Pradip Kumar Vs Falak Industries Private Limited (GSTAT Delhi)
Summary : The Delhi State Bench of the GST Appellate Tribunal dismissed the Department’s appeal against the order setting aside the rejection of Falak Industries Private Limited’s GST refund claim of ₹6,78,822. The company exported readymade garments to the UAE without payment of tax and claimed a refund under Section 54 of the CGST Act of accumulated input tax credit for October to December 2021. The refund comprised SGST alone. The adjudicating authority rejected the claim solely on limitation, and the Joint Commissioner (Appeals-II), CGST Delhi, reversed that decision on 20 September 2024.
Falak Industries filed its original refund application on 22 February 2024. On 6 March 2024, the officer issued a deficiency memo in FORM GST RFD-03 stating only that the supporting documents were incomplete. The company refiled on 27 March 2024 and received an acknowledgment in FORM GST RFD-02 on 9 April 2024. The show cause notice in FORM GST RFD-08 treated the refiled claim as time-barred. The first appellate authority calculated a residual delay of 12 days after applying the COVID-period exclusion and deducting 14 days for the interval between the original filing and the deficiency memo. It nevertheless allowed the appeal, relying on Madras and Delhi High Court decisions.
The Department argued that the rectified claim had to be treated as a fresh application under paragraph 12 of Circular No. 125/44/2019-GST and that only the interval specified in the proviso to Rule 90(3) could be excluded. It maintained that Section 54(1) conferred no power to condone the resulting delay. Falak Industries argued that the original application was timely, the memo did not identify the missing documents, and the revised filing continued the original claim. It separately objected to maintainability because the amount was below the ₹20 lakh limit for departmental appeals before the GSTAT.
The Tribunal held that the appeal under Section 112(3) was maintainable. Paragraph 4(iv) of Circular No. 207/1/2024-GST expressly excludes refund disputes from the monetary limits. The Tribunal also found that the case involved recurring questions of statutory interpretation concerning refund limitation and deficiency memos. It explained that the circular regulates the filing discretion of departmental officers under Section 120(1), while the Tribunal’s jurisdiction comes from the Act.
For computation, the Tribunal used 6 December 2021, the undisputed Let Export Date appearing on the shipping bills for the sea exports. Under Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, it excluded the starting date. The period from 7 December 2021 through 28 February 2022 then fell within the exclusion under Notification No. 13/2022–Central Tax. Applying paragraphs 5(I) and 5(II) of the Supreme Court’s order in In Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, it held that the full two-year period became available from 1 March 2022 and that the last filing date was 29 February 2024. The original application of 22 February 2024 was timely under the Tribunal’s computation and also under the dates considered by the first appellate authority and in the Andhra Pradesh High Court’s MC Wane decision.
On the effect of the deficiency memo, the Tribunal followed the Delhi High Court decisions in National Internet Exchange of India and Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited. A bona fide rectification relates back to an original application that was itself filed in time. The memo did not identify the missing documents, and the Department pointed to no material deficiency. The show cause notice and rejection rested solely on limitation. The Tribunal therefore treated the application of 27 March 2024 as a continuation of the original filing, and the asserted 12-day delay did not arise.
The Tribunal held that the two-year period in Section 54(1) is mandatory. Relying on Supreme Court authorities on limitation under fiscal statutes, it held that neither the proper officer nor the appellate authority had statutory power to condone delay in filing the refund application. It declined to adopt the directory interpretation in Lenovo and ARS Energy. The Tribunal upheld the result of the first appellate order because the original claim was filed within the statutory period and the rectified claim related back to it. The Department’s appeal was dismissed without an order as to costs.
Cases Discussed
- M/s MC Wane India Private Limited v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Others — 2026:APHC:13141, W.P. No. 26816 of 2024, 11 March 2026 (Andhra Pradesh High Court). The Tribunal considered its exclusion method and adopted a different restart date under the Supreme Court’s directions.
- Homag India Private Limited v. The Joint Commissioner — 2025:KHC:53116, W.P. No. 27378 of 2025, 12 December 2025 (Karnataka High Court). Treated the timely original application as the relevant filing for limitation after revision in response to a deficiency memo.
- M/s Durgambika Traders v. Union of India & Others — W.P. No. 5131 of 2024, 14 November 2025 (Karnataka High Court). Permitted a fresh filing with documents and directed that it be treated as relating back to the original claim.
- R. Nagaraj (Dead) Through LRs v. Rajmani — 2025 INSC 478, Civil Appeal No. 5131 of 2025, 9 April 2025 (Supreme Court). Cited for the court’s duty to ascertain whether proceedings were initiated within limitation.
- M/s Hallmark v. Jammu and Kashmir Goods and Services Tax Department & Others — W.P.(C) No. 2025 of 2020, 25 September 2024 (High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh). Discussed the Delhi High Court authorities on deficient refund applications and limitation.
- ARS Energy Pvt. Ltd. v. Additional Commissioner (Appeals), Chennai — (2023) 13 Centax 300 (Mad.), W.P. No. 17763 of 2020, 28 November 2023 (Madras High Court). The first appellate authority relied on its treatment of Section 54(1) as directory. The Tribunal declined to adopt that view.
- Lenovo (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Joint Commissioner of GST (Appeals-1) & Others — (2023) 12 Centax 230 (Mad.), W.P. Nos. 23604, 23605 and 23607 of 2022, 6 November 2023 (Madras High Court). The taxpayer relied on its directory reading of Section 54(1), which the Tribunal declined to adopt.
- National Internet Exchange of India v. Union of India & Others — W.P.(C) No. 871 of 2022, 9 August 2023 (Delhi High Court). Applied to the effect of a deficiency memo seeking further material after the original application.
- Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited v. Union of India & Others — 2023:DHC:2482-DB, W.P.(C) No. 3550 of 2023, 6 April 2023 (Delhi High Court). Applied for the principle that an original refund application cannot be treated as non est merely because further clarification or documents were sought.
- In Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation — (2022) 3 SCC 117, M.A. No. 21 of 2022 in M.A. No. 665 of 2021 in Suo Motu W.P.(C) No. 3 of 2020, 10 January 2022 (Supreme Court). The Tribunal applied the directions on exclusion and the availability of the balance limitation period from 1 March 2022.
- Union of India & Others v. VKC Footsteps India Pvt. Ltd. — (2022) 2 SCC 603, Civil Appeal No. 4810 of 2021, 13 September 2021 (Supreme Court). Cited for the statutory character of a GST refund and the requirement to comply with the prescribed conditions and procedure.
- Assistant Commissioner (CT), LTU, Kakinada v. Glaxo Smith Kline Consumer Health Care Ltd. — (2020) 19 SCC 681 (Supreme Court). Cited on the effect of the outer limit in a special fiscal statute.
- Satyendra Kumar v. Raj Nath Dubey — 2016 SCC OnLine SC 478 (Supreme Court). Cited on estoppel and a court’s power to decide a pure question of law correctly.
- Commissioner of Customs & Central Excise v. Hongo India (P) Ltd. — (2009) 5 SCC 791 (Supreme Court). Cited for strict application of the limitation scheme in a special tax statute.
- Singh Enterprises v. Commissioner of Central Excise — (2008) 3 SCC 70 (Supreme Court). Cited for the rule that a fiscal authority cannot condone delay beyond its statutory power.
