Ridhi Sidhi Trading Company Vs State of Rajasthan (Rajasthan High Court)
Summary: The Rajasthan High Court allowed the writ petition filed by Ridhi Sidhi Trading Company challenging the appellate order dated 22 May 2026, which had rejected its GST appeal as time-barred. A show cause notice dated 29 April 2024 concerning non-filing of GSTR-3B was uploaded on the portal, followed by an assessment order dated 17 May 2024 raising a demand of Rs.4,42,921, including interest, under Section 62 of the CGST Act read with Section 20 of the IGST Act. The petitioner filed the pending return on 4 October 2024 and discharged the tax liability with applicable interest and late fee. It subsequently filed an appeal on 24 March 2025 in Form GST APL-01, explaining the delay and subsequent compliance. The appellate authority rejected the appeal because it considered 17 August 2024 the filing deadline and found the appeal beyond even the additional one-month condonable period.
The petitioner argued that the assessment order had never been communicated as required by Section 107(1), and that the three-month limitation period therefore had not begun. Revenue contended that uploading the order on the GST portal constituted sufficient service under Section 169. The Court examined the distinction between making an order and communicating it to an affected person, referring to Supreme Court authorities concerning actual or constructive knowledge, effective communication and the opportunity to pursue a statutory remedy. It emphasised that the appellate authority’s power to condone delay is limited to one further month beyond the ordinary three-month period and that Section 5 of the Limitation Act stands excluded. These restrictions made strict compliance with the communication requirement essential.
Reading Sections 107 and 169 together, the Court held that mere uploading on the GST portal, in the circumstances before it, did not amount to communication of the order for commencing appellate limitation. It stated that the modes in clauses (a) to (c) of Section 169(1) were alternatives and that clauses (d) to (f) would follow if the former were not applicable. Drawing on Saral Wire Craft (P.) Ltd. v. Commissioner of Customs, Central Excise & Service Tax, the Court stressed meaningful service enabling the affected party to act. It also observed that rules could not circumscribe the statutory modes of communication. Since communication had not been established, the appellate authority was unjustified in treating the appeal as barred.
The Court set aside the appellate order dated 22 May 2026, condoned the delay and remanded the matter to the appellate authority for hearing and deciding the appeal on merits. The petition was allowed and pending applications were disposed of. The Court expressly left the merits open; its order did not adjudicate the correctness of the underlying assessment demand.
Cases Discussed
- Saral Wire Craft (P.) Ltd. v. Commissioner of Customs, Central Excise & Service Tax — (2015) 14 SCC 523; 51 GST 697 (Supreme Court). Relied upon for meaningful, effective service and strict compliance with the prescribed statutory mode.
- Hussein Ghadially v. State of Gujarat — (2014) 8 SCC 425 (Supreme Court). Mentioned in the passage reproduced from Saral Wire Craft concerning compliance with the prescribed manner of acting.
- Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission — (2010) 5 SCC 23 (Supreme Court). Cited for contextual interpretation of the statutory expression “communication”.
- Union of India v. S.P. Singh — (2008) 5 SCC 438 (Supreme Court). Cited for the meaning of communication as imparting or transmitting information.
- Singh Enterprises v. CCE, Jamshedpur — (2008) 3 SCC 70; [2008] 12 STT 21 (Supreme Court). Relied upon concerning exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act where the statutory condonation period is restricted.
- Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Qimat Rai Gupta — (2007) 7 SCC 309 (Supreme Court). Discussed the distinction between making an order and communicating it where communication enables recourse to law.
- D. Saibaba v. Bar Council of India — (2003) 6 SCC 186 (Supreme Court). Relied upon for computing limitation from communication or actual or constructive knowledge of an order.
- Babu Verghese v. Bar Council of Kerala — (1999) 3 SCC 422 (Supreme Court). Quoted through Saral Wire Craft for the principle that an act prescribed by statute must be performed in that manner or not at all.
