Sanatan Dharm Venkuth Dhamsewa Samiti Vs CIT (Exemptions) (ITAT Chandigarh)
Summary: The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Chandigarh Bench, considered a bunch of 24 appeals filed by assessee-trusts against separate but substantively identical orders of the Commissioner of Income Tax (Exemptions), Chandigarh, denying approval under Section 80G of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The common ground for denial was that the trusts were engaged in religious activities.
The first common ground raised by the assessee-trusts concerned the approach adopted by the CIT(E) under Explanation 3 to Section 80G. The CIT(E), after referring to certain objects of the respective trusts, had held that charitable purpose does not include a purpose the whole or substantially the whole of which is religious in nature. The Tribunal, however, noted that no factual examination of the financial statements had been undertaken and that the conclusion was not based on actual facts.
The Tribunal particularly noted Section 80G(5B), which contains a non-obstante clause and provides for continuation of satisfaction of the requirements of Section 80G(5) where expenditure of a religious nature in a previous year does not exceed five per cent of the trust’s total income for that year. According to the Tribunal, no such exercise had been carried out in the impugned orders and no corresponding finding had been brought on record. The Tribunal also observed that, apparently, the issue had not been confronted to the assessees.
The second substantive ground was that the activities carried out by the respective trusts could not be characterised as religious activities and that the activities were not confined to any particular religious community, caste or section of society. The assessees therefore contended that the activities did not fall within the mischief of Section 80G. Various judicial decisions were relied upon in support of the contention.
The Tribunal examined the statutory scheme of Section 80G and the meaning of the expression “religion”. It observed that the Income-tax Act does not define the expression “religion” and therefore constitutional jurisprudence was relevant for interpreting the expression.
Referring to Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, [1954 SCR 1005; 1954 AIR 282], the Tribunal noted the Supreme Court’s explanation that religion is a matter of faith and is not confined merely to doctrine or belief. Religious observances, ceremonies, rituals and modes of worship regarded as integral parts of religion may constitute religious acts, whereas secular activities associated with religion remain capable of State regulation.
The Tribunal further considered Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay, AIR 1954 SC 388, Durgah Committee, Ajmer v. Syed Hussain Ali, 1961 AIR 1402, Seshammal v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1972) 2 SCC 1, S.P. Mittal v. UOI, (1983) 1 SCC 51, and Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta v. Commissioner of Police, (1983) 4 SCC 522. The Tribunal drew from these decisions the distinction between essential or integral religious practices and activities that are secular, administrative or otherwise charitable despite being undertaken by a religious institution.
The Tribunal also relied upon CIT v. Dawoodi Bohra Jamat, (2014) 364 ITR 31 (SC), concerning the distinction between charitable and religious purposes. It noted the Supreme Court’s recognition that a trust may simultaneously possess charitable and religious objects and that the mere existence of religious activities does not necessarily destroy its charitable character. The Tribunal emphasised the relevance of the dominant purpose, primary objects and the actual manner in which activities are conducted.
On this basis, the Tribunal held that Section 80G does not require the complete absence of every religious element. Rather, the competent authority must examine whether religious activities dominate the objects and functioning of the institution so as to alter its essential charitable character. The Tribunal also reiterated the relevance of the five per cent threshold under Section 80G(5B).
The Tribunal summarised the applicable principles by distinguishing activities intrinsically connected with religious worship and observance—such as Puja, Archana, Yajna, Havan, Abhishek, recitation of scriptures and religious teaching—from activities such as feeding the poor, education, medical relief, construction of dharamshalas, environmental conservation, distribution of clothes and providing shelter. The latter may be inspired by religious philosophy but, when capable of existing independently of religious worship and directed towards public welfare, retain their charitable or secular character.
The Tribunal ultimately held that the impugned orders required reconsideration. It set aside the respective orders of the CIT(E) and restored all the captioned appeals to the CIT(E) for de novo adjudication. The assessees were directed to plead and prove their respective cases. The entire bunch of appeals was allowed for statistical purposes.
Thus, the Tribunal did not itself grant final approval under Section 80G to the trusts. Instead, the denial orders were set aside and the matters were remanded to the CIT(E) for fresh adjudication in accordance with the principles stated in the order. The order was pronounced on 03.08.2026.
Cases Discussed
- Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, [1954 SCR 1005; 1954 AIR 282] — considered for the meaning of religion and the distinction between integral religious practices and secular activities associated with religion.
- Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay, AIR 1954 SC 388 — considered on the protection of acts done in pursuance of religion and the distinction between religious and secular activities.
- Durgah Committee, Ajmer v. Syed Hussain Ali, 1961 AIR 1402 — considered on the principle that constitutional protection is confined to practices essential and integral to religion.
