Raj Trading Co. Vs J P Singh (GSTAT Prayagraj)
Summary : The GST Appellate Tribunal, Prayagraj, dismissed Raj Trading Co.’s appeal on merits while modifying the amounts payable under the order passed on remand. The dispute concerned undeclared sales of iron and steel goods from September 2017 to March 2018. The First Appellate Authority had confirmed tax of ₹45,36,330, interest of ₹70,78,166 and a penalty of ₹45,36,330. The Tribunal sustained the finding of suppression under Section 74 but capped tax and penalty at ₹45,00,000 each, with a corresponding limit on interest up to 10 September 2024.
On 23 March 2018, the Special Investigation Branch surveyed the trader’s godown-cum-office in Prayagraj and drew a Panchnama in the presence of the proprietor and two independent witnesses. A vehicle was unloading iron goods and retail sales were in progress. The Panchnama recorded that no stock register was maintained and no tax invoice had been issued for that day’s transactions. The proprietor described the use of duplicate-copy “Natraj” pads, with the original given to the customer and the counterpart destroyed after use. The officers seized stock and four sets of records marked Sanket-01 to Sanket-04. Sanket-02 comprised three bound notebooks containing 46 written pages of dated sales entries totalling ₹2,52,01,836.
After a notice in Form GST DRC-01 and three reminders went unanswered, the Deputy Commissioner passed an ex parte order on 31 December 2021, estimating undeclared sales at ₹7 crore and confirming a total demand of ₹3,70,98,286. The first appellate order of 10 September 2024 reduced the estimated turnover to ₹2.50 crore and fixed tax and penalty at ₹45 lakh each and interest at ₹56.70 lakh. In Writ Tax No. 2489 of 2024, the Allahabad High Court set that order aside on 2 September 2025 because the authority had fixed undeclared sales above the figure for undeclared purchases without explaining its calculation. The High Court directed a fresh reasoned order after hearing the stakeholders. On remand, the First Appellate Authority accepted the trader’s reconciliation for three exhibits and confined the demand to the Sanket-02 entries, applying 18% GST.
The trader described the notebooks as “dumb documents” left by brokers or transporters and pointed to the absence of buyer statements, transport documents, a cash trail, unaccounted purchases or a stock discrepancy. The State relied on the common seizure, the proprietor’s unretracted admission and the presumption under Rule 56(10). The Tribunal found that the notebooks were maintained sequentially and recorded dates, goods, weights, rates, amounts and recurring buyers. The proprietor had described the same kind of pads at the survey, and the trader had acknowledged before the First Appellate Authority that the notebooks were recovered from its shop. The trader offered no names, affidavits or other evidence to support its explanation.
The Tribunal held that Section 155 concerns the burden of proving entitlement to input tax credit and had no application to this dispute. It applied Rule 56(10) and the preponderance-of-probabilities standard, drawing on Collector of Customs, Madras v. D. Bhoormull. It distinguished CBI v. V.C. Shukla, Common Cause v. Union of India and the clandestine-removal authorities involving loose papers, third-party records or unauthenticated electronic data. A trader can sell goods purchased on invoice and omit those sales from its returns. The absence of a stock register meant that physical stock could not be reconciled with book stock. The remand demand was based on recorded sales after exhibit-wise reconciliation.
The Tribunal found deliberate suppression of outward supplies in GSTR-1 and GSTR-3B. It relied on the parallel sales records, the destruction of duplicate leaves, the absence of a stock register and the invoice-free sales observed during the survey. Those facts established intent to evade tax under Section 74 and supported an equal penalty. The Tribunal also found that the notice disclosed the Panchnama and exhibits and that the demand did not depend on third-party witness statements, distinguishing CCE v. Brindavan Beverages and Andaman Timber Industries v. CCE.
The Tribunal upheld service through the common portal under Section 169(1)(d), pointing to the record of service, the three reminders and the trader’s failure to appear in response to a summons under Section 70. It distinguished Srideva Sattva Private Limited v. State of Haryana, where the record did not establish service. It found no prejudice from the non-supply of the SIB report and videography in light of the disclosed material, the absence of a request for copies or inspection under Section 67(5), and the full reconciliation hearing on remand. It treated the reference to Section 63 in the appellate order as a clerical slip saved by Section 160.
The Tribunal held that the provisos to Section 107(11) did not require an enhancement notice because the remand order reduced the original adjudicated demand and stayed within the grounds and amounts in the show-cause notice, satisfying Section 75(7). However, the remand order increased tax and penalty by ₹36,330 each compared with the first appellate order that the trader itself had challenged. Applying Saudi Arabian Airlines v. Union of India and the principle that an appellant should not be placed in a worse position by pursuing a challenge, the Tribunal used Section 113 to restrict tax and penalty to ₹45 lakh each, divided equally between CGST and UPGST.
