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Interest on Sales Tax Deferral Starts After BIFR Exit: Madras High Court

Case Law Details

TaxGuru Citation
2026 taxguru.in 19312
Case Name
Metafilms India Ltd. Vs Assistant Commissioner (CT) & Ors. (Madras High Court)
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Metafilms India Ltd. Vs Assistant Commissioner (CT) & Ors. (Madras High Court)

Summary: The Madras High Court examined a dispute concerning interest on deferred sales tax availed by Metafilms India Ltd. under the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959. The company, a manufacturer of printed flexible packaging materials, had entered into a deferral agreement on 8 September 2000 under which sales tax was deemed paid and an equivalent amount was treated as a Government loan. The dispute concerned the effect of default under that agreement, the company’s subsequent proceedings before the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR), and the date from which interest could lawfully be demanded. The appellant had been declared a sick industrial company by BIFR on 31 May 2006 and was de-registered on 5 February 2013 after its net worth turned positive. The Commercial Taxes Department issued a demand on 20 March 2013 for deferred tax arrears of Rs.74,63,827, but did not then quantify interest. The Government rejected the company’s request for additional time on 3 November 2014, and a subsequent distraint order reflected an interest demand of Rs.70,98,256. The Single Judge held that the company had no vested right to complete waiver of interest and directed reconsideration through a Sub-Committee, leading to the present writ appeal.

The Division Bench held that the deferral agreement had not been cancelled by the Department. It rejected the contention that cancellation occurred automatically on breach: the contractual terms contemplated a written cancellation order, and natural justice required notice specifying the violations. The Court distinguished several earlier deferral cases and applied the principle stated in Amutha Mills Private Ltd. that interest on an interest-free sales tax deferral loan runs from the repayment due date, not from the original date of availing the loan. In the particular circumstances, statutory protection against recovery while the company was before BIFR was significant.

The High Court fixed 6 February 2013 as the repayment due date and partly allowed the appeal. Its operative order limited interest to 6 February 2013 through 24 May 2015, directed the assessing authority to verify the company’s proposed calculation of Rs.24,73,492 and issue a demand, and required lifting of the property attachment to facilitate sale. The company was allowed three months after lifting of attachment to pay the interest. It could separately approach the Government for relief under G.O.Ms.No.1076 dated 4 October 1988, but the Court declined to determine its applicability. The Bench expressly stated that its determination of the due date was confined to the peculiar facts and should not be treated as a precedent.

Cases Discussed

  1. Southern Agrifurane Industries Ltd. Vs Commercial Tax Officer — (2005) 2 SCC 575
  2. Amutha Mills Private Ltd. Vs Assistant Commissioner (CT) — W.A. No. 1482 of 2006 and W.P. No. 41326 of 2006, decided 06.12.2006
  3. Sri Krishna Smelters Ltd. Vs Joint Commissioner (CT), Salem Division — 2017 SCC OnLine Mad 24310
  4. Sun Gas Pvt. Ltd. Vs Assistant Commissioner — 2017 SCC OnLine Mad 37447
  5. A.R.S. Metals (P) Ltd. Vs Additional Commissioner — 2019 SCC OnLine Mad 38229

FULL TEXT OF THE JUDGMENT/ORDER OF MADRAS HIGH COURT

We have elaborately heard Mrs.G.Thilagavathy, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of Mr.R.Gopinath, learned counsel on record for the appellant and Mr.Mohammed Shaffiq, learned Special Government Pleader assisted by Mrs.G.Dhanamadhri, learned Government Advocate accepting notice for the respondents.

2. This appeal filed by the writ petitioner – dealer is directed against the order dated 06.2.2020 made in W.P.No.34208 of 2014.

3. The appellant filed the said writ petition to quash the proceedings of the third respondent dated 03.11.2014 and to direct the third respondent to consider the request for waiver of interest on the interest free sales tax deferral amount availed by the appellant under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu General Sales Tax Act, 1959 (for short, the Act) as provided under Section 17-A(2) of the Act by considering their case afresh for waiver of interest.

4. The learned Single Judge was of the view that though the appellant breached the terms of agreement, considering the peculiar facts and circumstances of the appellant’s case that it became a sick industrial company while it was coming out of the deferral period, at best, it might be entitled for further deferment of tax liability as per G.O.Ms.No.1076 (MIGI) dated 04.10.1988. It was further held that there was no legal basis for the appellant to claim a complete waiver from payment of interest as a matter of right based on the materials, which were presented for consideration. The learned Single Judge also issued a direction to form a Sub-Committee to decide the case of the appellant afresh in terms of the decision in the case of Amutha Mills Private Ltd. Vs. Assistant Commissioner (CT) [W.A.No.1482 of 2006 and W.P.No.41326 of 2006 dated 06.12.2006]. Being aggrieved by the order passed in the said writ petition, the appellant is before us by way of this appeal.

