Adhunik Fire Appliances Vs Commissioner State Tax Lucknow & Ors. (GSTAT Ghaziabad)
Summary: The GST Appellate Tribunal, Ghaziabad State Bench, allowed the appeal filed by Adhunik Fire Appliances, a proprietorship engaged in supplying fire appliances and providing related works contract services, against cancellation of its GST registration for non-filing of returns. The proper officer issued a show cause notice on 3 January 2024 alleging six months’ continuous default and cancelled the registration on 3 March 2024 with retrospective effect from 3 January 2024. The first appellate authority upheld cancellation on 8 December 2025, finding that returns were filed only through June 2023 and that the appellant had not sufficiently established financial hardship or payment. Before GSTAT, the appellant referred to delayed customer payments, personal circumstances and returns filed in May 2026, and offered to complete the outstanding compliance.
The Tribunal held the appeal to be within the notified limitation period under Section 112. It found the show cause notice deficient because it did not identify the actual default periods, due dates or monthly or quarterly filing status. If monthly returns had been filed through June 2023, the December 2023 return was not ordinarily due until 20 January 2024, after the notice of 3 January 2024. This was an illustration, not a finding of the actual filing position. Neither the cancellation order nor the first appellate order satisfactorily established the prescribed default as of the relevant dates. The retrospective effective date also lacked a separate reason or express proposal. Applying Supreme Court authority on specific notices and reasoned orders, GSTAT held the impugned decisions unsustainable.
The Tribunal rejected the sweeping claim that cancellation prevented every kind of return filing: Section 29(3) preserves earlier liabilities, and GSTR-1, GSTR-3B and GSTR-10 have distinct statutory functions. The appellant must prove payment through returns and ledgers, while genuine portal restrictions should be addressed by the proper officer. Restoration would not waive tax, interest, late fees or the requirement to verify input tax credit. Constitutional protection of business and livelihood justified a meaningful compliance opportunity, not an exemption from GST obligations.
GSTAT set aside both orders and directed restoration of GSTIN 09ADPPM6723Q1ZL effective 3 January 2024. The proper officer must update the portal within 15 days of receiving the order. Within 60 days of the Tribunal order dated 5 November 2026, the taxpayer must furnish period-wise reconciliation and acknowledgements, pay remaining admitted lawful dues with applicable interest and late fees, and file a consolidated report. Pending permissible, current and nil returns must be filed as legally required. Valid previous payments must be fully credited, without duplicate returns or payments.
Cases Discussed
- Woolcombers of India Ltd. v. Workers Union — (1974) 3 SCC 318. Duty to give reasons; prevention of arbitrariness.
- Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corpn. — (1985) 3 SCC 545. Right to livelihood under Article 21.
- Sodan Singh v. New Delhi Municipal Committee — (1989) 4 SCC 155. Freedom to carry on trade under Article 19(1)(g).
- Commissioner of Central Excise, Bangalore v. Brindavan Beverages (P) Ltd. — (2007) 5 SCC 388. Specific allegations required in show cause notice.
- Oryx Fisheries (P) Ltd. v. Union of India — (2010) 13 SCC 427. Fair consideration of reply and reasoned cancellation.
- Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. v. Masood Ahmed Khan — (2010) 9 SCC 496. Quasi-judicial duty to provide reasons.
- Gorkha Security Services v. Government (NCT of Delhi) — (2014) 9 SCC 105. Notice must disclose grounds and proposed action.
- Tvl. Suguna Cutpiece Center v. Appellate Deputy Commissioner (ST) (GST) — Madras High Court; 31/01/2022. GST restoration upon specified compliance.
- Smt Jumoni Boruah Phukan v. Union of India and Ors. — Gauhati High Court; 2026. GST registration restoration and Rule 22(4).
- Bal Krishna Sunar — High Court; citation not provided in order. Cited by appellant for registration restoration.
