Foreign Export Declarations & Customs Valuation: Revisiting Section 139 & Burden of Proof

Summary: The article examines the CESTAT Principal Bench order dated 21 August 2026 in Commissioner of Customs & Excise, Patparganj v. Premier Plastic Industries, which allowed three Revenue appeals and restored customs duty demands of approximately ₹71.21 lakh and equivalent penalties. The dispute concerned allegedly undervalued imports of urea-formaldehyde kitchenware and foreign export declarations obtained through the Indian Consulate in Hong Kong. The Tribunal treated those declarations as attracting Section 139 of the Customs Act, 1962, considered statements recorded under Section 108 and a ₹3 lakh deposit, and upheld rejection of declared transaction values. Author Amandeep Mehta questions whether Section 139(ii) creates a presumption about the truth of foreign documents, arguing that admissibility does not itself prove contents, authenticity or the price actually paid. The analysis distinguishes the statutory treatment of documents produced or seized in India from documents received abroad and examines whether Section 139, situated in the chapter on offences and prosecutions, extends to duty adjudication under Section 28. It compares the Tribunal’s reasoning with the Supreme Court’s decision in Ganpati Overseas and distinguishes earlier CESTAT authorities based on their supporting evidence. The article further questions the evidentiary status of an investigator-prepared comparative chart, the absence of a separate finding on the ingredients of Section 114A penalty, and inconsistent descriptions of the alleged value differential. These are the author’s critical arguments, not findings made by a higher court setting aside the Tribunal’s order.

Foreign Export Declarations and Customs Valuation: Revisiting Section 139 and the Burden of Proof

By Amandeep Mehta^[1]

Introduction

On 21^st August 2026, the Principal Bench of the CESTAT^[2] at New Delhi allowed three Revenue appeals and set aside Orders-in-Appeal that had dropped customs duty demands of roughly Rs. 71.21 lakh, together with equivalent penalties under Section 114A of the Customs Act, 1962 (“the Act”). The demands rested on foreign export declarations obtained from Hong Kong through the Indian Consulate, which were said to show that the importer had declared about two-thirds of the true value.

The Order treats Section 139(ii) of the Act providing for a presumption of correctness to those declarations and treats the importer’s failure to produce material controverting the declarations as fatal. This note examines that reasoning. It argues that the Order sits uneasily with the text of Section 139 of the Act, and is contrary to the view taken by the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Customs v. Ganpati Overseas, 2023 INSC 881. It also identifies several issues that were raised but are not decided in the Order.

Background of the Customs Valuation Dispute

The proceedings arose from a consignment cleared at ICD Ballabgarh and declared as “Urea Houseware – Trays and Bowls” under CTH 68159990. On examination, 19 excess cartons of bowls were found, and some goods bore a brand name that had not been declared. A CRCL report dated 20.01.2012 found the goods to be kitchenware made of urea formaldehyde resin.

The Revenue then made an overseas enquiry. The documents received through the Indian Consulate in Hong Kong, and a comparative chart prepared from them, were said to show that the exporter had declared substantially higher values to Chinese Customs. The three show cause notices followed. The Orders-in-Original confirmed the demands. The Commissioner (Appeals) set them aside, holding that the unattested photocopies of foreign documents were not admissible and that Section 139 of the Act did not apply. The Revenue appealed to the CESTAT.

Findings Recorded by CESTAT

The Tribunal held the following in substance:

The documents received from Hong Kong fall within Section 139(ii) of the Act i.e. they bear a presumption of correctness unless the contrary is proved. Furthermore, the importer’s objections i.e. the documents were unsigned, unstamped, and in a foreign language did not rebut the presumption under Section 139 of the Act.

The authentication under the Diplomatic and Consular Officers (Oaths and Fees) Act, 1948 is not a precondition to reliance on documents received from foreign customs authorities.

The importer’s statements under Section 108 of the Act, together with the deposit of ₹3 lakh, amounted to an acknowledgement of undervaluation, and such statements are substantive evidence.

