ourt held that upgradation of computers by changing certain parts, thereby enhancing the configuration of the computers for improving their efficiency, was only a revenue expenditure. The said view was again followed by this Court in CIT v. Southern Roadways Ltd. [2007] 288 ITR 15.
In State of West Bengal v. Purvi Communication (P.) Ltd. [2005] 140 STC 154, the Apex Court upheld the entertainment tax levy on cable television by West Bengal. It was held that cable operators had direct and close nexus with the entertainments made available to the viewer through their cable television network. The performance, film or programmes shown to the viewers through the cable television network came within the meaning of entertainments and therefore within the legislative competence of the State Legislature under Entry 62 of List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution to make law for the levy and collection of tax on such entertainments.
Assessee participated in the enquiry conducted under Section 131 of the Income Tax Act and had also made a statement confirming the purchase of the land. Subsequent thereto, the assessee had participated in the enquiry and on 15.5.2002, in response to the notice under Section 142(1)
It is to be noted that a settlement is an admixture of gift or partition or trust. In law, a family arrangement/settlement is accepted as a transfer of interest in the property in favour of an individual between whom the family arrangement or settlement is so made. Just because a deed/instrument answers the description of a ‘Trust Deed’, it does not cease to be a ‘settlement’ for the purpose of stamp duty, if it answers the description of ‘settlement’ also. As a matter of fact, a deed of trust/trust deed can also be a settlement deed.
Deemed payment could not be treated as actual payment to qualify for deduction under Section 43B of the Income Tax Act, we do not agree with the submission of the learned counsel appearing for the assessee herein that depositing the amount in a bank, even if it be in a separate account, would satisfy the provisions of Section 43 B as actual payment. Reading the decision in Sri Venkatesa Mills Ltd. (supra) along with the decision in McDowell & Co. Ltd. (supra), one can only observe that the law declared in both the above judgments are one and the same, in the sense, that both the decisions held that under Section 43 B only actual payment and not any notional or deemed payment that would be relevant for considering the deduction.
It is not in dispute that the petitioner had placed all the relevant records, including the construction agreement, before the passing of the original assessment order. Further, it is not the case of the respondent that the petitioner had suppressed certain material facts, due to which the original assessment order, passed by the respondent is liable to be re-assessed.
A reading of the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of CWT v. Vysyaraju Badreenarayana Morthy Raju [1985] 152 ITR 454 shows that the computation of the net wealth of an assessee calls for a determination of his assets and debts as on the valuation date. Whether the system of accounting, whether mercantile or cash or hybrid, is not relevant for the purpose of determining the assets of the assessee. This is clear from the definition of ‘net wealth’.
Apex Court held that till the amendment in 1995, the compensation received on surrendering the tenancy rights could not be assessed to capital gains. Thus, on the fact position as found by the Tribunal and which form the very basis of the order under Section 263 that the assessee was treated as tenants as per the document dated 25.02.1994, the genuineness of which was never questioned by the Revenue, we have no hesitation in confirming the order of the Tribunal. In the above circumstances, we reject the questions raised by the Revenue.
The assessee herein sought for withdrawal of the appeal to go before the Settlement Commission, which dismissed the petition on the ground that there was no appeal pending, a mandatory requirement as on the date of taking up a required application.
Law is well-settled that in cases where the company court sells the properties in accordance with various provisions of the Companies Act and the Rules framed thereunder, such sale can be interfered with only in cases where there is a total irregularity or the sale is effected against the provisions of the Companies Act or the Rules framed thereunder. On the factual matrix, it is not the case of the appellant that there has been any irregularity or the sale has been effected in gross violation of the provisions of the Companies Act. T