FULL TEXT OF THE ORDER OF GSTAT GHAZIABAD
Brief facts of the case
1. M/s Adhunik Fire Appliances is a proprietorship of Shri Deepak Mittal. It carries on business at B-9/2, Shop No. 12, City Plaza, Sector 62, Noida. It supplies fire appliances and, according to its written submissions, also provides works contract services relating to fire-fighting equipment. Its GST registration was cancelled because it had not filed returns for the prescribed period.
2. The cancellation order was passed on 3 March 2024 and was made effective from 3 January 2024. The appellant challenged that order before the first appellate authority.
The first appeal was dismissed on 8 December 2025. The appellant has now approached this Tribunal for restoration of its registration. It says that it has filed the returns which the portal allowed it to file and is willing to file the remaining returns and pay the lawful dues.
3. The dispute is whether cancellation should continue or whether the appellant should be given a further opportunity to comply with the law. The appeal also raises questions about limitation, the adequacy of the notice and the reasons given in the impugned orders, filing of returns after cancellation, and the effect of cancellation on the proprietor’s business and livelihood. References in this order to the Act and the Rules mean the applicable provisions of the CGST and Uttar Pradesh GST laws.
The show cause notice and the cancellation order
4. The proper officer issued a notice dated 3 January 2024 in a form headed GST REG- 17/31, bearing reference ZA090124020964N. Under the heading “Observations”, the notice stated the following ground:
“Failure to furnish returns for a continuous period of six months”.
5. The notice allowed thirty days for a reply and fixed a personal hearing on 31 January 2024 at 11 a.m. It also stated that registration stood suspended from 3 January 2024. The appellant submitted a reply on 31 January 2024 under ARN AA0901240135520. The later cancellation order expressly acknowledges that reply. On 3 March 2024, the proper officer passed an order in FORM GST REG-19, bearing reference ZA090324012498I. He referred to section 29(2)(c) and stated that returns had not been furnished for more than six continuous months. He rejected the reply because the appellant had neither filed the pending returns nor deposited the due tax. Registration was cancelled with effect from 3 January 2024. The proper officer also stated that cancellation would not remove the appellant’s liability to pay tax and other dues or to discharge its earlier obligations. The order required the appellant to file all pending returns. It specifically referred to the final return in FORM GSTR-10 and stated that it was to be filed within three months of the order. A supporting order repeats the same reasons for cancellation.
6. The appellant’s first-appeal form records that the cancellation order was communicated on 5 March 2024. The appeal was filed on 1 June 2024 under reference AD0906240012990. Thus, the appellant challenged the cancellation through the statutory appeal procedure. The first appellate authority’s decision on that challenge is considered next.
The order of the first appellate authority
7. The Additional Commissioner, Grade-II (Appeal), State Tax, Gautam Buddha Nagar, Noida, dismissed the first appeal on 8 December 2025. The summary is in FORM GST APL-04, reference ZD091225140021Z. The detailed order records the appellant’s grounds, the reason given by the proper officer, and the result of the appellate authority’s examination of the portal. The appellant had explained that it was facing financial difficulty because business payments had not been received. It said that cancellation was harming its business and preventing further compliance. The first appellate authority did not accept this explanation as a sufficient basis for setting aside the order. It found that no supporting evidence of financial difficulty had been produced before it. The appellate authority also found from the portal that returns had been filed only up to June 2023. It recorded that returns for the later period had not been filed and that proof of the necessary tax payment had not been produced. In its view, the appellant should have filed returns through December 2023. It therefore upheld the cancellation and rejected the appeal. Its main finding was that the earlier default had not been corrected and that the explanation was unsupported. The correctness of that finding must be examined on the material then before it, while later compliance must be considered separately.
8. The written submissions state that the appellate order was communicated on 15 December 2025. They also describe return filings made in May 2026, after the first appellate order. Those later filings could not have formed part of the first appellate authority’s assessment in December 2025. They may, however, be relevant to the relief now sought from the Tribunal. The record therefore shows a cancellation for return default, an unsuccessful first appeal on the merits, and a later attempt to regularise the returns. The appellant’s submissions on these matters are set out below.
