Vrundavan Ginning and Oil Mill Vs Asst. Registrar / President & Ors. (Gujarat High Court)
Summary: The Gujarat High Court, in Vrundavan Ginning and Oil Mill Vs Asst. Registrar / President & Ors., examined the scope of the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal’s power to rectify mistakes under Section 254(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. The petitioner, a partnership firm, challenged the Tribunal’s order dated 08.10.2018 rejecting its miscellaneous application seeking rectification of an earlier appellate order. The principal controversy concerned an addition of ₹67,59,613 on account of alleged suppression in the valuation of closing stock. The assessee contended that the Tribunal had failed to consider specific arguments and judicial decisions concerning the valuation of closing stock and therefore ought to reconsider the issue. The High Court was required to determine whether the alleged omission constituted a mistake apparent from the record or whether the assessee was effectively seeking a review of the Tribunal’s earlier decision.
The assessee had filed its income tax return on 16.09.2011 declaring income of ₹5,69,038. Following assessment under Section 143(3) on 27.03.2014, several additions were made. The CIT(A), by order dated 30.03.2016, confirmed additions concerning purchases of raw cotton from partners and their relatives and the alleged understatement of closing stock. Before the Tribunal, the assessee challenged additions of ₹69,93,910 relating to purchases from partners, ₹10,81,710 relating to purchases from relatives, and ₹67,59,613 relating to closing stock valuation. The Tribunal partly allowed the appeal but rejected the challenge concerning closing stock valuation. It agreed with the lower authorities that the assessee’s adoption of net realisable value was an ad hoc method lacking a scientific basis and relied upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Hindustan Zinc Ltd.
The assessee subsequently filed a miscellaneous application under Section 254(2), contending that several material facts concerning purchases from partners and relatives had not received adequate consideration. These included agricultural income disclosed by the partners through their Hindu Undivided Families, exemption claimed under Section 10(2), comparable purchase rates, quantitative reconciliation and the absence of rejection of books of account. Regarding closing stock valuation, the assessee argued that the Tribunal had failed to consider the alternative contention that the enhanced closing stock value should also be reflected in the opening stock of the succeeding year to prevent double taxation. It relied upon Chainrup Sampatram v. CIT and CIT v. Singhal Natural Stone (P) Ltd., and submitted that the stock had subsequently been sold at substantially lower prices. The Tribunal rejected the miscellaneous application, holding that the assessee was attempting to reopen matters already examined and decided on merits.
The High Court explained that Section 254(2) permits rectification only of a mistake apparent from the record. Such a mistake must be patent, obvious and capable of identification without elaborate argument, investigation or reconsideration of disputed facts and legal propositions. The Court distinguished rectification from review, observing that the statutory power does not authorise the Tribunal to recall its decision merely because a party considers its findings incorrect. Relying upon Master Construction Co. (P) Ltd. v. State of Orissa, Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde v. Mallikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale and T.S. Balaram v. Volkart Brothers, the Court reiterated that an error requiring prolonged reasoning on a debatable question cannot qualify as a mistake apparent from the record. The Court also examined the distinction between the limited rectification jurisdiction under Section 254(2) and the broader remedies available through appellate proceedings.
The High Court further considered decisions including Commissioner of Income Tax v. Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, Karan and Co. v. ITAT, Deeksha Suri v. ITAT, Honda Siel Power Products and Maruti Insurance Distribution Services Ltd. These authorities established that the Tribunal’s power under Section 254(2) does not extend to recalling an order for a fresh hearing or substituting a different conclusion on matters already adjudicated. Although the assessee relied upon Dattani and Co. v. Income Tax Officer to contend that failure to decide a specific ground could justify rectification, the High Court found that the Tribunal had, in fact, considered the closing stock issue and recorded its findings. The mere fact that the assessee disagreed with the Tribunal’s reasoning did not establish that the ground had been omitted from consideration.