- CCE, Madras v. M.M. Rubber and Co. — 1992 Supp (1) SCC 471 (Supreme Court). Relied upon for commencing remedial limitation from communication, distinguished from limitation governing an authority’s exercise of power.
- Kubic Darusz v. Union of India — (1990) 1 SCC 568 (Supreme Court). Cited for effective communication imparting sufficient knowledge to permit a purposeful representation.
- State of U.P. v. Singhara Singh — AIR 1964 SC 358 (Supreme Court). Mentioned in the reproduced Saral Wire Craft passage on the prescribed-manner principle.
- Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of Vindhya Pradesh — AIR 1954 SC 322 (Supreme Court). Mentioned in the reproduced passage as an application of the prescribed-manner principle.
- Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor — (1935–36) 63 IA 372 (Privy Council). Mentioned in the reproduced passage as approving the principle in Taylor v. Taylor.
- Taylor v. Taylor — (1875) 1 Ch D 426 (Chancery Division). Mentioned in the reproduced passage as the foundational authority for following the statutorily prescribed manner.
FULL TEXT OF THE JUDGMENT/ORDER OF RAJASTHAN HIGH COURT
Invoking extraordinary jurisdiction of this court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of the India, the petitioner has preferred this writ petition calling in question the legality, validity and correctness of the Order-in-Appeal dated 22.05.2026, by which petitioner’s appeal preferred under Section 107(1) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act of 2017’), has been dismissed holding that the appeal is barred by limitation and delay in filing the appeal cannot be condoned.
2. The aforesaid challenge has been made on the following factual backdrop:
(i) The petitioner was registered under the GST regime bearing registration number GSTIN 08DSPPK8715J1Z1. On 29.04.2024, a show cause notice was issued by respondent No.3, which was merely uploaded on the portal, on account of non-filing GSTR-3B and the consequent tax liability.
(ii) On 17.05.2024, an assessment order was passed and the same was also uploaded on the portal, raising a demand of Rs.4,42,921/- including interest under Section 62 of the Act of 2017 read with Section 20 of the IGST Act, 2017.
(iii) On 04.10.2024, the petitioner furnished the pending GSTR-3B for the relevant tax period and discharged the entire tax liability along with applicable interest and late fee
(iv) Thereafter, on 24.03.2025, the petitioner preferred an appeal under Section 107 of the Act of 2017 in Form GST APL-01 along with the facts explaining the circumstances leading to delay in filing the appeal and bringing on record the subsequent compliance. The Appellate Authority vide order dated 22.05.2026, dismissed the appeal observing that the appellant has filed the appeal after the time limit prescribed under Section 107(1) of the Act of 2017. The appeal filed is even beyond the period of one month allowed for delay to be condoned as per the provisions of Section 107(4) of the Act of 2017. It has been observed that the appeal was required to be filed by 17.08.2024, whereas the appeal has been filed on 24.03.2025.
(v) As such, against the order dated 22.05.2026 passed by the Appellate Authority, the instant writ petition has been preferred by the petitioner.
3. Mr. Sharad Kothari, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that the Order-in-Original was required to be communicated to the petitioner by virtue of the provisions contained in Section 107(1) of the Act of 2017. The period of three months provided in Section 107(1) of the Act of 2017 would start running from the date of communication of the order, or decision to the petitioner and since the order was never communicated, as mandated under Section 107(1) of the Act of 2017, therefore, as soon as the petitioner came to know about the order, he immediately preferred an appeal on 24.03.2025. He, therefore, submits that the appeal could not have been dismissed on the ground of delay and laches and as such, the impugned order dated 22.05.2026 is liable to be set aside.
4. On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the Revenue would submit that the order was uploaded on the GST portal and therefore, the petitioner deemed to have the knowledge about passing of the order. As such, uploading of order on the common portal, as required under Section 169 of the Act of 2017, itself is sufficient compliance and therefore, the appeal has rightly been dismissed by the Appellate Authority. He, therefore, submits that this writ petition deserves to be dismissed.
5. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and considered their rival submissions made herein-above and also went through the record with utmost circumspection.