Submissions of the appellant
9. The appellant submits that its default was not deliberate. Payments from customers had been withheld and its overdraft facility had been exhausted. It also refers to the illness and death of the proprietor’s mother in July 2023. According to the appellant, these financial and personal difficulties explain the non-filing of returns after June 2023. It relies on bank statements and a death certificate described in its written submissions. It states that the business is the proprietor’s source of livelihood and points out that the notice does not allege false invoices, fraudulent registration or misuse of input tax credit. It submits that cancellation should not continue indefinitely and claims to have corrected the default to the extent permitted by the portal by filing returns and paying the lawful dues.
10. The appellant further states that, after the first appellate decision, it filed all returns which the portal permitted. It relies on filings dated 22 and 26 May 2026 and claims that compliance was completed through January 2024. The image reproduced in the synopsis displays GSTR-3B entries for November and December 2023 and January 2024, together with GSTR-1/IFF entries for December 2023 and January 2024. The appellant further submits that cancellation blocked filing for the later period and that restoration must come before complete compliance. It undertakes to file the remaining returns and discharge the tax, interest and late fee once access is provided. It also argues that continued cancellation serves neither its business nor the Revenue because it prevents regular taxable business and further return filing.
11. The appellant relies on the proviso to rule 22(4) and cites the High Court decisions in Suguna Cutpiece Center, Jumoni Boruah Phukan and Bal Krishna Sunar. It seeks an order setting aside both impugned orders and restoring registration from the effective date of cancellation, subject to reasonable conditions. Alternatively, it seeks portal access to complete compliance.
12. These submissions require a distinction between what is claimed and what is proved. The complete bank, bereavement and return annexures described in the synopsis are not separately available in the supplied extracts. The visible return image establishes filing activity, but does not by itself prove that every return was filed or every liability paid. Those matters require verification from the complete record and the ledgers.
The Revenue position and the questions for decision
13. No separate written submissions from the Revenue are on record. The departmental representative supported cancellation before the first appellate authority. The Revenue’s position is therefore gathered from the cancellation and appellate orders. According to those orders, the appellant failed to file returns for the prescribed period and, despite the notice, did not file the pending returns or pay the due tax before cancellation. The first appellate authority found that returns had been filed only through June 2023 and that the claimed financial difficulty and necessary tax payment were not supported by evidence. On this basis, cancellation was treated as a valid exercise of power under section 29(2)(c). The Revenue’s position is also that cancellation does not extinguish earlier liabilities or end the obligation to comply. The proper officer accordingly directed the appellant to file the pending returns and GSTR-10.
14. The first question is whether this Tribunal appeal is within the applicable limitation period, including the Department of Revenue’s notified window for earlier orders. The next question is whether the notice and the orders properly establish the prescribed return default. This requires examination of the periods, their due dates and the appellant’s filing frequency. The further questions are whether cancellation prevents all return filing; how regular returns, tax payment and GSTR-10 differ; and what relief the Tribunal may grant under the Act. Finally, it is necessary to decide whether restoration should be granted and, if so, on what conditions.
Whether the appeal is within time
15. The first appeal and the present appeal are governed by different limitation provisions. Section 107(1) ordinarily allows a taxpayer three months from communication of the order to file the first appeal. Section 107(4) permits a limited further period on sufficient cause. Here, the cancellation order was communicated on 5 March 2024 and the first appeal was filed on 1 June 2024. It was therefore within the ordinary three-month period. The present appeal is governed by section 112. Notification S.O. 4220(E), dated 17 September 2025, initially allowed taxpayer appeals against orders communicated before 1 April 2026 to be filed by 30 June 2026. Notification S.O. 3502(E), dated 30 June 2026, superseded that notification and prescribed 31 July 2026 for taxpayer appeals against orders communicated before 1 May 2026. The stated date of communication of the first appellate order is 15 December 2025. It therefore falls within the notified class. Having regard to the notified filing window, we find that the present appeal is within limitation.