Interest under Section 50 must be computed on tax of ₹45 lakh and cannot exceed ₹56.70 lakh up to 10 September 2024. Statutory interest continues thereafter until payment. The Tribunal directed correction of Form GST APL-04 and adjustment of amounts already deposited or recovered. Any arithmetical error in interest may be corrected during recovery after giving the trader a hearing and subject to the limits fixed by the Tribunal.
Cases Discussed
- Final Order No. 70404/2026; 2026 (10) TMI 141 — Principal Commissioner of CGST v. Wast Industries (CESTAT Allahabad, 29 September 2026) — Distinguished because the demand there relied on unsigned or third-party records and unauthenticated electronic material.
- 2026 INSC 933; Civil Appeal No. 1052 of 2013 — M/s Saudi Arabian Airlines v. Union of India (Supreme Court, 1 September 2026) — Applied to cap liability at the amounts fixed before the appellant obtained remand.
- 2026 (3) TMI 1622 — Srideva Sattva Private Limited v. State of Haryana & Ors. (Supreme Court, 30 January 2026) — Distinguished because service of the notice was established in the present case.
- Writ Tax No. 2489 of 2024 — Raj Trading Company v. State of U.P. (Allahabad High Court, 2 September 2025; remand order) — Set aside the first appellate order and directed fresh, reasoned quantification after hearing the stakeholders.
- Final Order Nos. 76899–76900/2025 — DD Iron & Steel Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of CGST & Central Excise, Rourkela (CESTAT Kolkata, 14 July 2025) — Distinguished because the pocket diary and loose sheets were of unknown authorship and were disowned.
- 2023 (12) TMI 299; (2024) 15 Centax 313 — Prinik Steels (P) Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Bhubaneswar-I (CESTAT Kolkata) — Distinguished because the demand rested on computer printouts and statements that did not satisfy statutory requirements.
- 2018 (12) TMI 369 — Shiv Shankar Plywood v. CCE, Rohtak (CESTAT Chandigarh) — Distinguished because the statement was retracted and the documents were recovered from another person.
- 2018 (362) ELT 961 (Chh) — Hi-Tech Abrasives Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Raipur (Chhattisgarh High Court) — Distinguished because that decision concerned reliance on a director’s statement without following Section 9D of the Central Excise Act.
- (2017) 77 taxmann.com 245; (2018) 9 SCC 382 — Common Cause v. Union of India (Supreme Court, 2017) — Distinguished because the entries were in loose sheets recovered from third-party corporate premises.
- 2015 (324) ELT 641 (SC) — Andaman Timber Industries v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Kolkata-II (Supreme Court) — Distinguished because the GST demand did not rely on third-party witness statements.
- 2014 (309) ELT 411 (All) — Continental Cement Co. v. Union of India (Allahabad High Court) — Distinguished because the demand against the manufacturer lacked corroboration of clandestine production or clearance.
- Order dated 18 October 2012 — Raipur Alloys (CESTAT New Delhi, as identified in paragraph 12 of the GSTAT order) — The Tribunal identified the copy as a CENVAT credit remand and found it did not address loose sheets.
- 2009 (238) ELT 3 (SC) — Union of India v. Rajasthan Spinning & Weaving Mills (Supreme Court) — Applied by analogy on the conditions for imposing an equal penalty where suppression with intent to evade is established.
- 2007 (213) ELT 487 (SC) — CCE v. Brindavan Beverages (P) Ltd. (Supreme Court, 15 June 2007) — Distinguished because the GST notice set out the seized material and the basis of the demand.
- (2007) 293 ITR 43 (Del) — CIT v. S.M. Aggarwal (Delhi High Court, 28 March 2007) — Distinguished because the case turned on a single seized sheet and concurrent factual findings.
- (2000) 245 ITR 297 — Mahavir Woollen Mills v. CIT (Delhi High Court) — Discussed in connection with the evidentiary value of a purported dumb document.
- (1998) 3 SCC 410 — CBI v. V.C. Shukla (Supreme Court) — Distinguished because third-party diary entries could not establish liability without independent supporting evidence.
- 1989 UPTC 358 — Moti Lal Dwarika Prasad v. Commissioner of Sales Tax (Allahabad High Court) — Cited before the High Court for the principle that estimation of evaded turnover must have a reasoned basis.
- (1981) 131 ITR 597 (SC) — K. P. Varghese v. ITO (Supreme Court) — Distinguished because the Revenue relied on actual sales entries rather than a deeming provision.