- National Thermal Power Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax — (1998) 229 ITR 383 (Supreme Court). Cited for entertaining a question of law arising from facts already on record.
- Mafatlal Industries Ltd. v. Union of India — (1997) 5 SCC 536 (Supreme Court, Constitution Bench). Cited for the principle that statutory refund claims must be pursued under the governing fiscal enactment.
- Mathura Prasad Sarjoo Jaiswal v. Dossibai N.B. Jeejeebhoy — (1970) 1 SCC 613 (Supreme Court). Discussed through Satyendra Kumar in relation to deciding a pure question of law.
- Thakur Amar Singhji v. State of Rajasthan — (1955) 2 SCR 303 (Supreme Court, Constitution Bench). Cited for the rule against estoppel operating against a statute.
FULL TEXT OF THE JUDGMENT/ORDER OF GSTAT
1. This appeal has been filed by the Department under Section 112(3) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (here -in -after called “the Act 2017”), against Order-in-Appeal No. 276/JC/Central Tax/Appeal-II/Delhi/2024-25 dated 20.09.2024 (here -in -after called “the impugned OIA”) passed by the Joint Commissioner (Appeals-II), CGST Delhi (here -in -after called “the appellate authority”), whereby the appeal of the respondent was allowed.
2. The impugned OIA had set aside the Order-in-Original dated 29.05.2024 (here -in -after called “the OIO dated 29.05.2024”) passed by the Assistant Commissioner, CGST Hauz Khas Division, CGST Delhi South (here -in – after called “the adjudicating authority”), whereby a refund claim of Rs. 6,78,822/- filed by the respondent had been rejected solely on the ground of limitation.
3. The respondent, M/s Falak Industries Private Limited, 63, K S Market, Sarvapriya Vihar, South West Delhi, Delhi 110016, a registered person under GST (GSTIN 07AABCF7034R1Z7), is engaged in the export of readymade garments to the UAE without payment of tax. It claimed refund under Section 54 of the Act 2017 of the input tax credit accumulated on account of such exports for the period October 2021 to December 2021, amounting to Rs. 6,78,822/- (IGST nil, CGST nil and SGST Rs. 6,78,822/- ).
4. The chronology of the refund applications, as borne out by the record, is as follows:
(a) 22.02.2024 – original refund application filed (here -in -after called “refund application 1”);
(b) 06.03.2024 – deficiency memo issued in FORM GST RFD-03, stating that “supporting documents attached are incomplete”;
(c) 27.03.2024 – fresh application filed after rectification (here -in -after called “refund application 2”), acknowledged in FORM GST RFD-02 on 09.04.2024;
(d) 15.05.2024 – show cause notice in FORM GST RFD-08 (here -in -after called “the SCN”) issued (the date is recorded as 16.05.2024 in the OIO dated 29.05.2024), proposing rejection on the ground that the claim was time-barred, with a personal hearing fixed for 23.05.2024;
(e) 24.05.2024 – the OIO dated 24.05.2024 rejecting the claim in entirety as time-barred;
(f) 20.09.2024 – the impugned OIA allowing the appeal.
5. The SCN, issued in FORM GST RFD-08 (the date of the SCN is reflected as 15.05.2024 in the notice itself and as 16.05.2024 in the OIO dated 29.05.2024), proposed rejection of the refund claim of Rs. 6,78,822/- (IGST nil, CGST nil and SGST Rs. 6,78,822/-) on a single ground, namely limitation. The SCN recorded as under:
“As per Notification No.13/2022 – Central Tax dated 5th July 2022 – “(iii) excludes the period from the 1st day of March, 2020 to the 28th day of February, 2022 for computation of period of limitation for filing refund application under section 54 or section 55 of the said Act”
As per Circular 125/44/2019 dated 18.11.2019 – “12. It is also clarified that since a refund application filed after correction of deficiency is treated as a fresh refund application, such a rectified refund application, submitted after correction of deficiencies, shall also have to be submitted within 2 years of the relevant date, as defined in the explanation after sub-section (14) of section 54 of the CGST Act.”
Complying with the instruction laid in para 12 of Circular 125/44/2019, and Notification No.13/2022 the above-mentioned refund is time barred as the taxpayer applied for the refund on 27.03.2024 after the expiry of extended date of refund. Therefore, instant refund claim is restricted to Rs. 0/- in the following manner:”
6. Vide the SCN the respondent was called upon to show cause as to why its refund claim of Rs 6,78,822/- should not be rejected for reasons cited in the SCN as mentioned here in above, and was directed to furnish a reply to this notice within seven days from the date of service of this notice, a personal hearing before the proper officer was scheduled at 01:00 P.M. on 23.05.2024. It was also stated that if the respondent “fails to furnish a reply within the stipulated date, the case will be decided ex-parte on the basis of available records and on merits.”
7. The respondent furnished its reply to the SCN in FORM GST RFD-09, the relevant portions of which were extracted by the adjudicating authority in the OIO dated 24.05.2024. The respondent stated as under:
“1. The taxpayer said that the initial application filed was within period of limitation. The Noticee filed an application dated 22.02.2024 for the same period with the same amount.
3. Further, in respect of the said application a deficiency memo was issued dated 06.03.2024 mentioning that the “supporting documents attached were incomplete”. However, no proper explanation was provided as to which documents are required by the good office. While in the process for understanding the requirement of the good office and arranging for the correct documents, the Noticee couldn’t file a fresh application in the time limit after addition of the time period as prescribed under proviso to rule 90(3) of CGST Act, 2017 … However, the Noticee wishes to mention that the delay in filling of application was of few days only and a fresh application was filed for the same time period … on 27.03.2024, which was considered as time barred by the good office.
.
.
.
5. Pursuant to the above-mentioned judgements and in lieu of the honest mistake made by the bonafied taxpayer, the Noticee request the good office to consider our fresh application.”
8. In the same reply in para 4 , under the heading “Period of limitation under Section 54(1) directory in nature and it is not mandatory”, the respondent relied upon Lenovo (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Joint Commissioner of GST (Appeals-1), W.P. Nos. 23604, 23605 and 23607 of 2022, decided on 06.11.2023 (Mad.), (2023) 12 Centax 230 (Mad.) (Here in after called “Lenovo”), and ARS Energy Pvt. Ltd. v. Additional Commissioner (Appeals), Chennai, W.P. No. 17763 of 2020, decided on 28.11.2023 (Mad.), (2023) 13 Centax 300 (Mad.) (Here in after called “ARS Energy”).
9. By the OIO dated 24.05.2024, the adjudicating authority recorded that the refund application had been filed under Section 54 of the Act 2017 read with Section 16(3)(a) of the IGST Act, 2017, and that:
“Since the refund claim was accompanied by all relevant documents as per circular No. 125/44/2019-GST dt. 18.11.19, acknowledgement in Form GST RFD-02 was issued to the claimant electronically on 09.04.2024.”
