Case Law Details
Gurukul Lutheran Theological College and Research Institute Vs The Commissioner Corporation Of Chennai (Madras High Court)
In our view lawyers are perceived to be their client’s agents. The law of agency may not strictly apply to the client-lawyer’s relationship as lawyers or agents, lawyers have certain authority and certain duties. Because lawyers are also fiduciaries, their duties will sometimes be more demanding than those imposed on other agents. The authority-agency status affords the lawyers to act for the client on the subject-matter of the retainer. One of the most basic principles of the lawyer-client relationship is that lawyers owe fiduciary duties to their clients. As part of those duties, lawyers assume all the traditional duties that agents owe to their principals and, thus, have to respect the client’s autonomy to make decisions at a minimum, as to the objectives of the representation. Thus, according to generally accepted notions of professional responsibility, lawyers should follow the client’s instructions rather than substitute their judgment for that of the client. The law is now well settled that a lawyer must be specifically authorised to settle and compromise a claim, that merely on the basis of his employment he has no implied or ostensible authority to bind his client to a compromise/settlement. To put it alternatively that a lawyer by virtue of retention, has the authority to choose the means for achieving the client’s legal goal, while the client has the right to decide on what the goal will be. If the decision in question falls within those that clearly belong to the client, the lawyer’s conduct in failing to consult the client or in making the decision for the client, is more likely to constitute ineffective assistance of counsel.
Generally, admissions of fact made by a counsel are binding upon their principals as long as they are unequivocal; where, however, doubt exists as to a purported admission, the court should be wary to accept such admissions until and unless the counsel or the advocate is authorised by his principal to make such admissions. Furthermore, a client is not bound by a statement or admission which he or his lawyer was not authorised to make. A lawyer generally has no implied or apparent authority to make an admission or statement which would directly surrender or conclude the substantial legal rights of the client unless such an admission or statement is clearly a proper step in accomplishing the purpose for which the lawyer was employed (emphasis added). We hasten to add neither the client nor the court is bound by the lawyer’s statements or admissions as to matters of law or legal conclusions. Thus, according to generally accepted notions of professional responsibility, lawyers should follow the client’s instructions rather than substitute their judgment for that of the client. We may add that in some cases, lawyers can make decisions without consulting the client. While in others, the decision is reserved for the client. It is often said that the lawyer can make decisions as to tactics without consulting the client, while the client has a right to make decisions that can affect his rights.”
The principles that can be gleaned from the aforesaid judgments are that unequivocal concessions by a counsel on facts are binding on the client. On the contrary, concessions on pure questions of law are not binding. Further, a lawyer has no implied authority to make an admission or statement which would directly surrender or conclude the substantial legal rights of the client unless such admission helps achieve the purpose for which the lawyer was employed. When these principles are applied to the facts of this case, it is clear that the lawyer admitted liability without authorisation after making an assertion of entitlement to an exemption in the grounds. In our view, a concession by counsel does not create an estoppel as regards a statutory exemption. Given that the impugned order of the Writ Court does not discuss the exemption or its applicability, it cannot be concluded that a decision was made that the Appellant is not entitled to an exemption. Besides, it cannot be concluded that there was a voluntary relinquishment of the claim for exemption so as to constitute a waiver of a statutory right by the Appellant. As such, these contentions of the learned counsel for the Appellant, in this regard, are liable to be accepted.
As stated earlier, the claim for exemption under Section 101(c) is required to be established by the person concerned by providing evidence that the buildings were used for educational purposes. In the present case, it would be necessary for the Appellant to establish that the buildings were used for educational purposes during the relevant period. It would also be necessary to establish that the Appellant is entitled to an exemption in respect of the buildings that were used as hostels although hostel fees may have been collected. Such determination would have to be made by the Chennai Corporation authorities by examining relevant evidence. For such purposes, it is necessary that the matter be remanded for determination by the Chennai Corporation.
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