In conclusion, the Gujarat High Court held that the Tribunal had not committed any error warranting interference under Article 226 of the Constitution. The issue concerning the addition of ₹67,59,613 for alleged suppression of closing stock valuation had already been considered and decided by the Tribunal. Any challenge to the correctness of that decision would require examination through the appropriate appellate remedy rather than rectification under Section 254(2). The Court clarified that the assessee remained free to prefer an appeal under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act and raise its grievance concerning the Tribunal’s findings. Accordingly, by judgment dated 18.03.2021, the High Court dismissed the writ application while preserving the assessee’s liberty to pursue available appellate remedies in accordance with law.
Cases Discussed
- Hindustan Zinc Ltd. (Supreme Court) — Relied upon by the Tribunal while rejecting the assessee’s method of closing stock valuation.
- Chainrup Sampatram v. CIT, 24 ITR 481 (Supreme Court) — Cited by the assessee regarding the relationship between closing stock and opening stock valuation.
- CIT v. Singhal Natural Stone (P) Ltd., (2011) 243 CTR (Raj) 414 (Rajasthan High Court) — Cited regarding valuation of closing stock at a reduced rate.
- Master Construction Co. (P) Ltd. v. State of Orissa, (1966) 17 STC 360 (Supreme Court) — Considered regarding the meaning of an error apparent from the record.
- Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde v. Mallikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale, AIR 1960 SC 137 (Supreme Court) — Considered regarding errors requiring elaborate arguments.
- Commissioner of Income Tax v. Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, (2005) 204 CTR (Del) 349 (Delhi High Court) — Relied upon to distinguish rectification from review.
- Deeksha Suri v. ITAT (Delhi High Court) — Discussed in the quoted decision concerning the limited power of rectification.
- Karan and Co. v. ITAT, (2002) 253 ITR 131 (Delhi High Court) — Discussed regarding the impermissibility of recalling an entire order under Section 254(2).
- Commissioner of Income Tax v. Honda Siel Power Products, (2007) 293 ITR 132 (Delhi High Court) — Considered regarding recall and review of individual grounds.
- T.S. Balaram, Income Tax Officer v. Volkart Brothers, (1971) 82 ITR 50 (Supreme Court) — Relied upon for the principle that a debatable question cannot constitute a mistake apparent from the record.
- Sidhramappa v. Commissioner of Income Tax, (1952) 21 ITR 333 (Bombay High Court) — Referred to in the Supreme Court’s discussion of apparent mistakes.
- Commissioner of Income Tax-II v. Maruti Insurance Distribution Services Ltd., (2012) 26 taxmann.com 68 (Delhi High Court) — Relied upon regarding the limited jurisdiction under Section 254(2).
- Dattani and Co. v. Income Tax Officer, (2014) 41 taxmann.com 360 (Gujarat High Court) — Cited by the assessee in support of its rectification application.
FULL TEXT OF THE JUDGMENT/ORDER OF GUJARAT HIGH COURT
1. By this writ application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the writ applicant has prayed for the following reliefs:
“(A) Issue a writ of certiorari and/or a writ of mandamus and/or any other writ direction or order to quash and set aside the impugned order dated 8.10.2018 passed by the Hon’ble Triunal in Misc. Application No.249 of 2017 annexed hereto at Annexure ‘G’ and thereby, directing the Hon’ble Tribunal for de novo adjudication with regard to addition of Rs.67,59,613/- on account of suppression in the valuation of closing stock after giving opportunity of hearing to assessee and Revenue.
(B) Pending admission, hearing and disposal of this petition, ad-interim relief be granted and the respondent No.2 be ordered to restrain from enforcing compliance of impugned order dated 8.10.2018 passed by the Hon’ble Tribunal in Misc. Application No.249 of 2017 annexed hereto at Annexure ‘G’.
(C) Award the cost of this petition.
(D) Grant such other and further reliefs as this Hon’ble Court deems fit.”
2. The facts giving rise to this writ application may be summarised as under:
2.1 The writ applicant is a partnership firm and is being regularly assessed to tax. The firm filed its return of income on 16th September 2011 declaring the total income at Rs.5,69,038/-. The return filed by the firm was processed under Section 143(1) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (for short, ‘the Act’). The Assessing Officer passed an order under Section 143(3) of the Act on 27th March 2014.