10. The adjudicating authority found that the respondent had filed the refund claim with the correct jurisdictional authority and that it exists at its principal place of business; that “the party has filed its both monthly returns GSTR-3B and GSTR-1” for the period October 2021 to December 2021; and that the respondent “is primarily engaged in the business of export of goods i.e. export of Readymade garments to UAE”, having debited the amount for which the refund claim was filed in terms of Rule 89(3) of the CGST Rules, 2017 (here -in- after called “the Rules 2017”)
11. On the question of limitation, after reproducing Section 54(1), the definition of relevant date, notification No. 13/2022-Central Tax dated 05.07.2022 (here -in -after called notification No. 13/2022) and paragraph 12 of Circular No. 125/44/2019-GST, the adjudicating authority recorded as under:
“Taking the above point in consideration, I find that the said refund claims as mentioned above is filed after the prescribed time limit.” .
.
“It is observed that the taxpayer has made claim of refund of Rs. 6,78,822/- which is not admissible as it was filed after the expiry of two years from the relevant date.”
.
.
“Complying with the instruction laid in Para 12 of Circular 125/44/2019, and Notification No.13/2022 the above-mentioned refund is time barred as the taxpayer applied for the refund on 27.03.2024 after the expiry of extended date of refund. Therefore, instant refund claim is restricted to Rs. 0/- ”
11. The operative part of the OIO dated 24no.05.2024 reads as under:
“I hereby reject an amount of INR 6,78,822/- (Rupees Six Lakh Seventy-Eight Thousand Eight Hundred and Twenty-Two only/-) to M/s FALAK INDUSTRIES PRIVATE LIMITED having GSTIN: 07AABCF7034R1Z7 … dated 27-03-2024 on account of Export of Goods/ services -w/o payment of tax (Zero rated supplies of Goods and Services) under Section 54 of CGST Act, 2017 read with Section 16 (3) of IGST Act, 2017.”
12. Aggrieved, the respondent preferred an appeal before the appellate authority, reiterating the submissions made before the adjudicating authority, and relying upon notification No. 13/2022, the proviso to rule 90(3) of the Rules 2017 and the decision of the Hon’ble High Court of Madras in ARS Energy (supra).
13. The appellate authority held the appeal to be within the period prescribed under Section 107(1) of the Act 2017 and recorded that:
“the adjudicating authority had rejected the appellant’s refund claim merely on single ground of time-barred and the show cause notice dated 15.05.2024 was also given to the appellant proposing rejection of their refund claim on the said ground alone. . .”
14. Holding the case to be covered by clause (a)(i) of Explanation (2) to Section 54 of the Act 2017, the appellate authority recorded as under:
“I find that the appellant’s case covers under clause 2(a)(i) as their goods were exported by containers/sea which is evident from the shipping bills submitted by them along with their appeal. I find that it is difficult to know about the date when did the ship, having appellant’s goods, left India. However, the date of Let Export Order (LEO) can be construed as the relevant date in identical matters as after the LEO date, the goods are loaded for clearance. In the appellant’s case, I find that LEO date, for exporting their goods, has been mentioned in shipping bills as 06.12.2021. Therefore, the appellant, in terms of section 54(1), was required to file refund claim, which arose against said export, on or before 05.12.2023. However, considering the exclusion of time period from 01.03.2020 to 28.02.2022 vide Notification No. 13/2022-Central Tax dated 05.07.2022, I find that:”
15. The appellate authority then tabulated the relevant date as 06.12.2021, the two years as expiring on 06.12.2023, the period excluded as 06.12.2021 to 28.02.2022 (85 days), the two years as expiring on 01.03.2024 on considering that period, and the actual date of filing as 27.03.2024. It then recorded as under:
“7.2 From the above, it is evident that the appellant’s refund application was delayed by 26 days. However, I find that the appellant’s initial refund application was filed on 22.02.2024 which was well within time as calculated above. The appellant was issued a deficiency memo on 06.03.2024. This period i.e. from the date of refund application till the date of deficiency memo included 14 days which is also required to be deducted from the delay of 26 days in terms of proviso to rule 90(3) of CGST Rules, 2017 …
7.3 After exclusion of period from the date of initial refund claim till the date of deficiency memo, the appellant’s refund claim was delayed by 12 days (26 days minus 14 days). Regarding this delay of 12 days, the appellant has relied upon the judgment of Hon’ble High Court of Madras in the case of M/s ARS Energy Pvt. Ltd. vs. Additional Commissioner (Appeal), Chennai and Others …
7.4 In terms of above judgment, the appellant’s refund claim cannot be denied merely on the ground of time-barred. In this context, I find force from the judgment of Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in the case of M/s Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited vs. Union of India [W.P.(C) 3550/2023] (Here in after called “BSNL”) …”
16. Further, the appellate authority recorded as under:
“7.5 I find that the deficiency memo dated 06.03.2024 issued to the appellant did not mention about the documents which were incomplete. The said deficiency memo only gave reason as ‘supporting documents attached are incomplete’ and therefore such vague reason for issuing deficiency memo cannot be accepted. I find that the orders of the higher courts are of binding nature on the subordinate courts and authorities. Therefore, I hold that the date of appellant’s initial refund application i.e. 22.02.2024 is to be considered as date of filing of appellant’s refund claim which was well within the time limit for filing refund as discussed supra.
8. In view of the above, I find that the adjudicating authority has erred in rejecting appellant’s refund claim considering the same as time-barred which is contrary to the statute as well as judgment pronounced by the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in the case of M/s Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited vs. Union of India [W.P.(C) 3550/2023] which binding on lower courts and authorities including this appellate authority. It is pertinent to mention that the petitioner filed writ petition before the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi against the order passed by the then appellate authority and it appears that the said judgment has not been challenged by the department before the Hon’ble Supreme Court. As such, the impugned order passed by the adjudicating authority is neither legal nor maintainable in law and therefore the same is liable to be set aside.”
17. The operative part of the impugned OIA reads as under:
“9. The appeal filed by M/s Falak Industries Pvt. Ltd. … against Order-In-Original No. ZI0705240615198 dated 29.05.2024 is hereby allowed. The impugned order dated 29.05.2024 passed by the adjudicating authority is set aside as discussed supra. The instant appeal is disposed of in terms of Section 107(12) of CGST Act, 2017.”
18. The impugned OIA, received in the office of the Principal Commissioner on 23.09.2024, was examined in review under sub-section (3) of Section 112 of the Act 2017 by the Principal Commissioner, CGST, Delhi South, who, by the Review Order dated 18.03.2025, directed the Deputy/Assistant Commissioner, Division Hauz Khas, to file the present appeal.
19. Accordingly, the appellant has preferred this appeal on the following grounds:
a). That the appellate authority held the relevant date to be 06.12.2021, excluded a period of 85 days in terms of notification No. 13/2022 and a period of 14 days from the date of the refund application till the date of the deficiency memo, and still found that a delay of 12 days remained.
b). That on a perusal of Section 54(1) of the Act 2017, the time limit fixed thereunder is mandatory in nature; the taxpayer was liable to adhere to it but failed to do so, and the appellate authority himself observed a delay of 12 days even after considering the notification and the period till the date of the deficiency memo; the appellate authority has thus erred in allowing the appeal of the taxpayer.
c). That, regarding the remaining delay of 12 days, the appellate authority relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble High Court of Madras in ARS Energy (supra), reproducing Lenovo (supra), wherein it was held that the limitation of two years under Section 54(1) is directory in nature and delay shall be condoned if reasons are provided.
d). That the order dated 06.11.2023 of the Hon’ble High Court of Madras in Lenovo (supra) has not been accepted in review by the Puducherry Commissionerate, and Writ Appeals Nos. 730/2024, 731/2024 and 732/2024 have been filed against it and are still pending; the said order has not attained finality, and the impugned OIA merits challenge before this Tribunal.
e). That, in view of the above, the appellate authority has erred in allowing the appeal filed by the taxpayer, and the impugned OIA is not proper and legal.