- (1981) 1 SCC 80 — Ramji Dayawala & Sons (P) Ltd. v. Invest Import (Supreme Court, 9 October 1980) — Distinguished because the contents of the notebooks were supported by the proprietor’s admission and surrounding facts.
- (1974) 2 SCC 544 — Collector of Customs, Madras v. D. Bhoormull (Supreme Court) — Applied on proof by probabilities and the explanation of facts within a party’s special knowledge.
- (1967) 63 ITR 411 (SC) — CIT v. K. Y. Pilliah & Sons (Supreme Court) — Cited for the requirement that an estimate be made judicially on relevant material.
- (1954) 26 ITR 775 (SC) — Dhakeswari Cotton Mills Ltd. v. CIT (Supreme Court) — Distinguished because the demand was based on seized records disclosed in the notice and available for inspection.
3. A notice in Form GST DRC-01 (Ref. ZA091219010016W) was issued under section 74 on 21.12.2019 and was followed by three reminders, dated 29.12.2020, 25.06.2021 and 20.11.2021. The appellant did not respond. The Deputy Commissioner passed an ex-parte order on 31.12.2021 (No. ZD091221056226M), confirming tax of ₹1,26,00,000, interest of ₹1,18,98,286 and penalty of ₹1,26,00,000 (₹3,70,98,286 in all) on the basis of estimated evaded sales of ₹7 crore. The first appeal was partly allowed on 10.09.2024, with evaded sales taken at ₹2,50,00,000 and tax fixed at ₹45,00,000. The Hon’ble High Court, in Writ Tax No. 2489 of 2024 decided on 02.09.2025, quashed that order. It noted that the evaded sales had been fixed at a figure higher than the evaded purchases (₹1,15,60,493) without reasons being assigned, and it remanded the matter to the First Appellate Authority “for deciding the matter afresh by passing a reasoned and speaking order, after hearing all the stakeholders”. On remand the First Appellate Authority took the appellant through an exhibit-wise reconciliation. It accepted the appellant’s explanation in respect of Sanket-01, Sanket-03 and Sanket-04 and gave relief accordingly. It rejected the explanation for Sanket-02 and confirmed liability on the entries in that exhibit alone, at 18% (9% CGST and 9% UPGST) on ₹2,52,01,836, which is ₹45,36,330.
4. Shri N. K. Srivastava, learned counsel, assisted by Shri Madhukar Anand, Consultant, urged the following grounds in the memorandum of appeal, the additional submission of 23.10.2026 and the compilation of judgments. (i) Sanket-02 is an uncorroborated “dumb document”, said to have been left behind by visiting brokers or transporters, and there is no proof of goods actually supplied, no e-way bill or bilty, no buyer’s statement and no flow-back of cash. (ii) There is no unaccounted purchase, no stock discrepancy and no excess stock, and the survey itself found no discrepancy. (iii) The burden of proof was wrongly placed on the appellant by reliance on section 155, which is confined to input tax credit. (iv) The ingredients of section 74 (fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression) are absent. (v) The demand was “enhanced” on remand without the notice required by the proviso to section 107(11). (vi) Section 75(4) and natural justice were violated because the SIB report and the videography were not supplied. (vii) The impugned order mentions section 63, which deals with unregistered persons. (viii) The notice was not served. Reliance was placed on a number of authorities, which we deal with below. Smt. Vibha Mishra, learned State Representative, supported the impugned order and submitted that all four exhibits were seized together under one Panchnama from the appellant’s own premises, that the appellant had adopted three of them and disowned only the one that hurt it, that Rule 56(10) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 (“the Rules”) raises a presumption that the records are the appellant’s own unless the contrary is proved, and that the proprietor’s admissions were never retracted.
5. Before entering upon the grounds, two preliminary matters need to be dealt with. First, the total of the confirmed demand is stated in the impugned order, in Form GST APL-04 and in the pleadings as ₹1,61,77,826. The three components, ₹45,36,330 + ₹70,78,166 + ₹45,36,330, add up to ₹1,61,50,826. The difference of ₹27,000 is an arithmetical slip, the consequence of which is dealt with in paragraphs 15 and 18 below. Second, it is the appellant’s submission that the burden lay on the Revenue and that section 155 was invoked against it. Section 155, which deals with the burden of proof where input tax credit is claimed, is indeed confined to input tax credit and has no application here. The question of burden in this case is governed by Rule 56(10) of the Rules and by the general principles of evidence discussed below.