The transaction value was rightly rejected under Rule 12 of the Customs Valuation (Determination of Value of Imported Goods) Rules, 2007 and Rules 4 to 9 were followed sequentially.

The penalty under Section 114A of the Act is mandatory once the demand is upheld.

Section 139(ii)(b): Admissibility Is Not Proof of Contents

^[3]

The tribunal in the aforesaid order has accepted the revenue’s plea that the foreign export declarations, having been received through official channels, attract the presumption under Section 139(ii) of the Customs Act, 1962^[4]. Section 139 contemplates two classes of documents. Firstly, the documents produced by, or seized from, a person under the Act^[5]; and secondly, the documents received from outside India during the investigation of an offence under the Act^[6]. The consequences are set out in three limbs. Under clause (a), the court presumes that signatures and handwriting are genuine. Under clause (b), the court admits the document in evidence notwithstanding that it is not duly stamped, “if such document is otherwise admissible in evidence”. Under clause (c), the court presumes the truth of the contents, but only “in a case falling under clause (i)”

The Tribunal’s interpretation of Section 139(ii)(b) of the Act is contrary to the plain language of the provision. The expression “if such document is otherwise admissible in evidence” is a clear statutory threshold on the operation of clause (ii)(b) of the Act. The effect of the said qualification is that Section 139(ii)(b) of the Act does not itself make every document received from outside India admissible or conclusive in proof. The provision merely removes the limited objection, namely, that the document shall not be excluded solely on account of the circumstances in which it was received i.e. from outside India.  Furthermore, the provision also provides for a specific relaxation “notwithstanding that it is not duly stamped”.  It is argued that beyond the limited relaxation, the document must continue to satisfy the ordinary rules governing documentary evidence and its evidentiary worth must be independently assessed by the adjudicating authority.

The Parliament has consciously relaxed the objection relating to stamping. However, it has not enacted any corresponding relaxation in respect of unsigned, unauthenticated or photocopied documents or charts, nor has it dispensed with the requirement that the document be otherwise admissible in evidence. To read such additional relaxations into the provision would amount to supplying words which the legislature has deliberately omitted.

It is a settled^[7] canon of interpretation that where the legislature has expressly dealt with one class of cases, the Court cannot, by implication or intendment, extend the benefit or relaxation so provided in the provision, to other situations not contemplated by the text. If Parliament intended that every unsigned, unauthenticated or photocopied document received through official channels should automatically be received and acted upon, it would have said so in express terms. The Revenue’s argument, accepted by the Tribunal, effectively reads into the provision a rule of automatic admissibility and proof of contents for every document received from outside the country through official channels.

The documents relied upon by the Department are described in the order as copies of foreign declarations. The Tribunal records that they were received through official channels and that the Department prepared a comparative chart in english. It does not, however, identify the original declarations, explain how the copies were authenticated by their purported maker or custodian, or record evidence from a person able to establish their provenance and contents. The distinction matters particularly where the documents are relied upon to establish the price declared in the exporting country.

Such documents constitute, at best, secondary evidence. It is settled law^[8] that secondary evidence cannot be relied upon unless the statutory foundation prescribed by Section 65 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (“the Evidence Act”) is first established. Equally well settled is the principle that mere admission or exhibition of a document does not amount to proof of its contents. Although the provisions of the Evidence Act do not apply proprio vigore to customs adjudication, the material relied upon must still possess sufficient probative value to sustain the finding of undervaluation^[9]. The question, therefore, is not merely whether the copies could be looked at, but whether they reliably establish the contents attributed to them and the price paid or payable.