5. The short issue, which falls for consideration in this case, is as to whether the appellant is liable for payment of interest on the sales tax deferral amount availed by them in terms of Section 24(3) of the Act and if it is held that the appellant is liable for payment of interest, from what date the interest has to be calculated.

6. To decide the said issue, the following facts are to be taken into consideration : The appellant is a registered dealer on the file of the first respondent under the provisions of the Act and they are manufacturers and sellers of printed flexible packaging materials used in food and cosmetic industries with their place of business in Tiruvallur District. The appellant entered into a deed of agreement for deemed payment of deferred sales tax deemed to be loaning and recovery of loan, dated 08.9.2000. In terms of the said agreement, the sales tax due on the sale of products manufactured by the appellant in their premises should be deemed to have been paid to the Assessing Officer and an identical amount should be treated as Government loan. The said agreement contained as many as 12 conditions.

7. In terms of Clause 4 of the said agreement, in case of default in payment of the Government loan, the appellant had undertaken to repay the same together with interest. Clause 11 of the said agreement stated that in case of default of any of the conditions mentioned in condition Nos.3,4,5,6,7,8 and 9, the deferral agreement should be canceled for the entire period, for which, the same was granted. Clause 12 of the said agreement stated that in default of repayment of Government loan or cancellation of the deferral facility for violation of any of the conditions as mentioned in paragraphs 3 to 10, such Government loan, tax and interest due thereon should be recoverable in such manner as specified under the Revenue Recovery Act, 1864 for the loan and Sub-Section (2) of Section 24 of the Act for the tax and the amount was also liable for 24% interest per annum.

8. The admitted factual position is that the deferral agreement had not been canceled by the Department though the consistent case of the Department is that the appellant had defaulted in performing the conditions stipulated in the deferral agreement.

9. The argument of the learned Special Government Pleader is that cancellation of the agreement became automatic as soon as a default has occurred or a violation has occurred in the terms and conditions of the said agreement.

10. However, going by the language employed in Clause 1 of the said agreement, we find that a written order of cancellation is mandated because there was a condition stipulated that in case of default of any of the conditions, the deferral agreement should be canceled for the entire period, for which, the same has been granted. Furthermore, if there is a violation, it would be incumbent on the Department to indicate to the dealer as to the nature of violations and principles of natural justice also have to be read into the provision, which would require a show cause notice to be issued to the dealer. Hence, a written order of cancellation of the agreement is what is contemplated in Clause 11 of the terms and conditions of the deferral agreement.

11. As stated above, the deferral agreement entered into between the appellant and the Department was not canceled.

12. The following facts are very peculiar to the case on hand. We say so because in the following decisions, which were cited at the bar namely

(i) the decision of the Hon’ble First Bench of this Court in the case of Amutha Mills Private Ltd.;

(ii) the decision rendered by one of us (TSSJ) while sitting singly in the case of Sri Krishna Smelters Ltd. Vs. Joint Commissioner (CT), Salem Division, Salem [reported in 2017 SCC Online Mad 24310];

(iii) another decision rendered by one of us (TSSJ) while sitting singly in the case of Sun Gas Pvt. Ltd. Vs. Assistant Commissioner [reported in 2017 SCC Online Mad 37447]; and

(iv) the decision in the case of A.R.S.Metals (P) Ltd. Vs. Additional Commissioner [reported in 2019 SCC Online Mad 38229], the factual position was quite different and distinct and the issue, which was considered, was as to what was the date of repayment in those cases.

13. The learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has relied upon the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Southern Agrifurane Industries Ltd. Vs. Commercial Tax Officer [reported in 2005 (2) SCC 575] wherein we find that the case was factually different because moratorium was granted to the dealer therein pursuant to the claim of rehabilitation framed by the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction [for short, the BIFR] and the dealer defaulted in payment of tax in terms of the moratorium agreement, which gave a cause of action to issue a notice and for the consequential demand of tax and penalty.

14. In the instant case, the appellant became a sick industrial company and they filed a reference before the BIFR under Section 15(1) of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act,1958 (for short, the SICA) and it was received by the BIFR on 01.8.2003. By order dated 31.5.2006, the appellant was declared as a sick industrial company under Section 3(1)(o) of the SICA and the BIFR appointed the IDBI Bank as the Operating Agency under Section 17(3) the SICA with a direction to prepare a viability study report, if feasible. The Operating Agency was directed to keep in view the provisions of Section 18 of the SICA while preparing the viability study report and revival scheme.

