Convergence of Competition & Consumer Protection Laws: National & International Perspectives

An Analytical Study on the Convergence between the Competition Law and the Consumer Protection Law from National and International Perspectives

ABSTRACT

With the liberalization of the economy and the expansion of market competition, the Competition Commission’s role and relevance as a regulator are crucial. In Ashoka Smokeless Coal Ind. P. Ltd. v. Union of India (2007) 2 SCC 640, the Hon’ble Supreme Court made the observation that a level playing field is a factor in a new economy in a market ruled by a free economy where producers establish their own prices. A competitive and choice-filled market for goods manufacturing can lead to the aforementioned equal playing field. The State must prioritize the interests of the consumer if the free market policy is to be realized.

The relationship between consumer protection and the Competition Commission of India is the main topic of this essay. It starts by examining ideal consumer behavior and market conditions in addition to the current situation. The author continues by going over the parameters and outline of the consumer notion as it pertains to Indian law. In order to assess how consumer protection requirements have evolved over time, it is also important to critically examine how India’s competition law has developed. The essay continues by talking about how anti-competitive behaviors affect consumers and how the Competition Commission of India is empowered by law to investigate claims of violating anti-competitive agreement, abuse of dominance, and combination laws.

The Competition Commission of India reviews the cases it has accepted and critically evaluates the rationale behind its rulings.

In conclusion, the author makes the case that by controlling market quality, the Competition Commission of India is essential to consumer protection.

CHAPTER 1: Introduction

Competition Law is too specific. The implementation of Competition Law can be viewed as an extension of the ethos that guides consumer protection legislation. Both the legal domains agree and share a common objective to maintain a fair and competitive market environment for the welfare of consumers.

Competition law exercises control of business behavior and deters actions that hinder healthy competition. On the other hand, laws concerning consumer protection classify and also provide shields to consumers from unjust or beguiling practices accomplished by businesses and direct them to uphold their rights and interests. Certainly, for the advancement of consumer well-being and the continuing development of economic growth, it is absolutely necessary to positively involve all parties, government entities, industry players, and international jurisdictions through collective efforts. [1]

Problem Statement

In India, The Consumer Protection Act 1986 is empowered to deal with cases regarding the protection of consumers from unfair trade practices, i.e. price discrimination, qualitative & quantitative discrimination, etc., at the District, State, and National Levels.

The CCI only focuses on regulation and maintenance of competition in the market as per provisions CA 2002, more particularly with a focus on anti-competitive agreements and abuse of dominance.

The above-dissected position of two pieces of legislation always gives birth to confusion in giving relief and redressal to the complainants in India. In the US and UK, the Federal Trade Commission and Office of Fair Trading are given power to enforce both Consumer Law and Competition Law. This helps to minimize administrative functions and creates a 360-degree solution system for achieving the protection of consumer interest/welfare.

Consumer welfare can not be achieved fully by way of isolating one law from another. The best results can be achieved by way of the amalgamation of two adjudicating bodies where the common object of the two laws is identical.

Since the introduction of the Competition Act (CA) 2002, the role of unfair competition in the market that adversely affects consumer protection has subsequently been realized by the legislators, and as such, the main causes of injury ( Indirect ) suffered by the consumers ultimately are the same that is challenged in the Consumer Court where the anti-competitive effect is not scrutinized.

Effect

• In recent times, several complaints have been filed before the CCI for alleged injury, but prima facie in some of the cases suggest a remedy in consumer court only. Pravahan Mohanty v. HDFC Bank Ltd.
• In the cases of allegations of abuse of dominance, many cases were dismissed on the grounds that there was an absence of a dominant position held by the opposite party. DLF Case.
• Though there are several injuries (Direct or Indirect) suffered by the consumer caused by any reason on the part of the vendor/manufacturer/supplier that is not addressed simultaneously, it increases the cost and time of litigation because of the non-unification of the regulators.

Importance of the study

To sum up, competition law and consumer protection regulations bring notable advantages by safeguarding consumer interests and encouraging equitable market practices. However, they also present hurdles concerning implementation, expenses related to adherence, and the possibility of market irregularities. Achieving a harmonious equilibrium between defending consumer rights and nurturing competitive market dynamics is vital for optimizing the advantages provided by these legal structures.

The impacts of competition law and consumer protection statutes, as well as their absence, carry considerable ramifications for both consumers and businesses alike.

In the absence of these legal frameworks, markets become susceptible to distortions, inefficiencies, and the exploitation of consumers, leading to a decline in economic prosperity and stability. This can be exemplified by activities such as illegal syndication, manipulation of tender rights, bid rigging, and similar practices.

Research Objective

1. The common objective of legislation of the Consumer Protection Act and the Competition Act is the escalation and development of the Promotion of consumer welfare, which is the common goal.[2]
2. The policies behind both the legislation are complementary to each other.
3. In the commercial world, both acts aim to achieve the maximum development of market conditions so that the consumers have better choices at optimum price and utility.
4. Both the Consumer Protection Act and the Competition Act recognise the protection of the consumer from the industry owners in the market from their oppressive and unfair policies.

Aim & Objectives

The ultimate goal of these legislations is to provide protection to the consumers from suffering injury as well as to create a healthy and fair competition in the market environment.

It examines the interconnection and legal framework between the Competition Law and the Consumer Protection Act. It also explores the specification of the interface between these acts. However, it involves analyzing, constructing, and framing how Competition Law functions as an extension of consumer protection measures, identifying and defining areas of overlap as well as divergence between both of these regulatory frameworks, which assesses its effectiveness in safeguarding consumer interests while promoting healthy and fair market competition.

Hypothesis

• These existing laws are effecting and affecting consumer rights while both the Consumer Protection Act and Competition Law intersecting with each other.

Research Questions

1. Where is the overlap between the Consumer Protection Law and the Competition Law?
2. What is the impact of the co-existence of these two acts?
3. What about the other countries? Do they have one authority for competition law & consumer protection law?
4. If so, why? How does that work? Can it also be done in India?[3]

Research Methodology

The research methodology of this research will be doctrinal as well as analytical to find out the ground situation related to the convergence between the Competition Law and the Consumer Protection Act from national and international perspectives. It includes various secondary sources, such as books, journals, articles, statutory provisions, and law commission reports, for the purpose of information. By nature, our study aims to be deductive as well as qualitative by analyzing and scrutinizing the present scenario and finally providing suggestive implications based on analyzing the research.

Limitations of the study

Every research has its limitations, and these limitations arise due to the restrictions imposed on the methodology or research design. However, it is very important to discuss the limitations of the study and highlight them in this report. It is crucial that here we explain how the research limitations may affect the conclusions and opinions drawn from this research. Moreover, it shows that we investigated all the weaknesses of this study and have a deep understanding of the subject. Since this work is a library-based research with help from secondary data. The data has been collected from various books, statutory provisions, journals, reports, and websites for the purpose of providing information. In this regard, the study is limited and within the bounds of the information available from the cited books, statutory provisions, journals, reports, and websites.[4]

Scope of the Study

The scope of this research emphasized various provisions of the Competition Act that were enforced for the protection of consumers. To address deficiencies in the Competition Act, the government of India has released a series of proposed revisions in 2012. As per the recommendations put forth by the expert committee, the administration specifically presented the Competition Amendment Bill, 2012 (Bill) in the lower chamber of the Indian Parliament, known as the Lok Sabha. While these changes are pending official approval, their acceptance is expected to result in significant modifications to the competitive environment in India.[5]

Subsequently, the Competition Act of 2002 in India addresses the remaining gaps by safeguarding them from enterprises abusing their dominant position, as outlined in Section 4. In contrast, Section 5 and Section 6 deal with the regulation of enterprises, combinations of which may result in an acquisition or a merger, for example, a vertical or horizontal agreement.

The Competition Commission of India, as per Section 18, has the power to initiate action to promote competition and protect consumer interests. Entry barriers, including regulatory hurdles and high capital costs, are considered under Section 19 in assessing dominant positions. Additionally, consumer preferences play a crucial role in defining relevant markets as per Sections 19(4), 19(6) and 19(7).

Review of Literature

• Competition Commission of India
• The Hindustan Times House
• 18-20, Kasturba Gandhi Marg
• New Delhi-110001
• https://www.cci.gov.in/public/images/publications_booklet/en/introduction-to-competition-law-part-2-consumer-associationsngos1652182299.pdf – from this link I have got the points to make the Overview of both the acts for my dissertation topic. Last viewed on Monday, 2:56 am.
• HarshaAsnani,https://blog.ipleaders.in/relationship-competition-law-consumer-protection/ – from this link I have got the points to make the relationship between two acts for my dissertation topic. Last viewed on Monday, 2:20 am.
• Suhail Nathani and Pinar Akman
• https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/121795/1/JAE%20article%20%20Akman%20Nathani%20Nov%2016%20Final%20Pre-print.pdf – from this link I have got the points to make the interplay between two acts for my dissertation topic. Last viewed on Monday, 2:59 am.
• Book – By Avtar Singh: Competition Law – It helped me to understand about the competition in trade market. Last viewed on Monday, 2:38am
• Book – By R K Bangai: consumer Protection Law – It helped me to understand how this act provides the protetction to the consumers. Briefly explained the way consumers get benefited through this acts. Last viewed on Monday, 04/03/2024… 3:14am
• Surendra U Kanstia: https://incsoc.net/pdf/consumer-protection-under-the-competition-law-surendra-knastiya.pdf – – from this link I have got the points to about the prohibition of the abuse of dominance, regulation of combination, prohibition of the Anti-competitive practices from competition law and used for my dissertation topic. Last viewed on Monday, 04/03/2024,3:30am.

• Ivy Wigmore, Tech Target,Competition Law, April 2019: https://www.techtarget.com/whatis/definition/competitionlaw#:~:text=Competition%20law%20is%20the%20body,also%20known%20as%20Antitrust%20law.
• The interface between Competition Commission of India and Consumer Protection Law can be accessed at https://www.indianbarassociation.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Interface-of-Competition-Commission-of-India-and-Consumer-Protection-Law.pdf
• Nathani, S and Akman, P (2017) The interplay between consumer protection and competition law in India. Journal of Antitrust Enforcement, 5 (2). pp. 197-215. ISSN 20500688 https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/121795/1/JAE%20article%20%20Akman%20Nathani%20Nov%2016%20Final%20Pre-print.pdf
• MM Sharma, Competition Commission of India, Supreme Court of India 2nd Landmark Judgement, Vaish Associates Advocates, (02 January 2019) https://www.mondaq.com/india/cartels-monopolies/767346/supreme-court-of-india-2nd-landmark-judgment-on-cartels-in-india–dismisses-legalistic-findings-of-cci-and-compat-of-bid-rigging-in-tender-floated-by-iocl-for-lpg-cylinders-based-on-market-conditions
• Harshvardhan Korada and Vasanth Rajasekaran, Competition Commission of India, Supreme Court backs CCI in two cases, The Hindu Business Line, Business laws, (Feb 20, 2022)
• https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/business-laws/supreme-court-backs-cci-in-two-cases/article65068026.ece
• Vishwa, Legal Service India, CCI, Experience of International Jurisdiction International Competition agency.(Canada, USA), International history of competition law, November 22, 2019 https://www.legalserviceindia.com/legal/article-1298-international-history-of-competition-law.html
• Competition Bureau, CCI, Canada. ca, Experience of International Jurisdiction International Competition agency. (Canada) , Examining the Canadian Competition Act in the Digital Era
• February 8, 2022
• https://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/04621.html#sec09
• unit 20, limitations of consumer protection act, 1986, https://egyankosh.ac.in/bitstream/123456789/13507/1/Unit-20.pdf
• Ruchika Chitravanshi New Delhi, MCA revises thresholds for mergers and amalgamation under Competition Act, Business Standard, https://www.business-standard.com/industry/news/mca-revises-thresholds-for-mergers-and-amalgamation-under-competition-act-124030800590_1.html

Research Gaps

There is a gap between the Competition Law and the Consumer Protection Act.

1. Consumer Act, 1986 is for the protection of individual consumers against improper and unsatisfactory supply at the micro level but the Competition Act, 2002 investigates all unfair competition at the industry level, which reduces the probability of dissatisfaction to ultimate consumer means if and only if the better application is ensured in the Macro level reduces litigation in Micro level.
2. Since both legislations are moving in a common direction to give relief to the complainants only regarding the protection of interest but as such, there is no provision in both the legislations regarding perpetual compliances regulated and/or observed by the authorities concerned.[6]
3. Though the Competition Act provides for wider coverage but still the Consumer Protection Act still comes only when the individual consumers’ complaint is lodged with respect to quality & quantity, etc. This is a right protected against the specific person/vendor/supplier.
4. In a perfectly competitive market, the convergence between the Competition law and the Consumer Protection Act can be observed very prominently because the market competition itself works as a watchdog and constantly rectifies the elements of unfair trade practices, anti-competitive agreements and abuse of dominance. In India or other countries, the concept of a perfectly competitive market is an abstract idea and the terms of trade, commerce, and industry transactions, which ought to be dictated by the market demand and supply, remain restrained.

Contribution

Competition law bolsters the principles outlined in the Consumer Protection Act by extending safeguards to consumers through the advocacy of fair competition and the prevention of anti-competitive behaviors within markets. This expansion guarantees that consumers are shielded not only from deceptive trade practices and unfair treatment but also from dynamic markets offering various options, competitive pricing, and superior goods and services. Competition law acts as an added layer of defense against monopolistic behavior, collusion, price manipulation, and other behaviors that harm consumers. Consequently, competition law aids in reinforcing and improving consumer rights within the broader context of market competition.

CHAPTER 2: Evolution of the Competition Law and Consumer Protection Law

Introduction

Before the implementation of the Competition Act, there existed the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act of 1969 (MRTP Act), which addressed instances of restrictive trade practices within the market. Its primary aim was to distribute economic influence away from a small group of individuals. Despite undergoing multiple amendments to adapt to evolving market conditions, the MRTP Act continued to fall short of fulfilling its objectives. Consequently, in consideration of the nation’s economic progress, a new legislation was introduced. The one and only aim of promoting competition within markets is to stimulate economic growth and facilitate its advancement.

Back then the existing laws are extremely outdated. Because of this, it was very tough to understand the problem and get the solution of the wrongful activities. It enables the full exploitation of resources at their highest efficiency levels, subsequently drawing a significant consumer base benefiting from competitive pricing, while simultaneously generating revenue for the government. This symbiotic relationship forms an indispensable cycle where the effectiveness of each component is interdependent on the others. As a response to these dynamics, the Competition law under the CP Act of 2002 was established, taking into consideration everything. For example, exigent requirements, and subsequently which were ultimately enforced[7].

The Competition Act of 2002 now governs competition law in India. Before then, the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969 (MRTP) mainly regulated it. This essay revolves around the same in an effort to identify and go over the factors that contributed to its eventual replacement and failure. It explores the background to the Act’s creation, gives a succinct description and summary of it, and evaluates its shortcomings. Numerous shortcomings are noted, including ambiguity and vagueness, overbearing government control, the use of the “per se” rule rather than the “rule of reason,” the voluntary disclosure policy, the overindulgence in export promotion, and more.

These shortcomings are examined in light of the market and how they negatively impact it rather than advancing the goals of competition law. In addition, a few instances have been examined in order to perform the same analysis and offer a judicial explanation of the Act’s limitations. The failure of the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969 is judged to have been caused by its imprecise and powerful nature.

Since the existing laws are outdated and unclear, with the globalization and privatization underway, there’s a need for new legislation which can adapt to the ever-changing of economic and market condition.

Without being affected by an abundance of laws aimed at regulating the supply of inferior goods, curbing profiteering, and compelling industry and trade to prioritize consumer welfare, significant progress remained elusive. The ultimate reason behind this is the law of economy and the result of it the amount of demand and supply.

Until the mid-1980s, India grappled with a notable disparity between the amount of demand and the huge number of supply, which caused to led to an unspeakable scenario where the consumers were often overlooked. This was an era that was marked by a seller’s market paradigm, wherein marketing endeavors were minimal as consumers actively sought out sellers. This stood in stark contrast to Western nations and Japan, where the dynamics were reversed. In these regions, sellers engaged in fierce competition to vie for the attention of customers across a spectrum of goods and services, fostering the market environment in such circumstances where the choice of the consumer and the preference of the consumer were pivotal drivers of market dynamics[8].

This was the time for the first time an era was marked by a seller’s market paradigm, wherein marketing endeavors were minimal as consumers actively sought out sellers. This stood in stark contrast to Western nations and Japan, where the dynamics were reversed. In these regions, sellers engaged in fierce competition to vie for the attention of customers across a spectrum of goods and services, which was genuinely enlightened an environment in such circumstances where the choice of the consumer and the preference of the consumer were pivotal drivers of the actual market dynamics.

In India, consumers were often compelled to purchase whatever products were available, even if prices were high, quality and service were lacking, and sales terms were unappealing or unreasonable. Now this was in stark contrast to such conditions that prevailed in free-market economies such as the USA, Japan, or Europe. In these regions, consumers were not obligated to reserve a car, LPG gas for cooking, or a scooter by placing a deposit with the company. On the other side of the coin, manufacturers typically extended credit directly to buyers, facilitating more accessible and consumer-friendly purchasing processes.

Nowadays, a similar trend has begun to emerge in India, particularly in the realm of certain consumer durables where competition is intense. However, cultural factors and business ethics also play a significant role in shaping these practices.

Frequently, it seemed more prudent to opt for costly repairs rather than continually requesting company engineers to address issues. As per the market condition for consumer durables expanded, these challenges became more pronounced, prompting both consumers and the government proposed to take necessary action.

In 1986, the Consumer Protection Act was enacted with the object of the exercise of enhancing the safeguarding of consumer interests. The act included provisions for the establishment of consumer councils and other authorities to address consumer grievances in the USA, India, and related matters[9].

Subsequently, the pre-eminent goals of the Act are to enhance consumer protection and to establish effective mechanisms, notably consumer councils, for dispute resolution. Due to its inadequacies in fully safeguarding consumer interests, the Act underwent comprehensive revision in 1993, which came into effect on June 18th of that year. A key amendment aimed to extend protection to users of services.

The Overview of Consume Protection Law

The Consumer Protection Act of 1986 is a legislative measure passed by the Indian Parliament with the objective of advocating for and safeguarding consumer rights within the Indian jurisdiction. It was officially initiated as the Consumer Protection Act on December 24, 1986, designated as Act No. 68 of 1986. Furthermore, it was enforced on July 1st, 1987, marking its operational commencement[10].