Whilst the Parliament has expressly provided a presumption regarding the truth of the contents only in cases falling under clause (i), no corresponding presumption has been enacted in respect of documents falling under clause (ii) of the Act. The omission is deliberate and must be given due effect. It follows that, even where a foreign document is received in evidence under Section 139(ii) of the Act, its contents remain open to scrutiny and evaluation on their own merits. It is therefore evident from the plain language of the provision that it creates neither an irrebuttable presumption in favour of the Department nor an absolute rule as to the truth of documents received from abroad during an investigation into an alleged offence.

In addition, the Respondent-importer ought to have argued that the Department’s reliance upon the expression “shall admit the document in evidence” occurring in clause (b) of Section 139 is misplaced. Section 139(ii)(b) of the Act is procedural in character. It governs the receipt of documentary evidence and does not create a substantive rule dispensing with proof of the truth or correctness of the contents of the document. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in P.T. Rajan v. T.P.M. Sahir, 2003 INSC 514 held that the use of the word “shall” is not decisive of whether a provision is mandatory or directory, especially in the case of procedural provisions.

Does Section 139 Apply to Adjudication Under Section 28?

Section 139 sits in Chapter XVI, headed as “Offences and Prosecutions”, comprising Sections 132 to 140 of the Act. The provisions contained in the Chapter deal with offences, cognizance, and sanction for prosecution. The placement of Section 139 of the Act within this Chapter is neither incidental nor without significance. The Tribunal’s acceptance of the Department’s reliance on Section 139(ii)(b) of the Act is misconceived. It is argued that Section 139 of the Act does not apply to proceedings under Section 28 of the Customs Act.

The language employed in Section 139(ii) of the Act makes it apparent that Section 139 does not apply to proceedings under Section 28 of the Act at all. Parliament has consciously used the expressions “offence”, “prosecution”, “tried” and “court”. These are expressions associated with criminal proceedings. Equally significant is what the provision omits. It contains no reference to the “adjudicating authority”, the “Commissioner (Appeals)” or the “Appellate Tribunal”, though these are recognised statutory authorities under the Act and are expressly referred to elsewhere wherever Parliament intended a provision to apply to adjudicatory proceedings. For instance, Section 28AA i.e. “Interest on delayed payment of duty” expressly refers to “any Court, Appellate Tribunal or any authority”, thereby recognising each as a distinct statutory forum whose direction will have a direct bearing on the liability to pay interest under Section 28AA of the Act. Section 139(ii), however, refers only to “the Court” and makes no reference to the adjudicating authority, the Commissioner (Appeals), the Appellate Tribunal or any other authority. The omission is deliberate and must be given effect.

The Customs Act expressly defines and recognises the terms “adjudicating authority”, the “Commissioner (Appeals)” and the “Appellate Tribunal”. However, Section 139(ii) does not employ any of these defined expressions. Instead, Parliament has used the undefined term “court”, in conjunction with the words “prosecution”, “offence” and “tried”. Read in context, the term “court” must therefore receive its ordinary legal meaning i.e. a Court of law competent to hold a person criminally liable. Therefore, the meaning of the term court” in respect of Section 139 cannot be expanded to include statutory adjudication or appellate authorities under the Act.

It is a settled principle of statutory interpretation that the legislature is presumed to use different expressions deliberately, and where different words are employed in the same enactment, they cannot ordinarily be treated as synonymous. Equally well settled is the principle that a court cannot rewrite a statute by substituting one expression for another, supplying a casus omissus, or enlarging the scope of a provision by importing words consciously omitted by Parliament. To construe the expression “court” in Section 139(ii) as including the adjudicating authority or the appellate authorities constituted under the Act would therefore amount to rewriting the statutory text. Such an interpretation would obliterate the distinction consciously maintained by Parliament between a “Court” and the statutory authorities created under the Act, and would consequently be contrary to both the plain language and the overall scheme of the enactment.

The strongest textual support comes from within the same Chapter of the Act. Section 138B(2) of the Act provides that sub-section (1), on the relevance of statements, applies, so far as may be, to any proceeding under the Act other than a proceeding before a court, as it applies before a court. Section 138C makes microfilms, facsimile copies and computer printouts admissible in “any proceedings” under the Act. Section 139 has no equivalent. Pertinently, wherever the Parliament intended a Chapter XVI evidentiary rule to govern adjudication, it said so.