20. The appellant prayed for
(i) Setting aside Order-in-Appeal No. 276/JC/Central Tax/Appeal-II/Delhi/2024-25 dated 20.09.2024, in view of the grounds of appeal as above;
(ii) For passing any other order, as the GST Appellate Tribunal, Delhi, may deem fit and appropriate in the case.
21. In its reply dated 19.07.2026, the respondent has raised the following sets of submissions:
(i) that the appeal is not maintainable, as the disputed tax of Rs. 6,78,822/- is far below the monetary limit of Rs. 20,00,000/- prescribed for departmental appeals before this tribunal by circular No. 207/1/2024-GST dated 26.06.2024, issued after the 53rd GST Council meeting held on 22.06.2024 in furtherance of the National Litigation Policy; that the circular binds the department and its officers; that none of the exceptions to the limit is attracted, since the impugned OIA turns on the peculiar facts of the respondent’s case, and the exception relating to “refunds” is confined to interpretation of the substantive law governing entitlement to refund;
(ii) that the appeal raises no question of law, the dispute being purely factual; that the applicability of Section 54(1) of the Act 2017 and the two-year limit was never in dispute; that the appellate authority did not decide that the two-year period is merely directory but made a factual computation of limitation; and that the core finding in paragraphs 7.5 and 8 of the impugned OIA rests on the factual characterization of a vague deficiency memo, applying the binding judgment of the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in BSNL (supra);
(iii) that the grounds of the Department’s appeal are built entirely upon Lenovo and ARS Energy (supra), which was not the only reason for the decision of the appellate authority; that the appeal is silent on BSNL (supra), the actual ratio of the impugned OIA, which has been recorded as not challenged before the Hon’ble Supreme Court and has therefore attained finality; and
(iv) that, on merits, the entitlement of the respondent to refund under Section 54(3) of the Act 2017 is not disputed; that refund application 1 filed on 22.02.2024 was within time; that the vague deficiency memo did not render it non est; that the exclusion under notification No. 13/2022 dated 05.07.2022, read with the suo motu limitation orders of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, operates in its favour; and that the substantive right of a bona fide exporter ought not to be defeated on a hyper-technical objection, no prejudice being caused to the Revenue.
22. In its rejoinder to the reply, the appellant has submitted that:
(i) circular No. 207/1/2024-GST is an administrative instruction issued under Section 168(1) of the Act 2017 for the internal guidance of departmental officers, which neither confers nor curtails the statutory right of appeal under Section 112(3) of the Act 2017 nor the jurisdiction of this Tribunal circumscribed to entertain an appeal under section 112;
(ii) the appeal raises substantial questions of law, namely whether the limitation under Section 54(1) is mandatory or directory, whether a deficiency memo which does not itemise the deficient documents renders the original application effective for the exclusion under rule 90(3), and whether the appellate authority could depart from board own binding circular No. 125/44/2019-GST;
(iii) the grounds of appeal challenge the entire computation and conclusion recorded in the impugned OIA, including the residual delay of 12 days recorded by the appellate authority itself at paragraph 7.3;
(iv) the mere circumstance that BSNL (supra) has not been carried in appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court does not make its application to the present facts correct; and
(v) the proviso to Rule 90(3) excludes strictly the period from the date of filing of the refund claim ….till the date of communication of the deficiencies and the unexplained residual delay of 12 days in re-filing renders the claim time-barred on a plain application of the rule.
ISSUES FOR DETERMINATION
23. On a conspectus of the grounds of appeal, the cross-objections and the counter reply thereto, and the findings recorded in the orders below, the following issues arise for determination:
I). Whether the appeal is liable to be dismissed in limine as not maintainable, the disputed tax being below the monetary limit prescribed in Circular No. 207/1/2024-GST dated 26.06.2024, or whether it falls within the exceptions to that limit?
II). Whether refund application 1 was filed within the period of limitation prescribed under Section 54(1) of the Act 2017 read with Notification No. 13/2022, and, in particular, whether the computation of the appellate authority, leaving a residual delay of 12 days, is sustainable?
I11). What is the effect, if any, of the deficiency memo dated 06.03.2024 on the date from which limitation is to be reckoned, and whether refund application 2 relates back to refund application 1?
1V). Whether the two-year period under Section 54(1) of the Act 2017 is mandatory or merely directory?
24. We have heard the parties at length. Sh. Bajrang Prasad Meena, Ld. Assistant Commissioner argued the matter on behalf of the appellant, and Ms Ria Jain, Ld. CA argued the matter on behalf of the respondent. We have also perused the record. Their respective submissions may be summarized as follows:
25. On behalf of the appellant, it was strenuously argued by the Ld. AC that the impugned OIA is erroneous; that the appellate authority has itself recorded in the impugned OIA that, after excluding 85 days under notification No. 13/2022 and 14 days under the proviso to rule 90(3) of the Rule 2017, a delay of 12 days remains in the filing of refund application 2; that Section 54(1) of the Act 2017 prescribes a limit of two years from the relevant date and contains no power of condonation; that the proviso to rule 90(3) of the Rule 2017 is the only statutory relief for a rectified claim and paragraph 12 of Circular No. 125/44/2019-GST, binding on the appellate authority, treats a rectified application as a fresh application to be filed within two years; that Lenovo and ARS Energy (supra) are decisions of a Single Bench of the Hon’ble High Court of Madras, against which Writ Appeals are pending, and are not binding in Delhi; that BSNL (supra) applies only where the original application is not deficient in material particulars, which the impugned OIA does not record; and that the monetary limit in Circular No. 207/1/2024-GST is not a bar to the appeal.
26. On behalf of the respondent, it was vehemently argued at the outset that the appeal is not maintainable, being below the monetary limit and not falling within any exception. Without prejudice to this objection, it was further argued that refund application 1 dated 22.02.2024 was in any event filed within limitation, since notification No. 13/2022 excludes the entire period from 01.03.2020 to 28.02.2022 and the relevant date falling within that window, the two-year period could only commence running from 01.03.2022; that the deficiency memo dated 06.03.2024 does not specify the incomplete documents, so that the respondent could not cure what was not identified; that refund application 2, filed within about three weeks of the memo, relates back to refund application 1, which alone is relevant for limitation; that the OIO dated 24.05.2024 did not take the deficiency memo into consideration at all; that the appellate authority has rightly applied Lenovo and BSNL (supra) in holding that the date of refund application 1 alone is to be considered, a delay of 12 days being the most that could arise even if refund application 2 were reckoned from its own date; that no question of law arises, the impugned OIA resting on the binding judgment in BSNL (supra); that the delay, if any, is marginal and the substantive right of a bona fide exporter ought not to be defeated by technicalities; and that had a notice been issued instead of a deficiency memo, the claim would not have become time-barred.