3. We take notice of the fact that several additions were made in the assessment order passed by the Assessing Officer. The firm preferred an appeal before the CIT (Appeals). The CIT (Appeals) dismissed the appeal filed by the firm vide order dated 30th March 2016. However, it appears that even while dismissing the appeal, the CIT (Appeals) granted relief to the firm with reference to the addition account of under statement of net profit by lowering the value of closing stock. By doing so, it confirmed the addition of Rs.67,59,613/-.
4. The firm, being dissatisfied with the order passed by the CIT (Appeals), preferred appeal before the Appellate Authority. Before the Appellate Authority, three specific grounds as under were raised:
“1. The Ld. CIT(A) erred on facts and in law in confirming addition of Rs.69,93,910/- by holding purchase of raw cotton from the partners to be bogus.
2. The Ld. CIT(A) erred on facts and in law in confirming addition of Rs.10,81,710/- by holding purchase of raw cotton from the relatives of the partners to be unexplained / unsubstantiated.
3. The Ld. CIT(A) erred on facts and in law in confirming addition of Rs.67,59,613/- for alleged suppression in value of closing stock by discarding / disregarding the method of valuation consistently followed in and accepted in past assessments.”
5. The Appellate Authority partly allowed the appeal filed by the firm holding as under:
“11. In the present case, ld. CIT(A) has rightly observed that the assessee has not followed either of the method of valuation of closing stock, i.e., either on the basis of cost price or market price, whichever is lower, rather the assessee has followed net realizable value which is purely an ad-hoc method and without any basis. He also held that the net realization method is neither based on cost price nor calculated on the basis of market price; thus, there is no scientific method of calculation of the net realizable value. In view of these facts and circumstances of the case and considering the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Hindustan Zinc Ltd (supra), we do not find any infirmity in the orders of the authorities below in this regard. This ground of appeal of the assessee is accordingly rejected.”
6. The firm noticed that the ground No.3 referred to above had not been discussed at all by the Appellate Tribunal.
7. In such circumstances, the firm filed a Miscellaneous Application under Section 254 of the Act. In the Miscellaneous Application, the firm pointed out to the Appellate Tribunal the following:
“1.1 Applicant submits that while adjudicating first two grounds Hon’ble Tribunal escaped its attention to the following material facts which were specifically drawn to its notice in the course of hearing:
(a) Agricultural income was disclosed by the partners in returns furnished in the hands of HUF and copies of returns had been furnishing indicating disclosure of agricultural income.
(b) Partners in turn disclosed share in HUF income in their individual returns and claimed the same as exempt u/s 10(2).
(c) Income claimed exempt u/s 10(2) has not been disturbed by the Assessing Officer while making assessment.
(d) Purchases from the partners and relatives were made at market rate and comparable purchase vouchers along with chart were furnished indicating no excess payment to the partners and relatives.
(e) There was complete quantity tally on day to day basis.
(f) There was no rejection of book results.
1.2 It is therefore, submitted that 20% disallowance has been sustained by Hon’ble Tribunal while adjudicating ground Nos. 1 and 2 without taking into account the above stated facts and therefore, order of the Hon’ble Tribunal needs to be rectified to this extend and consequential required relief is requested to be granted.
2. In para 8 of the appellate order, Hon’ble Tribunal has adjudicated ground Nos.3 relating to addition of Rs.67,59,613/- on account of alleged suppression in value of closing stock. While adjudicating this ground following specific arguments / decisions have not been taken cognizance and therefore, order so passed requires rectification:
(a) Non consideration of alternative argument that value of opening stock of subsequent year need to be substituted with the enhanced value of closing stock of this year in the light of decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Chainrup Sampatram vs. CIT 24 ITR 481 (SC). Due to this reason income has been taxed twice.
(b) Non consideration of decision of Hon’ble Rajasthan High Court in the case of CIT vs. Singhal Natural Stone (P) Ltd (2011) 243 CTR (Raj) 414 holding that the assessee is entitled to value closing stock at reduced rate particularly when the same has been sold in the succeeding period at a lesser rate.
(c) Closing stock was sold at a substantially lower value in succeeding year.”