6. The first and central question is whether Sanket-02 can be acted upon to find that the appellant made outward supplies of ₹2,52,01,836 that it did not declare in its returns. The appellant’s case depends substantially on the proposition that these notebooks are “dumb documents” and loose papers that prove nothing without independent corroboration. The proposition is correct in the circumstances in which it was laid down, and it is necessary to state those circumstances precisely. In CBI v. V.C. Shukla (1998) 3 SCC 410, the Hon’ble Supreme Court dealt with the “Jain Hawala” diaries and loose sheets recovered from a third party. It held that such entries are not “books of account” within section 34 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, and that, even if they are, they cannot by themselves fasten liability on a person named in them without independent evidence that the entries are true. In Common Cause v. Union of India (2017) 77 taxmann.com 245 (SC) = (2018) 9 SCC 382, the Hon’ble Court applied the same principle to loose sheets and random entries recovered from corporate premises, and held that they were not good enough to justify an investigation against the persons named in them. We note that the appellant’s compilation contains a different judgment under that name (the Lokpal case), which does not touch the point, and we have relied upon the correct report. The common thread in these cases is that the documents were written by someone else, were found in someone else’s custody, and had no recognisable connection with the person sought to be charged.
7. Sanket-02 stands on a different footing. It was found inside the appellant’s own godown, in the same seizure and under the same Panchnama as the account books and invoice books that the appellant itself accepted and reconciled. The three notebooks are bound, sequentially maintained “Natraj” pads. They run through the whole period from September 2017 to March 2018 and carry 46 written pages of dated entries. Each entry records the date, the description of the iron goods, weight, rate and realisation, and the buyer. Several buyers recur (M/s Banti Bhai of Khuldabad, M/s Sangam Traders, M/s Satya Prakash Traders of Khaga, M/s Shyam Iron Store of Manauri and M/s Vishal Bhai of Allahabad). They are written in the language of the appellant’s own trade, which is the sale of sheets, angles, channels, sariya and pipes. The proprietor explained to the officers on the spot how the pads were used, namely that retail sales were noted on numbered duplicate pads, that the customer took the original and that the counterpart was destroyed. The pads are the very kind of record he described. That statement was recorded in the Panchnama in the presence of two independent witnesses. It was not retracted by any affidavit or complaint at any time, whether before the adjudicating authority, the First Appellate Authority or this Tribunal. A statement of this kind, made by the person best placed to know, against his own interest and at a time when he could not have anticipated the later dispute, is an admission and is evidence against him. With respect, this also distinguishes the present case from Shiv Shankar Plywood v. CCE, Rohtak 2018 (12) TMI 369 (CESTAT, Chandigarh), where the demand rested on a statement that had been retracted by a complaint to the police, and on documents taken from a third person; and from Hi-Tech Abrasives Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Raipur 2018 (362) ELT 961 (Chh), where the Hon’ble High Court held that a Director’s statement could not be relied on without following the procedure of section 9D of the Central Excise Act, 1944. Section 9D has no counterpart in this Act, and the entries in Sanket-02 do not depend on any third-party statement for their admissibility.
8. The appellant says that these are chits left by brokers or transporters. We are unable to accept the explanation, for three reasons. First, the proprietor’s contemporaneous account to the SIB team was different, and he was the only person who could say what the pads were. Second, even in this appeal the appellant has not named a single broker or transporter, given an address or GSTIN, produced an affidavit from any of them, or filed a police complaint, which a prudent trader faced with a demand of this size could be expected to do. Third, the appellant’s position is inconsistent with its own conduct. It owned and reconciled Sanket-01, Sanket-03 and Sanket-04, all of which were seized in the same operation from the same premises, and it disowned only Sanket-02. Its own written explanation before the First Appellate Authority acknowledges that the notebooks were recovered from its shop, and for that reason we are unable to accept the later suggestion, in the pleadings before this Tribunal, that they were not recovered from its premises. Where goods and records are found in a trader’s custody, and the facts of their origin lie solely within his knowledge, the law expects him to explain them. This is the principle of section 106 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (re-enacted in the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023), applied by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Collector of Customs, Madras v. D. Bhoormull (1974) 2 SCC 544. That decision holds that the Department is not required to prove its case with mathematical precision to a demonstrable degree, that legal proof is often no more than a prudent man’s estimate as to the probabilities of the case, and that, where the Department has led enough evidence to raise a presumption in its favour, facts within the special knowledge of the other side must be explained by him, failing which an adverse inference may arise. Applying these tests, we hold that the Department has led sufficient evidence to connect Sanket-2 with the appellant and his business and that the appellant has offered no valid explanation to the contrary.
