LG Polymers India Pvt Ltd Vs Principal Commissioner of Central Tax (CESTAT Hyderabad)
Summary: The Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (CESTAT), Hyderabad, in LG Polymers India Pvt Ltd Vs Principal Commissioner of Central Tax, held that a delay of five days in filing an appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) deserved condonation where the delay fell within the additional statutory period of 30 days prescribed under Section 35(1) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 and the appellant had furnished a plausible explanation constituting sufficient cause. The appellant, engaged in manufacturing General Purpose and High Impact Polystyrene under Chapter 39 of the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985, had challenged an Order-in-Original dated 29 March 2025 disallowing Cenvat credit of ₹4,75,403 relating to input services received during April 2017 to June 2017, together with applicable interest and a penalty of ₹47,540. However, the Commissioner (Appeals), Guntur, rejected the appeal on limitation without examining the substantive dispute.
The appellant submitted that the adjudication order had been received on 29 April 2025 and that an attempt was made to file the appeal at the Visakhapatnam appellate sub-office within the prescribed limitation period. The appellant was informed that the office had shifted to Guntur, following which the appeal was filed there on 3 July 2025. The appellant maintained that the five-day delay was neither deliberate nor attributable to negligence but arose from circumstances beyond its control. It was also pointed out that the Order-in-Original itself mentioned the Visakhapatnam appellate sub-office. Although the Commissioner (Appeals) relied upon a verification report indicating that no official record of the alleged interaction existed, the Tribunal held that the absence of such a record could not conclusively establish a lack of bona fides.
The Tribunal observed that Section 35(1) permits an appeal to be filed within 60 days from communication of the adjudication order and empowers the Commissioner (Appeals) to condone a further delay of up to 30 days upon sufficient cause being established. Referring to Singh Enterprises Vs CCE, Jamshedpur [2008 (221) ELT 163 (SC)], the Tribunal distinguished the prohibition against condoning delay beyond the statutory outer limit from the discretionary power to condone delay within that limit. It further relied upon Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag Vs Mst. Katiji & Others [1987 (28) ELT 185 (SC)] for the principle that sufficient cause should receive a justice-oriented interpretation so that substantial justice is not defeated by an unduly technical approach. Finding no indication of deliberate delay or mala fide intention, the Tribunal concluded that the Commissioner (Appeals) had adopted an excessively technical approach. Accordingly, it condoned the five-day delay, set aside the Order-in-Appeal dated 23 March 2026 and remanded the matter to the Commissioner (Appeals) for fresh adjudication on merits after granting the appellant a reasonable opportunity of hearing. The Tribunal did not decide the admissibility of the disputed Cenvat credit.
Cases Discussed
- Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag Vs Mst. Katiji & Others (Supreme Court); (1987) 2 SCC 107; 19/02/1987; AY: Not Applicable. Reported in the principal order as 1987 (28) ELT 185 (SC). The Supreme Court emphasised a justice-oriented interpretation of sufficient cause in limitation matters. The Tribunal applied this principle while assessing the explanation for the five-day delay.
- Singh Enterprises Vs Commissioner of Central Excise, Jamshedpur (Supreme Court); (2008) 3 SCC 70; 14/12/2007; AY: Not Applicable. Reported in the principal order as 2008 (221) ELT 163 (SC). The Supreme Court held that the Commissioner (Appeals) cannot condone delay beyond the additional period expressly permitted by Section 35(1). The Tribunal applied the distinction between delay falling within and beyond the statutory condonable period.
FULL TEXT OF THE CESTAT HYDERABAD ORDER
The present Appeal is directed against Impugned Order-in-Appeal dt.23.03.2026 passed by the Commissioner (Appeals), Guntur, whereby the appeal filed by the appellant was rejected on the ground of limitation without examining the merits of the case.
2. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that the appellant is engaged in the manufacture of General Purpose and High Impact Polystyrene falling under Chapter 39 of the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985. The dispute relates to the availment of Cenvat credit on certain input services during the period April, 2017 to June, 2017. The adjudicating authority, vide Order-in-Original dt.29.03.2025, disallowed the Cenvat credit amounting to Rs.4,75,403/- along with applicable interest and imposed a penalty of Rs.47,540/-. Aggrieved by the said order, the appellant preferred an appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals), which was rejected on the ground of limitation on account of a delay of 5 days.