27. These rival submissions are considered, issue-wise, in the discussion that follows.
28. Issue No I
Whether the appeal is liable to be dismissed in limine as not maintainable, the disputed tax being below the monetary limit prescribed in Circular No. 207/1/2024-GST dated 26.06.2024, or whether it falls within the exceptions to that limit?
29. At the outset, we shall deal with the submission of the respondent that the disputed tax of Rs. 6,78,822/- is far below the monetary limit of Rs. 20,00,000/- fixed by circular No. 207/1/2024-GST dated 26.06.2024 for departmental appeals before this tribunal, and that the appeal is on that ground alone not maintainable.
30. After hearing the parties at length and going through the record, this tribunal is unable to accept this contention. The right of the appellant to file an appeal is conferred by sub-section (3) of Section 112 of the Act 2017, which empowers the commissioner, where he is of the opinion that an order passed by the appellate authority is not legal or proper, to direct any officer subordinate to him to apply to this tribunal for determination of such points arising out of the order. The jurisdiction of this tribunal to entertain an appeal so filed flows from the Act 2017 itself. In the present case, the review Order was passed by the Principal Commissioner in the exercise of the power under sub-section (3) of Section 112 of the Act 2017, and the appeal has been filed on the direction contained therein.
31. The said circular itself provides that the monetary limits are subject to certain exclusions, in which the decision to file an appeal is to be taken on merits irrespective of the said limits. The relevant part of the circular is as under:
“iv. Where the matter is related to –
1. Valuation of goods or services; or
2. Classification of goods or services; or
3. Refunds; or
4. Place of Supply; or
5. Any other issue, which is recurring in nature and/or involves interpretation of the provisions of the Act /the Rules/ notification/circular/order/instruction etc;”
The present dispute is a dispute relating to refund and, therefore, falls squarely within the exceptions as contained in the circular. The submission of the Ld. CA for the respondent that the exception is confined to the “substantive law governing entitlement to refund” finds no support in the language of the circular, which speaks of a matter “related to” refunds without any such qualification.
32. Even otherwise, the aforementioned clause (e) is attracted in this matter, as the questions raised in the present appeal relates to true construction of Section 54(1) of the Act 2017 read with notification No. 13/2022, the proviso to rule 90(3) of the Rules 2017 and paragraph 12 of circular No. 125/44/2019-GST, and the effect of a deficiency memo on the date of filing of a refund application. Deficiency memos are issued to numerous refund applicants, and the answer would govern those cases as well. Section 120(1) of the Act 2017 itself empowers the board to issue instructions fixing monetary limits only “for the purposes of regulating the filing of appeal or application by the officer of the central tax”, which confirms that the circular regulates the discretion of the officers and does not touch the jurisdiction of this tribunal. The maintainability objection raised by the Ld. CA for the respondent is accordingly rejected.
33. Issue No II
Whether refund application 1 was filed within the period of limitation prescribed under Section 54(1) of the Act 2017 read with Notification No. 13/2022, and, in particular, whether the computation of the appellate authority, leaving a residual delay of 12 days, is sustainable?
34. Sub-section (1) of Section 54 of the Act 2017 provides as under:
“Any person claiming refund of any tax and interest, if any, paid on such tax or any other amount paid by him, may make an application before the expiry of two years from the relevant date in such form and manner as may be prescribed.”
The expression “relevant date” is defined in Explanation (2)(a) to Section 54 of the Act 2017 and, in the case of goods exported out of India, is as under: “(a) in the case of goods exported out of India where a refund of tax paid is available in respect of goods themselves or, as the case may be, the inputs or input services used in such goods, —
(i) if the goods are exported by sea or air, the date on which the ship or the aircraft in which such goods are loaded, leaves India; or
(ii) if the goods are exported by land, the date on which such goods pass the frontier; or
(iii) if the goods are exported by post, the date of despatch of goods by the Post Office concerned to a place outside India;”
35. This is not in dispute that the exports of the respondent were by sea. The appellate authority, considered the date on which the ship left India, took the date of Let Export Order, mentioned in the shipping bills as 06.12.2021, as the relevant date. This is also not in dispute between the parties, and, since the ship cannot leave India before the Let Export Order date, no prejudice arises to either side. The ordinary period of two years from the relevant date would, on this footing, have expired on 06.12.2023; it may be noted that the impugned OIA refers also to 05.12.2023.
36. Of central importance to this appeal is notification No. 13/2022 issued under Section 168A of the Act 2017, clause (iii) whereof “excludes the period from the 1st day of March, 2020 to the 28th day of February, 2022 for computation of period of limitation for filing refund application under Section 54 or Section 55 of the said Act”.
This notification extended to refund claims under GST law the benefit of the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s orders in In Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, Suo Motu Writ Petition (Civil) No. 3 of 2020, by which the Hon’ble Supreme Court, taking suo motu cognizance of the difficulties caused by the COVID-19 pandemic, extended the limitation prescribed under any general or special law in respect of all judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings for the period 15.03.2020 to 28.02.2022 (orders dated 23.03.2020, 08.03.2021, 27.04.2021, 23.09.2021 and 10.01.2022).
37. It must be emphasized that notification No. 13/2022 does not permit the limitation clock to run through the specified window; at the very least, no part of the period from 01.03.2020 to 28.02.2022 can be reckoned against the applicant. Where, as here, the relevant date itself falls within the excluded window (06.12.2021 lies between 01.03.2020 and 28.02.2022), two methods of giving effect to the exclusion are conceivable:
First, to exclude only the days that would otherwise have run between the relevant date and the end of the excluded window, and to add that number of days to the normal due date; or,
Second, since no part of the two-year period had even commenced running before the exclusion came to an end, to treat the full period of two years as commencing only from the day following the end of the excluded window, namely 01.03.2022. The appellate authority adopted the first method, adding 85 days to 06.12.2023 and arriving at 01.03.2024.
38. It is also necessary to set out the statutory provisions governing a refund application and the intervention of a deficiency memo. Rule 89 of the Rules 2017 prescribes the documents required to accompany a refund application. Rule 90 of the Rules 2017 governs scrutiny: sub-rule (2) requires an acknowledgment in within 15 days where the application is complete; sub-rule (3) requires communication of deficiencies in FORM GST RFD-03, upon which the applicant is required to file a fresh application after rectification. By notification No. 15/2021-Central Tax dated 18.05.2021, a further proviso was inserted in Rule 90(3) of the Rules 2017, which is as under:
“Provided also that the time period, from the date of filing of the refund claim in FORM GST RFD-01 till the date of communication of the deficiencies in FORM GST RFD-03 by the proper officer, shall be excluded from the period of two years as specified under sub-section (1) of section 54, in respect of any such fresh refund claim filed by the applicant after rectification of the deficiencies.”
This read with paragraph 12 of Circular No. 125/44/2019-GST dated 18.11.2019, which clarifies that a refiled application is to be treated as a fresh application but must nonetheless be filed within two years of the relevant date, constitutes the statutory machinery for computing limitation where a deficiency memo intervenes.
39. The appellate authority held that refund application 1 filed on 22.02.2024 was well within time, and the appellant has not disputed this in the grounds of appeal or in its reply. The entire case of the appellant is that a delay of 12 days remains in respect of refund application 2 filed on 27.03.2024. For the present, it is necessary to ascertain the last date for filing of the refund application, since limitation under a taxing statute goes to the root of the claim. The effect of refund application 2 is dealt with under Issue no iv here in below.