Whether the notice and orders establish the default
16. We have examined the notice, the cancellation order with its attachment, and the appellate order. The issue is not whether a registered person is free to disregard the statutory obligation to furnish returns. The issue is whether the particular default necessary for cancellation was clearly disclosed, established with reference to the relevant dates, and considered in a reasoned decision. Section 39(1) of the CGST Act, 2017 requires the ordinary registered person, subject to the statutory exclusions, to furnish an electronic return “for every calendar month or part thereof”. The return contains particulars of supplies, input tax credit and tax liability and must be furnished in the prescribed form, manner and time. The proviso permits notified classes of registered persons to furnish quarterly returns. Section 39(8) requires a return for the applicable tax period even where no supplies have been made. Rule 61 prescribes FORM GSTR-3B. For a monthly filer, the ordinary due date is the twentieth day of the succeeding month. For a quarterly filer in Uttar Pradesh, the ordinary due date is the twenty-fourth day of the month following the quarter, subject to any applicable extension. Therefore, identification of the tax period, filing frequency and due date is necessary before non-filing can be treated as a default. Section 29(2)(c), as applicable to these proceedings, permits cancellation where a registered person, other than the person covered by clause (b), has not furnished returns for the prescribed continuous tax period. Under the provisions effective from 1 October 2022, rule 21(h), applicable to a monthly filer under Section 39(1), uses the words “has not furnished returns for a continuous period of six months”. Rule 21(i) separately deals with a quarterly filer and requires continuous default for two tax periods. The present case must be tested against the provision applicable to the appellant’s actual filing frequency.
17. Rule 22 provides for notice in FORM GST REG-17 and an order in FORM GST REG-
18. The proviso to Section 29(2) requires an opportunity of hearing. Such opportunity must be meaningful. It requires disclosure of the factual case which the registered person is expected to answer. A recital of the statutory ground, without the material particulars which attract that ground, does not satisfy this requirement merely because it appears in the prescribed form.
. In Commissioner of Central Excise, Bangalore v. Brindavan Beverages (P) Ltd., (2007) 5 SCC 388, the Supreme Court explained that the show cause notice is the foundation of the departmental case. Allegations which are vague, lack particulars or are unintelligible deny a proper opportunity to meet the case. This principle applies to the present proceedings because the particular return periods form the factual basis of the alleged continuous default.
In Gorkha Security Services v. Government (NCT of Delhi), (2014) 9 SCC 105, the Supreme Court explained that the notice must sufficiently disclose the grounds and the proposed action so that the affected person can effectively answer them. Although that case concerned blacklisting, the principle of fair notice is relevant here. The proposed action may be clearly discernible from the notice, but the affected person cannot be required to guess the material factual basis of the action.
In Oryx Fisheries (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (2010) 13 SCC 427, the Supreme Court emphasised fair consideration of the reply and adequate reasons in an appealable cancellation order. That case concerned an export-related registration, not GST registration. We rely on its principle governing fair procedure and reasoned decision-making.
In Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. v. Masood Ahmed Khan, (2010) 9 SCC 496, the Supreme Court explained the duty of a quasi-judicial authority to give reasons supporting its conclusions. Reasons disclose the connection between the material considered and the decision reached. They also enable the appellate forum to examine whether the statutory discretion has been exercised on relevant grounds.
In Woolcombers of India Ltd. v. Workers Union [(1974) 3 SCC 318 Hon’ble Supreme court that the very requirement of giving reason is to prevent unfairness or arbitrariness in reaching conclusions. The second principle is based on the jurisprudential doctrine that justice should not only be done, it should also appear to be done as well. A just but unreasoned conclusion does not appear to be just to those who read the same. Reasoned and just conclusion on the other hand will also have the appearance of justice.
18. Applying above principles laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme court , we find that the notice dated 03.01.2024 is non-speaking on the material particulars of the alleged default. It does not state which six months were involved. It does not even disclose an unambiguous beginning and ending period from which those months can be identified. The expression “continuous period of six months” merely repeats the statutory threshold. It does not explain how that threshold was fulfilled in the appellant’s case.