Recently, the Karnataka High Court, in Commissioner of Customs v. Jyothi C. Jain^[10], held that Section 138B of the Act applies only to offences and prosecutions i.e. criminal proceedings because it sits in Chapter XVI of the Act. Whilst the judgment does not expressly controvert or return any finding on the aspect of Section 138B(2) of the Act, the parliament’s omission to add a corresponding provision like Section 138B(2) in Section 139 of the Act, is rather notable.

Furthermore, it is apposite to advert to Section 132(4A) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. Although enacted under a different fiscal statute, the provision embodies a statutory presumption analogous to that contained in Section 139 of the Customs Act. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has recognised that, where analogous provisions in fiscal statutes raise common questions of interpretation, principles evolved under one enactment may legitimately guide the construction of another^[11]. It is in this limited and well-recognised sense that reference is made to Section 132(4A) of the Act and the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in P.R. Metrani v. CIT [2006] 287 ITR 209 (SC)^[12].  Section 132 of the Income-tax Act governs search and seizure proceedings, which, under the erstwhile statutory framework, could lead to a distinct assessment under Section 132(5), separate from a regular assessment under Section 143(3). Against this backdrop, the question before the Hon’ble Supreme Court was whether the presumption under Section 132(4A), though enacted in the context of search proceedings, could also be invoked in regular assessment proceedings under Section 143(3), or whether its operation was confined to proceedings under Section 132(5).

The Court held that a statutory presumption is confined to the proceedings for which Parliament has enacted it and cannot be extended by implication to a different class of proceedings. The principle applies with equal force here. Section 139(ii) of the Act, by its express language, operates in the context of prosecution before a Court. It cannot be extended, by way of interpretation, to adjudication proceedings under Section 28 in the absence of express legislative mandate. The proceedings in Premier Plastic arose from a notice issued under Section 28 for determination of alleged differential duty and consequential penalty. They are adjudication proceedings and not a criminal prosecution before a Court. Section 139(ii) of the Act, therefore, does not operate in the manner as held by the Tribunal and therefore, the Revenue cannot seek a refuge in the said section for making its case.

Burden of Proof and the Supreme Court Ruling in Ganpati Overseas

In Ganpati Overseas^[13] the Supreme Court dealt with the same kind of evidence i.e. unattested photocopies of foreign export declarations relied on to allege under-invoicing. The Court reaffirmed that undervaluation must be proved by the Department, that it must show how declarations made in the exporting country were procured, and that even in adjudication the authority must examine the probative value of the documents relied on. In the present case, the evidence relied upon in Premier Plastic comprised export declarations pertaining to four Bills of Entry, written in a foreign language, and a chart prepared by the Indian Customs authorities. Neither, without proper authentication and proof, could suffice to discharge the Department’s burden.

The Premier Plastic Order does not refer to Ganpati Overseas. Its reasoning instead turns, at paragraphs 7.2, 7.4 and 9, on what the importer failed to do. It produced no translation, no contrary document and no proof that the declarations were different. That is a rebuttal-of-presumption analysis, and it places the evidentiary burden on the importer at the outset. Under Ganpati Overseas, the onus shifts to the importer only after the Department has discharged its initial burden with cogent evidence.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ganpati Overseas^[14] has held that unattested photocopies of foreign export declarations, without anyone proving or owning their authenticity, possess no evidentiary value and cannot constitute the basis for alleging under-valuation^[15]. This raises the question whether the Tribunal’s failure to follow the Supreme Court’s ruling on the very issue renders its decision per incuriam, particularly when it proceeded to hold that Section 139 of the Act had rightly been invoked by the original adjudicating authority, notwithstanding that the documents were photocopies of declarations made before the Chinese Customs authorities.^[16]

The Revenue ought to have distinguished Ganpati Overseas on its own facts before the Tribunal, in particular that in Ganpati Overseas, the foreign supplier later filed a second set of declarations at lower values which the Hong Kong authority accepted. In fairness, that is a notable distinction, however, it does not dispose of the proposition that unproved copies of purported export declarations do not become proof by being tendered.