- Seshammal v. State of Tamil Nadu, (1972) 2 SCC 1 — considered for the distinction between essential religious worship and secular aspects of temple administration.
- S.P. Mittal v. UOI, (1983) 1 SCC 51 — considered for the meaning of religion as comprising beliefs or doctrines together with external acts in pursuance thereof.
- Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta v. Commissioner of Police, (1983) 4 SCC 522 — considered on essential religious practices and the distinction between fundamental religious practices and secular or optional activities.
- CIT v. Dawoodi Bohra Jamat, (2014) 364 ITR 31 (SC) — considered on the distinction between charitable and religious purposes and the relevance of the dominant purpose and actual activities of a trust.
FULL TEXT OF THE JUDGMENT/ORDER OF ITAT CHANDIGARH
1. Aforesaid appeals by assessee-trusts were heard as a bunched matter since common issue was involved in all these appeals i.e. denial of approval u/s 80G. These appeals are directed against separate but substantively identical orders of Ld. Commissioner of Income Tax (Exemption), Chandigarh, [CIT(E)] denying approval to these trust u/s 80G on common ground that these trusts were engaged in religious activities.
2. The Ld. CIT(E), by quoting few of the objects of the assessee-trust and by invoking Explanation-3 to Sec. 80G, held that charitable purpose does not include a purpose, the whole or substantially the whole of which is religious in nature. However, no factual examination of financial statements have been carried out and the aforesaid conclusion is not based on actual facts. No doubt, Explanation-3 provides that charitable purpose does not include a purpose which is wholly or substantially wholly of a religious nature. However, sub-section (5B), which has non-obstante clause, deems an institution to continue to satisfy the requirement of Section 80G(5) wherein religious-nature expenditure in a previous year does not exceed five per cent of trust’s total income for that year. No such exercise has been carried out in the impugned orders and no such findings have been brought on record. Apparently, the said issue was not confronted to the assessee. This is the first common ground raised by respective representatives.
3. The second substantive ground is that various activities as carried out by the trusts could not be termed as religious in nature and the respective trust activities are not confined to a particular religious community or caste or a particular section of the society. Therefore, these activities would not fall within the mischief of Sec.80G. For the same, reference has been made to various judicial decisions.
4. We have carefully considered the rival submissions, perused the material available on record, and examined the statutory provisions as well as the judicial precedents cited before us. The controversy in the present appeal revolves around the interpretation of Section 80G(5) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and the extent to which the religious activities carried on by the assessee trusts affect its entitlement to approval under the said provision. Since the determination of the issue necessarily depends upon the meaning of the expression “religion” and the nature of religious activities contemplated by law, it is considered appropriate to first examine the statutory scheme and the legal principles governing the field.
5. We find that the provisions of Sec. 80G were enacted with the object of encouraging philanthropic contributions by granting deduction in respect of donations made to approved institutions and funds. However, such benefit is available only upon satisfaction of the conditions prescribed u/s 80G(5). One of the significant restrictions embodied in the provision is that the institution or fund should not be one expressed to be for the benefit of any particular religious community or caste. Simultaneously, the Legislature has consciously refrained from imposing a blanket prohibition upon institutions which may incidentally undertake certain religious activities. This legislative distinction demonstrates that Parliament intended to differentiate between institutions established predominantly for religious purposes and institutions whose dominant character continues to remain charitable notwithstanding the presence of certain religious elements in their functioning.
6. At this stage, it becomes necessary to understand the scope of the expression “religion”. Admittedly, the Income Tax Act does not define the said expression. The courts have, therefore, consistently relied upon constitutional jurisprudence while interpreting the provision. For this, certain guidance could be obtained from the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt [1954 SCR 1005; 1954 AIR 282] wherein Hon’ble Court authoritatively held that religion is certainly a matter of faith with individuals or communities and is not confined merely to matters of doctrine or belief. A religion may not only lay down a code of ethical rules for its followers to accept, it might prescribe rituals and observances, ceremonies and modes of worship which are regarded as integral parts of religion, and these forms and observances might extend even to matters of food and dress. In other words, the religion extends to acts done in pursuance of religion and embraces rituals, observances, ceremonies and modes of worship which are regarded by the community as integral parts of its religion. The Court further observed that what constitutes the essential part of a religion is primarily to be ascertained with reference to the doctrines of that religion itself. It illustrated that offerings to the deity, daily recitation of sacred texts, ablations to the sacred fire, and ceremonies prescribed by religious tenets are themselves religious acts notwithstanding that they involve expenditure of money or employment of priests. The court made an equally important distinction by observing that secular activities associated with religion are amenable to State regulation, whereas matters constituting the essential part of religion enjoy constitutional protection.