19. The omission is material. Without the return periods and their due dates, it is not possible to test from the notice whether the returns were already overdue, whether the alleged default was continuous, or whether the applicable monthly or quarterly requirement had been met. We do not hold that each month must invariably be set out in a separate entry. A clear and accurate period-wise statement would suffice. The present notice contains no such statement.
20. The cancellation order of proper officer does not cure this defect. It repeats that returns remained unfiled for more than six months and states that pending returns and tax had not been furnished or paid. It therefore contains a brief conclusion, but does not disclose the actual default details supporting that conclusion. The supporting attachment adds no period-wise particulars. In this material respect, the order remains non-speaking and does not show how the statutory condition was established on the record.
21. The appellate order does mention June 2023 as the last period for which returns were filed. We therefore do not hold that it contains no period-related2 information. The difficulty is that its portal-based observation does not establish the historical position when the proper officer issued the notice and passed the order. It neither identifies the actual filing dates nor explains which returns were overdue and outstanding on 03.03.2024. A statement of the position found during the appeal cannot, without this analysis, establish the factual basis of the earlier decision.
22. The distinction is significant. If the appellant was a monthly filer and the returns through June 2023 had already been furnished on 03.01.2024, the ordinary due date for the December 2023 return would have been 20.01.2024. On that basis, only the July to November 2023 monthly returns would have been overdue when the notice was issued. We do not make a final finding that this was the actual position, because the filing dates and filing frequency have not been established in the impugned orders. This illustrates why a finding based on the relevant dates was necessary. If quarterly filing applied, the due date for the October to December quarter also required consideration. The end of a tax period is not the same as the return becoming overdue. An earlier outstanding return or a different proved filing position could affect the calculation.
23. The appellate authority was required to examine whether the original proceedings were founded on the prescribed default and whether the proper officer’s conclusion was supported by the position existing when the order was made. It did not undertake that examination. Subsequent non-compliance may have consequences in accordance with law, but it does not, by itself, supply the missing particulars in the original notice or demonstrate the correctness of the original decision.
24. There is a further defect concerning the effective date. Section 29(2) permits cancellation from a date selected by the proper officer, including a retrospective date. Rule 22(3) also contemplates determination of the effective date. The power exists, but its exercise must rest on reasons relevant to the facts of the case. The cancellation order was passed on 03.03.2024 but made effective from 03.01.2024. The order gives no separate reason why cancellation should operate from the suspension date. The notice also does not expressly propose cancellation with retrospective effect from that date. The appellate authority does not address these matters.
25. Taken together, these defects affect the fairness and factual foundation of the proceedings. The notice is non-speaking on the actual default periods; the subsequent cancellation order does not disclose those particulars; and the appellate order does not determine the relevant filing position when the proper officer passed the order. The unexplained selection of the retrospective date is an additional defect. The impugned orders cannot be sustained on the reasoning disclosed in them.
26. In Kranti Associates (P) Ltd. v. Masood Ahmed Khan, (2010) 9 SCC 496, the Supreme Court observed: “Reasons reassure that discretion has been exercised by the decision maker on relevant grounds and by disregarding extraneous considerations.”
Whether cancellation removes the duty to file returns
27. The appellant’s broad claim that no return can be filed after cancellation cannot be accepted. The Act preserves earlier obligations and expressly provides for return compliance after cancellation. Section 29(3), which is also reproduced in the cancellation order, states:
“The cancellation of registration under this section shall not affect the liability of the person to pay tax and other dues under this Act or to discharge any obligation under this Act or the rules made thereunder for any period prior to the date of cancellation whether or not such tax and other dues are determined before or after the date of cancellation.”