15. It appears that subsequently, the matter was heard by the BIFR on several dates, which may not be of much relevance in this appeal except to note that the net worth of the appellant company turned positive and accordingly, by order dated 05.2.2013, the BIFR de-registered the appellant and held that it was no longer a sick industrial company under the provisions of the SICA and all the creditors/stake holders were free to recover their dues from the company as per law. If, according to the respondent – Department, the appellant was a defaulter, it was well open to the respondent – Department to initiaterecovery proceedings.

16. The respondent – Department rightly understood the position and issued a notice in Form No.4 on 20.3.2013 pointing out that the appellant had availed the deferral amount of Rs.74,63,827/- for the period from 01.6.1998 to 20.5.2003, that they ought to have started repayment of deferred tax from June 2003, that as the appellant violated the conditions with effect from 01.6.2003, they were in arrears of tax to the tune of Rs.74,63,827/- under the Act and the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956.

17. Further, in the said notice, it has been specifically stated that the appellant unit was declared as a sick industrial company by the BIFR vide case No.358/2003 and that the IDBI Bank was appointed as the Operating Agency. Further, on 05.2.2003, the BIFR de-registered the appellant as it was no longer a sick industrial company and ordered that all the creditors/stake holders were free to recover their dues from the appellant as per law. Hence, the appellant was called upon to pay the entire arrears of Rs.74,63,827/- together with interest under Section 24(3) of the Act. To be noted, in the said demand, the computation of interest was not made. But, it was mentioned that the appellant was liable to pay the entire arrears of tax together with interest under Section 24(3) of the Act.

18. The appellant submitted a representation dated 05.8.2014 to the Principal Secretary, Department of Commercial Tax, Government of Tamil Nadu, Chennai pointing out various issues and undertaking to settle the entire dues of sales tax deferral availed within 30 days, as it was included in their revival package. The appellant further stated that they were not in a position to make any payment when it was under referral with the BIFR and no interest or penalty was to be charged for the period, as they were not allowed to make payment as per the BIFR guidelines. The appellant also pointed out that the Sales Tax Department did not appear before the BIFR and that there was no representation on behalf of them in the various hearings held by the BIFR when the matter was pending before the BIFR. Ultimately, the appellant prayed that necessary instructions might be given to the Assessing Officer not to proceed with the attachment.

19. The Principal Secretary to Government, Commercial Taxes and Registration (F1) Department, Government of Tamil Nadu, by letter dated 03.11.2014, informed the appellant that the request had been examined by the Government in detail and it has been noted that the appellant’s net worth had become positive as on 31.3.2012 and based on this order, a notice had been served on the appellant, that recovery of the sales tax dues had to be done in accordance with law and that further extension of time to settle the sales tax dues was not feasible of compliance.

20. After the Government rejected the representation of the appellant vide order dated 03.11.2014, the Assessing Officer issued a distraint order under Section 8 of the Act. For the first time in the said distraint order, a sum of Rs.70,98,256/- was shown as interest payable under Section 24(3) of the Act. Immediately thereafter, the appellant filed the writ petition challenging the Government letter dated 03.11.2014 and also sought consequential directions.

21. In the counter affidavit filed by the Assessing Officer in the said writ petition, in paragraph 6, a tabulated statement has been given showing as to how the arrears were calculated and the interest was payable. The learned Single Judge issued directions in the writ petition for formation of a Sub-Committee and for reconsideration of the appellant’s case while simultaneously holding that the appellant was liable to pay interest and that they had got no vested right to claim that interest had to be waived by the respondent – Department.

22. Be that as it may, we will proceed to consider the facts of the present case as to what remedy the appellant would be entitled in our hands.

23. As rightly noted by the Department, the net worth of the appellant had become positive on 05.2.2013. In terms of the direction issued by the BIFR, it was well open to the respondent – Department to recover the dues from the appellant on and after 05.2.2013. This position was rightly understood and a demand dated 20.3.2013 was issued. The demand did not quantify the interest payable. The request of the appellant for extension of time was also rejected vide proceedings dated 03.11.2014 and the distraint order dated 20.11.2014. Thereafter, on 15.12.2014, the writ petition was filed and an order of interim stay was granted pending disposal of the writ petition. Ultimately, by order dated 06.2.2020, the writ petition was disposed of.

24. When the writ petition was heard, there was a doubt raised as to whether the appellant paid the sales tax dues. This fact is no longer a dispute, as the appellant produced before us copies of the demand drafts and receipt given by the Assessing Officer on 07.4.2015 acknowledging the entire payment of the sales tax vide two demand drafts both dated 25.4.2015.

25. The question is as to whether the appellant would be liable to payment of interest from the date of deferral agreement or from the date, on which, the repayment was due.

26. So far as the first question is concerned, the same is no longer res integra and it has been held in the decision of the Hon’ble First Bench of this Court in the case of Amutha Mills Private Ltd., that interest would be payable from the due date for repayment of the loan and not from the date, on which, the IFST deferral loan was availed.

