Geeta Satsang Ashram Samiti Vs Ward Exemption (ITAT Jodhpur)
Summary: The assessee, Geeta Satsang Ashram Samiti, a registered society, appealed against rejection of its application for approval under section 80G of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The application had been rejected by the Commissioner of Income Tax (Exemption), who treated the assessee as a religious institution and held that expenditure incurred for religious purposes exceeded the permissible limit under section 80G(5B).
The Tribunal recorded that the assessee carries out various charitable activities, including providing food to poor persons through Annakshetra, organising medical camps, distributing medicines and disseminating spiritual and philosophical teachings of the Bhagavad Gita. The application for approval under section 80G had originally been filed on 29.09.2022. An earlier rejection dated 20.03.2023 was challenged before the Tribunal, and the Jaipur Bench, by order dated 07.08.2023 in ITA No. 258/JP/2023, restored the matter to the CIT(E) for fresh consideration after giving the assessee an opportunity to furnish requisite documents. The assessee thereafter furnished detailed submissions dated 15.12.2025 and 21.01.2026 with supporting documents and accounts. The CIT(E) again rejected the application, principally on the basis that the objects contained elements of religious activities and that 54.44% of expenditure had been incurred on religious activities.
Before the Jodhpur Bench, the assessee contended that the CIT(E) had selectively considered the object concerning dissemination of Bhagavad Gita teachings without examining the constitution and activities as a whole. The objects also covered establishment of public libraries and reading rooms, natural, homoeopathic and ayurvedic dispensaries, free medical camps, distribution of medicines, an Annakshetra for indigent persons, moral and spiritual advancement of the public and service without distinction of class, caste or community. Membership was likewise not restricted to any particular caste, creed, sect or religious denomination.
The Tribunal examined the statutory framework under section 80G(5)(iii), under which an institution or fund should not be expressed to be for the benefit of any particular religious community or caste, together with Explanation 3 to section 80G, which excludes a purpose the whole or substantially the whole of which is of a religious nature from “charitable purpose”. It held that the statutory enquiry could not rest merely on the presence of spiritual or philosophical content. The true character of the institution, its objects read as a whole, the class of beneficiaries and the actual nature of its activities were relevant.
The Tribunal relied particularly on the jurisdictional Rajasthan High Court decision in Umaid Charitable Trust v. Union of India [2008] 307 ITR 226 (Raj.), which, as recorded in the order, emphasised the dominant object of the trust and held that approval under section 80G could not be denied merely because some expenditure may have a religious complexion where the trust deed did not show an intention to spend income for a particular religion. The Tribunal also referred to the Bangalore Bench decision in Shrouta Vijnan Gurukulam v. ITO, ITA No. 694/Bang/2024, concerning dissemination of Vedic thoughts and philosophy without caste, creed or religious restriction.
On the religious expenditure issue, the Tribunal found a fundamental factual error in the figures reported in Form No. 10AB. Column 27(a) answered “No” to whether the institution had incurred expenditure of a religious nature, while the amounts entered in Column 27(b) for religious expenditure—₹30,17,917, ₹39,06,678 and ₹39,70,210—exactly matched the total expenditure in the audited accounts for the respective years. The Tribunal accepted that the identity of the figures, read with the categorical answer in Column 27(a), substantially supported the explanation that the total expenditure had inadvertently been copied into the religious-expenditure column.
The Tribunal further examined “Mandir Pooja” expenditure, which amounted to ₹65,758, ₹77,629 and ₹1,44,968 against gross receipts of ₹44,88,854, ₹47,40,122 and ₹49,62,046, respectively. The corresponding percentages were 1.46%, 1.64% and 2.92%. Thus, even if the entire “Mandir Pooja” expenditure were treated as religious expenditure, it remained below the 5% threshold contemplated by section 80G(5B). The Tribunal held that the CIT(E) had instead proceeded on the apparent clerical error in Form 10AB and consequently arrived at the unsustainable figure of 54.44%.
The Tribunal also held that, since the assessee had already been afforded an opportunity following the earlier Tribunal order and had furnished the relevant submissions and supporting material, there was no useful purpose in again restoring the matter for reconsideration of the same issues. It concluded that the assessee’s objects, read in their entirety, were not for the benefit of any particular religious community or caste; its activities included relief to the poor, medical relief, public welfare and dissemination of ethical and philosophical teachings; its constitution contemplated service without distinction of class, caste or community; and the expenditure that could at the highest be regarded as religious was below the statutory ceiling.