27. Cancellation therefore does not erase earlier tax dues or the duty to account for taxable transactions. The absence of a quantified demand in APL-04 does not establish that no tax is payable. The appellant’s own portal image also shows online filings made in May 2026, long after the cancellation order. That evidence contradicts the claim that cancellation makes every kind of return filing impossible. Further, it is necessary to distinguish return filing from payment. GSTR-1 under section 37 and rule 59 provides outward-supply details. GSTR-3B under section 39 and rule 61 is the periodic return through which the relevant liability is reported and discharged. Filing outward-supply details alone does not establish that the tax has been paid. Similarly, a challan or money lying in the cash ledger does not, without the required debit or adjustment, prove discharge of the liability. A payment through DRC-03, where legally appropriate, is not a substitute for the periodic return. The officer must compare the return, liability register and ledger entries. Amounts already validly paid must be recognised so that the same liability is not collected twice.
28. The narrower claim of a technical block requires separate consideration. Cancellation may prevent filing for some later periods until registration is restored or the portal is enabled. Such a block must be examined with reference to the affected period, the error message and the complaint record. It cannot explain defaults which arose before suspension. Equally, the officer cannot insist on electronic filing while leaving a proved technical block unresolved. The proper course is to provide lawful access and then require timely compliance.
GSTR 10 and other means of compliance
29. Section 45 itself requires a final return after cancellation for a person covered by section 39(1). Its relevant time expression is:
“within three months of the date of cancellation or date of order of cancellation, whichever is later”.
30. Rule 81 prescribes FORM GSTR-10 and requires electronic filing through the common portal, directly or through a notified Facilitation Centre. In this case, the later event was the cancellation order dated 3 March 2024, rather than its effective date of 3 January 2024. Subject to any applicable extension, the original period for the final return ran from the later date. The REG-19 order specifically drew attention to this obligation. GSTR-10 is different from the annual return in GSTR-9. It is also not a combined substitute for unfiled GSTR-1 or GSTR-3B returns. It deals with the final-return requirements arising from cancellation, including relevant stock particulars and liability. Its existence shows that the law permits and requires return filing after cancellation.
31. Section 29(5) separately addresses the prescribed adjustment for stock and capital goods when registration is cancelled. If cancellation is later set aside retrospectively, the officer must reconcile any final return and payment with the restored registration. The appellant cannot be required to treat a continuing business as finally closed merely to obtain restoration. Any remaining obligation must be identified with reasons.
32. Where the portal rejects a legally permissible filing, the appellant should promptly lodge a complaint, preserve the error message and give the officer a signed period-wise statement with available payment proof. This helps establish the attempted compliance and correct the problem.
The power to restore registration
33. The law does not treat every return default as incapable of correction. The proviso to rule 22(4) provides:
“Provided that where the person instead of replying to the notice served under sub-rule (1) for contravention of the provisions contained in clause (b) or clause (c) of sub-section (2) of section 29, furnishes all the pending returns and makes full payment of the tax dues along with applicable interest and late fee, the proper officer shall drop the proceedings and pass an order in FORM GST-REG 20”.
35. This rule requires actual filing and payment. A promise alone is not enough. It directly concerns pending cancellation proceedings. Once a final cancellation order has been made, the taxpayer must ordinarily seek revocation or pursue an appeal. Even so, the rule shows that correction of the default is an important part of the statutory scheme.
36. Section 30 and rule 23 provide for revocation of an officer-initiated cancellation. Under the amended rule applicable from 1 October 2023, the ordinary application period is ninety days from service. The prescribed authority may extend it, on the required grounds, for a further period not exceeding one hundred and eighty days. The old thirty- day application period should not be applied mechanically to the March 2024 order.
37. A separate thirty-day requirement applies to the intervening returns after revocation. Rule 23 requires the default returns and the corresponding lawful dues before relief through the non-filing revocation route. Its further provisos require returns for the period between cancellation and revocation, including retrospective cancellation, within thirty days of the revocation order. This is different from the time allowed to apply for revocation.
38. The present case is before the Tribunal in appeal. Section 113(1) allows it, after giving the parties an opportunity of hearing, to confirm, modify or annul the order, or to remit the matter with directions. A proper officer carrying out an appellate restoration order does not have to decide afresh whether an ordinary REG-21 application is now time- barred.