6. In order to consider the plea raised at the Bar, it would be appropriate to notice that Section 107(1) of the Act of 2017 as under:
“107. Appeals to Appellate Authority-(1) Any person aggrieved by any decision or order passed under this Act or the State Goods and Services Tax Act or the Union Territory Goods and Services Tax Act by an adjudicating authority may appeal to such Appellate Authority as may be prescribed within three months from the date on which the said decision or order is communicated to such person.”
7. A careful perusal of Section 107(1) of the Act of 2017 would show that against the Order-in-Original, an appeal would lie to the Appellate Authority within three months from the date on which the said decision or order is communicated to such person. As such, the Adjudicating Authority is required to communicate the order to the person aggrieved for the purpose of providing a remedy to the person adversely affected by the order and thereby limitation would commence from the date of communication. However, the word “communication” used in Section 107(1) has not been defined in the Act of 2017 or the rules made thereunder, therefore, the same deserves to be interpreted by applying the rule of contextual interpretation and keeping in view the language of the relevant provisions (see Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission (2010) 5 SCC 23).
8. The word “communication”, according to Black’s Law Dictionary (Sixth Edition), means, information given; the sharing of knowledge by one with another; conference; consultation or bargaining preparatory to making a contract. A “communication” is ordinarily considered to be a deliberate interchange of thoughts or opinions between two or more persons, as distinguished from “res gestae” expressions which are spontaneously or instinctively provoked, or made while under such shock or excitement as to preclude the possibility of design. The ordinary meaning of communicate is to impart, confer or transmit information (see Union of India v. S.P. Singh (SC)/(2008) 5 SCC 438).
9. In the matter of Kubic Darusz v. Union of India (1990) 1 SCC 568, their Lordships of the Supreme Court while dealing with communication of grounds of detention under the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (COFEPOSA Act), held that “communicate” is a strong word. It requires that sufficient knowledge of the basic facts constituting the grounds should be imparted effectively and fully to the detenu in writing in a language which he understands, so as to enable him to make a purposeful and effective representation
10. In the matter of CCE, Madras v. M.M. Rubber and Co (SC)/1992 Supp (1) SCC 471, their Lordships of the Supreme Court while dealing with Section 35-E of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 held that if the intention is to provide a remedy to the person adversely affected, the statutory provision has to be so constituted that limitation commences from the date of communication of order, and observed in paragraph 18 as under:
“18. Thus if the intention or design of the statutory provision was to protect the interest of the person adversely affected, by providing a remedy against the order or decision any period of limitation prescribed with reference to invoking such remedy shall be read as commencing from the date of communication of the order. But if it is a limitation for a competent authority to make an order the date of exercise of that power and in the case of exercise of suo moto power over the subordinate authorities’ orders, the date on which such power was exercised by making an order are the relevant dates for determining the limitation. The ratio of this distinction may also be founded on the principle that the government is bound by the proceedings of its officers but persons affected are not concluded by the decision.”
11. Similarly, in the matter of Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Qimat Rai Gupta (2007) 7 SCC 309, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that an order ordinarily would be presumed to have been made when it is signed. It is required to be communicated where communication thereof is a necessary ingredient for bringing an end result to a status or to provide a person an opportunity to take recourse to law if he is aggrieved thereby. Their Lordships further held that the word “made” occurring in Section 126(4) of the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 cannot be construed to mean that unless the order is communicated, it should be deemed to have not been made.
12. In the matter of D. Saibaba v. Bar Council of India (2003) 6 SCC 186, the question before the Supreme Court was whether the limitation period for filing a review under Section 48AA of the Advocates Act, 1961, should commence from the date of the order or its communication. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court reasoned that the limitation period should start from the date of communication or knowledge of the order, aligning with principles of fairness and practicality. Their Lordships allowed the appeals, set aside the Bar Council’s orders, and restored the appellant’s (therein) enrollment as an advocate. Their Lordships further held in paragraph 14 as under:
“14. How can a person concerned or a person aggrieved be expected to exercise the right of review conferred by the provision unless the order is communicated to or is known to him either actually or constructively? The words “the date of that order”, therefore, mean and must be construed as meaning the date of communication or knowledge, actual or constructive, of the order sought to be reviewed.”