The Tribunal relied on its own earlier decision in Decor Rubber Industries v. Commissioner of Customs, New Delhi^[17],which adopted the same rebuttal of presumption approach without taking note of the law laid down in Ganpati Overseas. That decision was rendered on 03.11.2023, after the judgment in Ganpati Overseas was rendered by the apex court on 06.10.2023. However, even the Tribunal’s order in Decor Rubber fails to distinguish the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ganpati Overseas.

At paragraph 7.3, the Tribunal relies upon Orson Electronics Pvt. Ltd. v. Collector of Customs, Bombay^[18], Décor Rubber Industries v. Commissioner of Customs, New Delhi^[19], and Martwin Electronics v. Commissioner of Central Excise & Service Tax, Ahmedabad^[20]. It is submitted that all three decisions are distinguishable on facts. The authorities relied upon by the Tribunal do not establish that the mere receipt of foreign export declarations through official channels is sufficient to prove undervaluation. In each, the declarations were supported by independent evidence.

Decor Rubber Industries: Supporting Evidence

In Decor Rubber Industries v. Commissioner of Customs, the four Chinese export declarations were correlated with the corresponding imports through matching Bills of Lading, container numbers, vessel particulars and dates. The declarations had been obtained through official channels; Hong Kong Customs had expressly stated that it had no objection to their use in judicial proceedings in India, and they bore the signatures of the exporter’s merchandiser and accountant. The Department had also obtained an independent market quotation. Further, the proprietor admitted that five rolls had not been declared in the relevant Bill of Entry. Significantly, the Tribunal upheld enhancement only in respect of five Bills of Entry for which supporting evidence was available and the demand in respect of the remaining ten was dropped.

Martwin Electronics: Official Authentication

In Martwin Electronics v. Commissioner of Central Excise & Service Tax, the export declarations were forwarded by Hong Kong Customs under its official letter, accompanied by an express no-objection to their use in judicial proceedings in India. They also bore the signatures of the exporter’s representatives.

Orson Electronics: Corroborating Admission

In Orson Electronics Pvt. Ltd. v. Collector of Customs, the foreign invoices were supported by the statement of Shri M.R. Chhabria, who held positions in both the importing company and the foreign supplier and identified the invoices and acknowledged their genuineness.

The Tribunal records that the proprietor made statements under Section 108 and expressly treats them as an admission of undervaluation. That finding must be acknowledged. However, the order neither reproduces the relevant portions of those statements nor explains whether the proprietor admitted that the price actually paid to the supplier exceeded the declared invoice value. Further, it identifies no independent valuation material or consignment-wise correlation to justify extending the allegation of undervaluation to the remaining Bills of Entry. The cited decisions do not dispense with the need to examine the authenticity, probative value and relevance of the material relied upon.

Whether a Comparative Chart Qualifies as a Foreign Document

Section 139(ii) of the Act, however, applies only to “document” received from a place outside India in the course of investigation. The Comparative Chart is not the foreign document contemplated by the provision. It may merely be a comparative statement prepared for the purpose of investigation, vis-à-vis the values declared before Indian Customs with figures allegedly appearing in foreign export declarations^[21]. The benefit of Section 139 of the Act as regards a foreign document cannot, by implication, be extended to an analytical chart prepared by an indian investigating agency.