The prime concern of the act is to offer comprehensive protection to consumers and ensure effective measures against various forms of exploitation such as faulty products, inadequate services, and unjust trade practices. Additionally, it establishes provisions for accessible, prompt, and affordable mechanisms for addressing consumer complaints.

The momentousness of the act lies in raising social consciousness, setting up consumer protection mechanisms, and simultaneously educating consumers about the diverse provisions and remedies available under the Consumer Protection law. The impact of this statute approved such rights and different kinds of safeguards from the suffering of the consumers and specifically mentioned under this act. On the neither side of this legislation which evidently shapes that consumers are endowed with several entitlements, including the right to safety, the right to access information, the right to make choices, the right to be heard, the right to seek resolution, and the right to consumer education[11].

1. Consumers have an essential right to be safeguarded from the promotion and distribution of products that present substantial risks to their health and safety, thus guaranteeing their well-being and protection within the marketplace.
2. Consumers have the entitlement to receive comprehensive information regarding the quality, quantity, purity, standards, and pricing of goods, aiming to shield them from unjust trade practices,
3. Consumers deserve the guarantee at any cost so that they can access a wide array of goods and services, whenever and wherever it is actually viable, and at that same times these offerings will be available at competitive prices, ensuring that each should have ample choices and opportunities for fair pricing in the market environment.
4. Consumers have the exclusive right to pursue remedies and find solutions when they are faced with restrictive trade practices or instances of unethical exploitation, as a result of ensuring that they have channels to address concerns and resolve any injustices or wrongful activities. So that they may face the market world and its condition.
5. Consumers have the right to thorough consumer education, to get knowledge about the authority and the ways of development which includes access to information, resources, and guidance designed to improve their awareness of their rights, duties, and the intricacies of the market, enabling them to make informed choices and navigate consumer transactions proficiently.
6. Consumers have the entitlement to express their standpoints and be ensured that to be in the connection with this are given due attention at relevant platforms, prevention processes to their interests and give such assurances of fair consideration in the right decision-making processes.

Competition Law: A brief

The Parliament of India passed the Competition Act of 2002, which superseded the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act of 1969. It serves as the governing legislation for competition law in India. Basically, it’s a repealed act. Competition legislation came to be a replacement for MRTP law[12].

Following after the implementation of the Competition Act of 2002, it has undergone two subsequent amendments: the Competition (Amendment) Act of 2007 and 2009[13].

The initial legislation in India clearly objected to curbing the fraudulent use of market dominance dates back to 1969, known as the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Law (MRTP legislation). Its ultimate mission was to intercept as well as hinder the concentration of economic power, regulate monopolies, and interdict unfair trade practices.

At the very moment that India consolidated on the trajectory of reforms embracing Liberalization, Privatization, and Globalization, it abolished the MRTP legislation, acknowledged for its outdated and obsolete relevance and inadequate effectiveness in cultivating the growth ambitions of a population exceeding one billion. The great consequence emerged to collaborate and provide some nourishment for competition within the market landscape. The pre-eminent weapon of the CCI (Competition Commission of India) is to exterminate also we can say demolish the anti-competitive behaviors that have a massive side of negative collision in the competition, stimulate and prolong competitive environments, safeguard consumer interests, and uphold trade freedom within India’s markets. There was a genuine necessity to transition from the emphasis on controlling monopolies to actively encouraging competition.

In addition to that, the elementary object of the exercise to advance consumer welfare and contribute to sustainable economic growth through proactive collaboration with all stakeholders, which also includes consumers, industries, government entities, and international counterparts.

Competition Law is a double assurance of the Consumer protection law:

The Consumer Protection law and its core intention on consumer transactions, endeavor to embellish market conditions to facilitate more effective the consumer’s choice. The Competition law scrutinizes all undertakings that could interfere with the competition and diminish consumer well-being within the market environment. In the recent past, significant transformations have occurred, leading to the emergence of various competitive practices within global economies. But despite that, this surge in competition has resulted in adverse outcomes[14].

These unforeseen consequences are not confined solely to market stakeholders but also affect consumers. During the late 1970s, there was a lack of systematic initiatives aimed at safeguarding consumer interests. In the current time consumer-oriented climate, the degree of consumer awareness and protection within a country is increasingly regarded as an indicator of its development and progressiveness. These factors encompass heightened intricacy in production and distribution, elevated levels of sophistication in sales and marketing strategies, advertising and promotional methodologies, enhanced consumer mobility, and diminished interaction between consumers and sellers. To address this issue, the enactment of Competition laws stands as the most effective approach. Recognizing the consumer needs and disparities they encounter in economic terms, education levels, and bargaining power, several regulations have been established to advance consumer protection.

These directives have been developed or extended to encompass ‘sustainable consumption’ as a significant focus area. They have proven beneficial in establishing a globally recognized set of goals, especially and specifically for developing, and improving nations, aiding them in identifying in the proper way of prioritizing and structuring their consumer protection policies and legislations accordingly.

Implementation of Consumer protection through Competition laws

It is widely recognized that an imbalanced dynamic exists between producers and consumers. Consequently, Competition Law imposes limitations on producers to prevent the exploitation of their dominant market position. The Supreme Court of India has noted that the primary aim of Competition Law is to leverage competition to enhance economic efficiencies and foster a market that is attentive to consumer choices[15].

Employing competition as a strategy offers several advantages and some additional benefits for the consumers:

• It serves as a procedure for reducing prices and enhancing quality. Prices for consumers decrease due to heightened competition, which in turn boosts industry productivity. This not only compressed consumer prices but also leads to an increase the supplements in their employment.
• It results in the authorization of consumers by promoting factors such as increased consumer protection, individual choice freedom, and opposition to the concentration of power, thereby enhancing decentralized economic efficiency. Additionally, it aims to establish an open market to prevent shortages and consequently improve allocative efficiency.
• Within the easy reach of attaining these goals, acceleration in the constant growth, improvement, and development occurs, while we can see preserving both the political and economic democracy.
• It constructs the higher quality in a different class, superior, and freedom of choice.

It has been noted that there is a significant overlap between consumer protection policy and competition law and policy. A well-executed and efficient competition policy can diminish trade barriers related to market entry and exit. The decrease in barriers can contribute to creating a market environment that fosters entrepreneurship and supports the growth of small and medium-sized enterprises, facilitating their aggrandizement. The amplitude of competition law and policy is to uphold competition among different enterprises and offer solutions to behavioral and structural issues, thus facilitating the restoration of competition in the environment of the market. If the aforementioned prejudices is without fear or favor which are fulfilled, advantages such as growing and increased economic efficiency, in the form of greater innovation, and improved consumer welfare can be realized[16].

Consumer benefit which is the level of economic security given by government and that would be attained as consumers would enjoy expanded choices and increased availability of goods at fair and accessible market prices. In contrast, the guiding principles of consumers, however, focus on the dynamics of consumer transactions, highlighting as well as outlining actions and approaches aimed at emphasizing the market standing situations to enable consumers to make informed choices efficaciously like a new formation. Despite addressing very specifically the different market failures and their serious corresponding solutions, both policies or devices share a common goal or we can also say the similar motive of sustaining competitive markets that automatically build up the consumer assistance. This shared objective is what categorizes them as reciprocally animating. The chief goal of the exercise of competition guidelines is to establish a legal frame of reference that enables another course of action to promote competitive outcomes within the nation. An effective competition administration is not only crucial within the economic protocol and its groundwork but also serves to optimize both consumer and social protection. In other word’s we can say the prosperousness. The positive impact of consumers by fostering business living conditions where efficient resource allocation occurs, thereby mitigating or preventing frauds, the wrongful activities of market ability. In the context of India, alongside the Competition legislation, it was proposed during the Tenth Five-Year program of development of a National Competition organization. This proposed National Competition scheme would mirror the country’s requirement for enhanced economic advancement and betterment in citizens’ attributes of life, as well as improvements in the nation’s reputation and self-confidence. Moreover, it was suggested that the implementation of the National Competition scheme would cultivate a culture of competitiveness among diverse entities, thereby optimizing economic effectiveness, safeguarding consumer well-being, and enhancing the global competitivity level.

Essential provisions of Competition law that can enforce the consumer protection law:

Explicitly, as outlined in Section 4 of the Competition law, which states that consumers are safeguarded, stipulating that an enterprise or group can be deemed to exploit its dominant position if it curtails technical or scientific advancements in goods or services, thereby adversely affecting consumers. The determination of a firm or enterprise’s dominant position involves consideration of multiple factors. Chiefly, it is characterized as a position of influence held by an enterprise within the pertinent market in India, empowering it to sway consumers or the market in its favor[17].

Under Section 18 of the Act, the Competition Commission of India which clearly states that this legislation possesses the authority to initiate Suo moto actions aimed at eradicating practices detrimental to competition, instructing and preserving competition, safeguarding consumer interests, and ensuring the freedom of trade conducted by other market participants within the territory of India. Under section 19(4) of the competition legislation which specifically states that as an example, the assessment of a dominant position also considers consumer reliance on the enterprise and barriers to entry, including regulatory hurdles, financial risks, high capital entry costs, marketing barriers, technical obstacles, economies of scale, and at an excessive cost of alternative goods and services for the consumers only. As per section 19(6) and 19(7) of the above – mentioned act which also defines that the determination of the relevant geographical and product markets relies on various factors, with consumer preferences being a key consideration among others[18].

Safeguards from the Unfair Trade Practices and Restrictive Trade Practices to consumers:

Under the Competition Law it is clearly mentioned that the unfair trade practices are not acknowledged under competition law. Instead, they are addressed in the Consumer Protection Act of 1986, where individuals found violating these provisions are subject to penalties. A Restrictive Trade Practice is defined as any action capable of producing outcomes such as hindering, distorting, or limiting competition. Specifically, any trade practice that hinders the movement of capital or resources within the production process can be classified as a Restrictive Trade Practice. Instances of such practices encompass price manipulation and imposing conditions on the delivery or supply of goods that unjustifiably incur costs and restrictions. In every aspect we have noticed that these unfair or unjust business practices are destroying the environment of the market place every time[19].

CHAPTER 3: The Convergence between the Competition Law and Consumer Protection Act

The Competition Law is excessively detailed. One could see the application of competition law as a continuation of the principles that underpin consumer protection laws. The goal of both legal fields is to uphold a fair and competitive market environment for the benefit of customers[20].

Competition law regulates company conduct and discourages activities that would undermine a healthy level of competition. Nonetheless, laws pertaining to consumer protection categorize, insulate customers against unfair or deceptive company activities, and instruct them on how to defend their rights and interests. Unquestionably, it is vital to actively include all stakeholders, including governmental bodies, business leaders, and international jurisdictions, in order to improve consumer welfare and sustain economic progress.

Competition Law and Consumer Protection Law: Double Wings of The Same Home

Markets function and customers are shielded from deceit by competition policy. These two significant objectives also pertain to consumer protection. As a result, both policies’ ultimate goals are nearly identical[21].

The Interface between Competition Commission of India and Consumer Protection Law

With the objective of liberalization of the vast economy and the intensification of market competition, the representation of the Competition Commission as a controller becomes increasingly significant. In the case of Ashoka Smokeless Coal Ind. P. Ltd. v. Union of India (2007) 2 SCC 640, the Honorable Supreme Court noted that in a free-market economy where producers determine their own prices, ensuring a level playing field is crucial[22]. This equilibrium can be attained through choice and competition in the market for procuring goods. If the purpose of an open market policy is to be realized, the State must prioritize the benefit of consumers.

This dissertation scrutinizes the equivalence between consumer protection and the Competition Commission of India. It starts by elucidating the exquisite market environment and ideal consumer dealing, followed by an exploration of the disparities existing that are substantial. The author elucidates the inducement behind consumer protection and discusses the various criteria upon which consumer protection policies can be founded.

Introduction

To comprehend the necessity for market regulation aimed at consumer protection, one can refer to the idealized notion of a perfect market. Although achieving a perfect market system is impractical, Trivedi suggests that insights can be gleaned from free market economic theory. If the attributes of a perfect market were realized, the argument posits, regulation would become unnecessary[23].
Ramsay outlines the following traits of an ideal market:

• In the market, there exists a multitude of buyers and sellers, ensuring that the actions of any single economic participant have minimal influence on market output or prices.

Market entry and exit are unrestricted.

• In a perfect market scenario, the goods traded are homogeneous, meaning each seller offers essentially identical products within the specific market[24].
• Every economic participant possesses complete information regarding the characteristics and worth of the commodities exchanged.
• Additionally, all expenses associated with producing the commodity are incurred by the producer, while all benefits accrue to the consumer, thereby eliminating externalities.

The assessment of consumer choice posits that consumers are wise agents seeking to maximize their own fulfilment. It further asserts that consumers possess a clear understanding of their desires and will make consistent decisions accordingly. Additionally, consumers are expected to exert influence on producers and shape market dynamics. The choices made by the consumers serve as signals to producers regarding their needs and preferences. Failure to address consumer demands may result in the loss of customers and eventual exit from the market for the producers. A complete market is realized only when all criteria outlined by Ramsay’s criteria are fulfilled. However, a competitive market can still exist even if not all the characteristics of a perfect market are met. Additionally, it is acknowledged that individual consumers may have varying preferences and tolerances. Likewise, considerations such as safety and financial security may also influence consumer decisions[25].

Consumer protection is deemed necessary on the premise that consumers are considered the “weaker party” in transactions. Compared to sellers, consumers often lack bargaining power and are thus unable to safeguard their interests effectively. This perspective stems from the exploitation theory, which posits that consumers require protection for two primary reasons[26]. Firstly, consumers typically have limited options in imperfect markets, compelling them to accept terms dictated by large, powerful companies. Secondly, companies can exploit disparities in sophistication to their advantage. Therefore, in an environment lacking ideal market conditions and ideal consumer behavior, the presence of a regulatory body becomes imperative

What is Consumer Welfare?

The notion of consumer welfare encompasses systematic transactions, cost-saving measures, and social considerations regarding market safety and consumer health. In Marshallian demand curve analysis, consumer welfare is defined as the disparity between the price a consumer is willing to pay and the actual price paid. However, within the realm of antitrust law, the interpretation of this term is subject to significant debate. Two opposing camps emerge: one advocates for defining consumer welfare as “consumer surplus,” while the other contends it should represent “aggregate welfare” or “absolute welfare.” Consequently, there are two divergent standards: the first advocates for optimizing consumer gratuitous, known as the “consumer welfare standard,” while the second emphasizes productive and allocative efficiency in the market, referred to as the “absolute welfare standard” arrive. Competition legislation endeavors to promote consumer welfare by overseeing interactions among enterprises within the market. It establishes the legal framework dictating the standard of proof necessary for investigations and legal proceedings. Conversely, consumer law focuses on the interactions between consumers and enterprises, aiming to rebalance power dynamics by providing consumers with the information needed to make informed choices. Its objective is to enhance the consumer’s position in market transactions. While both competition law and consumer law share the overarching goal of advancing consumer welfare, they adopt distinct perspectives and employ different approaches toward achieving this objective. However, these two domains complement each other and yield optimal outcomes for consumer interests when harmonized effectively.

Who is Consumer?

From an economic perspective, the term “consumer” refers to the ultimate user of goods or services produced, manufactured, and distributed for consumption purposes[27]. However, within the legal framework of India, the definition varies under the Consumer law 1986, and the Competition law 2002.

Under Section 2(1)(d) of the Consumer law, which clearly speaks about a consumer is defined as any individual who purchases goods, hires services, or avails of services in exchange for payment, whether fully or partially, or under a deferred payment system. This definition also encompasses any other user or beneficiary of such goods or services, excluding the initial purchaser, when such use is approved by the purchaser[28].

The above-mentioned definition prohibits individuals who acquire such goods for resale or avail services for any commercial purposes. Regarding the interpretation of “commercial purpose,” the Supreme Court of India noted that the Parliament, through an explanation which is under section 2(1)(d), intended that exclusion from commercial purpose necessitates the use of goods for the buyer’s own livelihood, exclusively through self-employment generally. Comparable to the MRTP legislation (1969) and the Competition law (2002), which clearly allows third parties to file complaints with the Competition regulatory body[29]. The Competition Commission is empowered to investigate alleged violations of competition laws, including anti-competitive agreements and abuse of dominance, either on its own initiative or upon receiving complaints from consumers, associations, trade associations, or referrals from governmental or statutory authorities. The word “consumer” under the Competition legislation, encompasses a broader scope compared to the definition in the Consumer Protection law. While competition policy focuses on the behavior and activities of firms in the supply side of markets, consumer policy primarily concerns the demand-side structure of markets. Under the Competition law, a consumer is defined inclusively, covering purchases made for personal use, resale, or any commercial purpose, as well as hiring or availing of services for both commercial and personal use. Consequently, the Competition law directly provides safeguards and consumer rights even when goods and services are intended for resale or commercial purposes[30].

The Evolution of Competition Law in India

The ability of consumers to seek recourse through the Consumer Protection Redressal Forum or the Competition Commission in India is delineated by the Competition law framework. In 1969, the enactment of the MRTP Act followed Parliament’s consideration of the report submitted by the Monopolies Inquiry Commission, which highlighted the concentration of economic power among a few large industrial entities. This concentration of power was a consequence of stringent government control over capital issuance by companies and industrial licensing. The MRTP Commission introduced Part B concerning ‘Unfair Trade Practices’, and amendments were made in 1984 through sections 36A and 36E.

In the year of 1985, the UN General Assembly approved “Consumer Protection Resolution No. 39/248,” offering guidelines for governments to enhance consumer interest protection. As a signatory to the resolution, the Indian government enacted the Consumer Law, in 1986, aiming for expedited and simplified resolution of consumer grievances. This Act granted consumers several rights, such as the right to safety and the right to make informed choices, as outlined in Section 6.

In the year 1986, the Consumer law was enacted with the objective of shielding consumers from unjust practices within the business community. However, the original version of the Act lacked a specific definition of “unfair trade practice.” In 1993, Section 2(1)(r) was introduced, offering a comprehensive code on “Unfair Trade Practice,” inspired by Section 36A of the MRTP legislation[31].

Some essential legal framework of Anti-competitive practices on consumers

It’s essential to grasp that under Indian competition law, buyers of goods or services have recourse to the Redressal Forum of Consumer Protection or the commission of Competition legislation in India.