9. The next contention is that without corroboration of the kind insisted on in clandestine-removal cases (excess raw material, unaccounted purchases, electricity consumption, transport records, identification of buyers and flow-back of cash), no demand can stand. The appellant relies on DD Iron & Steel Pvt. Ltd. v. Commissioner of CGST & Central Excise, Rourkela, Final Order Nos. 76899-76900/2025, decided on 14.07.2025 (CESTAT Kolkata); Continental Cement Co. v. Union of India 2014 (309) ELT 411 (All); Prinik Steels (P) Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, Bhubaneswar-I 2023 (12) TMI 299 (CESTAT, Kolkata) = (2024) 15 Centax 313; Principal Commissioner of CGST v. Wast Industries, Final Order No. 70404/2026, decided on 29.09.2026 (CESTAT Allahabad) = 2026 (10) TMI 141; and Shiv Shankar Plywood (supra). We have examined the copies furnished. In DD Iron & Steel the Revenue relied on a pocket diary and pencil-written loose sheets of unknown authorship; the Director disowned them; and a stock-taking at the time showed no shortage of raw material or finished goods. In Continental Cement the case began with an anonymous complaint and parallel documents written by one person against a manufacturer, with no proof of excess production, raw material, power consumption or buyer receipt. In Prinik Steels the case rested on computer printouts which did not satisfy section 36B of the Central Excise Act, 1944, and on statements for which section 9D had not been followed. In Wast Industries the case rested on unsigned loose sheets, WhatsApp printouts and Tally data and files taken from third-party premises, with authorship, custody, extraction and integrity all unproved, and the Bench observed that a finding on preponderance of probability must arise from proved circumstances and not from successive assumptions. In Shiv Shankar Plywood the retracted statements and the denial of cross-examination have already been noted. We respectfully accept the principle common to all these decisions, namely that a charge of clandestine manufacture and clearance is a serious one, to be proved by reliable material connected with the assessee. In each of them the documents were either of unknown authorship or from third-party premises, or else they were electronic records which did not satisfy the statutory conditions. With respect, that principle is a rule about the sufficiency of proof; it does not, in our view, extend to a taxable person’s own bound books of daily sales, found in his own premises and explained by his own admission. Those cases, moreover, involved manufacture, where the Revenue had to establish clearances of goods not shown to have been produced from inputs, so that the markers of excess inputs and power were the natural test. The appellant is a trader, and the allegation is that it sold goods which it purchased but did not report some of the sales. There is no manufacturing chain to prove. The question is whether the sales recorded in its notebooks were really made, and that is answered by the nature and provenance of the notebooks, by the proprietor’s admission, and by the absence of any explanation.
10. The appellant’s argument that there is no unaccounted purchase and no stock discrepancy cannot be accepted, on the facts or on the law. On the facts, the Panchnama records that no stock register was kept. There was therefore no book record against which physical stock could be reconciled, and the absence of a “discrepancy” is a consequence of the absence of a register. The entire stock was seized for that very reason. As to law, an unrecorded sale does not require a matching unrecorded purchase. A trader can sell from goods bought on invoice and can under-report the sales in his returns while keeping the purchase records in order. The appellant’s own declared purchases of ₹1,08,16,001 and sales of ₹98,83,457.95, as recorded by the Hon’ble High Court, against Sanket-02 sales of ₹2.52 crore in about six months, show the extent of the mismatch. With the greatest respect to the Hon’ble High Court, we understand its direction to be that the quantification of the evaded turnover must be supported by reasons and by material, and not be fixed arbitrarily. That requirement is met, because the demand is no longer an estimate: the impugned order limits it to the entries actually found in Sanket-02, after an exhibit-wise reconciliation and after allowing relief on the other three exhibits. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in CIT v. K. Y. Pilliah & Sons (1967) 63 ITR 411 (SC) that the power to estimate a suppressed turnover must be exercised “not arbitrarily, but judicially in the light of relevant materials”; here no estimate was made at all, and the figure rests on recorded entries. This also squarely meets appellants reliance, before the Hon’ble High Court, upon Moti Lal Dwarika Prasad v. Commissioner of Sales Tax, 1989 UPTC 358 that holds “the evaded turnover estimation should not be arbitrary.” The principle of Dhakeswari Cotton Mills Ltd. v. CIT (1954) 26 ITR 775 (SC), that an assessment cannot rest on suspicion or on material not disclosed to the assessee, is therefore not attracted. The figure is derived from documents seized from the appellant, mentioned in the notice and open to its inspection throughout. K. P. Varghese v. ITO (1981) 131 ITR 597 (SC) concerned section 52(2) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and held that the Revenue must prove the understatement of consideration before the deeming provision can operate. With respect, it does not assist the appellant, because the Revenue here relies on no deeming provision, and the sales are proved by the entries themselves. Ramji Dayawala & Sons (P) Ltd. v. Invest Import (1981) 1 SCC 80 held that proof of the handwriting or execution of a document does not by itself prove the truth of its contents. The truth of the contents here is supported by the admission, the context and the absence of any other explanation, and not by proof of handwriting alone.