7. The same principle was reiterated by the Constitution Bench in Ratilal Panachand Gandhi v. State of Bombay (AIR 1954 SC 388), wherein the Supreme Court held that freedom of religion protects not merely religious opinion but also acts done in pursuance of religion. Nevertheless, the Court recognized that every activity carried on by a religious institution does not thereby become a religious activity. The Constitution itself, under Article 25(2)(a), preserves the power of the State to regulate economic, financial, political and other secular activities associated with religious practice. The distinction was further refined in Durgah Committee, Ajmer v. Syed Hussain Ali (1961 AIR 1402) wherein the Supreme Court cautioned that constitutional protection is confined to practices which are essential and integral to the religion and not to every custom or observance that has become associated with religion over time. The Court observed that practices which are merely superstitious accretions or incidental additions cannot claim the same constitutional protection as essential religious practices.
8. Similarly, in Seshammal v. State of Tamil Nadu (1972 2 SCC 1), while examining temple administration, the Supreme Court held that although the performance of worship according to Agamas may constitute an essential religious matter, the appointment of an Archaka is essentially a secular aspect capable of legislative regulation. Thus, the Court distinguished between the religious ritual itself and the machinery by which the ritual is performed.
9. The above principle has consistently been reiterated in subsequent decisions. In S.P. Mittal v. UOI [(1983) 1 SCC 51], the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed that religion ordinarily comprises a system of beliefs or doctrines regarded by those who profess that religion as conducive to their spiritual well-being, together with external acts in pursuance of such beliefs. Further, a religion is not merely an opinion, doctrine or belief. It has its outward expression in acts as well and religion need not be theistic. In the case of Acharya Jagadishwarananda Avadhuta v. Commissioner of Police [(1983) 4 SCC 522] dealing with essential religious practices, the Court emphasized that only those practices which are regarded as fundamental and indispensable to a religion acquire constitutional protection as essential religious practices, whereas activities that are merely secular, administrative or optional do not assume the character of religion merely because they are associated with a religious institution. These are broad principles laid down by Hon’ble Apex Court while interpreting the term ‘religion’.
10. In the above background, it could be derived that the doctrine of essential religious practices has an important bearing while interpreting Section 80G(5). Every activity undertaken by an institution having religious affiliations could not automatically be characterized as a religious activity for the purposes of the Income-tax Act. The true test is whether the activity in question constitutes an essential and integral manifestation of religious faith or whether it is essentially charitable, educational, medical, social or philanthropic in character. Distribution of food to the poor, medical relief, educational activities, preservation of cultural heritage, relief during natural calamities and similar welfare measures do not cease to be charitable merely because they are inspired by religious philosophy or are carried out by a religious denomination. Conversely, activities exclusively intended for propagation of a particular religion, performance of rituals exclusively for adherents of a particular faith, or advancement of the interests of a specified religious community may assume the character of religious activities depending upon the facts and circumstances of each case.
11. The distinction between charitable and religious purposes under the Income-tax Act has also been considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in CIT v. Dawoodi Bohra Jamat [(2014) 364 ITR 31 (SC)]. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the Income-tax Act recognizes that a trust may simultaneously possess charitable as well as religious objects. The Court further observed that merely because a trust carries on certain religious activities, it does not necessarily lose its charitable character. Unless the trust is established exclusively for the benefit of a particular religious community or caste in a manner prohibited by the statute, the benefit contemplated by the Act cannot be denied solely on account of incidental religious activities. The emphasis, therefore, is upon the dominant purpose, the primary objects of the institution, and the actual manner in which its activities are conducted.
12. The legislative intent behind Section 80G(5) also supports the above interpretation. As could be seen that the extant provision does not require complete absence of every religious element. Rather, it seeks to deny approval only where the institution is established for the benefit of a particular religious community or where its predominant activities are directed towards advancing the interests of such community. Consequently, the inquiry before the competent authority is not whether some religious activities are carried on, but whether such activities dominate the objects and functioning of the institution so as to alter its essential charitable character. In fact, the provisions of sub-section (5B), which has non-obstante clause, deems an institution to continue to satisfy the requirement of Section 80G(5) wherein religious-nature expenditure in a previous year does not exceed five per cent of trust’s total income for that year.