8. The Miscellaneous Application filed by the firm came to be rejected by the Appellate Tribunal vide order dated 8th October 2018 holding as under:
“4. We have considered rival submissions and gone through the record carefully, we find that the power of rectification under section 254 of the Income Tax Act can be exercised only when the mistake, which is sought to be rectified, is an obvious patent mistake and apparent from the record and not a mistake, which is required to be established by arguments and long drawn process of reasoning on points, on which there may conceivably be two opinions. We find the error pointed out by the assessee qua grounds no.1 and 2 are concerned, the Tribunal in the impugned order had detailed discussion from page nos.1 to 5 of the order and came to conclusion to restrict the disallowance to 20% of the purchase made from the partners and relative of the partners. In other words, 80% of the purchases made by the assessee have been allowed. Similarly, qua ground no.3 relating to addition of Rs.67,59,613/- on account of suppression in the value of closing stock is concerned, the Tribunal has discussed the issue from page no.5 to 11, and noticed well reasoned order of the CIT(A), and thereafter following the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of CIT vs. Hindustan Zinc Ltd came to the conclusion that valuation of closing stock adopted by the assessee was purely adhoc method and without any basis. We find that the scope of sub-section (2) is restricted to rectifying any mistake in the order which is apparent from record and does not extend to reviewing of the earlier order. By pointed out the alleged apparent errors, the assessee is trying to review entire order of the Tribunal, which is not permissible in law. Assessee in the present MA is making new found submissions, and trying to undo the order in guise of rectification. We do not find any merit in this application of the assessee, because the issues agitated in the MA have been examined and deliberated upon, and reached a conclusion on merit. Therefore, the same do not require a fresh look in the form of rectification, which is otherwise also not permissible in law.”
9. Being dissatisfied with the aforesaid order, the writ applicant is here before this Court with the present writ application.
10. We have heard Mr. Darshan R. Patel, the learned counsel appearing for the writ applicant and Ms. Mauna Bhatt, the learned Senior Standing Counsel appearing for the Revenue.
SCOPE OF SECTION 254(2) OF THE ACT:
11. Section 254(2) of the Act makes it amply clear that a ‘mistake apparent from the record’ is rectifiable. To attract the jurisdiction under Section 254(2), a mistake should exist and must be apparent from the record. The power to rectify the mistake, however, does not cover cases where a revision or review of the order is intended. “Mistake” means to understand wrongly or inaccurately; it is an error; a fault, a misunderstanding, a misconception. “Apparent” implies something that can be seen, or is visible; obvious; plain. A mistake which can be rectified under Section 254(2) is one which is patent, obvious and whose discovery is not dependent on argument. The language used in Section 254(2) is permissible where it is brought to the notice of the Tribunal that there is any mistake apparent from the record. The amendment of an order therefore, does not mean obliteration of the order originally passed and its substitution by a new order which is not permissible, under the provisions of Section 254(2). Further, where an error is far from self-evident, it ceases to be an “apparent” error. Undoubtedly, a mistake capable of rectification under Section 254(2) is not confined to clerical or arithmetical mistakes. At the same time, it does not cover any mistake which may be discovered by a complicated process of investigation, argument or proof. As observed by the Supreme Court in Master Construction Co. (P) Ltd. v. State of Orissa (1966) 17 STC 360, an error which is apparent on the face of the record should be one which is not an error which depends for its discovery on elaborate arguments on questions of fact or law. A similar view was also expressed in Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde vs. Mallikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale [AIR 1960 SC 137].
12. Significantly, the language used in Order 47, Rule 1 of the CPC, 1908, is different from the language used in Section 254(2) of the Act. Power is conferred upon various authorities to rectify any “mistake apparent from the record”. Though the expression “mistake” is of indefinite content and has a large subjective area of operation, yet, to attract the jurisdiction to rectify (an order) under Section 254(2), it is not sufficient if there is merely a mistake in the orders sought to be rectified. The mistake to be rectified must be one apparent from the record. A decision on the debatable point of law or undisputed question of fact, is not a mistake apparent from the record.