The statutory scheme reinforces this construction. The Explanation to Section 139, as amended by the Finance Act, 2021, expressly includes inventories, photographs and lists certified by a Magistrate under Section 110(1C) or by the Commissioner (Appeals) under Section 110(1D) within the meaning of “document”. The parliament has thus recognised certification as an evidentiary safeguard even for these categories of documents. It would be incongruous to accord unsigned and unauthenticated photocopies of an analytical chart allegedly originating abroad a higher evidentiary status than documents for which the Act expressly contemplates certification before statutory presumptions may operate.

Even otherwise, the export declarations do not satisfy the requirements contemplated by Section 139 of the Act. Significantly, clause (a) of Section 139 proceeds on the footing that the document “purports to be” signed, written, executed or attested by a particular person, whereupon the Court may presume the genuineness of such signature or execution unless the contrary is proved. The provision presupposes the existence of a signature, execution or attestation capable of attracting the statutory presumption. In the present case, the documents relied upon by the Department are admittedly unsigned and unauthenticated photocopies^[22]. The foundational facts necessary to invoke clause (a) were therefore absent.

Other Notable Discrepancies

Section 114A Penalty

Penalty: Paragraph 10.2 describes Section 114A as mandatory and equal to the duty. That is correct as to quantum once the statutory conditions are made out. The Order, however, makes no separate finding on collusion, wilful mis-statement or suppression, and appears to infer them from the undervaluation finding itself.

Internal Consistency of Valuation Figures

Internal consistency of the figures: The Order describes the undervaluation as approximately 68% of the FOB value^[23], as a value declared in China “almost four times” the declared value^[24], and as a value “almost 65% higher” than declared in India^[25].

Conclusion

The decision in Premier Plastic Industries raises an important question i.e. what does Section 139 of the Customs Act permit the Department to presume from foreign documents? The provision distinguishes between the admissibility of a document and the truth of its contents. In particular, clause (c) confines the presumption as to the truth of contents to documents covered by clause (i). A foreign document covered by clause (ii) does not, merely because it has been received through official channels, carry the same presumption.

The question assumes further significance in proceedings under Section 28 of the Act. Section 139 refers to prosecutions and trials, whereas other provisions in the same Chapter expressly extend to proceedings before customs authorities. Whether Section 139 also applies to customs adjudication therefore remains open to examination and ought to be tested in appeal or an appropriate case.

The Supreme Court’s decision in Ganpati Overseas makes clear that the Department must establish undervaluation through reliable evidence. The importer’s failure to produce a translation or contrary material cannot, by itself, relieve the Department of that burden. The Tribunal’s reasoning in Premier Plastic must be considered against this principle in appeal or an appropriate case.

The decision thus brings into focus three related questions: the scope of Section 139, the evidentiary value of foreign export declarations and reconciliation charts, and the burden of proving undervaluation. At their heart is a simple distinction, receiving a document from an official source is not the same as proving the truth of its contents.

Cases Discussed

• Commissioner of Customs v. Jyothi C. Jain — Customs Appeal No. 2 of 2023, 2025:KHC:31367-DB (Karnataka High Court). The author discusses its treatment of Section 138B and Chapter XVI.
• Union of India v. Rajeev Bansal — 2024 INSC 754 (Supreme Court). Cited on statutory interpretation and the limits of judicial supplementation of legislation.
• Decor Rubber Industries v. Commissioner of Customs, New Delhi — (2023) 12 Centax 238 (Tri.-Del.), decided 03.11.2023 (CESTAT Delhi). Distinguished on independent corroboration and consignment-wise evidence.
• Commissioner of Customs (Imports), Mumbai v. Ganpati Overseas — 2023 INSC 881; [2023] 13 SCR 172 (Supreme Court). Contrasted on the Department’s burden to authenticate overseas records and prove undervaluation.
• Martwin Electronics v. Commissioner of Central Excise & Service Tax, Ahmedabad — 2016 (331) ELT 85 (Tri.-Ahmd.). Distinguished because declarations were officially transmitted and signed.
• H. Siddiqui (Dead) by LRs v. A. Ramalingam — [2011] 5 SCR 587 (Supreme Court). Cited on foundational requirements for secondary evidence.
• Commissioner of Customs, Calcutta v. South India Television (P) Ltd. — 2007 INSC 737 (Supreme Court). Cited on the burden of proving customs undervaluation.
• P.R. Metrani v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bangalore — [2006] 287 ITR 209 (SC); 2006 INSC 847. Invoked by analogy concerning the limited statutory scope of presumptions.
• Commissioner of Customs, Calcutta v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. — 2004 INSC 120 (Supreme Court). Cited on interpretation of analogous fiscal provisions.
• P.T. Rajan v. T.P.M. Sahir — 2003 INSC 514 (Supreme Court). Cited on whether the word shall necessarily imposes a mandatory procedural requirement.
• Orson Electronics Pvt. Ltd. v. Collector of Customs, Bombay — 1996 (82) ELT 499 (Tri.-Del.). Distinguished because foreign invoices had corroborating admissions.