13. Coming to the facts of the case in light of the provisions contained in Section 107(1) of the Act of 2017 and in light of principles of law rendered by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in that regard, it is quite vivid that Section 107(1) mandates that the purpose of communication of order by the Adjudicating Authority is for the purpose of enabling the person aggrieved to file appeal before the Appellate Authority challenging the order so communicated and that period is also specifically provided to be three months from the date of communication of such decision to him by the Adjudicating Authority. In this case, the power to condone the delay in filing the appeal has been restricted to the Appellate Authority for a further period of one month in addition to three months, as specified in Section 107(1) of the Act of 2017. Therefore, considering the period of limitation to file appeal as three months + one month = four months, appeal can be preferred within three months from the date of communication of the order or decision and delay of one month in filing the appeal can be condoned. Therefore, the order has to be mandatorily communicated and the person aggrieved must be communicated with the decision or order. In other words, the party affected by the order or decision must know it, actually or constructively, and the period of three months would start running from the date of communication to the person affected of order by the authority concerned.
14. However, Section 169 of the Act of 2017, which provides for service of notice in certain cases, states as under:
“169. Service of notice in certain circumstances. – (1) Any decision, order, summons, notice or other communication under this Act or the rules made thereunder shall be served by any one of the following methods, namely:-
(a) by giving or tendering it directly or by a messenger including a courier to the addressee or the taxable person or to his manager or authorised representative or an advocate or a tax practitioner holding authority to appear in the proceedings on behalf of the taxable person or to a person regularly employed by him in connection with the business, or to any adult member of family residing with the taxable person; or
(b) by registered post or speed post or courier with acknowledgement due, to the person for whom it is intended or his authorised representative, if any, at his last known place of business or residence; or
(c) by sending a communication to his e-mail address provided at the time of registration or as amended from time to time; or
(d) by making it available on the common portal; or
(e) by publication in a newspaper circulating in the locality in which the taxable person or the person to whom it is issued is last known to have resided, carried on business or personally worked for gain; or
(f) if none of the modes aforesaid is practicable, by affixing it in some conspicuous place at his last known place of business or residence and if such mode is not practicable for any reason, then by affixing a copy thereof on the notice board of the office of the concerned officer or authority who or which passed such decision or order or issued such summons or notice.
(2) Every decision, order, summons, notice or any communication shall be deemed to have been served on the date on which it is tendered or published or a copy thereof is affixed in the manner provided in sub-section (1).
(3) When such decision, order, summons, notice or any communication is sent by registered post or speed post, it shall be deemed to have been received by the addressee at the expiry of the period normally taken by such post in transit unless the contrary is proved.”
15. According to Section 169 of the Act of 2017, any decision, order, summons, notice shall be served by any one of the methods, as prescribed in clauses (a) to (f), reproduced hereinabove. However, clause (a) to (c) would be alternative and if not applicable, then clause (d) to (f) would be followed. Sub-section (2) of Section 169 provides that every decision, order, summons, notice shall be deemed to have been served on the date on which it is tendered or published, or a copy thereof is affixed in the manner provided in sub-section (1).
16. In this regard, the decision of the Supreme Court in Saral Wire Craft (P.) Ltd. v. Commissioner of Customs, Central Excise & Service Tax 51 GST 697 (SC)/(2015) 14 SCC 523 may be noticed herein in which their Lordships of the Supreme Court while considering the provisions contained in Section 37C of the Central Excise Act held that every effort must be taken to meaningfully and realistically serve the affected party so as not merely to ensure that he has knowledge thereof but also to enable him to initiate any permissible action. It has been observed by their Lordships as under:-
“7. It is an anathema in law to decide a matter without due notice to the party concerned. Every effort must be taken to meaningfully and realistically serve the affected party so as not merely to ensure that he has knowledge thereof but also to enable him to initiate any permissible action. .