11. The appellant has also relied on CIT v. S.M. Aggarwal (2007) 293 ITR 43 (Del) in support of its “dumb document” plea. We have perused the judgment. A single seized page recorded a loan of ₹22.5 lakh and interest of ₹3.55 lakh. The assessee said that the account was his daughter’s, and she denied it. The Tribunal found the page to be a dumb document and, since that was a finding of fact, the Hon’ble High Court declined to entertain the Revenue’s appeal as raising no substantial question of law. With respect, the decision turns on its own facts and on the concurrent factual findings in that case. A single page of figures, with no evidence that the assessee carried on any money-lending, is very different from three bound notebooks of trade entries in the very business that the appellant carries on, entered over six months and explained by the appellant’s own admission. Mahavir Woolen Mills v. CIT (2000) 245 ITR 297 (SC), on which that judgment drew for the notion of a dumb document, stands on the same footing. The test is whether the document speaks, in its context, to the business of the person in whose custody it was found, and that test is satisfied here.
12. The appellant has further relied on CCE v. Brindavan Beverages (P) Ltd. (2007) 213 ELT 487 (SC), Andaman Timber Industries v. CCE (2015) 324 ELT 641 (SC), and the decisions said to be reported as CCE v. Raipur Alloys (2011) 4 SCC 607 and Saakeen Alloys (2014) 306 ELT 673 (SC). The description of Brindavan Beverages in the compilation as a case of clandestine removal on third-party statements does not appear to us to be accurate. It concerned the denial of small-scale exemption to a franchisee on the allegation that the brand owners had fragmented their units, and the Hon’ble Supreme Court dismissed the Revenue’s appeal because the show cause notice made no specific allegation of any role of the respondents and did not set out any material. It lays down that the notice is the foundation of the Department’s case and cannot be vague. The notice here, in contrast, recites the Panchnama and describes each of the four exhibits, the entries, and the sum involved. Andaman Timber decided that where a demand is founded on the statements of third-party witnesses, the denial of their cross-examination is a violation of natural justice. The demand here is founded on the appellant’s own records and its own proprietor’s admission, and no third-party witness has been relied on by the Revenue. The copy of Raipur Alloys in the compilation is an order of the Tribunal at New Delhi dated 18.10.2012 remanding a case relating to CENVAT credit for evidence of the genuineness of transactions. It is not the Supreme Court decision cited, and contains nothing on loose sheets. No copy of Saakeen Alloys was furnished and the citation provided by appellant appears to be incorrect.
13. The ground that the burden was shifted by invoking section 155 has already been dealt with. The question of burden is to be decided under Rule 56(10) of the Rules and on the ordinary principles of evidence. Rule 56(10) provides that, unless proved otherwise, if any documents, registers or any books of account belonging to a registered person are found at any premises other than those mentioned in the certificate of registration, they shall be presumed to be maintained by the said registered person. The Rule thus raises a rebuttable presumption of maintenance against the registered person even where such records are found at premises other than his registered premises; the presumption applies with greater force where, as here, they are found at the address at which the appellant carries on its business and which is shown as its address in these proceedings. The presumption lasts “unless proved otherwise”, and the onus of proving otherwise is on the appellant. In addition, in taxation proceedings as in others, the standard of proof is the preponderance of probabilities, and the apparent state of affairs may be accepted as the real one unless the party concerned shows otherwise, the test being that of human probabilities. The Revenue has, in the first place, shown by the seizure, the Panchnama and the exhibits that the appellant kept parallel unrecorded sales records, and the proprietor’s admission on how those records were kept is part of that showing. It was then for the appellant, who alone has the knowledge, to show who wrote the notebooks, what the entries are, and why they were in its godown. The appellant has not attempted to discharge that onus, and the presumption under Rule 56(10) therefore stands unrebutted. The inference that the entries record genuine sales which were not reported is the one a prudent person would draw.
14. The existence of the ingredients of section 74 is then to be considered. The levy under section 74 requires fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression of facts with intent to evade tax. Explanation 2 to section 74, as it stood on the date of the notice, defined suppression as non-declaration of facts or information which a taxable person is required to declare in the return, statement, report or any other document furnished under the Act or the Rules. The appellant did not declare sales of ₹2.52 crore in its GSTR-1 and GSTR-3B. That the omission was deliberate is established by the manner in which the sales were made. The retail sales were made on pads whose counterparts were destroyed after use, which is the opposite of the contemporaneous tax-invoice record the law requires under section 31. No stock register was maintained. Sales were being made without invoices at the very time of the survey. A taxable person who in this way keeps a parallel record of sales, and destroys the evidence of those sales, acts consciously, and the ingredients of suppression with intent to evade tax are therefore made out. Mere failure to pay tax, or a bona fide mistake or difference of interpretation, would be quite different, and section 73 is meant for such cases. The contention that proceedings should have been initiated under section 73 is therefore not accepted. The penalty equal to the tax follows as a statutory consequence. In Union of India v. Rajasthan Spinning & Weaving Mills 2009 (238) ELT 3 (SC), which dealt with the corresponding section 11AC of the Central Excise Act, 1944, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the penalty is attracted once the ingredients of fraud, collusion, wilful misstatement or suppression with intent to evade duty are established, and that mere short payment of duty is not enough. The conditions are satisfied here.