13. The contours of the jurisdiction under Section 254 (2) were examined by the Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Income Tax Appellate Tribunal [(2005) 204 CTR Del 349]. It was held that:
“6. It is evident from the above that the power available to the Tribunal is not in the nature of a review as is understood in legal parlance. The power is limited to correction of mistakes apparent from the record. What is significant is that the section envisages amendment of the original order of the Tribunal and not a total substitution thereof. That position is fairly well-settled by two decisions of this Court in Ms. Deeksha Suri v. ITAT and Karan and Co. v. ITAT [2002] 253 ITR 131. This Court has in both these decisions held that the foundation for the exercise of the jurisdiction lies in the rectification of a mistake apparent from the record which object is ensued by amending the order passed by the Tribunal. The said power does not however, contemplate a re-hearing of the appeal for a fresh disposal. Doing so would obliterate the distinction between the power to rectify mistakes and the power to review the order made by the Tribunal. The following passage from the decision of this Court in Karan and Co.’s case (supra) elucidates the difference between review and rectification of an order made by the Tribunal:
“The scope and ambit of application of Section 254(2) is very limited. The same is restricted to rectification of mistakes apparent from the record. We shall first deal with the question of the power of the Tribunal to recall an order in its entirety. Recalling the entire order obviously would mean passing of a fresh order. That does not appear to be the legislative intent. The order passed by the Tribunal under Section 254(1) is the effective order so far as the appeal is concerned. Any order passed under Section 254(2) either allowing the amendment or refusing to amend gets merged with the original order passed. The order as amended or remaining unamended is the effective order for all practical purposes. The same continues to be an order under Section 254(1). That is the final order in the appeal. An order under Section 254(2) does not have existence de hors the order under Section 254(1). Recalling of the order is not permissible under Section 254(2). Recalling of an order automatically necessitates re-hearing and readjudication of the entire subject-matter of appeal. The dispute no longer remains restricted to any mistake sought to be rectified. Power to recall an order is prescribed in terms or Rule 24 of the Income Tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules, 1963, and that too only in cases where the assessed shows that it had a reasonable cause for being absent at a time when the appeal was taken up and was decided ex parte. This position was highlighted by one of us (Justice Arijit Pasayat, Chief Justice) in CIT v. ITAT . Judged in the above background the order passed by the Tribunal is indefensible.”
7. That being the legal position, the Tribunal was not in our opinion justified in recalling the order passed by it in toto and setting the matter down for a fresh hearing. Just because a pronouncement made on the subject either by the Tribunal or by any other Court was not noticed by the Tribunal while taking a particular view on the merits of the controversy may constitute an error that would call for correction in an appropriate appeal against the order. Any such error may however fall short of constituting a mistake apparent from the record within the meaning of Section 254(2) of the Act. More importantly just because a point is debatable (which is one of the reasons given by the Tribunal in the instant case) would hardly provide a justification for recalling the order and fixing the appeal for a de novo hearing. While doing so, the Tribunal has no doubt made certain observations in regard to the levy of interest under Section 158BFA being statutory in nature with no power vested in any authority or Tribunal to condone the same, but the very fact that the Tribunal has made those observations would not render valid the order of recall passed by it. The net result of the order made by the Tribunal continues to remain the same viz, the appeal has to be heard again simply because one of the issues decided by the Tribunal is debatable or the Tribunal has not noticed an earlier decision rendered by another Bench. Both these reasons were insufficient to justify the order of recall made by the Tribunal.”
In Commissioner of Income Tax v Honda Siel Power Products (2007) 293 ITR 132 (Del) the Court held that:
“It makes no difference whether the entire order is sought to be recalled or the order passed by the Tribunal on individual grounds is sought to be recalled in entirety. In other words, if the Tribunal has given its decision on say grounds 3 and 4 in a particular way in its first order while dealing with ten separate grounds and pursuant to a rectification application, it recalls its decision on grounds 3 and 4 and gives a completely different decision on the said grounds, then it would certainly amount to recall and review of its entire order in respect of those grounds.”
The Court also noticed and held that:
“It must be remembered that this is not a power of review but is restricted to rectifying mistakes “apparent from the record.” A liberal approach might constitute an invitation to parties to allow the period for filing an appeal to expire, anticipate a change of coram of the bench that heard the appeal in the first instance, and then at their own sweet will “take a chance” by filing a rectification application on any fancy imagined ‘mistake apparent from the record’ at any time before the expiry of four years.”