Accordingly, the Tribunal set aside the impugned order of the CIT(E) and directed the CIT(E) to grant approval to the assessee under section 80G(5) in accordance with law. The assessee’s appeal was allowed.
Cases Discussed
- Umaid Charitable Trust v. Union of India [2008] 307 ITR 226 (Raj.) — discussed on the relevance of the dominant object of the charitable institution and the treatment of expenditure having a religious complexion for section 80G purposes.
- Shrouta Vijnan Gurukulam v. ITO, ITA No. 694/Bang/2024 — discussed on dissemination of Vedic thoughts and philosophy without restriction by caste, creed or religion and its treatment for section 80G approval.
Assessee Represented by: Mahendra Gargieya
FULL TEXT OF THE JUDGMENT/ORDER OF ITAT JODHPUR BENCH
The aforesaid appeal has been filed by the assessee against the impugned order passed by the learned Commissioner of Income Tax (Exemption), whereby the assessee’s application seeking approval under section 80G(5) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 has been rejected. The principal grievance of the assessee is that the learned CIT(E) has erred in treating the assessee as a religious institution and in holding that the expenditure incurred by it towards religious purposes exceeded the permissible limit prescribed under section 80G(5B).
2. The brief facts are that the assessee is a registered society carrying out various charitable activities, inter alia, providing food to the poor through Annakshetra, running and organising medical camps and dissemination of spiritual and philosophical teachings of the Bhagavad Gita. The assessee had filed its application seeking approval under section 80G on 29.09.2022. The said application was initially rejected by the learned CIT(E) vide order dated 20.03.2023, inter alia, on the grounds of non-registration under the Rajasthan Public Trust Act, 1959; that the assessee was a religious trust and, therefore, not eligible for approval under section 80G; expenditure having been incurred for religious purposes; and that genuineness of the activities was not established.
3. Against the said order, the assessee had preferred an appeal before the Tribunal and the Jaipur Bench of the Tribunal, vide order dated 07.08.2023 in ITA No.258/JP/2023, restored the matter to the file of the learned CIT(E) for deciding the application afresh after affording reasonable opportunity to the assessee to furnish the requisite documents. Pursuant thereto, the assessee filed detailed submissions dated 15.12.2025 and 21.01.2026 along with supporting documents and accounts. However, the learned CIT(E) has once again rejected the application, essentially on the ground that the objects of the assessee contained elements of religious activities and that 54.44% of the expenditure was incurred on religious activities, which according to him was beyond the permissible limit of 5%. Reference was also made to certain newspaper articles and to proceedings before the Hon’ble Rajasthan High Court. Ultimately, the application was rejected on the two grounds that the assessee is a religious trust not eligible for approval under section 80G(5) and that expenditure had been incurred for religious purposes.
4. Before us, the learned counsel submitted that the entire premise of the learned CIT(E) proceeds on an erroneous appreciation of the objects and activities of the assessee. He submitted that the learned CIT(E) has selectively referred to the objects relating to dissemination of the teachings of the Bhagavad Gita, without examining the constitution of the society in its entirety. Our attention was drawn to the objects of the society to point out that, apart from organising discourses, seminars and lectures, the objects specifically provide for establishment of libraries and reading rooms for the public; running natural, homoeopathic and ayurvedic dispensaries; organising free medical camps and distribution of medicines; running Annakshetra for indigent persons; and undertaking measures for moral and spiritual advancement of the public and rendering service without distinction of class, caste or community. It was further pointed out that even the membership of the society is not restricted to any particular caste, creed, sect or religious denomination.
5. The learned counsel further submitted that dissemination of the teachings and philosophy contained in the Bhagavad Gita cannot, ipso facto, be equated with advancement or propagation of a particular religion. Reliance was placed upon the judgment of the Hon’ble jurisdictional Rajasthan High Court in Umaid Charitable Trust v. Union of India [2008] 307 ITR 226 (Raj.), apart from the decisions in Dr. Ramesh Yeshwant Prabhoo v. Prabhakar K. Kunte (1996) 1 SCC 130; Catholic Bishops Council v. State of M.P.; Shrouta Vijnan Gurukulam v. ITO, ITA No.694/Bang/2024; and World Sankirtan Tour Trust v. CIT(E) [2026] 188 taxmann.com 849.