15. As to the contention under the proviso to section 107(11), the order dated 10.09.2024, in which the tax was fixed at ₹45,00,000, interest at ₹56,70,000 and penalty at ₹45,00,000 (₹1,46,70,000 in all), was set aside by the Hon’ble High Court on 02.09.2025, on the writ petition of the appellant, and the matter was remanded to be decided afresh. Measured against the order appealed against in the first appeal, which is the Order-in-Original dated 31.12.2021 confirming tax of ₹1,26,00,000, interest of ₹1,18,98,286 and penalty of ₹1,26,00,000, the position is as follows. The impugned order has reduced that demand to ₹45,36,330, a relief of more than ₹80 lakh, and has likewise reduced the penalty from ₹1,26,00,000 to ₹45,36,330. The first proviso to section 107(11) bars an order enhancing any fee, penalty or fine in lieu of confiscation, or reducing a refund or input tax credit, without a reasonable opportunity to show cause. The second proviso requires a show-cause notice where the Appellate Authority forms the opinion that tax has not been paid or short-paid and orders it to be paid. Neither is attracted by a reduction of a demand that was raised by the notice itself. The tax and penalty confirmed are also well within the amounts specified in the notice of 21.12.2019, and the confirmation is made on the very ground stated in the notice, namely the suppression of outward supplies as disclosed by the seized records. Section 75(7) is therefore not offended. Measured, however, against the order dated 10.09.2024, which the appellant carried to the Hon’ble High Court and which was set aside at its instance, the impugned order confirms tax and penalty each higher by ₹36,330 (₹45,36,330 against ₹45,00,000). In this limited respect we find force in the appellant’s submission, though on a footing different from the proviso to section 107(11). In M/s Saudi Arabian Airlines v. Union of India, 2026 INSC 933 (Civil Appeal No. 1052 of 2013, decided on 01.09.2026), the Hon’ble Supreme Court, dealing with a penalty of ₹12,000 that was raised to ₹71,29,140 on de novo adjudication after the matter had been remanded on the assessee’s appeal, endorsed the maxim reformatio in peius and held that a person should not be placed in a worse position as a result of filing an appeal, and that no appellant can, by filing an appeal, be worse off than he was before it (paras 51 to 54). With respect, we read that principle as applying with equal force here, where the appellant approached the Hon’ble High Court against the order of 10.09.2024 and the remand followed at its instance. We also respectfully read the direction of the Hon’ble High Court to decide the matter afresh by a reasoned and speaking order as not intended to leave the writ petitioner worse off than before. Accordingly, notwithstanding that the liability on the entries in Sanket-02 works out to the higher figure, the tax and the penalty payable by the appellant cannot exceed ₹45,00,000 each, and interest shall be computed on the tax of ₹45,00,000 only. The interest so computed up to the date of the order dated 10.09.2024 shall not exceed the amount of ₹56,70,000 determined by that order. Interest under section 50 accruing thereafter on the tax of ₹45,00,000, until the date of payment, is a statutory consequence of the tax and is not affected by this limit.
16. The contention based on natural justice and sections 75(4) and 70 is also without substance. Section 75(4) requires an opportunity of hearing where a request is made in writing or where an adverse decision is contemplated. The notice dated 21.12.2019 was served on the common portal, which is a valid mode of service under section 169(1)(d) of the Act. The appellant relies on Srideva Sattva Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Haryana 2026 (3) TMI 1622 (SC) (order dated 30.01.2026). There, the record contained no material to show that the show cause notice had been served at all, and the Hon’ble Court set aside the order to that extent and restored the matter for reply, while rejecting the plea that the notice was vague. Here, service is shown on the record, and the notice was followed by reminders dated 29.12.2020, 25.06.2021 and 20.11.2021. The appellant did not appear even when a summons under section 70 was issued, and it cannot rely on its own default. There is also no breach of natural justice at the appellate stage. The principal complaint is that the SIB report and the videography were not supplied. The appellant did not ask for inspection or copies of the seized records under section 67(5), either during the inquiry or in the adjudication. The notice and the Order-in-Original set out the Panchnama and the contents of the exhibits in full. Nor has the appellant shown how the report or the videography could have helped its case. The First Appellate Authority in fact held an exhibit-wise reconciliation with the appellant’s participation on remand, and relief followed on three of the four exhibits. A procedural defect at the adjudication stage that has been cured by a full hearing on remand, and has caused no prejudice, does not vitiate the demand. The direction of the Hon’ble High Court to pass a reasoned order after hearing “all the stakeholders” also stands complied with.