Footnotes and References

[1] Amandeep Mehta is an Advocate specialising in tax controversy, appearing before Tribunals and High Courts across India. The views expressed herein are personal. ↩

[2] Commissioner of Customs & Excise, Patparganj v. M/s Premier Plastic Industries , Customs Appeal Nos. 52896, 52897 and 52904 of 2016, Final Order Nos. 51356-51358/2026, decided on 21.08.2026 (CESTAT, Principal Bench, New Delhi) ↩

[3] Section 139 of the Customs Act, 1962, https://indiacode.ecourtsindia.com/customs-act-1962/section/139/ ↩

[4] Supra 2 , Para 9 and 11 ↩

[5] Section 139(i) of the Customs Act, 1962 ↩

[6] Section 139(ii) of the Customs Act, 1962 ↩

[7] Part D, Para 35 of the Judgment, Union of India v. Rajeev Bansal , 2024 INSC 754 ↩

[8] Para 10, Page 599 of [2011] 5 SCR 587, H. Siddiqui (Dead) by L.Rs. v. A. Ramalingam ↩

[9] Commissioner of Customs, Calcutta v. South India Television (P) Ltd. , 2007 INSC 737, Para 12 ↩

[10] Customs Appeal No. 2 OF 2023, Karnataka High Court [CSTA No. 2 of 2023; 2025:KHC:31367-DB] ↩

[11] Commissioner of Customs, Calcutta v. Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. , 2004 INSC 120, Para 13 ↩

[12] P. R. Metrani v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bangalore , 2006 INSC 847 ↩

[13] Commissioner of Customs (Imports), Mumbai v. M/s Ganpati Overseas through its proprietor Shri Yashpal Sharma & Anr ., [2023] 13 S.C.R. 172: 2023 INSC 881 ↩

[14] Ibid ↩

[15] Ibid , Para 16 & 17 ↩

[16] Supra 2 , Please see para 7.3 of the Order ↩

[17] (2023) 12 Centax 238 (Tri.-Del.), https://cestat.gov.in/weborders/file/delhi/265940 ↩

[18] 1996 (82) ELT 499 (Tri.-Del.) ↩

[19] (2023) 12 Centax 238 (Tri.-Del.), https://cestat.gov.in/weborders/file/delhi/265940 ↩

[20] 2016 (331) ELT 85 (Tri.-Ahmd) ↩

[21] Since the Order does not record any findings on the nature or evidentiary value of the Comparative Chart, it is presumed that the chart was merely a reconciliation statement prepared by the Customs authorities. Nevertheless, the argument ought to have extended to questioning its probative value, particularly in light of Ganpati Overseas , 2023 INSC 881 and the Department’s failure to establish the authenticity and evidentiary worth of the underlying material. ↩

[22] Supra 2 , Please see para 7.2 and 7.3 of the Order ↩

[23] Supra 2, at paragraph 2.4 ↩

[24] Supra 2 , at paragraph 4.1 ↩

[25] Supra 2 , at paragraph 7.3 ↩