This legal framework was established following the enactment of the MRTP law in 1969. The impetus for this legislation came from the Parliament’s consideration of the Inquiry for Monopolies and it’s Commission’s findings, which highlighted the engagement of the economic power among a handful of large industrial conglomerates. This concentration or involvement of power was particularly pronounced during a period characterized by stringent government control over various aspects such as capital issuance by companies and industrial licensing. The MRTP Commission introduced necessary amendments in 1984, including the incorporation of Part B focusing on ‘Unfair or Unjust Trade Practices’ through such Sections of 36A and 36E. basically, this is how it explains about the necessary stages of this commission to give the redressal for the injustice[32].

In the year of 1985, the United Nations of General Assembly formulated what is commonly referred to as ” The Consumer Protection and its Resolution No. – 39/248,” which outlined guidelines for governments to enhance consumer protection. As a signatory to this special resolution, the Indian government instituted the Consumer Protection law in 1986, aiming to streamline and expedite the resolution of consumer grievances. This legislation granted consumers specific rights, including the right to safety and the right to choose, as outlined in Section 6 of the defined act.

During that period of 1986, The Consumer Protection law was formulated with the objective of shielding consumers from unjust or unfair practices within the business community. However, initially, the legislation did not support any definition of unfair trade practices. In 1993, under section 2(1)(r) which was introduced, establishing a comprehensive framework for addressing the procedure of ”unfair trade system” akin to Section 36A of the specified MRTP law of 1969.

Definition of Anti-competitive Practice

Competition serves as a catalyst for businesses to offer high-quality goods and services at competitive prices. By doing so, companies attract the customers and enlarge their one and only market share. Moreover, competition fosters innovation and its diversity. In order to vie for consumer attention, firms strive to differentiate their products from those of competitors, making them much more appealing to the consumers. Consequently, competition compels businesses to be inventive and innovative, whether through product design or technological advancements. Anticompetitive practices, conversely, are business strategies that hinder or diminish competition within a market. Such practices often lead to market distortions, resulting in inflated prices, lower product quality, diminished service standards, and a suppression of innovation[33].

Effect of Anti-competitive practices on consumers

To fulfill its mandate of eradicating practices detrimental to competition, fostering and sustaining the competition, safeguarding consumer interests, and ensuring the freedom of trade among market participants in India, the Act mandates an inquiry into alleged violations concerning anti-competitive agreements, the abuse of dominance, and the combinations by the administrative body. It not only safeguards trade but also prioritizes consumer welfare[34].

Section 3(1) serves as a blanket prohibition on agreements pertaining to the production, supply, distribution, storage, acquisition, or control of goods or services, which either cause or are likely to cause a significant adverse impact on the competition within territory of India. Section 3(3) specifically addresses agreements among competitors operating at the same production stage within the same market, which are presumed to have a substantial adverse effect on the competition. Conversely, agreements among parties at different production stages and thus in distinct markets are considered violative of Section 3(1) only if they demonstrably hinder competition to a significant degree. Therefore, while Section 3(1) and Section 3(3) adhere to the per se rule, and under section 3(4) is evaluated under the rule of reason. This means that the restraint in question should not eliminate competition, and the court must typically assess the unique circumstances of each case precisely. In determining whether there is a significant adverse impact on such competition, the Commission estimates various factors, including the benefits accruing to consumers.

In assessing the abuse of a dominant situation through an enterprise, the Commission takes into the account several factors, such as consumer dependency on the particular enterprise. Section 6 subjecting the combinations among individuals or enterprises to the identical criterion of not having a significant adverse effect on competition which is absolutely within the relevant marketplace. Hence, Indian competition law factors in consumer welfare or interests. In some instances, the Competition Commission, finding no prima facie evidence, has dismissed cases using its powers specified as per Section 26. However, in others, it has applied the consumer welfare standard when determining the subsistence of anti-competitive practices with a significant adverse effect on the competition in India. The consumer welfare regulation was applied in the case of Belaire Owner’s Association v. DLF Limited, HUDA & OR’s. In this case, that informant had engaged in standard-form which made contracts with DLF Limited for the allocation of apartments which was in their particular Group Housing Apartment.

The Commission instructed the Director-General to investigate and inspect claims of unfair or unjust and arbitrary terms in the exact contract, suggesting abuse of dominance by way of DLF. The Director-General identified various clauses in that agreement as breaching the particular Section 4(2)(a) of the legislation. The report highlighted the impact on consumers, noting the presence of evidence dissymmetry. It pointed out that DLF essentially controlled the highly expensive residential market environment in Gurgaon, making it unlikely for a customer seeking a flat to consider even a cheaper and lower-priced alternative elsewhere in Gurgaon. In India, the association of CCI reviewed the Director-General’s report and remarked that the agreement or contract terms were ‘unfair’ and disregarded consumers’ rights. Such practices by dominant companies could potentially lead smaller players to emulate them[35].

The association of CCI applied this approach in the well-known case of Ramakant Kiini v. Kiini of Hiranandani Hospital. Here, the hospital required maternity services patients to exclusively utilize the supplier service of stem cells of Cryobench, without informing them that external stem cell bodies would possibly not be permitted to collect those stem cells on-site. This limited consumers’ choices, as those seeking maternity services had to either use the specified service of those stem cells or choose a different hospital altogether. The Commission acknowledged the impact on consumers, noting that patients who receive maternity services from a particular consultant tend to enhance an exclusive bond with themselves over time and making it challenging for themselves to switch hospitals. As per section 27 of the legislation, the Commission issued an order imposing a fine of Rs.3.81 crore on the hospital[36].

After everything, these instances represent exceptional cases where agreements, typically falling under some unjust or unfair trade practices, were considered. This Commission generally does not get initiate inquiries in such cases where actually there is not at all the prima facie evidence of such exploitative practices. Evidence suggesting the existence of exploitation or dominance is necessary to establish the prima facie matter, prompting the Commission to direct the official Director-General. So that, later on, it can be investigated further. In the matter of Neelam Sodo v. M/s Raheja Developers Pvt. Ltd., the informant made a complaint about unfair and the particular arbitrary terms in the contract of the Flat Buyers with the real estate and its developer for the purpose of Flat purchase in that residential complex. Assessing the lack of evidence and the suggestion for the opponent party which held a predominant position in the house services provisions located in Gurgaon. However, the case was closed by the commission through the provisions mentioned under section 26(2).

In cases like Ohm Value Services Ltd. v. Janta Land Promoters Ltd., the Competition Commission of India (CCI) demonstrated a similar approach. The informant argued that the conditions outlined in those allotment letters by the way of the opposite party, concerning land allocation for establishing non-polluting industries, were unfair, illegal, and constituted an abuse of dominant situation.

Specifically, Clause 6 of the specified allotment letter permitted the opposite party to levy an 18% annual interest rate, especially for the delayed payments or the cancellation of that allotment, without any provision for the informant to impose penalties for defaults or deficiencies on the part of those opponent parties. The Commission noted that, as because there was prima facie, so no evidence suggesting that the particular opposite party held a hugely dominant position within the marketplace for the industrial plots in Punjab. It also found where the consumers and such markets had the option to switch to other market players if possibly they found again unfavorable terms[37].

It also observed that there were different market players in that specific relevant market for “services for the improvement, development and the residential units sale located in Gurgaon,” which includes DLF, The Ananthraj Group, and the Group of Earth Infrastructure. The commission basically did not assess the terms and conditions of the contract papers of the Floor Buyer. Another reason for not considering the terms because of the violation of Section 4 which is defined in the Act. Subsequently, it is evident about the Commission, occasionally considers such instances of illegal trade practices, particularly when there is an imbalance which clear, however, the relationship between the consumers and the businesses, is leading the smaller players to emulate unfair conditions set by larger entities.

Well, apart from the cases we can see here how CCI regulates its framework to stop illegal activities and company affairs which is is also unfair. There are numerous cases where consumers suffer and face huge problems and eventually, it harms the consumer interest. In such cases, CCI officially investigates in its process to deal with the problems and solve the cases. To seek for redressal consumer’s come up to CCI and it inspects, reviews the matters of various sides of unfair practices[38].

Conclusion

Such trade practices like illegal, unfair, and unjust those are as discriminatory or unjust contract terms, misleading the way of advertising, and excessive costing and pricing, directly impact consumer interest. Meanwhile, restrictions on different practices have an indirect influence on consumer well-being. Cases like Belaire Owner’s Association v. DLF Limited, HUDA & Ors, and Ramakant Kiini v. Dr. L.H. Hiranandani Hospital demonstrate that the Commission considers the effect on consumers in certain instances. Although they may examine different strategies for seeking the remedy. Now both the competition law and consumer protection Program share the common goal of promoting the welfare of consumer’s. As stated by Mr. Subhad Prasad Deo, who is the former Additional Director General of the CCI, “while it predominantly adopts the approved competition which was standard and conventional in the most cases, it is also willing to embrace the Indian context when necessary[39].

The Interplay between Consumer Protection law and the Competition Law in India

In the context of consumer protection policy, there are the rights mentioned under the statute for the consumers’ benefit. It acts as a shield to the consumers from the company’s enterprises and to protect the consumer’s well-being. Also takes care not to harm the interest of consumers. Now if we talk about the Competition law it formulates its legal structure. The scheme of CCI has the special aim of inquiring about wrongful activities which is already in illegal manners for a long time. CCI is extremely determined regarding its role. It plays a crucial role in to the applicable market in India. Competition law works in its exclusive method. The way CCI works it is clearly noticeable in the marketplace of India. Eventually, it helps consumers who face problems and suffer from fraudulent activities the unjust practices. In some way, both acts are clear regarding the provisions mentioned in the specified legislation. There is a thin line that stands for a connection between these two pieces of legislation regarding consumer protection. We found out the interconnections between these two major statutes[40].

Introduction

The safeguarding of consumer interests is a central tenet of present competition laws and a direct objective of consumer protection legislation. Despite their complementary nature, the competition laws and the consumer protection legislation address different issues. Which apply distinct methods to achieve their respective objectives. While consumer protection regulations aim to directly shield consumers from unfair treatment in transactions, considering consumers as the weaker party, competition law indirectly safeguards consumers and their economic welfare by ensuring effective market competition. This entire article delves into the interplay or the interaction between the consumer protection law and the competition law within the Indian context, drawing comparisons along with the EU stance where applicable. Through an analysis of pertinent legislation and some case laws, the entire article concludes that given the Competition Commission of India’s mandate to prevent such practices that are detrimental to competition, it should intervene in the cases to explain the overlap between the consumer protection legislation and the competition laws solely based on their unfavorable effects on such competition or AAEC. The treatment of ‘unfair trade practices’ is cited to illustrate the suitability of this specific approach[41].

Across various regions globally, policymakers continue to examine the most effective integration of the competition law and consumer legislation. Some jurisdictions opt to amalgamate both legal frameworks and their enforcement, while others prefer to maintain a clear distinction between them. This dynamic landscape often witnesses shifts in policy direction over time, as evidenced by the UK’s transition from consolidating competition and consumer powers under the Office of Fair Trading to later separating them with the establishment of the current supremacy of the Competition along with the Markets Authority. Similarly, India has been actively assessing the suitable relationship between these two legislations which are competition law and consumer protection law. Initially, these laws were consolidated under a single act, the MRTP Act of 1970. Which was replaced by the Competition legislation. However, subsequent legislative developments, such as the enactment of the Consumer Protection law in 1986 and the Competition law in 2002, led to a division in both regulatory frameworks and enforcement responsibilities. Although competition law primarily addresses consumer interests indirectly, while consumer protection law does so directly, it remains imperative to establish a coherent relationship between these legal domains to avoid confusion in their application[42].

The enforcement of Competition law as the worldwide operates on the basis of two main theories of injury or harm, focusing on potential harm or injury to consumers and to the competition itself. However, this dual focus often necessitates competition mechanisms to adjust their enforcement priorities, sometimes favoring consumer interests and at other times prioritizing business concerns. As we approach the seventh year of Indian competition law enforcement, two critical questions arise like a level of huge importance: Are these enforcement priorities clearly defined? And does emphasizing one aspect imply neglecting the other?

This paper aims to examine the distinctions and parallels between competition law and consumer protection law, exploring how a combination of these frameworks can effectively address the identified theories of injury or harm. Specifically, it analyzes the actual relationship between these laws which are competition law and consumer protection law in India, comparing it with the corresponding relationship under EU law where relevant[43]. To achieve this goal, the article delves into the relevant legal provisions and enforcement mechanisms.

An illustrative example used in this analysis is the prohibition of ‘unfair trade practices,’ which showcases the interconnectedness of these legal domains. The underlying premise is that both competition and consumer protection laws ultimately serve consumer interests, albeit in varying ways. In India, the Consumer Protection Law (1986) explicitly prioritizes consumer welfare, while the Competition Law (2002) implicitly does so, recognizing that any commercial transaction ultimately impacts consumers through the provision of goods or services. The legislative long history of these mentioned enactments provides valuable insight into the overlaps and distinctions between these two statutes. In the EU context, there’s ongoing debate regarding whether decisions in applying competition law should be guided by consumer welfare and broader consumer interests, reflecting over fifty years of enforcement experience[44].

Indeed, it highlights a potential source of conflict between the enforcement dealings or actions undertaken by the European Commission and the rulings issued by the Court of Justice of the European Union in this legal domain. This discrepancy also reflects differing perspectives on the objectives of competition law. The structure of the paper is as follows: Section II provides an overview of the legislative framework in both India and the EU. Section III examines the interaction between the consumer protection and competition concerning ‘ the unfair trade practices’ and ‘the restrictive trade practices’ as well in India. Section IV illustrates the significance of accurately delineating ‘unfair trade practices’ and ‘restrictive trade practices,’ drawing on examples primarily from India but also referencing experiences from the EU and to some extent, the United States.

Section V which concludes that despite being a relatively young jurisdiction in terms of competition law, India is well-positioned to effectively distinguish between consumer protection and competition law matters, given the specificity of its legislation and other pertinent factors. The effective separation of these issues hinges largely on the decisions made by the Competition Commission of India in its enforcement actions.

The Legislative background

India

The Consumer Protection law was introduced with the aim of establishing a new legal framework to safeguard consumer interests and address the existing gaps in consumer protection laws. The Law Commission of India, in its 199th Report, highlighted the inadequacy of various provisions scattered across different enactments such as the CPC (1908), Contract Law (1872), Sale of Goods Law (1930), and others in effectively protecting consumers only. While the MRTP Act of (1969) offered some relief and remedy, there remained a pressing need to shield consumers from exploitation, substandard goods, deficient services, and unfair business practices. Thus, the Consumer Protection legislation (1986) (CPA) was formulated to specifically address these concerns and safeguard consumers from the detrimental practices of the business community. Enacted in 1987, the CPA has undergone subsequent amendments over time to enhance its effectiveness.

The Law Commission elucidated that the deficiency lay not in the absence of a legislative structure, but rather in the presence of a specialized entity exclusively addressing issues detrimental to consumer interests. The then-prevailing MRTP Law, instituted under the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act of 1969 (MRTPA), held a dual responsibility encompassing both anti-competitive and anti-consumer behaviors. However, this broad mandate proved inadequate. The commission’s purview extended to unfair or unjust trade practices (UTP), which encompassed consumer harm, alongside monopolistic and restrictive practices (RTP) that posed threats to competition and consumer well-being.

In broad terms, unfair trade practices (UTPs) denote any unjust method or deceptive tactic utilized to boost the utilization, sale, or distribution of goods or services. Restrictive trade practices (RTPs), on the other hand, encompass behaviors that hinder, distort, or limit competition. The notion of monopolistic practices is frequently used synonymously with restrictive practices[45].

The inclusion of unfair trade practices (UTPs) within the jurisdiction of the MRTP occurred in 1984 following recommendations from a committee chaired by Justice Rajinder Sachar (the “Sachar Committee”). This committee esteemed that single handedly addressing monopolistic and restrictive trade practices (RTP) would only partially address consumer grievances arising from such practices. The report of the Sachar Committee proposed an important framework to address practices directly harmful to consumers and to balance the position of consumers in relation to the businesses. These commission recommendations were comprised of the MRTPA through an amendment in 1984.

UTPs were characterized as actions aimed at misleading, falsely, or deceitful consumers through representations concerning the price, quality, or utility of goods or services, as well as through deceptive advertising or misleading gift offers. Additionally, the Act prohibited practices such as hoarding or destroying goods or refusing to sell them, with the intention of inflating the price of identical or similar goods[46].

At the same time, the legislation of MRTP which also prohibited restrictive trade practices (RTPs) intended to impede the influx of capital or the resources which are mentioned to use for the market place, manipulate prices, alter delivery conditions, or influence the supply flow of goods or the services in a manner that unjustly imposed costs or restrictions on the consumers. In 1991, the Parliament revisited the provisions regarding unfair trade practices (UTPs) in the MRTPA and expanded their scope. This was achieved by adding the phrase “adopts any unjust or unfair way of process or wrongful or deceptive approach or practice which includes any of those following practices” to the section heading. This adjustment prioritized the act of deceiving a consumer over its specific form and made the list of UTPs provided in the MRTPA which is absolutely non-exhaustive. A notable consequence of this amendment was observed in the Supreme Court of India’s ruling in the case of Om Prakash vs. Assistant Engineer, Haryana Argo Industries Corporation Limited, and Amr. The Court reviewed an appeal through the National Commission well-established under the statute of the Consumer Act. During that period, the Consumer Act referenced the MRTPA to define properly about unfair business practices. The appellant was dissatisfied with the respondent’s selective delivery policy, which led to a price hike for the tractor he bought. At that time it was observed by the Supreme Court that prior to the amendment of 1991, the MRTPA provided an exhaustive list of UTPs.

The time of the tractor sale, the MRTPA only prohibited actions such as hoarding, as well as the destruction, or refusing to sell the goods or such services with the intention to raise their price. Therefore, the Court observed that a mere delay in delivering such a tractor, even if deliberate, would not qualify as an unfair business practice. However, following the amendment of 1991, all unfair or these deceptive practices, including those challenged in this case, would be considered UTPs[47].

