 2015-16 and therefore, the assessment year 2014-15 is out of the block of 10 years. In this regard, the ld. AR has placed reliance on the order of Hon’ble jurisdictional High Court in PCIT vs. Ojjus Medicare Pvt. Ltd. (supra) wherein it has been held as under:

“95. The relevant block of ten AYs’ when computed for the period 01 April 2023 – 31 March 2024, with the date of the Satisfaction Note drawn by the AO of the non-searched person falling within that period, would come to be identified as under:

Computation of the ten-year block period as provided under section 153C read with section 153A of the Act No. of years
AY 2024-25 1
AY 2023-24 2
AY 2022-23 3
AY 2021-22 4
AY 2020-21 5
AY 2019-20 6
AY 2018-19 7
AY 2017-18 8
AY 2016-17 9
AY 2015-16 10

4. We have heard the rival submissions and perused the material placed on record as well as the decision of the Hon’ble jurisdictional High Court in PCIT vs. Ojjus Medicare Pvt. Ltd. (supra). From the facts of the case narrated hereinbefore, it is clear that A.Y. 2014-15 is beyond the scope of section 153C, as

the period of 10 years has to be computed from A.Y. 2024-25 in this case. Accordingly, the notice u/s 153C as well as the assessment order being invalid are hereby quashed.

ITA No. 6625/Del/2026 for A.Y. 2015-16

ITA No. 6626/Del/2026 for A.Y. 2016-17

5. As common issues are involved in both the appeals which are being disposed off by a common order. ITA No. 6625/Del/2025 for A.Y. 2015-16 is taken up as the “lead” case.

6. Brief facts of the case are that the original return was filed by the assessee on 12.03.2016 declaring income of Rs.4,80,100/-. Subsequently, a search and seizure proceedings u/s 132 was carried out on the Alankit Group and Associates on 18.10.2019, during the course of which some incriminating documents were found in the name of the assessee from one of the premises searched. Accordingly, case of the assessee was centralized in Central Circle-28, New Delhi and a notice u/s 153C dated 12.06.2023 was issued asking him to file his return of income. Assessment was completed u/s 153C at an income of Rs.15,80,100/- vide order dated 09.03.2024. Aggrieved the assessee went in appeal before the ld. CIT(A) which was dismissed vide order dated 09.10.2025.

6.1 Further aggrieved the assessee is in appeal before the Tribunal. At the outset before us, ld. AR has raised a legal issue submitting that the notice u/s 153C issued on 12.06.2023 was illegal in view of the amended provisions of the Act. After 01.04.2021, in such cases only a notice u/s 148 could have been issued. In support of his claim, ld. AR has placed reliance on the decision of Hon’ble Madras High Court in the case of Harigovind Vs. ACIT (2025) 180 taxmann.com 197 wherein it has been held that in such cases after 01.04.2021, proceedings could be initiated only u/s 148 and hence the proceedings undertaken u/s 153C were held to be invalid. This decision has been followed by the various co-ordinate benches. Ld. AR has further placed reliance on the decision in the case of Smt. Geetanjali Bhayana Vs. DCIT in ITA Nos. 2227, 2228 & 2252/Del/2025 order dated 27.10.2026 wherein, in light of decision of the Hon’ble Madras High Court, the co-ordinate bench has held as under:

“16. As per first proviso to Section 153C(1), the date of initiation of search u/s 132 or making requisition u/s 132A in terms of second proviso to Sub Section (1) of Section 153A shall be construed as reference to the date of receiving the books of account or documents or assets seized or requisitioned by the Assessing Officer having jurisdiction over such other person. As observed above, in the present case, the AO of the assessee has recorded the satisfaction on 03.12.2021 after taking the seized material thus the date of search in the case of assessee should be 03.12.2021. This view is supported by the judgement of Hon’ble Jurisdictional High Court in the case of Ojjus Medicare (supra), the headnote reads as under:

“Section 153C of the Income-tax Act, 1961 – Search and seizure – Assessment of any other person (Block assessment) – Assessment years 2010-11 to 2013-14 – Whether first proviso to section 153C, and which has been consistently recognized to also embody commencement point for reckoning six or ten assessment years’, shifts relevant date from date of initiation of search or a requisition made to date of receipt of books of account or documents and assets seized by jurisdictional Assessing Officer of non-searched person – Held, yes – Whether furthermore where date of handing over of documents was not available, date of issuance of satisfaction Note by Assessing Officer under section 153C would be pertinent for purpose of First Proviso to section 153C – Held, yes – Whether significant difference between computation of relevant assessment year for identification of six assessment years and to construct a block of ten assessment years is that while six assessment years’ hinge upon phrase “immediately preceding” assessment year pertaining to search year, ten assessment years’ are liable to be computed or reckoned from end of assessment year relevant to year of search – Held, yes – Whether thus, in instant case where satisfaction note were issued between 1-4-2021 and 31-3-2022, relevant assessment year would be 2022-23 and assessment years’ 2010-11, 2011-12 and 2012-13 would clearly fall outside block period of ten assessment years as provided under section 153C read with section 153A – Held, yes [Paras 85, 86, 96 and 97] [In favour of assessee].”