17. The reference to section 63 in the preamble of the impugned order is the last of the technical objections. The notice was issued under section 74, the Order-in-Original was passed under section 74(9), and the impugned order adjudicates liability under section 74. There is no suggestion that the appellant is unregistered, and its GSTIN appears in every document. The mention of section 63 is a clerical slip. Section 160 provides that no assessment, re-assessment, adjudication, review, revision, appeal, rectification, notice, summons or other proceeding shall be invalid by reason of a mistake, defect or omission if it is in substance and effect in conformity with, or according to the intent and purposes of, the Act. The slip does not affect the validity of the order.
18. We now turn to the figures. Under section 113(1) the Tribunal may confirm, modify or annul the order appealed against, and section 113(3) enables rectification of errors apparent on the record. In view of the discussion in paragraph 15, we confirm the liability to tax, interest and penalty under section 74, but, in accordance with the principle laid down in Saudi Arabian Airlines (supra), modify the amounts confirmed by the impugned order as follows: tax ₹45,00,000 (CGST ₹22,50,000 and UPGST ₹22,50,000) and penalty ₹45,00,000 (CGST ₹22,50,000 and UPGST ₹22,50,000); and interest under section 50 on the tax of ₹45,00,000, which, up to 10.09.2024, shall not exceed ₹56,70,000 (₹28,35,000 under each Act), together with interest accruing thereafter until the date of payment. The arithmetical discrepancy of ₹27,000 in the total stated in the impugned order does not survive this modification. Interest under section 50 is a statutory consequence of the tax found payable. If, at the time of recovery, any arithmetical error in the computation of interest is found, it will be open to the proper officer to correct it in accordance with law after giving the appellant an opportunity of being heard, without exceeding the limits stated above.
19. To sum up, from the yardstick of preponderance of probability arising out of material available on record, the seized document Sanket 2 is proved to be appellant’s own documents related to his business and is an account of his clandestine sale rather than a stray un-authenticated record belonging to someone else as claimed by the appellant. The appellant has not rebutted the Revenue’s case on the contents of the notebooks, the premises where they were found, the presumption under Rule 56(10), and the proprietor’s admissions. We have respectfully accepted the principle of the cases relied on by the appellant, that loose or third-party records and unauthenticated electronic data cannot alone sustain a demand, but those cases are distinguishable on their facts. The demand of tax rests on documents recovered from the appellant itself, and has been brought down from the amount in the Order-in-Original to the amount of the entries, and has been further limited, in accordance with the principle of no reformatio in peius laid down in Saudi Arabian Airlines (supra), to the tax and penalty determined by the order dated 10.09.2024, with interest correspondingly limited. The concern of the Hon’ble High Court that the quantification be reasoned and supported by material, and its direction for a reasoned order after hearing the stakeholders, have in our view been met. The further objections regarding service, hearing, the proviso to section 107(11) and the reference to section 63 fail for the reasons given. The appeal therefore fails on merits.
ORDER
In the result:
Appeal No. APL/17/ALB/2026 is dismissed on merits.
ii. The Order-in-Appeal No. ZD0912253326675 dated 18.12.2025 is affirmed, subject to the modification under Section 113 that the demand confirmed stands limited, in accordance with the principle of no reformatio in peius laid down in Saudi Arabian Airlines v. Union of India, 2026 INSC 933, to tax of ₹45,00,000/- and penalty of ₹45,00,000/- (each divided equally between CGST and UPGST), and interest under Section 50 on the said tax of ₹45,00,000/-, which, up to 10.09.2024, shall not exceed ₹56,70,000/-, together with further interest accruing thereafter until the date of payment, and Form GST APL-04 shall stand corrected accordingly.
iii. Interest under section 50 shall continue to be payable on the confirmed tax of ₹45,00,000/- until the date of payment, subject to the limit stated in (ii) above for the period up to 10.09.2024. If any arithmetical error in the computation of interest is found at the time of recovery, the proper officer may correct it in accordance with law after giving the appellant an opportunity of being heard, without exceeding the said limits.
iv. Any amount already deposited or recovered shall be adjusted against the liability so determined.
v. All pending applications stand disposed of. A copy of this order be sent to both parties and the authorities concerned.