Two years subsequent to the Sachar Committee’s suggestions that integrated unfair or unjust trade practices (UTPs) into the realm of the MRTP, the Parliament introduced the Consumer Act. This Act served as parallel legislation aimed at regulating UTPs. Its primary aim was to enhance consumer protection by establishing consumer councils along with other authorities to resolve consumer disputes and related matters. It was instituted forums at the district, state, and national levels to address consumer grievances. The Consumer Law and the MRTPA both prohibited equivalently unfair or unjust trade practices (UTPs) and defined them in identical terms. Initially, the Consumer Act did not address restrictive trade practices (RTPs). However, in 1993, an amendment expanded its scope to include RTPs like ‘tie-in’ sales, and another amendment in 2002 covered delays in supply intended to inflate prices as RTPs. Nonetheless, the Consumer Act’s regulation of RTPs was narrower compared to the MRTPA, which defined RTPs as practices obstructing, distorting, or settling limits on competition. For instance, the MRTPA considered actions hindering the flow of capital or resources into production as RTPs. Similarly, manipulation of market prices, delivery terms, or supply flow resulting in unjustified costs or restrictions for consumers fell under RTPs.

Despite similarities in UTP regulations between the MRTPA and the Consumer Act, the latter didn’t extend protection to buyers purchasing goods or services for commercial purposes, thus excluding commercial purchasers from being considered consumers eligible to petition Consumer Forums. Although the MRTPA lacked a consumer definition, Indian courts referred to the Consumer Act’s definition in cases involving UTPs, consequently leaving consumers vulnerable to UTPs practiced by actual commercial buyers.

Following the liberalization in the Indian economy in 1991 and the business or trade liberalization both domestically and internationally under the WTO (World Trade Organization), it became evident that the existing market regulation law, the MRTPA, was inadequate to address the requirements of the domiciliary or domestic industry and competition in a globalized trade environment.

In response, the Government of India established a Committee led by Mr. S.V.S. Raghavan in the year 1999 to propose measures for implementing a more substantial competition policy (the “Raghavan Committee”). This committee recommended that the Competition Act is the repealed Act of the MRTPA and the enactment of the comprehensive of competition statute aligned with its suggestions. Notably, the Committee proposed that the CCI, to be well-established under the newest statute, would handle issues related to monopolistic and restrictive trade practices (MRTPs), while the unfair or unjust trade practices (UTPs) would be addressed by the adjudication machinery under the above-mentioned Consumer Act[48].

The Committee outlined the agenda for the newest competition policy, emphasizing that competition primarily serves the interests of consumers, and their right to free, healthy, and fair competition should supersede all other considerations.

It highlighted the importance of supportive institutions to foster a competitive society, including the dissemination of market information, free communication, and easy access to goods. The competition policy, according to the Committee, should aim to promote consumer welfare as its positive objective.

The European Union

In the European Union (EU), the competition regulations are outlined in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which has been fundamental to the European investigation or cross-questioning project since its inception. Article 101 TFEU prohibits any agreements, practices, or decisions among businesses that aim to prevent, restrict, or distort competition inside the limits of the internal marketplace, particularly those affecting trade between the Member States. On the other hand, Article 102 TFEU prohibits the maltreatment or the abuse of dominant market position, particularly if it impacts trade between the Member States. Of relevance to this discussion, Article 102(a) TFEU prohibits the imposition of unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair trading conditions as an example of abusive behavior. This prohibition of unfair practices prompts a similar inquiry to the one in the context of India, regarding the relationship between unfair or unjust trade practices (UTPs) and the abusive nature of anticompetitive practices.

consumer protection regulations were notably absent from the original Treaties of Rome, which were established in the Community of European Economic. This omission is somewhat expected, considering that the concept of a ‘consumerist society’ largely emerged in the aftermath of World War II due to economic and social changes. In Europe, consumer interests were relatively disregarded until the 1960s and 1970s. Initially, consumer protection laws only played a secondary role in the process of market integration, unlike the prominent role of competition regulations[49].

In the concept of EU it’s worth mentioning that consumer protection not only seeks to ensure a high standard of consumer safeguarding but also aims to balance this very well, along with promoting the competitiveness of activities. For instance, the Unfair or Unjust Commercial Practices and its Directive explicitly state that by safeguarding consumers from ‘unfair trade or business-to-the consumer commercial manner or practices,’ the Directive which indirectly safeguards legitimate businesses or trade from the competitors who engage in unfair practices. Consequently, it ensures fair competition in sectors regulated by the Directive[50].

In no uncertain terms the directive rights of Consumers expressly and positively states that its aim is to support the absolute way of functioning in the internal marketplace by ensuring a high standard of consumer protection. This aligns with Protocol 27 attached to the TFEU and the Treaty on European Union (TEU), which define the internal market, as outlined in Article 3 TEU, as a system that prevents distortion of competition. In the context of the EU, the competition rules, instructions, and the consumer protection regulations are closely intertwined with the shared goal of facilitating the smooth operation of the internal marketplace[51].

But despite that, the exact relationship between these legal domains, particularly concerning enforcement and its actions in specific cases, poses a significant challenge both in the EU and in Indian framework[52].

The Interplay between Consumer Protection and Competition in the context of UTPs and RTPs in India

The handling of restrictive trade practices (RTPs) and unfair trade practices (UTPs) in India under the enforcement of the Consumer Act and the Competition Act reveals a noteworthy convergence in their functions[53].

Restrictive Trade Practices.

The way in which RTPs are treated illustrates the points at which the content and enforcement of the two Acts overlap, as well as the possible consequences of this confluence. The Consumer Act prohibits RTPs that have the tendency to manipulate delivery conditions or prices, or to interfere with the flow of supplies in the market pertaining to goods or services in a way that imposes unwarranted costs or restrictions on consumers. Examples of these tactics include “tie-in” sales and “delayed supplies,” which increase the cost of goods or services. Although the Raghavan Committee noted a small overlap between the two Acts regarding “tie-in” sales, the Consumer Act’s definition of RTPs is unquestionably broad and would include any trade practice that tends to manipulate price or delivery conditions or alter the flow of supplies related to goods or services in the market in a way that places unwarranted costs or restrictions on the consumer. Any “delay beyond the period agreed to by a trader in the supply of such goods or in providing the services which have led or are likely to lead to rising in the price” was expressly forbidden by a 2002 amendment to the Consumer Act. It is possible that the Raghavan Committee did not consider the impact of this change because it was made a year after the report of the Raghavan Committee and concurrently with the Competition Act’s announcement. As a result, there is a considerable overlap between the Competition and Consumer Act’s regulations regarding RTPs[54].

However, how does this overlap manifest itself in terms of RTP regulation? An agreement between traders is a prerequisite requirement of the Competition Act.

It applies a rule of reason standard for vertical agreements and a per se norm for horizontal agreements (26). This reminds me a little bit of the MRTPA’s enforcement history. During its infancy, the MRTPA discriminated between RTPs that fell under its purview and considered them actionable only in cases where they reduced or eliminated competition. The Parliament added a per se criteria for RTP violation to the MRTPA through an amendment in 1984. Nevertheless, some RTPs continued to require a rule of reason analysis even after this modification[55].

The Competition Act forbids RTPs to the extent that they constitute an abuse of a dominant position with regard to the regulation of dominant companies. Significantly, it is unclear from the CCI’s enforcement history under the Competition Act whether RTPs in the form of abuse of dominance call for a per se examination or a rule of reason. The Competition Commission of India (CCI) examined, among other things, whether the National Stock Exchange’s currency derivates segment’s waiver of transaction fees violated Section 4 of the Competition Act. According to the CCI – the definition of “unfair” as stated in section 4(2) of the Act must be considered when analyzing situations where a rival or a consumer is being treated unfairly. The CCI noted that as section 4 does not require it to be proven, [NSE’s] argument that there is no element of abuse and that there is no observation on harm to consumers in the Commission’s ruling of May 25, 2011, deserves to be rejected. First and foremost, the section demands proof that a company or organization holds a dominating position in the relevant market. After then, it must demonstrate that it has acted in the ways listed in clauses (a) through (e) of the section. Following their establishment, there is no legal obligation to look into any further effects on rivals, customers, or the market[56]. The two questions listed above have been clearly established by the Commission in its order. In contrast to section 3, section 4 of the Act does not call for an assessment of the significant adverse effects on competition (AAEC) or of the factors—such as the accumulation of advantages to consumers-mentioned in section 19(3).

The ruling in NSE naturally calls for a re-examination of the co-extensive treatment of RTPs under the Consumer and Competition Acts, given the CCI’s interpretation of the lack of a requirement to demonstrate elimination or restriction of competition under the Consumer Act (with the caveat that in NSE, the complainant MCX was a competitor and not a consumer). It seems from the CCI’s ruling in NSE that neither statute strictly applies an effects-based approach. Although the Consumer Act necessitates direct harm to a consumer before cease and desist and compensation orders can be issued, the CCI’s decision-making process regarding Section 4 of the Competition Act does not seem to support an effects-based standard for enforcement, as mentioned in NSE. Therefore, it would seem that the Competition Act and the Consumer Act are applied to RTPs without the need to prove that they have a negative impact on consumers or competition. The Competition Act’s Section 18 requires the CCI to eliminate practices that hurt competition, promote and sustain competition, protect consumer interests, and ensure freedom of trade carried on by other participants in Indian markets. This broad mandate makes a strong case for applying a rule of reason approach to Section 4 of the Competition Act, even though the Consumer Act was never intended to look at any potential harm to a body of consumers. We address whether the Competition Act supports in section X below in this kind of construction[57].

Interests of consumers

The way that the two Acts treat consumers is another significant distinction. Consumers are defined under the Competition Act as those who purchase products or services, regardless of whether they intend to use them for personal, resale, or “commercial purpose.” This is consistent with the Act’s preamble, which mandates that the CCI stop anti-competitive acts, encourage and maintain market competition, safeguard consumer interests, and guarantee the freedom of other market participants to engage in business in India.

In contrast to the MRTPA, the Competition Act does not stipulate that a consumer must activate the adjudication mechanism. A consumer is defined by the Consumer Act as someone who makes purchases of products or services without intending to resell them. This indicates that the Consumer Act’s primary goal is to safeguard the interests of ultimate consumers, not those of other dealers operating in a separate industry. The grievance redress provisions of both acts and the addressability of their orders make this divergence evident. While the Competition Act indirectly addresses consumer welfare by ensuring that efficiency is encouraged and more options are accessible to consumers, the Consumer Act directly resolves customer claims against dealers. We observe that this distinction is frequently rather hazy in practice. The DLF case is a noteworthy illustration of direct regulation that benefits the consumer. It concerned a complaint from a group of apartment owners criticizing specific clauses in DLF’s standard form Apartment Buyer’s Agreement and accusing DLF of abusing its power. These conditions included DLF’s power to alter the complex’s super space without first contacting the apartment owners, as well as other provisions pertaining to extra payments and its discretion to alter the arrangement and kind of use of the building without the approval of the unit allottees. The complaint also accused DLF of treating apartment allottees unfairly and imposing unfair terms. Talking about the final ruling, the CCI fined DLF 6.3 billion rupees and ordered the company to stop “formulating” and “imposing” “unfair” clauses in its contracts with Gurgaon buyers. DLF was also instructed by the CCI to alter its contracts with purchasers. According to the order, DLF’s mistreatment was “unfair” and “even exploitative.”

An intriguing illustration of the blurring of the boundaries between consumer processes and competition may be seen in the DLF case. According to the CCI, DLF’s real estate tactics impair the competitiveness in Gurgaon’s real estate market, which is a small satellite town in Delhi’s National Capital Region. According to the CCI, these kinds of actions made switching between services or offerings more difficult. It was therefore implied that the competition for other real estate players was distorted for those customers who had exercised their option to buy an apartment from DLF due to the additional expense of moving to another real estate developer and the lack of sufficient information provided to the customer to understand the value and cost of his investment[58].

The buyer, who had the option to choose other real estate service providers, is locked in with DLF after paying a significant sum and is not given a free exit option, all without even being aware of the comprehensive terms and conditions imposed by the Agreement, according to the CCI. In addition to destroying choice, a high switching cost also limits market mobility. Due to the information asymmetry brought about by this lock-in and the lack of awareness of the terms and conditions of the Agreement, market competition and consumer welfare are both being negatively impacted.

It is arguable that the CCI did find a theory of injury in the competition domain, but it is questionable if these actions gave consumers more options, better quality, and price competition in the real estate market. The CCI provides answers to these queries in the section where it analyzes how DLF’s actions affect other real estate industry participants. In particular, it found that other participants are likely to copy the terms and conditions DLF uses, which would be detrimental to the welfare of consumers.

The Competition Appellate Tribunal stated that “the order of CCI as well as this judgment is expected to go a long way to ameliorate all the conditions of the customers” in its affirmation of the CCI’s decision on appeal. DLF is still the only real estate case that has successfully navigated two tiers of antitrust review to date. The CCI ruling on real estate practices sparked a rush of cases, which suggests that consumers dealing with smaller real estate developers will not benefit from the consumer remedies awarded in DLF. The Government of India received recommendations from the CCI on the frequency of supplementary payments in the DLF case. The complaint also accused DLF of treating apartment allottees unfairly and imposing unfair terms. In a final ruling, the CCI fined DLF 6.3 billion rupees and ordered the company to stop “formulating” and “imposing” “unfair” clauses in its contracts with Gurgaon buyers. DLF was also instructed by the CCI to alter its contracts with purchasers. According to the order, DLF’s mistreatment was “unfair” and “even exploitative.[59]”

An intriguing illustration of the blurring of the boundaries between consumer processes and competition may be seen in the DLF case. According to the CCI, DLF’s real estate tactics impair the competitiveness in Gurgaon’s real estate market, which is a small satellite town in Delhi’s National Capital Region. According to the CCI, these kinds of actions made switching between services or offerings more difficult. It was therefore implied that the competition for other real estate players was distorted for those customers who had exercised their option to buy an apartment from DLF due to the additional expense of moving to another real estate developer and the lack of sufficient information provided to the customer to understand the value and cost of his investment. The buyer, who had the option to choose other real estate service providers, is locked in with DLF after paying a significant sum and is not given a free exit option, all without even being aware of the comprehensive terms and conditions imposed by the Agreement, according to the CCI. In addition to destroying choice, a high switching cost also limits market mobility. Due to the information asymmetry brought about by this lock-in and the lack of awareness of the terms and conditions of the Agreement, market competition and consumer welfare are both being negatively impacted. It is arguable that the CCI did find a theory of injury in the competition domain, but it is questionable if these actions gave consumers more options, better quality, and price competition in the real estate market. The CCI provides answers to these queries in the section where it analyzes how DLF’s actions affect other real estate industry participants. In particular, it found that other participants are likely to copy the terms and conditions DLF uses, which would be detrimental to the welfare of consumers[60].

The Competition Appellate Tribunal stated that “the order of CCI, as well as this judgment, is expected to go a long way to ameliorate all the conditions of the customers” in its affirmation of the CCI’s decision on appeal. DLF is still the only real estate case that has successfully navigated two tiers of antitrust review to date. The CCI ruling on real estate practices sparked a rush of cases, which suggests that consumers dealing with smaller real estate developers will not benefit from the consumer remedies awarded in DLF[61]. In a first-of-its-kind direct consumer injury case, the CCI’s recommendations to the Government of India regarding the prevalence of “unfair trade practices” in the real estate sector may serve as evidence of the regulator’s commendable efforts to strike a balance. Since then, the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 has been notified by the Parliament in order to regulate and develop the real estate industry, safeguard consumers’ interests in the industry, and create a fast-moving dispute resolution process. It remains to be seen if the CCI would give up this jurisdiction and if this Act will lead to reduced competition oversight in the real estate sector.

Regulation of unfair trade practices

Another important change to the Competition Act is the removal of UTPs from its purview. UTPs were initially supposed to be retained in the MRTPA by the Sachar Committee because these “practices were likely to cause grave loss or damage to many consumers.” Nevertheless, the Competition Act contains no mention of UTPs in the MRTPA sense. Although the Competition Act uses the term “unfair,” Section 4 uses it in relation to restrictive trade practices by a dominant organization. A “dominant entity” is defined by the Competition Act as one that has a strong position in a relevant market that allows it to: (I) function independently of forces of competition; and (ii) have a positive impact on its customers, rivals, or the pertinent market. The Competition Act forbids the imposition of an unfair price or condition on the sale or purchase of goods or services under Section 4. The Consumer Act does not define “unfair,” either, preferring to regulate UTPs based on “effects” rather than “form.” As an example, the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Forum ruled in the Unitech cases that practices that pertain to using unfair means and methods against consumers, even if they are not specifically regulated by Section 2(r) of the Consumer Act, may be considered UTPs. As previously mentioned in the NSE case, the CCI’s enforcement policy does not advocate prioritizing “effects over form.” However, in a separate decision, the Competition Appellate Tribunal debated this interpretation of the term “unfair.” The Competition Appellate Tribunal examined whether Section 4(2)(a) of the Act was violated in Schott Glass by applying unfair and discriminatory terms of price and supply conditions. The Appellate Tribunal ruled that terms imposed by a dominating corporation could not be deemed unfair if they had no impact on consumers or the market. Therefore, the Competition Act’s understanding of “unfair” must obviously depart from the Consumer Act’s inclusive definition of UTPs that prioritizes “effects over form.” Numerous UTP cases have already been differentiated by the CCI’s decision-making process. The complainant in Sanjeev Pandey v. Mahendran & Mahendran & OR’s claimed that a particular car model was introduced in some states by the opposing parties, depriving distributors of the benefit of higher sales[62]. The Consumer Act provides a more suitable path for attacking UTPs, the CCI noted in closing the investigation. In a similar vein, Subhash Yadav v. Force Motor Ltd. and ORs dealt with a customer’s complaint resulting from buying a car from the other party. The informant claimed that when the air conditioning was turned on, the engine began to overheat. The source claimed that the opposing side had utilized the Daimler engine in the aforementioned car, which is typically found in Mercedes SUVs that cost 300,000 rupees, but in a Force One car that costs over a million rupees. Additionally, it was claimed that by entering the Indian market and pricing the car far lower than rival manufacturers, the opposing party established a dominant position. The Competition Commission of India (CCI), which declined to take up the case and came to the conclusion that the primary distinction between the Competition and Consumer Acts is that the former gives consumers a direct channel for redress when they have complaints, while the latter guarantees market competition, which in turn indirectly benefits consumers. Before the CCI, these cases actually raised important consumer concerns.

The Need for Correct Separation of UTPs and RTPs[63].

