Dhanasekaran Vs Union of India (Madras High Court)
Summary: The Madras High Court, in Dhanasekaran Vs Union of India, dismissed the bail application of an accused allegedly involved in transporting 10 kilograms of methamphetamine, holding that merely accompanying Directorate of Revenue Intelligence (DRI) officers for enquiry does not automatically constitute arrest or detention. The petitioner, arrayed as A5 in C.C.No.165 of 2025, was travelling with A4 and A6 in a car intercepted by DRI officials on 29 August 2024 at approximately 8.30 p.m. The contraband was allegedly recovered from a secret chamber in the vehicle. The petitioner contended that the car belonged to A6, that he had no knowledge of the concealed contraband and that the prosecution attributed its purchase to A4 and A6. His principal argument was that, although the vehicle was intercepted on 29 August 2024, he was remanded to judicial custody only on 31 August 2024, beyond the permissible period of 24 hours. He therefore challenged the legality of his custody and sought bail.
The petitioner relied upon Directorate of Enforcement Vs Subhash Sharma (2025 SCC OnLine SC 240), Biswajit Mandal Vs Inspector, Narcotic Control Bureau (2025 SCC OnLine Ker 6017), Dhanraj Aswani Vs Amar S. Mulchandani and Another [(2024) 10 SCC 336] and T. Ramadevi Vs State of Telangana (2024 SCC OnLine TS 4288) to contend that the 24-hour period must be calculated from the commencement of actual detention rather than the formal recording of arrest. The Special Public Prosecutor opposed the application, submitting that interception of the vehicle and the direction to accompany investigating officers did not amount to arrest. According to the prosecution, the petitioner was initially examined pursuant to summons issued under Section 43 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023, and was formally arrested only on 31 August 2024 after the authorities became satisfied about his involvement. The prosecution therefore disputed the allegation that the petitioner had been detained illegally before his formal arrest.
Justice C. Kumarappan examined whether the petitioner’s attendance with DRI officers following interception of the vehicle amounted to detention triggering the 24-hour requirement. The Court distinguished Subhash Sharma, where detention had commenced pursuant to a Look Out Circular, and observed that no comparable material established detention in the present case. Referring to Dhanraj Aswani, the Court considered the requirement of communicating compulsion to the person concerned before an arrest could be regarded as having taken place. It also distinguished T. Ramadevi, which recognised that the 24-hour period runs from actual detention rather than a subsequently recorded arrest. The High Court held that the petitioner had failed to establish a factual foundation showing earlier detention. It noted that summons had been issued, the petitioner had been questioned and his arrest was effected after the investigating authorities formed the requisite belief regarding his involvement. The remand application, which referred to his attendance at the DRI office and subsequent arrest, did not independently establish that he had been detained from the time of interception.
The High Court further observed that the alleged recovery involved 10 kilograms of methamphetamine, constituting commercial quantity under the NDPS Act. Consequently, the stringent restrictions on bail prescribed under Section 37 of the NDPS Act, 1985, were applicable. The Court found no material or circumstance sufficient to overcome the statutory embargo. It rejected the contention that the interval between interception and judicial remand, without proof of actual earlier detention, rendered the petitioner’s custody illegal. Accordingly, the Criminal Original Petition was dismissed. The decision clarifies that, for determining compliance with the 24-hour production requirement, the decisive consideration is the actual commencement of detention, which must be established from the facts and circumstances of the case. Mere interception, attendance before investigating officers or participation in an enquiry does not, by itself, establish that arrest or detention has commenced.
Cases Discussed
1. Directorate of Enforcement Vs Subhash Sharma (Supreme Court); 2025 SCC OnLine SC 240.
Principle: Where detention begins pursuant to a Look Out Circular, the period for production before a Magistrate is calculated from the actual commencement of detention.
Treatment: Distinguished on facts because the petitioner had not established comparable detention when he accompanied the DRI officers.
2. Biswajit Mandal Vs Inspector, Narcotic Control Bureau (Kerala High Court); 2025 SCC OnLine Ker 6017.
Treatment: Cited by the petitioner in support of the contention concerning detention and the 24-hour requirement. The judgment does not separately analyse its factual or legal ratio.
3. Dhanraj Aswani Vs Amar S. Mulchandani and Another (Supreme Court); (2024) 10 SCC 336.
Principle: The judgment discusses communication of compulsion and submission to that compulsion in determining when arrest takes place.
Treatment: Distinguished because the High Court found no comparable communication or restraint when the petitioner initially accompanied the officers.
4. T. Ramadevi Vs State of Telangana (Telangana High Court); 2024 SCC OnLine TS 4288.
Principle: The 24-hour period is calculated from actual detention rather than a subsequently recorded formal arrest.
Treatment: Distinguished because the petitioner had not established an earlier period of detention.
FULL TEXT OF THE ORDER OF MADRAS HIGH COURT
The petitioner, who was arrested and remanded to judicial custody on 30.08.2024 for the offences punishable under Sections 8(c), 22(c), 25, 25A, 27, 28, 29 and 30 of the NDPS Act in C.C.No.165 of 2025 on the file of the learned Principal Special Court for EC and NDPS Act Cases, Chennai, in connection with R.R.No.44 of 2024 in F.No.DRI/CZU/VIII/48/ENQ-1/INT-27/2024 on the file of the respondent, seeks bail.
2. The case of the prosecution is that the petitioner is arrayed as A5 in this case. It is alleged that while A4 to A6 were transporting 10 kgs of Methamphetamine from Chennai to Madurai in a car, the respondent officials intercepted the said car and recovered the contraband from a secret chamber in the vehicle. Hence, the petitioner, along with A4 and A6, was arrested. Based on the statements recorded from the other accused, A1 and A3 were also arrested and they are also in custody.