The right to life and the freedom to carry on business
38. Cancellation can seriously affect a proprietor’s business. It can interfere with the ability to issue valid tax invoices, deal with registered customers and remain part of the credit system. These effects must be considered fairly. At the same time, the Constitution does not give a trader a right to ignore registration conditions, returns or tax payment. Article 19(1)(g) protects a citizen’s freedom to practise a profession or carry on an occupation, trade or business. Article 19(6) permits reasonable restrictions in the public interest.
It has been held by the Hon’ble supreme court in Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corpn., (1985) 3 SCC 545 that “”As we have stated while summing up the petitioners’ case, the main plank of their argument is that the right to life which is guaranteed by Article 21 includes the right to livelihood and since, they will be deprived of their livelihood if they are evicted from their slum and pavement dwellings, their eviction is tantamount to deprivation of their life and is hence unconstitutional. For purposes of argument, we will assume the factual correctness of the premise that if the petitioners are evicted from their dwellings, they will be deprived of their livelihood. Upon that assumption, the question which we have to consider is whether the right to life includes the right to livelihood. We see only one answer
to that question, namely, that it does. The sweep of the right to life conferred by Article 21 is wide and far-reaching. It does not mean merely that life cannot be extinguished or taken away as, for example, by the imposition and execution of the death sentence, except according to procedure established by law. That is but one aspect of the right to life. An equally important facet of that right is the right to livelihood because, no person can live without the means of living, that is, the means of livelihood. If the right to livelihood is not treated as a part of the constitutional right to life, the easiest way of depriving a person of his right to life would be to deprive him of his means of livelihood to the point of abrogation. Such deprivation would not only denude the life of its effective content and meaningfulness but it would make life impossible to live. And yet, such deprivation would not have to be in accordance with the procedure established by law, if the right to livelihood is not regarded as a part of the right to life. That, which alone makes it possible to live, leave aside what makes life livable, must be deemed to be an integral component of the right to life. Deprive a person of his right to livelihood and you shall have deprived him of his life. Indeed, that explains the massive migration of the rural population to big cities. They migrate because they have no means of livelihood in the villages. The motive force which propels their desertion of their hearths and homes in the village is the struggle for survival, that is, the struggle for life. So unimpeachable is the evidence of the nexus between life and the means of livelihood. They have to eat to live : only a handful can afford the luxury of living to eat. That they can do, namely, eat, only if they have the means of livelihood. That is the context in which it was said by Douglas, J. in Baksey [347 US 442, 472 : 98 L Ed 829 (1954)] that the right to work is the most precious liberty that man possesses. It is the most precious liberty because, it sustains and enables a man to live and the right to life is a precious freedom. “Life”, as observed by Field, J. in Munn v. Illinois [(1877) 94 US 113] means something more than mere animal existence and the inhibition against the deprivation of life extends to all those limits and faculties by which life is enjoyed. “
44. The Supreme Court recognised livelihood as an important aspect of the right to life under Article 21. The case concerned eviction of pavement and slum dwellers. It supports careful consideration of the consequences of State action and the need for fair legal procedure. It does not create an exemption from valid tax obligations.
It has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme court in Sodan Singh v. New Delhi Municipal Committee, (1989) 4 SCC 155 that The guarantee under Article 19(1)(g) extends to practise any profession, or to carry on any occupation, trade or business. “Profession” means an occupation carried on by a person by virtue of his personal and specialised qualifications, training or skill. The word “occupation” has a wide meaning such as any regular work,
profession, job, principal activity, employment, business or a calling in which an individual is engaged. “Trade” in its wider sense includes any bargain or sale, any occupation or business carried on for subsistence or profit, it is an act of buying and selling of goods and services. It may include any business carried on with a view to profit whether manual or mercantile. “Business” is a very wide term and would include anything which occupies the time, attention and labour of a man for the purpose of profit. It may include in its form trade, profession, industrial and commercial operations, purchase and sale of goods, and would include anything which is an occupation as distinguished from pleasure. The object of using four analogous and overlapping words in Article 19(1)(g) is to make the guaranteed right as comprehensive as possible to include all the avenues and modes through which a man may earn his livelihood. In a nutshell, the guarantee takes into its fold any activity carried on by a citizen of India to earn his living. The activity must of course be legitimate and not anti-social like gambling, trafficking in women and the like.