40. It is well settled that there can be no estoppel against a statute and that a concession or a shifting position on a question of law binds neither the party who has taken it nor the tribunal before whom it is taken [Thakur Amar Singhji v. State of Rajasthan, (1955) 2 SCR 303 (Constitution Bench)]. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in R. Nagaraj (Dead) Through LRs v. Rajmani, 2025 INSC 478, has reiterated that it is the duty of every court to ascertain whether a lis has been initiated within the time prescribed by law, this being a question that may be raised, and must be answered, at any stage. In Satyendra Kumar v. Raj Nath Dubey, 2016 SCC OnLine SC 478, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, relying upon Mathura Prasad Sarjoo Jaiswal v. Dossibai N.B. Jeejeebhoy, (1970) 1 SCC 613, has held that the principle of estoppel operates against the parties and not against the court, and that nothing comes in the way of a competent court deciding a pure question of law correctly; and in National Thermal Power Co. Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, (1998) 229 ITR 383 (SC), it was held that a question of law arising on the facts already on record may be entertained although it was not raised before the authorities below. The controversy whether the entire window of exclusion is to be excluded and the period of two years reckoned afresh after it, or only a part of the days is to be added to the original due date, is a pure question of law on admitted facts, and this tribunal is bound to reckon limitation correctly in terms of law, uninfluenced by the manner in which the parties or the authorities below have computed it.
41. The judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in In Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, Suo Motu Writ Petition (C) No. 3 of 2020, decided on 10.01.2022 (2022-VIL-03-SC; (2022) 3 SCC 117), is the foundation of Notification No. 13/2022-Central Tax, the Act 2017 being a special law. For ready reference, paragraph 5 of the said judgment, containing the directions, is reproduced in full hereunder:
“5. Taking into consideration the arguments advanced by learned counsel and the impact of the surge of the virus on public health and adversities faced by litigants in the prevailing conditions, we deem it appropriate to dispose of the M.A. No. 21 of 2022 with the following directions:
I. The order dated 23.03.2020 is restored and in continuation of the subsequent orders dated 08.03.2021, 27.04.2021 and 23.09.2021, it is directed that the period from 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022 shall stand excluded for the purposes of limitation as may be prescribed under any general or special laws in respect of all judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings.
II. Consequently, the balance period of limitation remaining as on 03.10.2021, if any, shall become available with effect from 01.03.2022.
III. In cases where the limitation would have expired during the period between 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022, notwithstanding the actual balance period of limitation remaining, all persons shall have a limitation period of 90 days from 01.03.2022. In the event the actual balance period of limitation remaining, with effect from 01.03.2022 is greater than 90 days, that longer period shall apply.
IV. It is further clarified that the period from 15.03.2020 till 28.02.2022 shall also stand excluded in computing the periods prescribed under Sections 23 (4) and 29A of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 and provisos (b) and (c) of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and any other laws, which prescribe period(s) of limitation for instituting proceedings, outer limits (within which the court or tribunal can condone delay) and termination of proceedings.”
42. The judgment of the Hon’ble High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Amaravati in M/s MC Wane India Private Limited v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Others, Writ Petition No. 26816 of 2024, decided on 11.03.2026 (2026: APHC:13141), which adopts the first method of computation, has also been taken note of by us. The relevant part of the said judgment is as under:
“7. It is the admitted case of both sides that the relevant date, under Section 54, for the present case, is 29.08.2021. In the normal course, the application would have to be filed on or before 28.08.2023, inasmuch as the period of limitation, under Section 54, is two years from the relevant date.
8. The Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court as well as the notification, mentioned above, clearly stipulate that the period from 01.03.2020 to 28.02.2022 should be excluded while including the period of two years mentioned in Section 54. In the present case, the period of limitation would commence only from 29.08.2021. However, this would mean that the period from 29.08.2021 to 28.02.2022 would have to be excluded. Once this period is excluded, the limitation would commence only from 28.02.2022. In such circumstances, the last date for filing the application would be 27.02.2024.”
43. We have taken care of the judgments referred to above. This Tribunal is here for delivery of justice, and for the implementation of the exclusion period in terms of the desired intent of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in In Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation (supra) as well as the desired intent of notification No. 13/2022 in its letter and spirit. The Hon’ble Apex Court has categorically mentioned in paragraph 5(III) of its judgment that where the limitation would have expired during the period between 15.03.2020 and 28.02.2022, all persons shall have a limitation period of 90 days from 01.03.2022, or the longer balance period, if any. Meaning thereby, this period of 90 days is applicable only where the period of limitation had expired within the exclusion window.
44. In the present matter, this is not the case, as the period of limitation as per Section 54 of the Act 2017 commenced only from the relevant date, i.e., 06.12.2021, and the normal period of two years was not to expire within the exclusion window. Accordingly, paragraph 5(I) of the judgment In Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation (supra) is applicable, and the entire period till 28.02.2022 stands excluded. The same result follows from notification No. 13/2022, which excludes the period from 01.03.2020 to 28.02.2022 in computing the period of limitation under Section 54 of the Act 2017, the relevant date of 06.12.2021 falling within that window as well. The last date for filing the refund application is arrived at as hereinafter discussed.
45. Section 54(1) of the Act 2017 provides for an application for refund to be made before the expiry of two years “from the relevant date”. Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, which applies to the Act 2017, provides that for the purpose of excluding the first in a series of days or any period of time, the word “from” is to be used, and, for the purpose of including the last, the word “to”. Thus, the day which is the relevant date, i.e., 06.12.2021, from which the period is to be reckoned, is to be excluded, and the period must be reckoned from the next day, i.e., 07.12.2021. Section 12(1) of the Limitation Act, 1963 embodies the same principle.
46. The entire period from 07.12.2021 till 28.02.2022 being excluded, as no part of the two years had run, the balance period of limitation which, in terms of the judgment In Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation (supra), became available with effect from 01.03.2022, is the full period of two years. The period of two years is, therefore, to be reckoned with 01.03.2022 as its first day, 28.02.2022 being the last day of the exclusion.
47. Under Section 3(66) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, a year means a year reckoned according to the British calendar. The two years beginning on 01.03.2022 thus comprise the period from 01.03.2022 to 29.02.2024, both days inclusive (365 days and 366 days, i.e., 731 days in all), the next day, i.e. 01.03.2024, being the corresponding date on which the period of two years stands completed. The last date for filing the refund application is, accordingly, 29.02.2024, in terms of notification No. 13/2022 as well as paragraphs 5(I) and 5(II) of the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court In Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation (supra).
48. With due respect, we do not deem appropriate to dwell upon to adopt a different computation for the dictum as laid down in the judgment of the Hon’ble Andhra Pradesh High Court in M/s MC Wane India Private Limited (supra), in view of paragraphs 5(II) and 5(III) of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in In Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation (supra), under which the balance period becomes available only with effect from 01.03.2022. In any case, nothing turns on the difference in the present matter, since refund application 1 was filed on 22.02.2024, which is within time even on the computation of the Hon’ble Andhra Pradesh High Court (last date 27.02.2024), on the computation of the appellate authority (01.03.2024), and on the computation which we have found to be correct (29.02.2024).