6. Insofar as the alleged religious expenditure is concerned, the learned counsel pointed out a fundamental factual error in the impugned order. In Form No.10AB, against Column 27(a), namely, whether the institution had incurred any expenditure of religious nature, the assessee had specifically answered “No”. However, while filling Column 27(b), the data-entry operator inadvertently copied the figure of the entire expenditure of the society in the column meant for religious expenditure. Thus, for the relevant three years, the amounts of ₹30,17,917, ₹39,06,678 and ₹39,70,210 appearing as religious expenditure were exactly the same as the total expenditure reflected in the audited accounts for those respective years. According to the learned counsel, this itself demonstrates that it was merely a clerical/data-entry error and could not have been regarded as an admission that the entire expenditure of the society was religious in nature.
7. It was further submitted that even if the expenditure specifically debited under the head “Mandir Pooja” is assumed to be religious expenditure, it was only ₹65,758, ₹77,629 and ₹1,44,968 for the three relevant years against gross receipts of ₹44,88,854, ₹47,40,122 and ₹49,62,046, respectively, constituting merely 1.46%, 1.64% and 2.92% of the gross receipts. Thus, even on the Revenue’s assumption, the expenditure remained below the statutory threshold of 5% contemplated under section 80G(5B). Reliance in this regard was also placed upon the decision of the Jaipur Bench in Samya Gyan Prachar Prasar Trust v. CIT(E) [2025] 176 taxmann.com 411.
8. We have heard the rival submissions and perused the material placed before us. The first and foremost issue which requires consideration is whether merely because one of the objects of the assessee is dissemination of the teachings and philosophy of the Bhagavad Gita, the institution can be regarded as existing wholly or substantially for religious purposes and thereby rendered ineligible for approval under section 80G.
9. At the outset, we find that the approach adopted by the learned CIT(E) proceeds largely by isolating certain clauses of the objects rather than examining the constitution and activities of the society as a whole. The objects placed before us clearly show that the assessee’s activities have a much wider charitable canvas. Besides dissemination of philosophical and spiritual literature, the society is authorised to establish libraries and reading rooms for the public; run natural, homoeopathic and ayurvedic dispensaries; organise free medical camps and distribute medicines; run Annakshetra for indigent persons; and undertake activities for moral and spiritual advancement and service of the public. More importantly, the object clause itself stipulates that such service is to be rendered without distinction of class, caste or community. The membership clause also does not confine membership to any particular caste or religious denomination. Thus, neither the objects nor the beneficiaries are circumscribed by allegiance to any particular religious community or caste.
10. Section 80G(5)(iii) contemplates that the institution or fund should not be expressed to be for the benefit of any particular religious community or caste. Explanation 3 to section 80G, on the other hand, excludes from the expression “charitable purpose” a purpose the whole or substantially the whole of which is of a religious nature. The statutory enquiry, therefore, cannot rest merely upon the presence of some spiritual or philosophical content in the objects. What is required to be seen is the true character of the institution, its objects read as a whole, the class of beneficiaries and the actual nature of its activities.
11. In this regard, the judgment of the Hon’ble jurisdictional Rajasthan High Court in Umaid Charitable Trust v. Union of India [2008] 307 ITR 226 (Raj.) assumes considerable significance. The Hon’ble High Court held that unless the object of the charitable trust itself is to spend its income for a particular religion and such intention is discernible from the trust deed, approval under section 80G cannot be denied merely because some expenditure may have a religious complexion. Their Lordships further observed that it is the dominant object of the trust which is important and the expenditure incurred has to be appreciated in the light of the objects for which the charitable institution was constituted.
12. Tested on the aforesaid principle, we are unable to concur with the conclusion of the learned CIT(E) that the assessee is a religious trust merely because its objects include dissemination of the teachings of the Bhagavad Gita. The Bhagavad Gita undoubtedly has profound spiritual provenance; but the question before us is not one of theological classification. What is relevant for the purpose of section 80G is whether dissemination of its ethical and philosophical teachings, in the manner undertaken by this assessee, amounts to advancement of a particular religion or is confined to the followers of a particular religious community. There is nothing in the constitution of the assessee to suggest any such denominational restriction.