17. Now coming to the sub-section (3) of section 153C of the Act which provides that provisions of section 153C are not applicable to the search initiated on or after 1st day of April, 2021. Since in the present case, date of search is to be taken as 03.12.2021 i.e. the date when the satisfaction note was recorded by the AO of the assessee and, such date (03.12.2021) is fallen after 01.04.2021, therefore, as per sub-section (3) of section 153C, provisions of section 153C would not be applicable and the initiation of proceedings u/s 153C and subsequent assessment order passed us/ 153C of the Act is invalid and without jurisdiction. The hon’ble Madras High court after considering these facts under identical circumstances, in the case of Harigovind v ACIT (supra) has held as under:

35. “A reading of the second proviso to Section 153A(1) would show that the assessment or reassessment, if any, relating to any assessment year falling within the period of six assessment years and for the relevant assessment year or years referred to in this sub-section, 153C(1) pending on the date of initiation of the search under Section 132 or making of requisition under Section 132A, as the case may be, shall abate. Therefore, any pending proceedings shall be abated as per the above proviso.

36. On the strength of the above second proviso to Section 153A(1), the respondents had strongly contended that the first proviso to Section 153C is only with regard to the abatement of proceedings and not for anything else.

37. On the other hand, the petitioners had contended that it is not only for abatement but for all the other purposes. According to the petitioner, if a particular date is determined for the purpose of abatement of proceedings, then the same would be applicable for all the purposes, including the date of initiation of proceedings under Section 153C against the other person.

38. Even a reading of Section 153C makes it clear that determination of total income of such other person for 6 assessment years immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year, in which the search was conducted or requisition was made and for the relevant assessment year or years, referred in sub Section (1) of Section 153C of the Act.

39. As far as the other person is concerned, the six years period would be calculated, the date on which the requisition was made and that would be the date, for the purpose of determination of assessment of income. On the other hand, as far as the searched person is concerned, this 6 years period would vary and the same would be calculated from the date of search made in the premises of searched person. Therefore, for the purpose of initiation and determination of income for 6 assessment years, two different dates have been fixed by the Statute, i.e., for the searched person, it was taken the date of search, whereas, for the other person, it was taken the date, on which the requisition is made to the JAO of the other person.

40. Thus, as far as the searched person is concerned, the date of initiation of search is the date, on which the search was conducted in his premises. The said date would be the date of initiation of search for searched person for all purposes. As far as the other person is concerned, the date of initiation of search would be the date, on which the materials, books of accounts, etc., are handed over to the JAO of the other person and this date would be considered as the date of initiation of search for other person for all purposes. Thus, there cannot be two different date of initiation of search, either for the searched person or for the other person.

41. The provisions of Sub-Section (3) of Section 153C states that “153C (3).nothing contained in this Section shall apply in relation to a search initiated under Section 132 or books of account, other documents or any assets requisition under Section 132A on or after the 1st day of April, 2021” which means, if the search is initiated

subsequent to 01.04.2021, the provision of Section 153C will not apply and accordingly, no proceedings can be initiated against the other person.

42. According to the petitioner, the date of handing over of the seized materials, i.e., 25.11.2022, is the date of initiation of search. If the said contention of the petitioner is accepted, obviously, the issuance of impugned notices dated 07.02.2023 by the 2nd respondent is without any authority and contrary to Sub-Section (3) of Section 153C of the Act and thus, the same is liable to be quashed.

43. In terms of Sub-Section (1) of Section 153C of the Act, for the purpose of calculating the six years period, the date of handing over of the materials to the petitioner’s JAO has to be construed as the date of initiation of search for other person. Further, in terms of first proviso to Sub-Section (1) of Section 153C, for the purpose of abatement also, the date of handing over of the materials to the petitioner’s JAO has to be construed as the date of initiation of search for the other person. In such view of the matter, this Court is unable to comprehend the submissions made by the learned counsel for respondents that yet another date is available for the purpose of initiation of search in respect of the other person.

44. Certainly, there cannot be two different dates for initiation of search for the other person. Hence, for all practical purpose, the initiation of search would be the same date and it is apparent upon reading the provisions of Section 153C of the Act. In the provision of Section 153C(1) of the Act, the date of initiation of search is mentioned as the date of handing over of materials and as per the first proviso, the same date would apply for the purpose of abatement also. When such being the case, no other date will come into picture for the purpose of determination of initiation of search for other person. At this juncture, it would be apposite to refer the judgement rendered by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Jasjit Singh (supra), wherein, it was held on the aspect as to whether the first proviso to Section 153C would apply only for the purpose of abatement of pending proceedings or otherwise.

45. When a similar contention was raised before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid case of Jasjit Singh (supra), the same was recorded in the said judgement as

“..The revenue argued that the proviso to Section 153C(1), is confined in its application to the question of abatement”.