45. The Supreme Court considered street trading under Article 19(1)(g), subject to reasonable regulation. It distinguished that business claim from the livelihood setting in Olga Tellis. Here too, the main question is fair regulation of business. Article 21 reinforces the need to consider the effect on livelihood; it does not guarantee continued registration without compliance.
46. A restriction must reasonably serve its purpose. Articles 39(a) and 41 also guide State policy towards livelihood and work, subject to their constitutional limits. Under Article 37 they do not independently override tax legislation. Article 265 requires authority of law for tax collection. These principles support a fair opportunity to correct default, but not an invented restoration fee, an unadjudicated penalty or a tax waiver beyond the Tribunal’s power. The balance is therefore between effective compliance and avoidable harm to a lawful business. Restoration with enforceable conditions can serve both purposes where the particular facts justify it.
47. The principles discussed above support a meaningful opportunity to correct return defaults where the circumstances justify restoration. Such an opportunity must preserve the duty to file returns and discharge lawful dues. Financial hardship may explain a lapse, but it does not extinguish a statutory obligation. Similarly, restoration does not establish entitlement to every credit claimed. The complete return history and payment records must be examined, and actual compliance must follow the opportunity granted.
48. In the present case, the appellant’s subsequent filing activity, its undertaking to complete compliance and the nature of the alleged default support conditional restoration. We have already held that the appeal is within limitation. A structured opportunity can protect the business while preserving the Revenue’s right to recover lawful dues and verify compliance. The overall period of sixty days granted below is a case-specific arrangement for compliance. It does not extend any shorter mandatory statutory requirement, waive lawful dues or restart any period of limitation for raising a demand.
Findings on restoration and the time for compliance
42. The stated ground of cancellation is return filing default for continuous six months and there is no further allegation such as fraudulent registration, false invoices or misuse of input tax credit. As discussed above, the notice and the impugned orders suffer from defects concerning the identification of the default periods, the relevant filing position and the effective date of cancellation. In these circumstances, continued cancellation without a structured opportunity to comply would cause further difficulty to the business without necessarily improving collection. Conditional restoration is therefore appropriate under section 113.
43. The appellant’s broad assertion that cancellation prevents every return is rejected. Earlier obligations survive, and the record itself shows later filings. However, genuine portal restrictions for the intervening period must be removed so that the remaining lawful filings can be made. The Revenue is entitled to verify the full history and payments. Restoration does not amount to a finding that all dues have already been paid.
44. An overall period of sixty days from the date of this order is appropriate for completing the reconciliation, making lawful payments and submitting the compliance report.
Final order
45. The appeal is allowed on the following terms. The first appellate order dated 8 December 2025, bearing APL-04 reference ZD091225140021Z, and the cancellation order dated 3 March 2024 in FORM GST REG-19 are set aside. Registration bearing GSTIN 09ADPPM6723Q1ZL shall be restored with effect from 3 January 2024, subject to the following compliance requirements.
46. The proper officer shall give effect to this order on the common portal within fifteen days of receiving it.
47. Within sixty days from the date of this order, the appellant shall provide a complete period-wise reconciliation from the first default through restoration, furnish the return acknowledgements and payment particulars, discharge unpaid self-assessed and admitted lawful dues with applicable interest and late fee, and submit a consolidated compliance report. Full credit shall be given for amounts already validly discharged. Duplicate returns or payments shall not be required.
48. All pending returns which are legally permissible shall be filed electronically in the prescribed forms. Current returns shall be filed by their ordinary due dates. Nil returns shall be filed wherever required.
49 Registry is directed to make available a copy of this order to the Revenue officer for compliance. Order pronounced in the open Tribunal proceeding .