13. The Bangalore Bench of the Tribunal in Shrouta Vijnan Gurukulam v. ITO, ITA No.694/Bang/2024, while dealing with propagation of Vedic thoughts and philosophy, has also held that such dissemination, when not restricted by caste, creed or religion and coupled with activities of education and relief to the poor, cannot by itself be characterised as a religious activity disentitling the institution from approval under section 80G. The Tribunal took note of the objects and actual activities as a whole and directed grant of approval under section 80G. The same principle applies with greater force here, where the assessee’s constitution expressly contains independent objects of relief to the poor, medical relief and public welfare, and the beneficiaries are not confined to any particular religion or caste.
14. We also find considerable merit in the assessee’s contention regarding the alleged religious expenditure. The learned CIT(E) has proceeded on the figures appearing in Column 27(b) of Form 10AB without reconciling them with the answer furnished in Column 27(a) and the audited accounts. Column 27(a) specifically records “No” to the query whether the institution had incurred expenditure of religious nature. More importantly, the amounts mentioned in Column 27(b) as religious expenditure correspond exactly with the entire expenditure of the assessee for the respective years. For instance, ₹30,17,917, ₹39,06,678 and ₹39,70,210 shown in Column 27(b) are the very figures of total expenditure in the audited accounts for the corresponding years. This striking identity of figures, read with the categorical answer “No” in Column 27(a), lends substantial credence to the explanation that the figures of total expenditure were inadvertently copied into the column relating to religious expenditure. A manifest clerical mistake of this nature cannot be elevated into a substantive admission contrary to the audited financial statements.
15. What is even more significant is that the expenditure which could possibly be regarded as having a religious element, namely “Mandir Pooja” expenditure, was only ₹65,758, ₹77,629 and ₹1,44,968 against gross receipts of ₹44,88,854, ₹47,40,122 and ₹49,62,046 for the respective years. The corresponding percentages work out to 1.46%, 1.64% and 2.92%. Thus, even if the entire expenditure under the head “Mandir Pooja” is treated as expenditure of religious nature, it remains well below the threshold of 5%.
16. This brings us to section 80G(5B), which itself provides a statutory latitude in a case where an institution incurs expenditure of a religious nature not exceeding 5% of its total income. Therefore, even assuming for the sake of argument that some incidental expenditure of the assessee possesses a religious character, that by itself cannot defeat the assessee’s eligibility when such expenditure remains within the statutory limit. The learned CIT(E), instead of examining the actual expenditure with reference to the audited accounts, proceeded on an apparent clerical error in Form 10AB and consequently arrived at the figure of 54.44%. Such a conclusion, in the face of the underlying accounts and the reconciliation placed on record, cannot be sustained.
17. The matter may also be viewed from another perspective. The assessee had already been afforded an opportunity pursuant to the earlier order of the Tribunal and had furnished detailed submissions and supporting material before the learned CIT(E). The rejection in the second round substantially rests upon the same broad characterisation of the assessee as a religious institution and upon the erroneous figure of religious expenditure. The material necessary for adjudicating these issues is already before us. Therefore, no useful purpose would be served by once again restoring the matter for reconsideration of the very same issues.
18. In the ultimate analysis, what emerges is that the objects of the assessee, when read in their entirety, are not for the benefit of any particular religious community or caste; its charitable activities encompass relief to the poor, medical relief, public welfare and dissemination of ethical and philosophical teachings; its constitution expressly contemplates service without distinction of class, caste or community; and the expenditure which can at the highest be regarded as religious is demonstrably below the statutory ceiling prescribed under section 80G(5B). The learned CIT(E), therefore, was not justified either in characterising the assessee as an institution existing wholly or substantially for religious purposes or in treating the entire expenditure reflected in Column 27(b) of Form 10AB as religious expenditure.
19. Accordingly, the impugned order passed by the learned CIT(E) is set aside and the learned CIT(E) is directed to grant approval to the assessee under section 80G(5) of the Act in accordance with law.
20. In the result, the appeal of the assessee is allowed.
Order pronounced in the open court on 13/08/2026.