However, while deciding the said issue, the Hon’ble Apex Court had arrived at a conclusion and rendered its judgement by stating that

“..the revenue’s argument is insubstantial and without merit”.

When such being the case, it is clear that the Hon’ble Apex Court had rejected the contention of the revenue that “the first proviso to Section 153C(1), is confined in its application to the question of abatement”, which means, as per the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, the said provision is not only for the purpose of abatement but also for all the other practical purposes.

46. For ready reference, the relevant portion of the judgement rendered in the case of Jasjit Singh (supra) is extracted hereunder:

“9. It is evident on a plain interpretation of Section 153C(1) that the Parliamentary intent to enact the proviso was to cater not merely to the question of abatement but also with regard to the date from which the six year period was to be reckoned, in respect of which the returns were to be filed by the third party (whose premises are not searched and in respect of whom the specific provision under Section 153-C was enacted. The revenue argued that the proviso [to Section 153(c)(1)] is confined in its application to the question of abatement.

10. This Court is of the opinion that the revenue’s argument is insubstantial and without merit. It is quite plausible that without the kind of interpretation which SSP Aviation adopted, the A.O. seized of the materials – of the search party, under Section 132 – would take his own time to forward the papers and materials belonging to the third party, to the concerned A.O. In that event if the date would virtually “relate back” as is sought to be contended by the revenue, (to the date of the seizure), the prejudice caused to the third party, who would be drawn into proceedings as it were unwittingly (and in many cases have no concern with it at all), is dis-proportionate. For instance, if the papers are in fact assigned under Section 153-C after a period of four years, the third party assessee’s prejudice is writ large as it would have to virtually preserve the records for at latest 10 years which is not the requirement in law. Such disastrous and harsh consequences cannot be attributed to Parliament. On the other hand, a plain reading of Section 153-C supports the interpretation which this Court adopts.

[**Emphasis supplied]

47. A reading of the above shows that the Hon’ble Apex Court had rejected the contention of the respondent and hence, it is clear that the first proviso to Sub-Section (1) of Section 153C is not only for the purpose of abatement but also for all other purposes, viz., initiation of search for other person in terms of Section 153C(3) of the Act. In such case, the date of initiation of search for the petitioner is the date, on which the documents were handed over to the JAO of the petitioner, i.e., 25.11.2022 is the date of initiation of search for the petitioner.

48. In terms of Sub-Section (3) of Section 153C, the provision of Section 153C will not apply for any search, which is initiated on or after 01.04.2021.

49. As stated above, in this case, the date of handing over of seized material to the petitioner’s JAO is on 25.11.2022 and the said date is the date of initiation of search for the petitioner. Thus, in the present case, it is crystal clear like cloudless sky that the initiation of search was subsequent to 01.04.2021, for which, the provisions of Section 153C will not apply. Therefore, the impugned notices dated 07.02.2023 is unsustainable and the same were issued without authority and against the provisions of Sub-Section (3) of Section 153C of the Act.

50. In such view of the matter, all the impugned notices are liable to be quashed and accordingly, all the impugned notices dated 07.02.2023 issued by the 2nd respondent are quashed.”

18. The facts of the aforesaid case of hon’ble Madras High court are squarely applicable to the facts of the present case. It is also a matter of fact that the AO himself has initiated the proceedings u/s 153C of the Act for AY 2018-19 to AY 2020-21 though the date of search in the case of Shri Kuldeep Bishnoi was 23.07.2019 and as per the same, the search year was AY 2020-21. Thus, by respectfully following the judgement of hon’ble Madra High court in the case of Harigovind vs ACIT (supra), we set aside the notice issued u/s 153C on the assessee as the date of handing over the material i.e. 03.12.2021 is the date of initiation of search. The issuance of notice us 153C dt. 06.12.2021 is without any authority and contrary to subsection (3) of section 153C of the Act and thus the consequent order passed u/s 153C of the Act is quashed. The additional grounds of appeal Nos. I to III are thus, allowed.”

7. Respectfully following the decision of Hon’ble Madras High Court as well as the co-ordinate bench of the Tribunal, we hold that since the satisfaction has been recorded after 01.04.2021,

the proceedings u/s 148 ought to have been initiated. Accordingly, we hereby quash the proceedings initiated u/s 153C of the Act. As the notice u/s 153C has been quashed, other grounds of appeal are rendered academic in nature, and, therefore, not being adjudicated upon.

8. As identical issues are involved in ITA No. 6626/Del/2025 (for A.Y. 2016-17), the above decision shall apply mutatis mutandis in the instant appeal also.

9. In the result, all the three appeals are hereby allowed.

Order Pronounced in the Open Court on 30/04/2026.

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Author Info

CA Sandeep Kanoi
Qualification: Graduate, CA in Job / Business, DD
Company: Taxguru Consultancy
Location: Mumbai, Maharashtra
Articles Published: 24,747

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