In order to attain the best possible separation between consumer protection and competition regulations, this section tries to explain why it is crucial to accurately distinguish between betelnuts and RTPs in practical application. For the sake of argument, let us suppose that a dominant entity engages in UTP. To what extent should antitrust laws apply in these kinds of cases? For instance, American courts have favored consumer protection and competition legislation that are based on effects. For the time being, let’s assume them. Before a U.S. Court of Appeals, the FTC challenged Official Airline Guides (OAG), a monopolist/publisher of airline schedules, for refusing to include schedules of commuter airlines in its compendium[64]. This unreasonable, discriminatory unwillingness to cooperate hurt commuter airlines in their battle with certificated airlines. Nonetheless, the monopolist refrained from using coercion, avoided entering the commuter airline industry where the antitrust jury was held, and had no intention of acquiring dominance in that market. The court decided not to enforce the Commission’s order, despite acknowledging that FTC determinations regarding acts that qualify as a “unfair method of competition” merit substantial weight. The court clearly gave an explanation for its ruling, stating that it was concerned that if the Commission were given too much discretion to replace a respondent’s autonomous business decisions made without any intention or chance of causing anti-competitive behavior, it would give it too much power to do so. In summary, the challenged behavior did not contravene the antitrust laws’ guiding principles, while being damaging and discriminatory. Comparably, in Boise Cascade, the 9th Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals was debating a delivered pricing scheme for the entire sector. The lawsuit concerned the violation of the She ran and FTCA Ct. by adding a false freight factor to the price that customers were paid. The court rejected this argument, ruling that delivery pricing was a kind of price parallelism that was implemented in response to consumer preferences. The court determined that there was insufficient evidence of an anticompetitive effect in this particular case, so the question of whether intentionally similar conduct alone might ever violate Section 5 of the FTC Act was non-sequitur. Due to this past, the Court determined that in order to establish a Section 5 violation for the use of delivered pricing, “the Commission must find either collusion or actual effect on competition.” More recently, in 2015, the FTC released a statement about the Agency’s five authorities to deal with deceptive business practices. The fact that the FTC issued this statement more than a century after gaining the authority to enforce Section 5 shows how complex the relationship is between UTPs and anti-competitive behavior, especially in a country with as much experience as this one. The Financial Times clarified in its statement that the FTC will consider the public policy that underpins antitrust laws, namely the promotion of consumer welfare when determining whether to challenge a practice as an unfair method of competition in violation of Section 5 on an individual basis[65]. The practice will be assessed using a framework akin to the rule of reason, meaning that an act or practice challenged by the Commission must cause, or be likely to cause, harm to the competition or the competitive environment. Considering any pertinent commercial rationales and efficiency, stealing is less likely to be contested as an unfair means of competition on its own if the practice’s competitive harm can be adequately addressed by the execution of the Sherman or Clayton Acts[66]. Commissioner Holshausen notes in her dissenting opinion that this policy statement gives the FTC too much discretion in allowing it to potentially apply Section 5 in situations where there is no allowing trade practices and anticompetitive practices remain a complicated one in the legal system, even though it goes some way toward explaining that the exercise of the powers to control unfair methods of competition is driven by an inquiry into whether the Reichard to competition.

The topic is really complicated in the EU, especially in light of Article 102 TFEU’s provisions regarding unfair trading conditions, which are wide enough to encompass a variety of unfair practices, some of which may also be considered “unfair commercial practices” under the current consumer protection laws. Therefore, there is a risk that unfair activities (such those that could hurt a competitor’s interests) could also be prohibited in the EU under Article 102 TFEU if they have a negative impact on competition. In addition, it is questionable whether negative consequences of competition are necessary for the Article 102 TFEU prohibition to apply in the context of EU competition law and, if so, what kind of impacts would be sufficient in this investigation. It is evident that mere likelihood of consequences, at most, suffices in lieu of real effects on competitiveness. Even in this pursuit of effects, it is questionable whether effects on consumer welfare or, for that matter, impacts on the rival of a dominant undertaking would be sufficient to meet the requirements. This is especially a problem with “exploitative practices,” which primarily manifest as the dominating enterprise’s clients, including end consumers, suffering negative consequences. These practices do not necessitate an instantaneous distortion of competition. While it is undeniable that Article 102 TFEU forbids exploitative behavior, Kaman has argued elsewhere that in order for Article 102 TFEU to be implemented as the competition regulation that it is meant to be, it must be combined with exclusionary behavior that undermines competition in order for it to be deemed abusive[67]. Thus far in EU decision-making practice, this has not been the case. Although the Commission has mostly concentrated on exclusionary abuses when enforcing Article 102 TFEU, in the few instances where exploitation was a concern, it was not always – clearly – combined with exclusion, which begs the question of whether the action was justified. For instance, some price-based and other activities of a dominating endeavor were deemed “unfair” and hence potentially “exploitative” of the client in British Leyland, the 1998 Football World Cup, and Beke; yet, it was not always clear how these were detrimental to competition. It’s also unclear why “unfair trading conditions” in contracts were considered abusive in situations like SABAM, GEMA, DSD, and Tetra Pak II; it’s a matter of competition law. In other instances, the outcomes of the dominating activity’s inefficiency have been deemed abusive since they would have abused the trade partners of the said undertaking without necessarily having a distorting effect on competition. Certain of these behaviors seem more like contractual or consumer protection issues than competition law issues in the absence of this independent demonstration of harm to competition in the form of, for example, exclusion. Therefore, rather than under competition law, such acts should be addressed under contract law or consumer protection law[68]. In making decisions, the CCI in India has likewise had to deal with this problem.

The CCI acknowledged in Shivangi Agarwal & OR’s vs. Spartech Ltd. Noida,60 that many businesses, whether dominant or not, use UTPs. The Competition Act does not apply to every unfair commercial practice or abuse committed by a business. The Consumer Protection Act covers a number of issues of the injustice on the side of the goods/service supplier. Unfair commercial practices and charging more than what was agreed upon by the parties are the two areas that are covered by the Consumer Protection Act.

In the legal matter of Mr. Rajinder Singh Kohli vs. Genius ProBuild Private Limited, the CCI deliberated on the question of whether the postponement of apartment delivery qualified as an abuse of dominant position. The other side contested the CCI’s authority to look into UTPs. Nevertheless, the CCI considered the case on its merits and noted that, as abuse of dominant position was at stake, the CCI will investigate the case to see if the Act’s provisions against abuse of dominance were violated. It stated that the existence of unilateral behavior of the type specified in Section 4 of the Act is the foundation for the CCI[69].

Due to the pervasive growth of digital media and e-commerce in the Indian market, businesses do not always need to use a form-based approach when adapting to business and competition. Because of this, in cases when practices do not fit neatly into Section 4’s definitions of unilateral behavior, the CCI must take an effects-based enforcement strategy into account. Naturally, as UTPs are expressly excluded from the Competition Act’s jurisdiction, unlike, say, Article 102 TFEU, which specifically addresses unfair prices and unfair business conditions, this may also necessitate changes to the current statute.

An effects-based approach is desirable, as evidenced by other regulators’ experiences dealing with UTPs that limit or distort competition. For instance, a “fair trade hindering” criterion for UTPs is specified in the Guidelines for Review of Unfair Trade Practices published by the Korean Fair Trade Commission. According to these rules, a substantial or potential decrease in the number of competing firms (including prospective competitive enterprises) or level of market competition brought on by the relevant act is considered fair trade hindering. In a similar vein, they define “unfairness” as an impartial assessment of unfair commercial practices or methods of competition. Aside from the cost and quality of issues, the unfairness of competitive means refers to impeding or potentially impeding fair competition through the use of unethical competitive means. Therefore, rather than under competition law, such acts should be addressed under contract law or consumer protection law[70].

In making decisions, the CCI in India has likewise had to deal with this problem.

Agarwal Shivangi & OR’s vs. Spartech Ltd. The CCI acknowledged in Noida that many businesses, whether dominant or not, use UTPs. The Competition Act does not apply to every unfair commercial practice or abuse committed by a business. The Consumer Protection Act covers a number of issues of the injustice on the side of the goods/service supplier. Unfair commercial practices and charging more than what was agreed upon by the parties are the two areas that are covered by the Consumer Protection Act.

In the legal matter of Mr. Rajinder Singh Kohli vs. Genius ProBuild Private Limited, the CCI deliberated on the question of whether the postponement of apartment delivery qualified as an abuse of dominant position. The other side contested the CCI’s authority to look into UTPs. Nevertheless, the CCI considered the case on its merits and noted that, as abuse of dominant position was at stake, the CCI will investigate the case to see if the Act’s provisions against abuse of dominance were violated. It stated that the existence of unilateral behavior of the type specified in Section 4 of the Act is the foundation for the CCI’s enforcement practices.

Due to the pervasive growth of digital media and e-commerce in the Indian market, businesses do not always need to use a form-based approach when adapting to business and competition. Because of this, in cases when practices do not fit neatly into Section 4’s definitions of unilateral behavior, the CCI must take an effects-based enforcement strategy into account. Naturally, as UTPs are expressly excluded from the Competition Act’s jurisdiction, unlike, say, Article 102 TFEU, which specifically addresses unfair prices and unfair business conditions, this may also necessitate changes to the current statute[71].

An effects-based approach is desirable, as evidenced by other regulators’ experiences dealing with UTPs that limit or distort competition. For instance, a “fair trade hindering” criterion for UTPs is specified in the Guidelines for Review of Unfair Trade Practices published by the Korean Fair-Trade Commission. According to these rules, a substantial or potential decrease in the number of competing firms (including prospective competitive enterprises) or level of market competition brought on by the relevant act is considered fair trade hindering. In a similar vein, they define “unfairness” as an impartial assessment of unfair commercial practices or methods of competition. Aside from the price and quality of products and services, the unfairness of competitive means refers to impeding or potentially impeding fair competition through the use of improper competitive means. Unfair commerce is defined as a breach or potential breach of the principles of fair trade that results in a disadvantage or impedes the ability to make free and fair decisions based on such business relationships.

The wisdom of consumer forums looking into specific instances of anti-competitive behavior against consumers at the policy level is a related matter. While some contend that they do consider certain consumer-relevant RTP and UTP issues, regulations need to change to reflect changing business practices and the times. We need to think about whether or not consumer fora equipped with CCI-like authority have been more successful in addressing real estate practices and establishing a code of conduct similar to what the CCI suggested in the DLF. This might have avoided divisive questions of competition and market power that arose in real estate instances like DLF’s foreclosure. On the other hand, the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) experiences with Section 5 of the U.S. Federal Trade Commission Act, which forbids “unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce,” provide valuable insight into the need for convergence in consumers’ rights and competition laws. A 1938 modification to the FTC Act clarified that a consumer hurt by an unfair trade practice has equal legal concern as a manufacturer or merchant hurt by a dishonest competitor’s unfair tactics. In the following lines, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld this expansive obligation in FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co.:

Congress outlines the FTC’s authority to safeguard both consumers and rival businesses. It also gives the agency the power to decide whether actions that are challenged may be considered unfair competition practices or unfair or deceptive acts or practices even if they do not violate the letter or spirit of antitrust laws. This extensive congressional obligation is reaffirmed by the year 1938, Wheeler-Lea Act[72].

Conclusion

With 3.7 million consumer cases pending in consumer forums as of 2014, despite the fact that the CCI and consumer fora have very different mandates and jurisdictions under Indian law, it would be wise to introduce some level of consumer-friendly market regulation into the current system by allowing Suo-moto regulation by the consumer fora or by creating a best-practices code. The Consumer Protection (Amendment) Bill, 2015, which suggests creating a Central Consumer Protection Authority (CCPA) to advance, defend, and uphold consumer rights, already conceptualizes some of these reforms. Among other things, the CCPA will perform the following duties: (I) investigating and filing complaints at the proper forum in regards to alleged violations of consumer rights; (ii) issuing directives for the recall of products or services, or for the withdrawal of such services and payment of the price paid; (iii) issuing safety alerts and the orderly removal of advertisements; and (iv) declaring as void any contracts that are unfair to a consumer. Even while protecting and advancing consumer interests may be one of their shared objectives, policymakers should begin by acknowledging that consumer protection and competition legislation serve distinct purposes and have distinct processes. In distinct ways, the two legal fields safeguard the interests of consumers. The supreme goals of consumer protection law are far more expansive than those of competition law. Competition legislation ought to be upheld in order to forbid actions that stifle competition and harm consumers or the general welfare, or any other final objective as decided by policy. Competition authorities may be required to act as regulators for which they are unlikely to be the right bodies in order to scrutinize practices that are merely exclusionary through distorting effects on competition, such as unfair practices and the like, or that exploit the customers of a dominant undertaking[73].

The Indian lawmaker has already shown that it prefers the boundaries between competition law and consumer protection law when it comes to UTPs by eliminating them from the Competition Act’s purview. This shows a more contemporary approach to competition law than that of the US and the EU, neither of which has succeeded in achieving this level of legislative independence. It is a positive step to ensure that consumer interests are protected in terms of consumer protection from unfair and restrictive practices by the CCPA and consumer welfare by ensuring effective competition through the CCI. The proposal to establish an apex body (the CCPA) with powers similar to the CCI to look specifically at consumer issues. Although the EU is still lagging behind in finding a workable separation regarding the competition law treatment of practices that may harm consumer interests without necessarily also distorting competition, the US has made UTPs subject to a demonstration of harm to competition before they will be acted against through case law and FTC policy. In actuality, the EU has also failed to resolve the problem of how to handle business tactics that could hurt rivals but don’t necessarily hurt customers. All things considered, the jurisdictions under review have a lot to teach one other about how competition law and consumer protection law interact.

CHAPTER 4: Judicial Pronouncement

The study deals with the Convergence between Competition law and the Consumer Protection Act along with some judicial pronouncement.

Case-based research. a critical evaluation. historic rulings. The Landmark Judgements: (High Court, CCI, and Supreme Court).

Based on the market conditions there are some cases :

The CCI only focuses on regulation and maintenance of competition in the market as per provisions CA 2002, more particularly with a focus on anti-competitive agreements and abuse of dominance.

The above-dissected position of two pieces of legislation always gives birth to confusion in giving relief and redressal to the complainants in India. In the US and UK, the Federal Trade Commission and Office of Fair Trading are given power to enforce both Consumer Law and Competition Law. This helps to minimize administrative functions and creates a 360-degree solution system for achieving the protection of consumer interest/welfare.

Consumer welfare can not be achieved fully by way of isolating one law from another. The best results can be achieved by way of the amalgamation of two adjudicating bodies where the common object of the two laws is identical.

Since the introduction of the Competition Act (CA) 2002, the role of unfair competition in the market that adversely affects consumer protection has subsequently been realized by the legislators, and as such, the main causes of injury ( Indirect ) suffered by the consumers ultimately are the same that is challenged in the Consumer Court where the anti-competitive effect is not scrutinized[74].

• In recent times, several complaints have been filed before the CCI for alleged injury, but prima facie in some of the cases suggest a remedy in consumer court only. Pravahan Mohanty v. HDFC Bank Ltd.
• In the cases of allegations of abuse of dominance, many cases were dismissed on the grounds that there was an absence of a dominant position held by the opposite party. DLF Case[75].
• Though there are several injuries (Direct or Indirect) suffered by the consumer caused by any reason on the part of the vendor/manufacturer/supplier that is not addressed simultaneously, it increases the cost and time of litigation because of the non-unification of the regulators.

For instance, according to The Supreme Court of India’s Second Landmark Judgment on Cartels in India rejects the legalistic findings of the CCI and COMPAT on bid rigging in the tender that IOCL floated for LPG cylinders. In a landmark judgment issued on October 1, 2018, the Supreme Court of India (“Court”) granted the appeals of forty-four LPG cylinder manufacturers and overturned the finding of bid-rigging in the 14.2 kg domestic LPG cylinder supply to Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. (IOCL). This action nullified the ruling of the former Competition Appellate Tribunal (COMPAT), which had previously upheld the Competition Commission of India’s (CCI) findings and fined each party 10% of their average relevant turnover.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court has underlined the necessity of analyzing the market structure and market conditions before reaching a conclusion about cartels, basing upon rulings and guidelines on cartels/bid rigging from numerous foreign countries. This ruling is a paradigm shift that will probably affect how the antitrust agency reviews evidence of cartels going forward.

The Apex Court ruled that, given the market conditions under which the appellants’ bids were submitted, there was insufficient evidence to prove that the LPG cylinder suppliers (“Appellants”) had an “agreement” to engage in bid-rigging or collusive bidding in the IOCL tender. As a result, the orders issued by COMPAT on December 20, 2013, which had upheld the CCI’s findings in the Suo Moto Case No. 03/2011, were set aside.

The Appellants manufacture gas cylinders with a specified capacity of 14.2 kg, which they exclusively purchase from the three Indian oil marketing companies (OMCs): IOCL, Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd (BPCL), and Hindustan Petroleum Corporation of India (HPCL). These three OMCs are the only buyers for LPG cylinder manufacturers.

The following observations were the main basis for the CCI’s findings, which COMPAT also affirmed, which indicated that the appellants had engaged in collusive bidding:

• Despite variations in production prices, locations, input costs, etc., all 50 empaneled LPG providers submitted nearly similar quotes for the tender, and every bidder was able to secure the order.
• The Indian LPG Cylinders Manufacturers group, an active trade group of the appellants, had bidder meetings in Mumbai just one or two days prior to the tender submission date of March 3, 2010, which was attended by 19 members. During these meetings, the bids were manipulated.
• The way the manufacturers of LPG cylinders have gathered on the Indian LPG Cylinders Manufacturers Association platform and set the bid prices guarantees that no new player could enter the relevant market and quote the prices on their own, which would make it difficult for a new player to enter.

Supreme Court decision

The first argument made by Ms. Divan was split into factual and legal parts by the Honorable Court. The legal argument that there couldn’t be any competition in the market for section 3(3) of the Act to apply was refuted by pointing out that the Act’s “purpose is to illuminate practices hurting the competition and promote sustain competition in the market.” As a result, strong enforcement is crucial to both penalize anti-competitive behavior and discourage similar behavior in the future. The Court noted that in this particular case, there are three buyers and sixty suppliers of the product. Each supplier would like to be an L1 or L2 supplier in order to secure orders for larger quantities than the other, and as a result, there would be competition among them. In any event, CCI needs to make sure that the factors that tend to stifle competition are reduced[76].