9. It is in these circumstances that we are of the clear conclusion that a miscarriage of justice has taken place, in that the authorities/courts below have failed to notice the specific language of Section 37-C(1)(a) of the Act which requires that an order must be tendered on the person concerned or his authorised agent, in other words, on no other person, to ensure efficaciousness. We must immediately recall the decision in Taylor v. Taylor9 rendered venerable by virtue of its jural acceptance and applicable for over a century. It was approved by the Privy Council in Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor and was subsequently applied in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of Vindhya Pradesh, State of U.P. v. Singhara Singh, Babu Verghese v. Bar Council of Kerala and more recently in Hussein Ghadially v. State of Gujarat. As observed by this Court in Babu Verghese (supra): (SCC p. 432, para 31)
“31. It is the basic principle of law long settled that if the manner of doing a particular act is prescribed under any statute, the act must be done in that manner or not at all.”
17. Considering the provisions of Section 169 of the Act of 2017, which provides the manner of serving the copy of decision or order, summons, notice, it is quite vivid that the purpose of communicating the order to the person aggrieved, in this case the appellant herein, is for the purpose of enabling him to prefer an appeal against the order of the Appellate Authority, as only three months period has been provided from the date of communication to prefer appeal and the Appellate Authority is empowered only to condone the delay for further one month and thereafter, after three months + one month, no further jurisdiction has been conferred to the Appellate Authority to condone the delay.
18. As such, there is complete exclusion of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, as held by the Supreme Court in the matter of Singh Enterprises v. CCE, Jamshedpur [2008] 12 STT 21 (SC)/(2008) 3 SCC 70. Therefore, the Adjudicating Authority was obliged to strictly comply with the provisions contained in Section 107(1) of the Act of 2017 read with Section 169(1) of the Act of 2017 and communicate the order to the person aggrieved, which, in the present case, has not been done and only the order has been uploaded on the GST Portal, as submitted by the learned counsel for the Revenue, which, in our considered opinion, would not amount to the communication of order in terms of Section 107(1) of the Act of 2017.
19. Since the provision relating to communication has to be construed strictly and even, as stated by the learned counsel appearing for the Revenue, in accordance with Section 107(1) read with Section 169(1) of the Act of 2017, the petitioner was never communicated with the order passed by the Adjudicating Authority in order to enable him to file the appeal. As such, the period of limitation of three months would not start running unless the order in question is served by the Adjudicating Authority.
20. It is to be noted that the Rules are creature of a Statute and the Rules cannot circumscribe the mode that had been provided under the Statute. The Statute under Section 107 mandates communication of the order to the person aggrieved by registered post/ e-mail, etc.
21. The Rules cannot be limited to only serving it through electronic modes. The provision contained in Section 107(1) of the Act of 2017 qua communication to the affected party is mandatory in nature and unless the order is communicated to the affected person, the period of limitation would not start running. As such, the Appellate Authority is absolutely unjustified in holding that the appeal is barred by limitation as the appeal was required to be filed by 17.08.2024, whereas the same has been filed on 24.03.2025.
22. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 22.05.2026 is set aside, and as according to the learned counsel for the appellant, the appellant immediately after coming to know about the order, deposited the entire dues on 04.10.2024 and filed the appeal on 24.03.2025, the delay in filing the appeal is condoned and the matter is remanded back to the Appellate Authority for hearing and deciding the appeal on merits.
23. With the above observations, the petition stands allowed. Pending application, if any, stands disposed of.
24. It is made clear that this Court has not expressed any opinion on the merits of the matter.
Notes:
1 (2010) 5 SCC 23
2 (2008) 5 SCC 438
3 (1990) 1 SCC 568
4 1992 Supp (1) SCC 471
5 (2007) 7 SCC 309
6 (2003) 6 SCC 186
7 (2015) 14 SCC 523
8 (2008) 3 SCC 70