27. Hence, the question would be, in the facts and circumstances of the present case, what is the date, on which, the repayment is due. As we have mentioned earlier, the case on hand is very peculiar and appears to have not arisen in any of the earlier litigations and therefore, it requires to be dealt with in a different manner and obviously on such a reasoning, any observation or direction, which we may issue in this judgment, cannot be treated as a precedent.

28. As mentioned above, the appellant was de-registered by the BIFR on 05.2.2013. The first demand notice was issued on 20.3.2013. However, the appellant paid the dues only on 25.4.2015. The question would be, in the facts and circumstances, what would be the date, on which, the repayment of the loan is due.

29. The Department’s contention is that it should be the date, on which, the default occurred. If that is to be reckoned as the date, then an order of cancellation of the agreement followed by recovery proceedings should have been taken by the Department, which admittedly has not been done. This is presumably for the reason that from 2003 to 2013, the appellant was before the Board and it was declared as a sick industrial company and in terms of Section 22 of the SICA, the respondent – Department was prohibited from proceeding with any recovery against the appellant and this is a statutory prohibition, which binds the respondent – Department.

30. From the representation given by the appellant to the Government dated 05.8.2014, we find that the Sales Tax Department did not appear before the Board on several dates when the case was heard. Be that as it may, the due date for repayment could have never occurred, in the facts and circumstances, between 01.8.2003 when the appellant was referred to the BIFR and 31.5.2006, the appellant was declared as a sick industrial company till its net worth turned positive and it was discharged from the Board on 05.2.2013.

31. Thus, on facts, we hold that the date, on which, the repayment became due for the appellant’s case shall be fixed on 06.2.2013. Admittedly, the appellant cleared the entire sales tax on 25.4.2015. Hence, for the period from 06.2.2013 to 25.4.2015, the appellant is liable to pay interest.

32. The learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant has placed reliance on G.O.Ms.No.99 Industries (MIG-II) Department dated 04.4.1994.

33. This is a Government Order extending IFST deferral concession for revival of units not covered under the BIFR and it referred to three Government Orders, namely

(i) G.O.Ms.No.848 Industries (MIGI) dated 28.6.1988;

(ii) G.O.Ms.No.1076 Industries (MIGI) dated 04.10.1988; and

(iii) G.O.Ms.No.191 Industries (MIGI) dated 20.5.1992, of which, G.O.Ms.No.1076 dated 04.10.1988 would be issued in cases where the scheme of revival was passed by the BIFR and in terms of the same, the Government thought fit to grant deferral from payment of sales tax for a period of three years from the date of actual revival of the unit or from the date, from which, the BIFR declared the unit as sick, whichever is later.

34. The endeavour of the learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant is to take umbrage under the said Government Order namely G.O.Ms.No.1076 Industries (MIGI) dated 04.10.1988 and she has stated that if G.O.Ms.No.1076 Industries (MIGI) dated 04.10.1988 is made applicable to the appellant, then they would be entitled for deferral till 04.2.2016 and that the payment of sales tax dues having been made on 24.5.2015, i.e well before 04.2.2016, the appellant may not be liable for interest.

35. However, the benefit of G.O.Ms.No.1076 Industries (MIGI) dated 04.10.1988 cannot be straightaway made applicable to the appellant because it is a discretion vested with the Government and several factors are to be considered before discretion is exercised. Hence, for the present, we do not intend to make any observation with regard to the applicability of G.O.Ms.No.1076 Industries (MIGI) dated 04.10.1988 to the appellant’s case. But, it is left open to the appellant to approach the Government, if so advised.

36. For the foregoing reasons, the writ appeal is partly allowed, the order and direction issued in the writ petition is modified and the period, for which, the appellant shall be liable for interest is from 06.2.2013 to 24.5.2015. The computation of interest, according to the appellant, is Rs.24,73,492/-, which the first respondent may verify and accordingly issue a demand. Along with the demand, the first respondent shall pass an order lifting the attachment on the appellant’s property so as to enable them to sell the property. The appellant is granted three months’ time from the date, on which, the attachment is lifted, to remit the interest, which shall be calculated by the first respondent for the period from 06.2.2013 to 24.5.2015. It will be open to the appellant to make a representation to the Government, if so advised, as they seek to avail the benefit of G.O.Ms.No.1076 Industries (MIGI) dated 04.10.1988. As mentioned above, we make it clear that this judgment cannot be treated as a precedent for the purpose of determining the date, on which, the repayment was due and this decision is rendered purely on the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. No costs. Consequently, the connected CMP is closed.

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CA Sandeep Kanoi
Qualification: Graduate, CA in Job / Business, DD
Company: Taxguru Consultancy
Location: Mumbai, Maharashtra
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