3. Learned Counsel for the appellant has submitted that the Order-in-Original was received on 29.04.2025 and the appellant attempted to file the appeal on 27.06.2026 at the appellate sub-office at Visakhapatnam, within the prescribed period of 60 days. However, the appellant was informed that the said office had been shifted to Guntur. Consequently, the appeal was filed at Guntur on 03.07.2025, resulting in a delay of only 5 days. It has been submitted that the delay was neither deliberate nor attributable to negligence but occurred due to circumstances beyond the appellant’s control. It has been further submitted that the appeal was admittedly filed within the additional condonable period of 30 days prescribed under section 35(1) of the Central Excise Act, 1944. Therefore, the Commissioner (Appeals) ought to have condoned the delay and decided the appeal on merits.
4. Learned AR has supported the impugned orders.
5. Heard both sides and perused the records.
6. I find that the limited issue requiring consideration is whether the Commissioner (Appeals) was justified in refusing to condone the delay of 5 days in filing the appeal.
7. Section 35(1) of the Central Excise Act, 1944 provides a period of 60 days for filing an appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals), with a further period of 30 days within which delay may be condoned upon sufficient cause being shown. In the present case, admittedly, the appeal was filed with a delay of only 5 days beyond the normal period of limitation and was, therefore, well within the statutory condonable period.
8. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Singh Enterprises Vs CCE, Jamshedpur [2008 (221) ELT 163 (SC)], has held that the Commissioner (Appeals) cannot condone delay beyond the additional period expressly prescribed under section 35(1) of the Act. However, where the delay falls within the permissible condonable period, the Commissioner (Appeals) is empowered to condone the same upon being satisfied about the existence of sufficient cause.
9. I further find that the appellant has furnished a specific explanation that it attempted to file the appeal at Visakhapatnam within the prescribed period but could not do so on account of the shifting of the appellate sub-office to Guntur. The appellant has also pointed out that Order-in-Original itself mentioned the Visakhapatnam appellate sub-office. Although the Commissioner (Appeals) relied upon a verification report indicating that no record of such interaction was available, mere absence of official record of attempted filing cannot, by itself, be treated as conclusive evidence of absence of bonafides. The explanation furnished by the appellant is plausible and deserves consideration in the light of the short period of delay.
10. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition Anantnag Vs Mst. Katiji & Others [1987 (28) ELT 185 (SC)], has emphasized that the expression ‘sufficient cause’ should receive a justice-oriented interpretation so that substantial justice is not defeated by a technical approach to limitation. The said principle insofar as it concerns the assessment of sufficient cause, is relevant to the exercise of the discretion expressly conferred under section 35(1) of the Act.
11. In the present case, I find that the delay was merely 5 days and the appellant has furnished a reasonable explanation for the same. There is nothing to indicate that the delay was deliberate or occasioned by any malafide intention. It is settled that although limitation provisions are required to be strictly followed, the discretion expressly conferred by the statute must be exercised judiciously upon consideration of the facts and circumstances of each case. In my considered view, the Commissioner (Appeals) adopted an unduly technical approach in declining to condone such a short delay, particularly when the appeal was admittedly filed within the statutory condonable period.
12. In view of the foregoing discussion, I am of the considered opinion that the appellant has established sufficient cause for condonation of the delay of 5 days. Consequently, the impugned order rejecting the appeal on limitation cannot be sustained and deserves to be set aside. Since the Commissioner (Appeals) has not examined the substantive issue regarding admissibility of Cenvat credit, it would be proper to remand the matter for fresh consideration on merits.
13. Accordingly, the impugned Order-in-Appeal dt.23.03.2026 is set aside and the delay of 5 days in filing the appeal before the Commissioner (Appeals) is condoned. The matter is remanded back to the Commissioner (Appeals) with a direction to decide the appeal afresh on merits, in accordance with law, after affording reasonable opportunity of hearing to the appellant.
14. The appeal is allowed by way of remand in the above terms.
(Pronounced in Open Court on 05.11.2026)