The Supreme Court also, in T.S. Balaram, Income Tax Officer, Company Circle IV, Bombay v. Volkart Brothers, Bombay [1971] 82 ITR 50 (SC) placed similar interpretation on the expression “with a view to rectifying any mistake apparent from the record” – an expression common in section 254(2) and section 154 of the Act, holding:
From what has been said above, it is clear that the question whether Section 17(1) of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922 was applicable to the case of the first respondent is not free from doubt. Therefore the Income-tax Officer was not justified in thinking that on that question there can be no two opinions. It was not open to the Income-tax Officer to go into the true scope of the relevant provisions of the Act in a proceeding under Section 154 of the Income-tax Act, 1961. A mistake apparent on the record must be an obvious and patent mistake and not something which can be established by a long drawn process of reasoning on points on which there may conceivably be two opinions. As seen earlier, the High Court of Bombay opined that the original assessments were in accordance with law though in our opinion the High Court was not justified in going into that question. In Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde and Ors. v. Millikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale [1960] 1 SCR 890 this Court while spelling out the scope of the power of a High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution ruled that an error which has to be established by a long drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions cannot be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record. A decision on a debatable point of law is not a mistake apparent from the record-see Sidhramappa v. Commissioner of Income-tax, Bombay [1952] 21 ITR 333(Bom). The power of the officers mentioned in Section 154 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 to correct “any mistake apparent from the record” is undoubtedly not more than that of the High Court to entertain a writ petition on the basis of an “error apparent on the face of the record’’.
[See : Commissioner of Income Tax-II vs. Maruti Insurance Distribution Services Ltd – [2012] 26 taxmann.com 68 (Delhi)]
14. The case on hand is quite unusual or rather we may say typical.
15. The case of the writ applicant is that a specific ground raised in the appeal has not been taken into consideration by the Appellate Tribunal. In other words, no finding has been recorded in that regard by the Appellate Tribunal. It is argued that in such circumstances, an application under Section 254 of the Act would be maintainable. It is argued by the learned counsel appearing for the writ applicant that although Section 254 of the Act talks about the power of rectification, yet the matter of the present type would also be covered under Section 254 of the Act.
16. In this regard, Mr. Patel seeks to rely upon a decision of this Court in the case of Dattani and Co. vs. Income Tax Officer reported in [2014] 41 taxmann.com 360 (Gujarat), more particularly, the observations made in para 4 therein.
17. On the other hand, the argument of the learned Senior Standing Counsel appearing for the Revenue, while opposing the present writ application, is that no error, not to speak of any error of law could be said to have been committed by the Tribunal in passing the impugned order.
18. The stance of the Tribunal, as it reflects on plain reading of the impugned order, is that the ground which the writ applicant is talking about relating to addition of Rs.67,59,613/- on account of suppression in the value of closing stock has been discussed. While disposing of the application, the Tribunal took the view that the scope of sub-section (2) of Section 254 of the Act is restricted to rectify any mistake in the order apparent on the face of it and would not extend to review the order.
19. Having regard to the materials on record, we find it difficult to take the view that the ground No.3, which the writ applicant is talking about, has not been dealt with at all by the Appellate Tribunal. The Appellate Tribunal, in its own way, has discussed the said issue and recorded a particular finding. If the writ applicant is dissatisfied, then it is always open for him to prefer an appeal under Section 260A of the Act before this High Court and in the course of the appeal, it can be pointed out to the Court as regards the ground No.3 and if the Court is convinced, then it may remit the matter to the Tribunal for fresh consideration of the ground No.3, which the writ applicant is talking about. The power to rectify an order under Section 254(2) of the Act is extremely limited, as observed by the Delhi High Court in the case of Maruti Insurance (supra). It does not extend to correcting the errors of law or re-appreciating the factual findings. Those properly fall within the appellate review of an order of Court of first instance. What legitimately falls for consideration are errors (mistakes) apparent from the record.
20. For the foregoing reasons, we are of the view that we should not interfere with the impugned order passed by the Appellate Tribunal.
21. In the result, this writ application fails and is hereby rejected. If the assessee feels aggrieved as regards the findings recorded by the Appellate Tribunal so far as the ground No.3 is concerned, it is open to it to seek its appellate remedies, if so advised, in accordance with law.