Regarding the second contention and the factual aspect of the first contention, which states that there was no bid-rigging or collusive agreement, the Apex Court agreed with the CCI’s basic contention that even in the absence of proof of a concluded formal agreement, when there are indicators that there was practical cooperation between the parties that knowingly substituted the risk of competition, that would amount to anti-competitive practices. The Apex Court referenced its earlier judgments in the Excel Crop Care8 case, CCI Vs. Coordination Committee of Artists & Technicians of West Bengal Film & Television9 and various International Guidelines10, agreeing with the CCI’s basic contention that there may not be direct evidence in cartel cases and that the standard of proof for cartels remains that of “preponderance of probability.”

In Re: Ministry of Corporate Affairs and Apollo Tires and OR’s, the Competition Commission of India (CCI) imposed a collective penalty of ₹17.88 billion on five tire companies and their association, the Automotive Tire Manufacturers Association (ATMA), through an order dated August 31, 2018 (CCI Order). The tire businesses and ATMA were penalized by the CCI for engaging in cartelization and violating Section 3 of the Competition Act, 2002 (the Act).

MRF Ltd. filed a writ suit in the Madras High Court, protesting the CCI Order, but it was ultimately dismissed. The case was heard by the High Court’s division bench, which ordered on March 8, 2018, that the CCI Order be maintained under seal until the writ appeal was resolved.

In the end, the division bench of the High Court denied the aforementioned appeal with a ruling dated January 6, 2022. Tire businesses appealed the division bench of the High Court’s ruling to the Supreme Court, citing their dissatisfaction with the ruling. The parties are free to seek legal remedies from the Apex Court, which declined to intervene with the CCI Order[77].

• In a different recent ruling (Competition Commission of India v. State of Mizoram), the Hon’ble Supreme Court ruled that although lotteries may be considered commodities and res extra commercium (things beyond commerce), this does not absolve the CCI of its authority to investigate claims of anti-competitive behavior in lotto-related businesses or services.

The broad definition of “service” found in Section 2(u) of the Competition Act was noted by the Apex Court.

“Service of any description” that was to be made available to potential users was what the word “service” meant and entailed. In the context of the Competition Act, the Apex Court held that the buyer of a lottery ticket to a prospective user constituted a service made accessible by the selling agents.

The Lotteries (Regulation) Act, 1998 may still apply to the lottery industry. But, the lottery industry’s extra-commercial nature would not be a defense if there was a component of the tendering process that was anti-competitive and called for a CCI investigation.[78]. This became even more evident when the State of Mizoram’s administration chose to deal in lotteries.

Comparison

• The Competition Act addresses the market as a whole, whereas the Consumer Act focuses on the consumer.
• The Competition Act encourages a pro-competitive market environment by penalizing anti-competitive behavior, while the Consumer Protection Act establishes a redressal mechanism for consumer complaints through a framework of Consumer Forums at the District, State, and National levels.
• Generally speaking, the goal of competition policy is to safeguard consumer choice and, when appropriate and effective, to expand it. In addition, consumer policy aims to guarantee that consumers can exercise their choice efficiently and with confidence in the fairness and integrity of the market process, as well as to preserve and, when necessary, improve the quality of that choice.
• The Consumer Protection Act was created to shield customers from unfair business tactics, subpar products, and inadequate services. On the other hand, any conduct that could impede competition and lower consumer welfare in the market is investigated under the Competition Act.
• The Consumer Protection Act handles complaints about unfair trade practices, flaws, shortcomings, etc. The Competition Act, on the other hand, addresses complaints about abuses of dominance and anti-competitive agreements, among other things.
• Generally speaking, the Consumer Act exclusively protects final consumers who buy products for their own use. Simultaneously, the Competition Act offers a more comprehensive definition of consumers.
• The Consumer Act establishes Persona Rights. However, Rights-in-Rem are provided for by the Competition Act[79].
• The Consumer Protection Act aims to enhance market conditions for efficient consumer choice exercises by focusing primarily on the nature of consumer interactions. In addition to addressing structural or behavioral issues, competition law focuses on fostering and maintaining the process of competition amongst businesses.
• Consumer agencies now have access to more specialized and targeted remedies: For instance, actions intended to enhance consumer information flows. On the other hand, severe fines and/or the outlawing of anticompetitive behavior are the remedies available under competition law.

Experience of the International Jurisdiction of the International Competition Organization. (USA, Canada, India, Australia.)- Describe.

The region’s competition rules are evolving quickly. Crackdowns on abusive behavior are becoming more common, and to help with their investigations, enforcement agencies are interacting more internationally. Investors need to maintain their knowledge of local laws and increase compliance now more than ever.

AUSTRALIA

• Recent advances in Australian competition law have been significant. There will soon be significant changes to Australia’s antitrust laws, and the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) is already taking more enforcement action and closely examining acquisitions.
• In conclusion, major pending law reform that would essentially broaden Australia’s anti-competitive conduct laws,
• the first prosecutions of criminal cartels, the push for higher fines for antitrust violations,
• the ongoing scrutiny of mergers, and
• the increased use of market studies are some of the current trends in competition law in Australia.
• Law reform is still pending.
• The Harper Review, which was commissioned by the federal government in 2014, examined Australia’s competition laws. Most of the review’s recommendations were put into practice by the government, which also produced draft legislation in September 2016 and brought it before parliament in March 2017. It is anticipated that this law will soon be passed.

Key Reforms:

Abuse of market power:

As of right now, it is illegal for businesses with a “substantial degree of market power” to use their influence to harm rivals, obstruct new entrants, or discourage competition. A company with a significant amount of market power will be prohibited from engaging in “any conduct that has the purpose, or has or is likely to have the effect, of substantially lessening competition” under the proposed amendments, which would also remove the “taking advantage” limb and replace it with a “effects” test.

Concerted practices:

There will be a new ban on “concerted practices” that aim to significantly reduce competition or have that effect. Compared to the present restriction, which only covers “contracts, arrangements, or understandings” that have the intent or effect of materially decreasing competition, this is meant to include a broader spectrum of behavior. This is perhaps most applicable when it comes to information sharing between competitors, real or imagined[80].

Cartel conduct:

It shall be made clearer what jurisdiction the cartel conduct regulations cover. The regulations governing cartel conduct will be applicable to activities carried out both within Australia and between Australia and foreign locations. The laws against cartels now exempt some types of joint venture agreements. A narrowing of the joint venture exception is also suggested.

Criminal cartel prosecutions:

Under Australian competition law, cartel activities may be illegal. Australian competition laws included the criminal penalties on cartel behavior in 2009.

One of the ACCC’s competitive priorities for 2017 is the prosecution of criminal cartels. In 2016, Nippon Yusen Kabushiki Kaisha (NYK) was the target of the first criminal cartel case brought by the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (CDPP). In that instance, between 2009 and 2012, NYK entered a guilty plea to a single allegation of participating in cartel behavior related to the shipping of automobiles to Australia.

The verdict from the sentencing hearing, which was held on April 11, 2017, is still pending. Additionally, the CDPP filed criminal cartel charges against Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha in 2016.

More criminal prosecutions are anticipated in the coming years, according to the ACCC, which has stated that other investigations into other alleged criminal cartel activity are well advanced.

More severe penalties

In Australia, the ACCC does not have the authority to enforce penalties; only courts do. There is presently a tendency toward stiffer penalties for breaking competition laws. Rod Sims, the chairman of the ACCC, has been a vocal supporter of harsher punishments, and the ACCC has been contesting penalty rulings at first instance more frequently. Legal analysis indicates that the courts are in favor of harsher punishments[81].

Penalties cannot be imposed by the ACCC;

only courts in Australia have this authority. There is presently a tendency toward stiffer penalties for breaking competition laws. The ACCC has been appealing penalty decisions at first instance more frequently, and its chairman, Rod Sims, has been a vocal supporter of harsher punishments[82].

Australia and New Zealand Banking Group (ANZ) and Macquarie Bank reached a settlement with the ACCC in December 2016 regarding attempts to manipulate the Malaysian ringgit benchmark set in Singapore through cartel behavior. A court-imposed penalty of A$9 million (US$6.8 million) was accepted by ANZ as part of the settlement, while Macquarie agreed to pay A$6 million. Although the fines were within the allowable limits, the judge stated that he would have imposed greater, “possibly significantly higher,” penalties had the case gone to trial.

The ACCC filed an appeal in May 2017 against a Federal Court ruling that Yazaki Corporation should pay A$9.5 million in penalties for engaging in collusive behavior regarding the supply of wire harnesses used in the production of automobiles. In order to take into the official account “both the size of Yazaki’s operations and the very serious nature of its collusive conduct,” the ACCC had requested fines ranging from A$42 million to A$55 million. “If penalties don’t match the serious nature of the conduct, we run the risk that big businesses will simply view the penalties for breaking Australia’s competition laws as no more than a cost of doing business,” the chairman of the ACCC stated in announcing the ACCC’s decision to appeal the court’s decision.

Merger scrutiny:

The ACCC is still keeping a careful eye on mergers. Trends in merger evaluations as of late include:

integration vertically. Concerns about vertical integration have come up frequently in the ACCC’s latest merger assessments. A recent rise in the quantity of infrastructure transactions that the ACCC has examined has contributed to this.

startup purchases. The ACCC has stated in public that it is curious about the effects on competition and the purchase of start-ups by established firms. Notifying the ACCC of a merger is not subject to any financial limitations or minimum turnover requirements. In contrast to other jurisdictions, the ACCC is already able to examine startup acquisitions.

The ACCC is beginning to look into the role of data when it reviews mergers. For instance, the ACCC evaluated the effect of Tabcorp Holdings’ control over customer and gaming data when evaluating the company’s acquisition of Intec. Based on both regulatory and competitive constraints, the ACCC determined that it was unlikely that control over this data would result in a material reduction of competition.

global collaboration. The ACCC evaluates international transactions in close collaboration with foreign merger control bodies. The ACCC’s examination of Dow Chemical Company and DuPont’s planned merger serves as the most recent example of this. During that examination, the ACCC determined that local divestment commitments were not necessary and that the worldwide divestments that the parties had agreed upon with the European Commission addressed its concerns about competition.

Market research:

Although the ACCC lacks the statutory authority to conduct market studies that the UK does, it does have some capacity to examine markets and ask market participants for information. The retail supply and pricing of power, gas, new car retailing, the communications industry, the retail supply and pricing of beef and dairy products, and the retail supply and pricing of electricity have all been the subject of recent market studies and assessments by the ACCC[83].

The CANADA Perspective of competition Law

The Competition Bureau’s experiences implementing and policing the Act in Canada. Canada’s framework for competition policy is under serious problems. Above all, the Bureau is a law enforcement organization. The areas for improvement mentioned in these submissions are the reflection of the actual difficulties the Bureau runs across when implementing the Act on a daily basis.

To decide what Canadian competition law should look like in the twenty-first century, Canada has to conduct a thorough study of the Act. The Bureau is in favor of a comprehensive, easily accessible review that engages a broad range of stakeholders.

It’s crucial to do this consultation step. All Canadians will benefit from improved market protection and promotion as well as long-term economic development if our laws are updated to reflect modern realities. International peers are putting forth a lot of effort to improve the instruments at their disposal to encourage and safeguard competition within their borders.

Canada can’t afford to take it easy. Competition boosts the economy and keeps goods and services within Canadians’ means. Markets that are competitive serve as the cornerstone of Canada’s ongoing success. The primary objective of Canada’s framework for competition policy should continue to be maintaining competition in the Canadian economy. However, this framework has to be updated. Long-term inaction will be detrimental to the economy. Now, Canada needs more competitors[84].

The USA PERSPECTIVE’S:

Once upon a time, in the early 1800s, there were numerous sizable companies that were well-known as trusts. They dominated whole industries, including sugar, steel, oil, and railroads. U.S. Steel and Commonplace Oil were two of the most well-known trusts; they were monopolies that controlled both the value and the availability of their products. One corporation controlling the whole industry meant that there was no competition, and consumers and smaller enterprises had no choice except to buy from this one supplier. Prices skyrocketed, and quality shouldn’t be the top concern. This led to hardship and jeopardized the recently achieved wealth in America.The public became enraged and demanded that government take action while the wealthy, well-connected businessmen continued to amass wealth. Through the imposition of what became known as antitrust laws, President Roosevelt busted (or broke up) several trusts. These rules were designed to protect consumers by encouraging competition in the market[85].

The United States Congress enacted numerous laws to discourage unfair competition practices and help foster competition:

The oldest antitrust statute in the country is the Sherman Act. Enacted in 1890, it prohibits rival businesses from entering into agreements with one another that could restrict competition. Therefore, it would be value fixing if they agreed to set a value for a product, for example. The Act also declares it improper for a company to have a monopoly if it engages in dishonesty or unfair competition. Business leaders who use that technique in their operations could end up paying hefty fines or possibly going to the custody!

In 1914, the Clayton Act was enacted. Because of the Sherman Act and the dissolution of trusts, American business practices were dynamic. Nevertheless, some businesses found that merging was a better way to control costs and output; rather than building trusts, rivals merged to establish a single business. By preventing mergers and acquisitions that are likely to hinder competition, the Clayton Act protects American consumers.

Congress established a new administrative organization to monitor us for unfair business activities with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act (1914) [5]. This act granted the Federal Trade Commission the power to look into and halt unfair competitive strategies and deceptive practices[86].

These three fundamental federal just laws are being enforced by the Department of Justice’s just division and the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) Bureau of Competition. Before beginning any inquiry, the authorities consult with all available options to determine WHO is most qualified to look into the facts and handle any potential cases. However, every agency has gained expertise in specific areas. Just laws exist in every state and are upheld by the attorney general of each.[6] Your state capitol has a workplace that assists clients or companies that might suffer if they are not treated fairly in the marketplace.

Antitrust laws were not established to shield rival companies from fierce competition. Businesses might fail and competition can be fierce. In marketplaces with fierce competition, that is the strategy that works, and buyers gain from the fierce rivalry between vendors. One of the key cases in the development of US competition law is the Kodak case. One of the most well-known brands in the film and camera industries is Kodak. In the United States, Kodak once held 96% of the market. Kodak has faced several antitrust allegations and legal actions from both federal and private entities throughout the years. The US government brought out one of the most important cases in 1921. As a result of this lawsuit, Kodak was forced to sign a consent decree promising to solely sell its own brand of film instead of any private labels.

In 1954, Kodak also consented to a consent decree with the US government. Shortly after Kodak developed its color film, this lawsuit was brought. The business was the only one that could process this type of film and was both a maker and a supplier of color film. Kodak charged clients a price to send, process, and transport film in order to capitalize on this advantage in its business plan.

Third parties had to be granted licenses to use the coloring technique by the corporation. The orders were in force until 1994, when a court overturned them because of shifting global economic circumstances[87].

INDIA

In India, merger control went into effect on June 1, 2011. Prior to that, there was no legal requirement in India to alert antitrust authorities or to apply for and receive prior clearance before finalizing an M&A transaction. Industry opposition delayed the implementation of the Competition Act, 2002’s merger control provisions (sections 5 and 6). This delay occurred even after the act was passed. The Competition Commission of India (CCI) has issued orders in relation to over 400 notified transactions in a little less than six years since the act’s commencement, making the Indian competition authority one of the most active in merger control despite the act’s poorly conceived and even worse drafted provisions.

he Competition Commission of India (CCI) is one of the world’s most active merger control regulatory bodies, having issued rulings pertaining to over 400 notified transactions.

The legal framework governing merger control in India is made up of sections 5 and 6 of the Act as well as the Competition Commission of India (Procedure regarding the transaction of business relating to combinations) Regulations, 2011 (combination regulations), which were issued by the CCI and went into effect on June 1st, 2011.

For transactions (referred to as combinations under the act) that need to be reported to the CCI prior to implementation, Section 5 specifies the jurisdictional thresholds (depending on the assets/turnover of the combining parties). Stated differently, transactions that meet the jurisdictional requirements outlined in section 5 are required to be notified to and approved in advance by the CCI in accordance with section 6.

If a transaction satisfies the section 5 thresholds and qualifies as a combination, it cannot be completed until the CCI approves it or the 210-day review period has passed, whichever comes first.

Transactions that have the potential to have an appreciable adverse effect on competition (AAEC) in India are prohibited by Section 6 and are nullified[88].

It is significant to note that the CCI’s approval of a notified combination does not grant parties immunity or clearance from further investigations under section 4 (abuse of dominance) or section 3 (anti-competitive agreements) of the act with regard to subsequent violations or ancillary restrictions, which are various restrictions that come with the acquisition[89].

Under Indian merger control law, the transaction is not exempt from the filing requirement due to notifications issued by the Indian government or safe harbors offered by the CCI’s combination regulations. Rather, the notification obligation arises if the combined value of assets or turnover of the parties to the transaction meets the jurisdictional thresholds prescribed under the act.

The jurisdictional thresholds for merger control in India, the challenges in determining whether a given transaction qualifies for mandatory notification, the lack of guidance from the CCI on these thresholds, and the mystery created by the CCI regarding how these jurisdictional thresholds are to be applied, the entities in the corporate group of the parties whose assets and turnover must be considered, the rules for calculating assets and turnover, the levels of control that could trigger a filing, the legal ramifications of “gun-jumping,” the effects of placing the transaction on hold until the CCI approves it, the identification of relevant markets affected by the proposed transaction, and whether the safe harbors offer absolute exemptions.

The Indian legal and regulatory environment for merger control is distinct due to all of these factors, necessitating the advice of knowledgeable Indian merger control attorneys.

It is essential to comprehend these unique aspects of Indian merger control in order to minimize fines for unintentional non-compliance and to quickly obtain the CCI’s permission.

NOTIFIABLE TRANSACTION

The Indian merger control law covers the following kinds of transactions:

acquiring property, stock, voting rights, or managerial authority over a business;

Acquisition of control over a business, in which the acquirer already possesses direct or indirect control over a business that produces, distributes, trades, or offers commodities or services that are comparable, interchangeable, or equivalent; and

Combination or union.

The acquirer is required to inform the transaction in the case of acquisition transactions. It is necessary for all parties involved in a merger or amalgamation to file the notification together[90].

WHEN TO NOTIFY

Up until recently, the Indian merger control regime required notice of a combination to be submitted to the CCI within 30 days of the execution of a definitive agreement or other document expressing or demonstrating the decision to acquire, or within 30 days of the board of directors of the company approving the proposed merger and/or amalgamation.