49. In view of the above, we hold that refund application 1, filed on 22.02.2024, was filed within the period prescribed under Section 54(1) of the Act 2017 as extended in terms of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and Notification No. 13/2022. The residual delay of 12 days recorded by the appellate authority arises only if refund application 2 is treated as a fresh application, and that is the question to which we are now switching to. Issue No III is answered accordingly, in favour of the respondent.
50. Issue No III
What is the effect, if any, of the deficiency memo dated 06.03.2024 on the date from which limitation is to be reckoned, and whether refund application 2 relates back to refund application 1?
51. Having held that refund application 1, filed on 22.02.2024, was filed within the period of limitation, we shall now turn to the effect of the deficiency memo dated 06.03.2024. The Ld. AC for the appellant contended that refund application 2, filed on 27.03.2024 after rectification, and hence is a fresh application; that, in terms of the third proviso to Rule 90(3) of the Rules 2017 and paragraph 12 of circular No. 125/44/2019-GST, binding on the appellate authority under Section 168(1) of the Act 2017, only the period from the date of refund application 1 till the date of the deficiency memo is to be excluded; and that, so reckoned, refund application 2 is delayed by 12 days. The Ld. CA for the respondent, on the other hand, contended that the deficiency memo did not identify any deficiency and was vague, that refund application 2 is a continuation of refund application 1, and that the appellate authority has rightly relied upon the judgments of the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi.
52. Section 54(1) of the Act 2017 requires an application for refund to be made before the expiry of two years from the relevant date “in such form and manner as may be prescribed”. The form and manner of the application and the documents which are to accompany it are prescribed by Rule 89 of the Rules 2017, and its scrutiny by Rule 90 of the Rules 2017 thereof, as already noticed hereinabove. Before the appellate authority, and again before us, the respondent has relied upon decisions of various Hon’ble Superior Courts for the proposition that, where a refund application is followed by a deficiency memo, the date of the original application and not the date of the refiled application is to be treated as the relevant reference point for computing limitation. This line of authority is well established.
53. In M/s Durgambika Traders v. The Union of India, decided on 14 November 2025, the Hon’ble Karnataka High Court in W.P. 5131/2024 held that;
“ii) The petitioner is reserved liberty to file a fresh/new refund application along with relevant documents within a period of 6 weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.
iii) It is further directed that pursuant to the petitioner filing fresh/new refund application along with relevant documents before the respondents, the respondents shall construe/consider/treat the fresh/new refund application to be filed by the petitioner as if the same was filed on 03.05.2023 on which date the first refund application was filed by the petitioner and by excluding the entire period from 03.05.2023 till the date of filing the fresh/new refund application for the purpose of limitation under Section 54 of the CGST Act.
iv) Along with fresh/new refund application, the liberty is reserved in favour of the petitioner to file pleadings/documents etc., in support of his claim.
v) Pursuant to the petitioner filing the fresh/new refund application, the concerned respondent shall consider the refund claim of the petitioner and pass appropriate orders together with the claim of interest put forth by the petitioner in accordance with the provisions contained in Section 54 of the CGST Act read with Rule 89 of the CGST Rules as expeditiously as possible within a period of three months from the date of petitioner filing fresh/new refund application.”
54. The Hon’ble Jammu & Kashmir High Court in M/s Hallmark v. Jammu and Kashmir Goods and Services, decided on 25 September 2024, W.P.(C) 2025/2020, has held that;
“18. What is held by a Division Bench of the High Court of New Delhi in paragraph-25 of WP(C) 871/2022, decided on 09.08.2023, in case, titled as, National Internet Exchange of India vs Union of India & ors., is relevant to reproduce hereunder:
“25. As noted above, in terms of Section 54(1) of the CGST Act, an application is required to be made in the prescribed form and manner before two years from the relevant date. It is clear that the petitioner had complied with the said requirement inasmuch as it had filed an application for refund on 31.10.2019 in the “form and manner” as prescribed in the CGST Act and the CGST Rules. Thus, in terms of Section 54(1) of the CGST Act, the period of limitation would stop running notwithstanding that the proper officer required further documents or material to satisfy himself that the refund claimed was due to the petitioner.”
19. Similarly, what is held by a Division Bench of the High Court of New Delhi in paragraphs-27, 28 & 29 of WP(C) 3550/2023, decided on 06.04.2023, in case, titled as, Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited vs Union of India & ors., is also relevant to reproduce hereunder:
“27. It is pointed out that the Adjudicating Authority had proceeded on the basis that it had communicated the deficiencies in Form GST RFD 03 on 31.01.2020 electronically and the said deficiency was resolved after the expiry of two years as stipulated in Section 54 of the CGST Act. The Adjudicating Authority had referred to Rule 90(3) of the Rules and had proceeded on the basis that the said Rule provides for filing of a fresh refund application after rectification of deficiencies. And, the date for filing the fresh application was required to be considered for the purpose of limitation.
28. We are of the view that Rule 90(3) cannot be applied in the manner as sought to be done by the Adjudicating Authority. Merely because certain other documents or clarifications are sought by way of issuing a Deficiency Memo, the same will not render the application by a taxpayer as non est. 29. If the application filed is not deficient in material particulars, it cannot be treated as non est. If it is accompanied by the “documentary evidences” as mentioned in Rule 89(2) of the Rules, it cannot be ignored for the purposes of limitation. The limitation would necessarily stop on filing the said application. This is not to say that the information disclosed may not warrant further clarification, however, that by itself cannot lead to the conclusion that the application is required to be treated as non est for the purposes of Section 54 of the CGST Act. It is erroneous to assume that the application, which is accompanied by the documents as specified under Rule 89(2) of the Rules, is required to be treated as complete only after the taxpayer furnishes the clarification of further documents as may be required by the proper officer and that too from the date such clarification is issued.”
55. The Hon’ble High Court of Karnataka recently, in Homag India Private Limited v. Joint Commissioner (Writ Petition 27378/2025), has held as under;
“5. In the instant case, the undisputed material on record will indicate that the petitioner initially filed a refund application on 04.07.2024 which was well within the prescribed period as contemplated under Section 54(3) of the CGST Act and it was that date on which the petitioner filed the refund application has to be considered for the purpose of computing period of limitation and not subsequent revised refund application filed by the petitioner pursuant to the deficiency memo issued by the respondents, which is clearly incorrect and consequently, the said finding recorded by the respondents is erroneous and matter deserves to be quashed.” Therefore, it is clear that a rectified application filed thereafter is a continuation of, and not a substitute for, the original claim.
56. We respectfully agree with and adopt the principle underlying this line of authority. A genuine, bona fide rectification of deficiencies carried out pursuant to a deficiency memo does not give rise to a fresh cause of action or a fresh limitation period; it relates back to, and is treated as a continuation of, the original application. The judgments of the Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in National Internet Exchange of India and Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited (supra) are, moreover, binding on the authorities and on this tribunal functioning within its territorial jurisdiction.