3. The learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that there are six accused in the present case and the petitioner is arrayed as A5. It is his further submission that, according to the prosecution, on 29.08.2024 at about 8.30 p.m., the respondent officials intercepted a car belonging to A6, in which A4 and the present petitioner were also travelling. On search of the vehicle, the respondent officials recovered 10 kgs of Methamphetamine from a secret chamber. Thereafter, the petitioner was arrested on 31.08.2024. It is the specific submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner is not the owner of the car and that A6 alone is the owner of the car. It is further submitted that there are no allegations or averments in the complaint as to the petitioner having knowledge of the existence of the secret chamber in the car.
4. It is the further contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner that it is not even the prosecution case that the petitioner was part of the team which purchased the contraband. According to the prosecution, A4 and A6 purchased the contraband from A3. The main contention put forth by the learned counsel for the petitioner is that, though the petitioner was intercepted in the car while travelling along with A4 and A6 on 29.08.2024 at about 8.30 p.m., he was remanded to judicial custody only after a period exceeding 24 hours. Therefore, according to him, the very custody of the petitioner is illegal. In this connection, the learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the following judgments:-
(i) Directorate of Enforcement Vs. Subhash Sharma, reported in 2025 SCC OnLine SC 240;
(ii) Biswajit Mandal Vs. Inspector, Narcotic Control Bureau, reported in 2025 SCC OnLine Ker 6017;
(iii) Dhanraj Aswani Vs. Amar S. Mulchandani and another, reported in (2024) 10 SCC 336; and
(iv) T. Ramadevi Vs. State of Telangana, reported in 2024 SCC OnLine TS 4288.
5. The said contention was stoutly opposed by the learned Special Public Prosecutor appearing for the respondent, who would contend that the mere interception of the vehicle at 8.30 p.m. on 29.08.2024 and the direction to accompany the officers for the purpose of search and investigation would not amount to arrest. It is the further submission of the learned Special Public Prosecutor that the petitioner’s arrest was effected only on 31.08.2024 and, in the meanwhile, the petitioner was examined after issuance of summons under Section 43 of the BNSS. Hence, he prayed for dismissal of the present petition.
6. I have given my anxious consideration to either side submissions.
7. It is not in dispute that the vehicle in which the petitioner was travelling was intercepted on 29.08.2024 and that the petitioner was subsequently remanded to judicial custody on 31.08.2024. Therefore, it is an admitted fact that the time between the interception of the vehicle in which the petitioner was travelling and the time of remand exceeds 24 hours. The point that arises for our consideration is whether the interception of the vehicle for the purpose of search, and the direction to the petitioner to accompany the officers for the purpose of search and investigation, would amount to arrest.
8. In this case, though the petitioner heavily relied upon the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Subhash Sharma’s case (cited supra), in the reported case, the appellant was issued with a Look Out Circular, only on that basis, he was detained at IGI Airport, and was thereafter remanded after 24 hours. The facts in the present case are distinguishable from the reported case. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the very Look Out Circular itself conferred power to detain and therefore, the period of 24 hours had to be reckoned from the time of detention.
9. Similarly, the petitioner has also relied upon the judgment in Dhanraj Aswani’s case (cited supra), wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court dealt with the issue relating to anticipatory bail of an arrested person and observed that the person sought to be arrested must be made aware that he is under compulsion, and as a result of such communication, the said person should submit to the compulsion can be said to have been consummated the arrest.
10. However, in the present case, the factual position is altogether different. Here, at the time when the petitioner accompanied the officials, no formal notice or communication was made to him informing that he was under arrest, and therefore, the same cannot be termed as “detention” in the sense understood in Subhash Sharma’s case (cited supra). Further, before arrest the Police Officer must have reason to believe that such person has committed the offence. Here, the respondent appears to have initially proceeded to ascertain to find out is there is any reason to believe, whether the petitioner had any involvement in the offence or not, and only after completion of such enquiry, and upon being satisfied about the petitioner’s involvement in the offence, effected arrest on 31.08.2024.
11. At this juncture, it is also relevant to refer to the judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court of Telangana in T. Ramadevi’s case (cited supra), wherein the Division Bench held that Section 57 of Cr.P.C. deals with detention and that the period of 24 hours has to be calculated from the date and time of detention, and not from the subsequent date and time of arrest as recorded by the prosecuting agency. However, the said ruling is not applicable to the present case, since the petitioner has not made out any factual foundation to establish any detention, except the fact that he had accompanied the respondent officials pursuant to their instructions for the purpose of further legal formalities. It is also relevant to refer that the summons were issued to the petitioner and, upon interrogation pursuant to the said summons, the respondent authorities were satisfied about his involvement and thereafter effected arrest on 31.08.2024. The very fact that summons issued to the petitioner discloses the fact that, he was a free man till his arrest and he was not at all in detention.
12. Therefore, this Court is of the firm view that the rulings relied upon by the petitioner have no application to the facts of the present case. Further, the quantity involved is 10 kgs of Methamphetamine, which is a commercial quantity. In order to overcome the rigour under Section 37 of the NDPS Act, there are no materials available before this Court. Even the submissions made by the learned counsel for the petitioner do not disclose any circumstance sufficient to overcome the said statutory embargo.
13. Though the learned counsel for the petitioner relied upon the remand application, the same only narrates the sequence of events and merely refers to the fact that the petitioner was taken to the office of the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, Chennai, and thereafter, the very same remand report also refers to the issuance of summons and the subsequent arrest. Therefore, the mere reference to the petitioner having been instructed to come to the office of the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence cannot, by itself, be construed as detention.
14. In the result, this Criminal Original Petition is dismissed.