However, the 30-day filing deadline has been removed by the Government of India through a recent announcement dated June 29, 2017. The government aims to simplify the Indian merger control regulations with this notification.

Where the total value of the parties’ assets or revenue meets the jurisdictional requirements in the context of international transactions including India.

The execution of the global transactional document would initiate the notification obligation in the context of international transactions involving India, where the total value of the assets or turnover of the parties to the transaction meets the jurisdictional thresholds specified under section 5 of the act. The global transaction agreement or, if appropriate, the public notification of the global transaction to the Indian stock exchanges would be considered the trigger document for transactions structured as acquisitions. In a similar vein, the board resolution authorizing the worldwide merger may be regarded as the trigger document in mergers or amalgamations.

FAILURE TO NOTIFY

A penalty of up to 1% of the total assets or turnover, whichever is higher, of the parties to the transaction may be imposed for failing to notify or complete a notifiable transaction before the sooner of receiving the CCI’s permission or the passage of 210 days. Furthermore, the CCI has the authority to deem the combination null and void.

Penalties have been periodically applied by the CCI for failure to comply with the notification obligation. Because the CCI considers mitigating circumstances based on the particular facts of each case and at its discretion, the CCI may overlook mitigating elements that it considers in one case and considers in another.

Thankfully, the 30-day period for notifying a combination has been eliminated. For the transacting parties, this is a huge relief because in the past, they have been fined for missing the time for notifying a notifiable transaction[91].

JURISDICTIONAL THRESHOLDS

In accordance with the Indian merger control framework, when thresholds based on the value of assets or turnover of the parties to a deal are met, a filing requirement is triggered (subject to the appropriate exemptions and safe harbors). Note that depending on the type and structure of the transaction, different entities may be relevant for the purposes of threshold calculations. The transaction would qualify as a combination and the CCI would have to be notified if either the party’s test or the group test is satisfied.

Nonetheless, if the transaction qualifies for the failing banks’ exemption or the de minimis exemption, which apply to transactions involving relatively small targets, or if the combination belongs to the group of combinations that are typically not likely to produce in that way. In despite of that, if the combination falls into the category of combinations that are typically not likely to cause AAEC in India (i.e., normally exempt transactions), or if the transaction can benefit from the de minimis exemption – which applies to transactions involving relatively small targets – or the failing banks’ exemption, then such a combination would not be subject to the act’s notification requirement.

EXEMPTIONS TO NOTIFY

The notification requirement for combinations under the act has been exempted by both the Indian government and the CCI. Although the de minimis exemption and the exemption for failing banks have been announced by the government, the CCI has established the usually exempt transaction categories, which are all covered below. The safe harbors established by the combination regulations represent the CCI’s belief that certain types of transactions are typically not likely to result in AAEC in India and, therefore, do not require notification. In contrast, the government-granted exemptions are more strongly based on the provisions of the act itself; however, if a transaction falling within the ordinarily exempt transactions nevertheless raises competitive concerns, the transaction would still need to be advised to the CCI[92].

As a result, unlike the de minimis exemption and the failing banks’ exemption, the safe harbors offered by the ordinarily exempt transaction categories are not absolute safe harbors, and it is the responsibility of the parties to a transaction category to carefully consider whether the transaction needs to be reported to the CCI in accordance with the act. Regretfully, the CCI does not offer any objective bright-line tests or standards in this area, and its decision-making process is therefore not very helpful.

The “anti-avoidance rule,” which states that the notification requirement must be assessed based on the substance of the transaction and not on its formal presentation to the CCI or as captured in an agreement, must ultimately be taken into consideration when determining whether or not a transaction should be notified under the act. Put differently, the CCI will not consider any transaction structure that effectively avoids the filing requirement for a transaction that would otherwise be subject to the act’s notification requirement. This once more places the onus on the parties involved in the transaction to decide whether or not the act requires notification of the transaction.

The CCI makes it clear that if even one of these interconnected transactions meets the requirements of section 5, all of the related transactions in a proposed combination must be filed as a composite whole. This is true even if some or all of the related transactions would not have met the jurisdictional thresholds of section 5 or would have been exempt from the notification requirement on their own[93].

NOTIFICATION PROCEDURE

Before notifying a transaction, parties may choose to speak with CCI officials informally to discuss the transaction’s modifiability, ascertain what information is needed, and which form to use for filing the notice. These discussions are, nevertheless, informal, verbal, and non-binding.

Until the CCI grants permission or 210 calendar days have passed after the notification date, whichever comes first, the merging parties must postpone the completion and consummation of the deal.

The two phases below could be included in the CCI’s examination, based on the type and complexity of the combinations that were notified:

First Review Phase. The combination regulations give the CCI a self-imposed deadline of 30 working days after receiving a notification, within which the CCI must give the parties its preliminary assessment of whether the combination is likely to result in an AAEC in India.

Phase Two Evaluation. A thorough inquiry is conducted until the CCI approves, alters, or rejects the combination, or the statutory limit of 210 days has passed, if at any point during the phase I review the CCI establishes a prima facie conclusion that the combination produces or is likely to cause an AAEC.

In general, the public has access to the data submitted to the CCI. Nonetheless, the notifying party may ask the CCI to preserve specific data and records.

Mainly, the public has access to the data submitted to the CCI. Nonetheless, if the request is submitted in writing and includes a thorough justification for the claimed secrecy, the notifying party may ask the CCI to maintain the confidentiality of certain information and documents. Confidentiality is often granted by the CCI for the duration of the review and for three years after the CCI’s ruling[94].

KEY CONCEPTS

One of the things that can cause a combination to be notified is the acquisition of “control.” “Controlling the affairs or management by (I) one or more enterprises, either jointly or singly, over another enterprise or group; (ii) one or more groups, either jointly or singly, over another group or enterprise” is the definition of “control” given in Explanation (a) to Section 5 of the Act. The ability to exercise decisive influence over the management or affairs and strategic commercial decisions of a target enterprise is what the CCI has defined as “control.” This ability can be exercised through contractual arrangements with shareholders or by way of a majority shareholding. “Joint control” is encompassed within the phrase “control.” The word “joint Control” is not defined in the statute. According to the combination legislation, an enterprise is considered to be under joint management if two or more people jointly manage its strategic commercial operations. In order to establish control or joint control, the CCI has not offered a clear guideline; instead, it has determined joint control on an individual basis.

The transition from joint control to single control is a part of the acquisition of control. It is important to note that joint control cannot be achieved by merely granting minority protection rights, such as special resolution rights under the Indian Companies Act. Joint control can only develop when a party’s rights are granted by agreement and go beyond minority protection rights and special resolution rights to grant that party approval or veto rights over those particular strategic commercial decisions or settlement.

It will be necessary to conduct a thorough investigation and carefully consider the veto and approval rights that each party is granted by the agreement in order to determine whether or not joint control is appropriate in the context of a transaction. Effective guidelines about the threshold at which some events of influence become joint control are provided by the CCI’s ruling in the Sony case [C-2012/06/63]. These regulations are comparable to those that apply to EC Merger Control[95].

The acquisition of minority shareholding or voting rights in the ordinary course of business (as long as it doesn’t result in the acquisition of control) or as an investment alone is recognized by Indian merger control law as an ordinarily exempt transaction. The CCI has amended the word “solely as an investment” to further clarify its meaning and implications. In a recent modification, the CCI attempted to add some objectivity and further clarified the meaning and import of the word “solely as an investment.” In particular, any acquisition of less than 10% of a target company’s equity share capital or voting rights would be considered to be “treated – solely as an investment,” provided that: (a) the acquirer does not obtain any special rights and can only exercise those that are available to the target enterprise’s ordinary shareholders to the extent of their respective shareholding, and (b) the acquirer has no intention of participating in the target enterprise’s management or affairs, is not a member of the target enterprise’s board of directors, and does not have the authority or desire to nominate a director to the target enterprise’s board of directors.

MERGER REVIEW

Any combination that results in or is likely to result in an AAEC in India is prohibited by Section 6(1) of the act. As such, the legal standard for merger review necessitates an evaluation of the competition within the framework of a relevant market, with the identification of said relevant market serving as the initial stage of the review procedure.

In the majority of situations when the announced combination does not provide a competitive risk, the CCI has taken a pragmatic approach to market definition and has kept the definition flexible (with regard to product and geographic scope). The CCI takes into account the product’s attributes, demand-side and supply-side substitutability, and nature in order to determine the relevant market.

.Section 20(4) of the act provides a methodology for assessing whether the announced combination is likely to cause AAEC in the relevant Indian market. The following elements have been the CCI’s primary focus:

When it comes to horizontal overlaps, the CCI often concentrates on the market shares (individual and combined) of the parties involved in the proposed transaction, the incremental market shares, the relevant market’s structure, the amount of competition that remains after the combination, combinations that result in the acquisition of a potential competitor, or the removal of a maverick player. In order to evaluate the competitive implications of a suggested combination, the CCI also takes opposing buyer power into account.

In terms of vertical relationships, the CCI examines how vertically integrated the parties to the proposed combination are. In other words, it determines whether the combining parties’ vertical relationships would lead to market foreclosure, wherein suppliers would be unable to enter or remain in the market or where customers would be unable to access relevant products and services from other suppliers[96].

Efficiency enhancement arguments are normally taken into the account by the CCI on a transaction-by-transaction basis, but only if they are believable and verifiable. The CCI frequently expects notifying parties to submit information on the full spectrum of portfolio investments made by such private equity companies in order to establish the potential horizontal investment, based on the author’s experience with the CCI about notifications of investments by private equity firms. The Competition Commission of India frequently mandates that involved parties provide details regarding all portfolio investments conducted by private equity firms. This is essential for assessing potential overlaps in the market and vertical associations.

Limitation

Over ten years have passed since the 1986 Consumer Protection Act went into effect. The Act was expanded in 1993 with an amendment. Nevertheless, the Act has several drawbacks. The majority of the demands made by consumer activists are met by the Act. There are:

i) As things stand right now, this Act only applies to services like banking, phone service, power, and others that require a specific payment. Therefore, the Act does not apply to physicians or hospitals, including those that provide free medical care, like government hospitals. Furthermore, the Act does not apply to required civic services that are provided by municipal or state agencies, such as water supply and sanitation.

The deplorable situation in the public hospitals cannot be tolerated by the government. The physicians at government hospitals haven’t been able to elevate their game to provide the general population with adequate care.

ii) Although the Consumer Protection (Amendment) Act, 1993 included two provisions pertaining to the supply of innocuous items, it does not hold suppliers of such goods strictly liable.

iii) Moreover, safety regulations and allowable hazard levels are not defined under the Consumer Protection Act of 1986. It would be necessary to investigate any safety regulations that are already mandated by law to determine whether or not they have been broken. In fact, some standards for product safety ought to be included in the Act itself[97].

iv) The Consumer Redressal Fora are not authorized by the Act to issue “cease and desist orders” or temporary injunctions. The Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969, grants the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Commission several authorities.

v) The Consumer Redressal Forums are not authorized by the Act to take up matters Suo moto. M.R.T.P. Commissions are authorized by the Monopolies and Restrictive Trade Practices Act, 1969, to investigate any unfair practices based on their own knowledge or facts.

vi) The Act does not give consumer forums the authority to list the names of producers, distributors, and dealers whose products are determined to pose a risk to public safety. If implemented, this empowerment will educate customers and serve as a deterrent to the unethical corporate community.

vii) The Act totally disregards customers’ rights to a safe environment. Only the six consumer rights recognized by the worldwide federation of consumer unions are acknowledged.

viii) The Act makes no mention of the topic of commodity storage. This issue grows in importance every day to the point that it surpasses even the production of the items.

Upon close examination, numerous shortcomings are shown, making it unable to provide the worried customer with the much-needed protection. Additionally, there are a few issues with the Act’s execution[98].

• In addition, the Competition Act fell short of its duties in the following ways:

The telecom sector is one of the Competition Commission’s most recent big cases that demonstrates how it has disregarded its duties. Under Section 19(1)(a) of the Competition Act, 2002, Reliance Jio Info COMM Limited (RJIL) filed a case with the Competition Commission of India (CCI) in December 2016. This was directed on the Cellular Operators Association of India (COAI), Bharti Airtel Limited (Airtel), Vodafone Group (Vodafone PLC), Vodafone India, and Vodafone Mobile Services Limited (VMSL). together with Idea Cellular Limited (Idea). These are established Indian telecommunications companies who claim to have violated Section 3 of the statute. In this instance, Reliance accused the incumbents of charging predatory prices. Prior to that, the company had complained to the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) about the incumbents’ refusal to grant Reliance access to the point of interconnection, which is crucial for call quality.

In this instance, the complaint has been filed with sector-specific regulatory agencies, TRAI and CCI, which serve as the main investigative bodies for any industry-related anti-competitive behavior. Both of these organizations’ primary goals are to guarantee the kinds of practices that will optimize the privilege to the consumer. The means by which it is accomplished or the sub-objective itself may differ. The primary inquiry at hand pertains to the necessity of having two distinct laws covering the same issue when one could adequately address it. It is important to remember that sector-specific laws that create regulatory organizations such as TRAI are governed by unique laws. While general law governs the CCI’s operations. When special legislation and general legislation conflict, it has long been accepted that the specific legislation will take precedence. Therefore, in the event of a dispute between TRAI and CCI, the former will take precedence.

In a similar vein, there has been much debate regarding the incompatibility between the Competition Act and the Patents Act. When two laws overlap in their respective areas of jurisdiction, conflicts occur. An obvious illustration of this tension is seen in the pharmaceutical sector.

LIMITATIONS:

• Only four transgressions are recognized, all of which are thought to violate the natural justice principle.
• An order to stop and penalize such abusive competition-abusing conduct may be passed under the Competition Act.
• Under the Competition Act, an entity holding a dominating position is not viewed negatively; it contributes competition funding for the purpose of promoting competition advocacy, raising public knowledge of competitive issues, and providing training as may be specified in its rules. However, it is deemed immoral to exploit a strong position that affects the interests of consumers[99].
• There is no such obligation for agreement registration in the Competition Act.
• The definition of “group” under the Competition Act has been condensed and now emphasizes the organizational structure of the company rather than its size.
• The definition of “group” under the Competition Act has been condensed and now emphasizes the organizational structure of the company rather than its size.
• The Competition Commission has the authority to impose fines and start Suo moto proceedings.
• A committee made up of retired judges and someone with professional experience in a variety of trade, commerce, industry, finance, etc. will appoint the chairman of the Competition Act.
• Cases pertaining to unfair trade practices will be transferred to consumer courts under the Competition Act[100].
• The CCI’s enforcement of cartel laws has benefited from the leniency regime, which serves as a tool for whistleblowers.
• Over 650 merger notices have been swiftly cleared by CCI in 2018, with an average disposal time of 23 days. The Act is no longer sufficient to address the evolving e-commerce, technology, and telecommunications business environments, as well as the government’s own involvement in stifling competition.
• One of the main challenges is handling antitrust issues pertaining to the modern economy and the changing global corporate landscape. Antitrust authorities worldwide are struggling with analytical techniques to look at concerns related to the digital economy.
• Moving away from traditional measurements of market share exclusively to characteristics that incorporate access to data, network effects, and multi-sided marketplaces is crucial. Examples of these include algorithm pricing, big data, or mergers where data and not turnover are of real value.
• A monopoly or an oligopoly may be based on the “asset” of consumer behavior and data. This resource can be abused by the government or private companies by giving them monopoly power over a variety of commodities and services.
• It sets threshold restrictions that don’t align with the different needs of different sectors of the Indian economy[101].
• It may misuse its regulatory authority by favoring large domestic firms over foreign ones or by meddling in pricing. For example, a company’s asset size alone is insufficient to prevent it from growing into new markets. Industries that require significant capital creation, like petroleum refining and infrastructure, may be subject to the Act’s strict regulations simply because of their size.
• It appears to impede the completion of combines, particularly outbound combinations that have elevated India to the forefront of international business activity. As a result, businesses are cautious of combining projects.
• It imposes onerous notice requirements that are not very definite even after the designated waiting periods have passed.
• The Act does not cover any services that are paid for.
• There is no clause requiring the suppliers of dangerous materials to bear responsibility.
• The safety regulations are not clearly stated.

CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION

Since efficient players drive out inefficient ones from the market, the competitive spirit demands constant improvement in the current system, which benefits both customers and market participants financially.

The Competition Commission of India, as the competition watchdog, provides adequate regulatory monitoring and restrictions to encourage healthy behaviors and to prevent anti-competitive behavior, even though perfect competition in the markets may seem like a paradise. With the assistance of knowledgeable consumers, the markets are constantly working to become more efficient[102].

Understanding the purpose and boundaries of the Competition Act and the Consumer Protection Act, as well as pursuing relevant issues in the right forum to benefit consumers and society at large, can help consumer associations fulfill their duty more successfully. The Competition Act’s rules and the process for submitting official information when they discover anti-competitive behavior should be familiar to Consumer Associations.

The market’s ongoing expansion and the participants’ and consumers’ financial security cause the inefficient players to gradually become more motivated to improve in order to remain competitive. Even if perfect market competition might seem like a pipe dream, the Competition Commission of India, as the nation’s competition watchdog, offers enough regulatory oversight and checks to encourage ethical and healthy behavior and outlaw anti-competitive behavior. With the assistance of knowledgeable consumers, the markets are constantly working to become more efficient. Understanding the purpose and boundaries of the Competition Act and the Consumer Protection Act, as well as pursuing relevant matters in the right venue for the greater good of consumers and society at large, can help Consumer Associations fulfill their duty more effectively. The Competition Act’s rules and the process for submitting official information when they discover anti-competitive behavior should be familiar to Consumer Associations[103].

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[1] Competition Commission of India, The Hindustan Times House, 18-20, Kasturba Gandhi Marg, New Delhi-110001

https://www.cci.gov.in/public/images/publications_booklet/en/introduction-to-competition-law-part-2-consumer-associationsngos1652182299.pdf – Visited on 04/03/2024, 2:56 am.

[2] Harsha Asnani, https://blog.ipleaders.in/relationship-competition-law-consumer-protection/ – Last viewed on 04-03-2024, 2:20 am.

[3] Suhail Nathani and Pinar Akman https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/121795/1/JAE%20article%20%20Akman%20Nathani%20Nov%2016%20Final%20Pre-print.pdf – Last visited on Monday, 04/03/2024, 2:59 am.