57. However, the doctrine of relation-back recognized in this line of authority operates only where the original application was itself filed within the period of limitation prescribed under Section 54(1) of the Act 2017, as extended by notification No. 13/2022. In each of the decisions referred to above, the assessee’s original application was admittedly within time, and it was only the subsequent, deficiency-memo-driven application that the department sought, erroneously, to treat as the relevant date for limitation. The doctrine of relation-back cures the effect of an intervening deficiency memo upon an otherwise claim not barred by limitation; it cannot cure an antecedent infirmity in the limitation of the original claim itself. In the present case, as already held, refund application 1 was filed on 22.02.2024, i.e., before the last date of 29.02.2024, and the condition for the application of the doctrine is therefore satisfied.
58. The deficiency memo dated 06.03.2024 stated only that “supporting documents attached are incomplete”. The appellate authority has recorded in the impugned OIA that the deficiency memo did not mention which documents were incomplete. The adjudicating authority has not recorded any specific finding to the effect that refund application 1 was deficient in any material particular. The SCN and the OIO dated 29.05.2024 are founded exclusively on limitation. The appellant, who was asked by the appellate authority to furnish para-wise comments on 08.07.2024, but did not respond, has not pointed out, even before us, what material particular was missing from refund application 1. In these circumstances, the principle laid down in paragraphs 28 and 29 of Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited (supra) squarely applies, and refund application 1 cannot be treated as non-est merely because a memo seeking unspecified further documents was issued.
59. The submission of the Ld. AC for the appellant that the respondent understood and cured the deficiency, as is evident from its re-filing within about three weeks, does not advance its case. A taxpayer who responds promptly to a deficiency memo cannot be penalized for his diligence, and a rectification so made is precisely the bona fide rectification to which the above principle applies. The explanation of the respondent in its reply to the SCN, that it was understanding the requirement and arranging the correct documents, itself bears out its bona fides.
60. The residual delay of 12 days on which the whole case of the appellant rests, arises only if refund application 2 is treated as a fresh application. Since refund application 2 is a continuation of refund application 1, the date of filing for the purposes of limitation is 22.02.2024, and no question of any delay arises.
61. Issue No III is accordingly answered in favour of the respondent.
62. Issue No IV
Whether the two-year period under Section 54(1) of the Act 2017 is mandatory or merely directory?
63. The appellate authority in the impugned OIA, has relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble High Court of Madras in ARS Energy (supra), which in turn reproduces Lenovo (supra), in the following terms:
“11. Recently, this court had passed an order in W.P.No.23604 of 2022 dated 06.11.2023 [M/s Lenovo (India) Pvt. Ltd., vs. The Joint Commissioner of GST (Appeals-1) and others], wherein it has been held that the fixation of limitation for making refund application is only directory in nature and the same is not mandatory. Accordingly, the limitation of 2 years, which was provided under section 54(1) of Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, is directory in nature. In such case, if any reasons were provided for delay in filing the refund application, the same shall be considered and the said delay shall be condoned by the respondent.”
64. The appellant contends that the Madras decisions have not been accepted by the department, and that Writ Appeals Nos. 730/2024, 731/2024 and 732/2024 against Lenovo (supra) are pending and the said decision has not attained finality. The respondent, relying on the use of the word “may” in Section 54(1), supports the view taken by the appellate authority, and further submits that a substantive right of a bona fide exporter ought not to be defeated on a hyper-technical objection.
65. We are unable to endorse the view that the period of two years prescribed by Section 54(1) of the Act 2017 is merely directory. This distinction is reinforced by the settled position of the Hon’ble Apex Court that limitation periods under special fiscal statutes are to be strictly construed and are not ordinarily susceptible to relaxation on equitable grounds, however marginal the delay. In Mafatlal Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, (1997) 5 SCC 536, a Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that a claim for refund of duty under a fiscal statute must be made, and can only be made, within the four corners of that statute and cannot be pursued outside the statute on general principles of equity or under the ordinary law of limitation.
66. In another matter, Assistant Commissioner (CT), LTU, Kakinada v. Glaxo Smith Kline Consumer Health Care Ltd., (2020) 19 SCC 681, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that where a special statute prescribes its own limitation without expressly conferring a power to condone delay beyond it, neither the authorities under that statute nor even a High Court in writ jurisdiction can extend that period, as doing so would render the specific statutory limit otiose. This principle is reflected also in the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Commissioner of Customs & Central Excise v. Hongo India (P) Ltd., (2009) 5 SCC 791, and in Singh Enterprises v. Commissioner of Central Excise, (2008) 3 SCC 70, both holding that where a taxing statute is a complete code prescribing a specific period, with at best a limited power of condonation, the authorities constituted under it cannot travel beyond that period by resort to Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has further held, in VKC Footsteps India (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (2021) 4 SCC 705, that a refund under GST law is in the nature of a statutory concession, to be claimed strictly in accordance with the conditions, form and procedure prescribed by the statute itself.
67. The law declared by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the decisions noticed above holds the field under Article 141 of the Constitution of India, and those decisions require that a limitation prescribed by a special fiscal statute governing refund be strictly construed. With the greatest respect to the Hon’ble High Court of Madras in Lenovo and ARS Energy (supra) which has taken the view that the period under Section 54(1) of the Act 2017 is directory, the correctness of that view is itself the subject matter of pending Writ Appeals as claimed by the appellant. In the light of the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court noticed above, we find ourselves, with utmost respect, unable to adopt the dictum of Hon’ble High Court of Madras for the purposes of the present case. No provision of the Act 2017 confers on the proper officer or on the appellate authority a power to condone delay in filing a refund application. It was therefore not incumbent upon the appellate authority to conclude that the appellant’s refund claim can’t be denied merely on the ground of time barred.
68. The above error does not, however, affect the final outcome. As held under Issue Nos II and III, refund application 1 was filed within time and refund application 2 is its continuation, so that there is no delay which requires to be condoned. The conclusion of the appellate authority that the claim of the respondent cannot be rejected as time barred, resting as it does on Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited (supra) is sustained for the reasons recorded in this judgment.
69. Issue No IV is accordingly answered partly in favour of the appellant, in that the limitation under Section 54(1) of the Act 2017 is held to be mandatory and not directory; this finding does not, however, affect the outcome, since the refund claim of the respondent is, in any event, within the statutory period.
CONCLUSION
70. For the reasons recorded above:
(i) the appeal is maintainable, the dispute being one relating to refund and falling within the exclusions in para 4(iv) of Circular No. 207/1/2024-GST dated 26.06.2024.
(ii) the relevant date for the exports of the respondent, which were by sea, is 06.12.2021, being the date taken by the appellate authority on the basis of the “Let Export Date” on the shipping bills, which is not in dispute;
(iii) the correct extended due date, after applying the exclusion under Notification No. 13/2022 and paragraph 5(I) and 5(II) of the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in In Re: Cognizance for Extension of Limitation, is 29.02.2024;
(iv) refund application 1, dated 22.02.2024, was filed within the extended period of limitation and was not barred by limitation;
(v) refund application 2, dated 27.03.2024, relates back to, and is a continuation of, the timely refund application 1, the deficiency memo dated 06.03.2024 not having identified any deficiency in refund application 1, and has no independent bearing on limitation; and
(vi) the two-year period under Section 54(1) of the Act 2017 is mandatory and the appellate authority erred in treating it as directory, but this finding does not affect the outcome, since the claim of the respondent is, in any event, within the statutory period.
ORDER
71. In view of the foregoing, the appeal filed by the appellant/department stands dismissed.
No order as to costs. Announced in the open court.