13. In the light of the aforesaid statutory provisions and judicial pronouncements, the legal position could be summarized thus. First, the expression “religion” under Section 80G must receive the meaning assigned to it by constitutional jurisprudence, namely, a system of faith encompassing beliefs, doctrines, rituals, observances and practices regarded as integral by its followers. Secondly, only those activities which constitute essential or integral manifestations of religious faith qualify as religious activities in the strict legal sense. Thirdly, every activity undertaken by a religious institution cannot automatically be categorized as religious rather charitable and welfare activities retain their independent charitable character notwithstanding their religious inspiration. Fourthly, while considering eligibility under Section 80G(5), the competent authority is required to examine the dominant objects of the institution, the real nature of its activities, the beneficiaries thereof and the application of its income, rather than isolating individual activities or expressions occurring in the trust deed. Finally, unless the institution is found to be established or substantially operated for the benefit of a particular religious community or caste, or its predominant purpose is advancement of religion to the exclusion of charitable purposes, approval under Section 80G cannot be denied merely because certain incidental or ancillary religious activities are undertaken. The following principles clearly emerges:
i) A religious purpose is one that is intrinsically connected with the profession, practice and observance of religion itself. Such purposes include worship of the deity, performance of Puja, Archana, Yajna, Havan, Abhishek, recitation of scriptures, teachings of religious textbooks, observance of religious festivals, and other rituals prescribed by the tenets of the religion.
ii) The fact that an activity is motivated by religion does not necessarily make the activity itself religious. The origin or inspiration of an activity is different from its legal character.
iii) Activities such as providing food to the poor, imparting education, establishing hospitals, constructing dharamshalas, preserving rivers, planting trees, environmental conservation, distribution of clothes, organising marriages of indigent persons, and providing shelter undoubtedly find support in Hindu scriptures and are regarded as acts of Dharma. However, if these activities are examined independently, divorced from any act of worship or religious ritual, they predominantly serve public welfare and society at large. Their beneficiaries are not confined to adherents of any religion, nor are these activities indispensable for the performance of religious worship. Consequently, they cannot, merely because of their religious inspiration, be characterized as religious purposes per se.
iv) The proper inquiry is not whether religion encourages the activity, but whether the activity itself constitutes an indispensable and intrinsic manifestation of religion. If the activity can exist independently of religious worship and continues to achieve a secular or charitable objective, it retains its secular or charitable character notwithstanding its religious origin.
This distinction is particularly relevant in the context of Hindu philosophy. The Indian cultural & civilization / history treat protection of rivers, trees, animals, education, hospitality, feeding the poor and service to humanity as acts of Dharma. Yet, these are also universal humanitarian obligations. The religious element lies in the believer’s motivation, whereas the activity itself produces secular and charitable consequences. By contrast, the performance of Puja, Archana, Havan, Abhishek, recitation of Vedic mantras, teachings of religious books, temple worship, or observance of prescribed rituals cannot be divorced from religion itself. These acts derive their very existence from religious doctrine and lose their meaning outside the framework of religious observance. The jurisprudence of the Supreme Court consistently recognizes that the constitutional and legal conception of “religious purpose” is confined to those purposes that are core, essential, integral and inseparable from the observance of religion itself. Activities which merely emanate from religious philosophy, but whose dominant object is social welfare, charity, education, environmental protection or public benefit, cannot, when viewed in isolation, be regarded as religious purposes merely because their inspiration can be traced to religious teachings. This distinction preserves both the sanctity of religion and the autonomy of charitable activities, each within its own legal sphere.
14. Based on above guiding principles, the expression “religious purpose” would generally be understood to include activities such as construction or maintenance of temples, mosques, churches, gurudwaras, or other places of worship; performance of religious rituals, ceremonies and worship; propagation or promotion of a particular religion or its doctrines; reading & teachings of religious books; Activities intended primarily to advance the religious interests of a particular faith or denomination. However, an institution is not necessarily regarded as religious merely because it has some religious elements. Courts have repeatedly held that where the dominant or primary object is charitable such as education, medical relief, relief of poor or other public welfare then incidental religious activities do not automatically make the institution a religious one. Whether an institution is charitable or religious depends on its predominant purpose, as reflected in its founding documents and actual activities. It could be said that religion would mean a system of faith, beliefs, doctrines, and worship, together with the practices and observances regarded by its followers as integral to that faith. In the context of the Income-tax Act, the distinction between religious and charitable purposes is determined by the institution’s primary or dominant object and not merely by the presence of religious practices or symbolism.
15. Finally, on the given facts and circumstances of these appeals and in the light of our above observations, we deem it fit to set aside the respective impugned orders. Accordingly, all the captioned appeals stand restored back to Ld. CIT(E) for de novo adjudication. The assessee is directed to plead and prove their respective cases. The entire bunch of captioned appeals stand allowed for statistical purposes. A copy of this order may be placed in all the respective files.
16. All the appeals stand allowed for statistical purposes.
Order pronounced on 03rd August, 2026