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[7] Sangya Ranjan, reasons for shift from MRRP to Competition Act, IJMER, June 2012, https://ijmer.in/pdf/volume1-issue2-2012/531-538.pdf.

[8] Kees Kuilwijk, Anticompetitive Practices, Global Dictionary of Competition Law, Concurrences, Art. N° 85395, https://www.concurrences.com/en/dictionary/anticompetitive-practices

[9] Dr.S.Chakravarthy, consumer protection and competition policy, https://cuts-ccier.org/pdf/Paper-5-Mozambique.pdf

[10] 02 AUG 2023 6:21PM by PIB Delhi, https://pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=1945167#:~:text=Under%20the%20provisions%20of%20the,and%20consumers%20as%20a%20class.

[11] The Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (Act 68 of 1986)

[12] Shraddha Jain, Competition Law, IPleaders, August 24, 2022, https://blog.ipleaders.in/competition-law-in-india-2/

[13] Preamble to the Competition Act, 2002.

[14] Competition Commission of India, competition law module for administrative and judicial training academies, 11September 2000, https://www.cci.gov.in/images/publications_training/en/competition-law-module-for-administrative-and-judicial-training-academies1652179010.pdf

[15] Ivy Wigmore, TechTarget, Competition Law, April 2019, https://www.techtarget.com/whatis/definition/competition-law#:~:text=Competition%20law%20is%20the%20body,also%20known%20as%20Antitrust%20law.

[16] Pathshala, MHRD Govt of India, Competition Law and Consumer Protection law, https://epgp.inflibnet.ac.in/epgpdata/uploads/epgp_content/law/03._competition_law/07._competition_law_and_consumer_protection_law/et/5650_et_07et.pdf

[17] Samir Gandhi, Hemangini Dadwal and Indrajeet Sircar, A vlog by Baker Mckenzie, https://www.globalcompliancenews.com/antitrust-and-competition/antitrust-and-competition-in-india/

[18] Aditi Gupta, Aims and Objectives of the Consumer Protection Act 1986, CCI, consumer Protection Act, Legal Service India, E-Journal, (February 18, 2021) https://www.legalserviceindia.com/legal/article-4966-aims-and-objectives-of-the-consumer-protection-act-1986.html

[19] Scherer F.M. – ‘International Competition Policy and Economic Development’ – Industrial Economics and International Management Series, ZEW, Mannheim, Germany, May, 1996 (a discussion paper)

[20] Thomas B. Leary, Cited by 46, competition law and consumer protection law: two wings of the same house, https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/competition-law-and-consumer-protection-law-two-wings-same-house/041022learyarticle.pdf

[21] This balance is not “based on the assumption that competition itself is unreasonable” and is not unrelated to competitive effects. Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 696 (1978).

[22] Louise Sylvan, The Interface between Consumer Policy and Competition Policy, paper presented at the Consumer Affairs Victria Lecture, Melbourne, in honour of Professor Maureen Brunt AO.

[23] Geeta Gouri, Convergence of competition policy, competition law and public interest in India, 25 September 2020 https://rujec.org/article/51303/

[24] See Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 52 (1977).

[25] Bhatacharjee A., De O., Gouri G. (2019). Competition law and competition policy in India: How the Competition Commission has dealt with anticompetitive restraints by public-sector entities. Review of Industrial Organization, 54 (2), 221–250. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11151-018-9641-0

[26] Actually, I believe this traditional distinction has become blurred, and today it is more accurate to refer to the contrast between cases that focus on the nature of the restraint and cases that focus on the nature of the market. See Thomas Leary, A Structured Outline for the Analysis of Horizontal Agreements (Mar. 2004), available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/leary/chairshowcasetalk.pdf.

[27] Indianbarassociation, https://www.indianbarassociation.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/Interface-of-Competition-Commission-of-India-and-Consumer-Protection-Law.pdf

[28] M.L.Trivedi, Managerial Economics- Theories and Applications (Tata McGraw-Hill Edication, New Delhi, 2002).

[29] I. Ramsay, Rationales for Intervention in the Consumer Marketplace (Office of Fair Trading, UK, 1984).

[30] R. Sexton, Exploring Economics (Cengage Learning, Ohio, USA).

[31] J. Behar, Cooperation and Competition in a common market place (Physica-Verlag Heidelberg, Germany, 2008).

[32] 5 R, Giesela, Consumer Protection in Choice of Law (April 20, 2011). Cornell International Law Journal, Vol. 44, 2011

[33] Joseph F. Brodley, “The Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer Welfare, and Technological Progress”, 62 N.Y.U.L. REV 1020 (1987); see also John B. Kirkwood and Robert H. Lande, “ The Fundamental Goal of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers, Not Increasing Efficiency”, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV 191 (2008).

[34] C.W. Guilebaud, “The Evolution of Marshall’s Principles of Economics”, 52 ECON.J. 344-349 (1942).

[35] Dennis W. Carlton,” Does Antitrust Need to be Modernized?”, 21 J. ECON PERSP156 (2007); see also Gregory J. Werden,”Monopsony and the Sherman Act: Consumer Welfare in a New Light”, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 707 (2007).

[36] Clarisse Girot, User Protection in IT Contracts: A Comparative Study of the Protection of the User Against Defective Performance in Information Technology 3 (Kluwer Law International, Netherlands, 2001).  The Consumer Protection Act, 1986 (Act 68 of 1986).

[37] Louise Sylvan, The Interface between Consumer Policy and Competition Policy, paper presented at the Consumer Affairs Victria Lecture, Melbourne, in honour of Professor Maureen Brunt AO.

[38] Pradeep S. Mehta, A Functional Competition Policy for India 51 (Academic Foundation, New Delhi, 2006). The Competition Act, 2002 (Act 12 0f 2003) s 19(1).

[39] Louise Sylvan, The Interface between Consumer Policy and Competition Policy, paper presented at the Consumer Affairs Victria Lecture, Melbourne, in honour of Professor Maureen Brunt AO.

[40] Nathani, S and Akman, P (2017) The interplay between consumer protection and competition law in India. Journal of Antitrust Enforcement, 5 (2). pp. 197-215. ISSN 2050-0688 , University of Leads, https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/121795/1/JAE%20article%20-%20Akman%20Nathani%20Nov%2016%20Final%20Pre-print.pdf

[41] 4K Cseres Competition Law and Consumer Protection (Kluwer Law International 2005) 152.

[42] See Cseres (n 14) 193-202 for the historical development of consumer protection rules in the EU.

[43] See eg Art 12 TFEU, Art 169(1) TFEU, Art 169(2) (a) TFEU.

[44] Rajasthan Housing Board v. Parvati Devi (Smt.) and others; Appeal (civil) 14994 of 1996 judgment dated 03 May 2000.

[45] MCX Stock Exchange Ltd. Vs. National Stock Exchange of India Ltd., DotEx International Ltd. and Omnesys Technologies Pvt. Ltd., CCI Case No. 13 of 2009, Order dated 03 June 2011.

[46] Information’ can be filed by any person under Section 26(1) of the Competition Act. However, the Competition Appellate Tribunal has stressed on the need to evaluate the locus standi of informants; L.H. Hiranandani Hospital Vs. Competition Commission of India and Ors. Order of the Competition Appellate Tribunal in Appeal No. 19 of 2014 dated 18 December 2015

[47] Belaire Owner’s Association vs. DLF Limited, CCI Order dated 12 August 2011 in Case No. 19 of 2010.

[48] Case No. 43 of 2012, Case No. 24 of 2014, Case No. 97 of 2014, Case No. 101 of 2014, Case No. 89 of 2015, Case No. 103 of 2015, Case No. 14 of 2016, Case No. 59 of 2016, Case No. 60 of 2016 among others.

[49] Parvinder Singh vs. Unitech Limited, Consumer Case No. 449 of 2013 Decided On: 12.02.2016; Satish Kumar Pandey v. M/s. Unitech Ltd., Consumer Case No. 427/2014 Decided On: 08.06.2015

[50] Schott Glass India Private Limited vs. Competition Commission of India, COMPAT Appeal Nos. 91 and 92 of 2012, Order dated 02 April 2014.

[51] Extract from the Concurring Opinion of Commissioner Jon Leibowitz in the Matter Of Rambus, Inc. Docket No. 9302, FTC

[52] Boise Cascade, 637 F.2d at 581.

[53] See Statement of Enforcement Principles Regarding “Unfair Methods of Competition” Under Section 5 of the FTC Act, 13 August 2015, available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/735201/150813section5enforcement.pdf.

[54] See Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Maureen K Ohlhausen: FTC Act Section 5 Policy Statement, 13 August 2015, available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/735371/150813ohlhausendissentfinal.pdf.

[55] See eg Case C-23/14 Post Danmark A/S v KonkurrencerådetEU:C:1979:36, [67].

[56] Case 226/84 British Leyland plc v Commission [1987] 1 CMLR 185; 1998 Football World Cup (Case IV/36/888) Commission Decision 2001/12/EC [2000] OJ L5/55; BdKEP – Restrictions on Mail Preparation (Case COMP/38.745) Commission Decision 20 October 2004 (unreported).

[57] Akman (n 55) 320. Such cases include Case C-179/90 Merciconvenzionaliporto di Genova SpA v SiderurgicaGabrielliSpA[1991] ECR I-5889; Case C-41/90 Klaus Höfner and Fritz Elser v Macrotron GmbH [1991] ECR I-1979; British Telecommunications (Case IV/29/877) Commission Decision 82/861/EEC [1982] OJ L360/36; P&I Clubs, IGA and P&I Clubs, Pooling Agreement (Case IV/D-1/30.373 and IV/D-1/37.143) Commission Decision 1999/329/EC [1999] OJ L125/12.

[58] Guidelines for Review of Unfair Trade Practices, 12 August 2009.

[59] See Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Maureen K Ohlhausen: FTC Act Section 5 Policy Statement, 13 August 2015, available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/735371/150813ohlhausendissentfinal.pdf.

[60] Bishop S., Walker M. (2009). The economics of EC competition law. Sweet and Mawell.

[61] LawBhoomi, April 23, 2020, https://lawbhoomi.com/case-brief-belaire-owner-s-assoviation-v-dlf-ltd/

[62] Paolisa Nebbia, Competition Law and Consumer Protection Against Unfair Commercial PracticesA More- than- Complementary Relationship? , 2012, https://www.degruyter.com/document/doi/10.1515/9780804782678-012/html?lang=en

[63] Monopolistic and Restrictive Trade Practices (MRTP) Act, Vedantu, 09th Apr 2024, https://www.vedantu.com/civics/mrtp-act

[64] Boise Cascade, 637 F.2d at 581.

[65] Chakravarthy S. (2006a). Evolution of competition policy and law in India. In P. Mehta (Ed.), Towards a functional competition policy for India (pp. 40–53). Academic Foundation and CUTS International.

[66] The Competition Act, 2002 (Act 12 0f 2003) s 19(1).

[67] Laxmi Engineering Works v. P.S.G Industrial Institute (1995) 3 SCC 583

[68] Pradeep S. Mehta, A Functional Competition Policy for India 51 (Academic Foundation, New Delhi, 2006)

[69] Clarisse Girot, User Protection in IT Contracts: A Comparative Study of the Protection of the User Against Defective Performance in Information Technology 3 (Kluwer Law International, Netherlands, 2001).

[70] 3 K J Cseres, “The Controversies of the Consumer Welfare Standard”, 3(2) Compl. Rev 121 (2006).

[71] C.W. Guilebaud, “The Evolution of Marshall’s Principles of Economics”, 52 ECON.J. 344-349 (1942).

[72] Amit Kapoor, Competition Regulation-history, Insights and Issues for the Way Forward, 2009 Manupatra (2009).

[73] Aditya Bhattacharjea, India’s New Antitrust Regime: The First Two Years of Enforcement, 57 Antitrust Bull. 449 (2012).

[74] Competition Commission of India, Pravahan Mohanty v. HDFC Bank Ltd, 23 May,2011, https://www.cci.gov.in/images/antitrustorder/en/1720101652354352.pdf

[75] DLF Limited vs. Competition Commission of India; COMPAT Order dated 09 May 2014 in Appeal No. 20 of 2011

[76] Dorothy Shapiro, A Competition Act by India, for India: The First Three Years of Enforcement under the New Competition Act, 5 Indian J. Int’l Econ. L. 59 (2012).

[77] S. Chakravarthy, India’s New Competition Act 2002 – A Work Still in Progress, 5 Bus. L. Int’l 240 (2004).

[78] UK Essays, MRTP Act: Rise Fall and Need for Change: Eco Legal Analysis, November 2013.

[79] Harsha Asnani,IPleadrers, What Is The Relationship Between Competition Law And Consumer Protection, May 10, 2016, https://blog.ipleaders.in/relationship-competition-law-consumer-protection/#:~:text=Enforcement%20of%20Consumer%20protection%20through,of%20theirs%20in%20the%20market.

[80] Nathani, S and Akman, P (2017) The interplay between consumer protection and competition law in India. Journal of Antitrust Enforcement, 5 (2). pp. 197-215. ISSN 2050-0688 https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/121795/1/JAE%20article%20-%20Akman%20Nathani%20Nov%2016%20Final%20Pre-print.pdf

[81] MM Sharma, Competition Commission of India, Supreme Court of India 2nd Landmark Judgement, Vaish Associates Advocates, (02 January 2019) https://www.mondaq.com/india/cartels-monopolies/767346/supreme-court-of-india-2nd-landmark-judgment-on-cartels-in-india–dismisses-legalistic-findings-of-cci-and-compat-of-bid-rigging-in-tender-floated-by-iocl-for-lpg-cylinders-based-on-market-conditions

[82] Harshvardhan Korada and Vasanth Rajasekaran, Competition Commission of India, Supreme Court backs CCI in two cases, The Hindu Business Line, Business laws, (Feb 20, 2022), https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/business-laws/supreme-court-backs-cci-in-two-cases/article65068026.ece

[83] S.S. Rana & Co, Anti-competitive Agreements, AAEC, https://ssrana.in/corporate-laws/competition-law/anti-competitive-agreements/#:~:text=Agreement%20having%20appreciable%20adverse%20effect,which%20causes%20or%20is%20likely

[84] Competition Bureau, CCI, Canada. ca, Experience of International Jurisdiction International Competition agency. (Canada) , Examining the Canadian Competition Act in the Digital Era February 8, 2022 https://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/04621.html#sec09

[85] Scherer F.M. – ‘International Competition Policy and Economic Development’ – Industrial Economics and International Management Series, ZEW, Mannheim, Germany, May, 1996 (a discussion paper)

[86] Merrilees and Cotman – ‘An Economic Analysis of Consumer Protection Law’ – Austr Quarterly March 1976. P.79.

[87] Gouri G. (1993). India industrial performance and policy. In T. Majumar (Ed.), Nature, man and the Indian economy (pp. 202–229). New Delhi: Oxford University Press.

[88] Rochet J.-C., Tirole J. (2006). Two-sided markets: A progress report. RAND Journal of Economics, 37 (3), 645–667. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00036.x

[89] The Competition Act 2002 can be accessed at https://www.cci.gov.in/sites/default/files/advocacy_booklet_document/CCI%20Basic%20Introduction_0.pdf

[90] Rochet J.-C., Tirole J. (2003). Platform competition in two-sided markets. Journal of the European Economic Association, 1 (4), 990–1029. https://doi.org/10.1162/154247603322493212

[91] Competition Commission of India rejects complaint against proposed PVR-INOX deal SECTIONSCompetition Commission of .. Sep 13, 2022, 08:37:00 PM https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/media/entertainment/competition-commission-of-india-rejects-complaint-against-proposed-pvr-inox-deal/articleshow/94182554.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst

[92] MCX Stock Exchange Ltd. Vs. National Stock Exchange of India Ltd., DotEx International Ltd. and Omnesys Technologies Pvt. Ltd., CCI Case No. 13 of 2009, Order dated 03 June 2011. Section 4 of the Competition Act prohibits an abuse of dominant position.

[93] Agreements between players at different levels of the production chain.

[94] Agreements between players engaged in an identical trade.

[95] Ruchika Chitravanshi New Delhi, MCA revises thresholds for mergers and amalgamation under Competition Act, Business Standard, https://www.business-standard.com/industry/news/mca-revises-thresholds-for-mergers-and-amalgamation-under-competition-act-124030800590_1.html

[96] Merger control in India – an overview, azb, https://www.azbpartners.com/privacy-policy-2/

[97] High Level Committee on Competition Policy and Law (The Raghavan Committee). Department of Company Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi, 2000. https://theindiancompetitionlaw.files.wordpress.com/2013/02/report_of_high_level_committee_on_competition_policy_law_svs_raghavan_committee.pdf

[98] eGyankosh, The Limitation of Consumer Protection Act can be accessed at https://egyankosh.ac.in/bitstream/123456789/13507/1/Unit-20.pdf

[99] Aishwarya Mishra, monday, India: Limitation Vis-A-Vis Consumer Protection Act – An Analysis Of The Judgement Of The Hon’ble Supreme Court Of India In The Matter Of National Insurance Co. Ltd. Vs. Hindustan Safety Glass Works Ltd. And Ors., 01 May 2018, https://www.mondaq.com/india/dodd-frank-consumer-protection-act/697368/limitation-vis-a-vis-consumer-protection-act–an-analysis-of-the-judgement-of-the-honble-supreme-court-of-india-in-the-matter-of-national-insurance-co-ltd-vs-hindustan-safety-glass-works-ltd-and-ors

[100] Surendra U Kanstiya, Mumbai, incsoc.net, https://incsoc.net/pdf/consumer-protection-under-the-competition-law-surendra-knastiya.pdf

[101] Reddy Y. (1989). State, market and privatisation: Stalemate in state-action in India. In T. L. Sankar, & Y. Venugopal Reddy (Eds.), Privatisation: Diversification of ownership of public enterprises (pp. 21–52). Booklinks Corporation.

[102] Competition Commission of India rejects complaint against proposed PVR-INOX deal SECTIONSCompetition Commission of .. Sep 13, 2022, 08:37:00 PM https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/industry/media/entertainment/competition-commission-of-india-rejects-complaint-against-proposed-pvr-inox-deal/articleshow/94182554.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=cppst

[103] See paper presented by Swaminathan. S. Aiyar to the Expert Group, Indian Institute of Foreign Trade, New Delhi, 1998 (the Expert Group was appointed by the Ministry of Commerce, Govt of India to study the interface between Competition and Trade policies).