Santosh Kumar Gautam Vs Initiating Officer (Appellate Tribunal under SAFEMA, New Delhi)
Recall of Ganpati Dealcom Judgment Constitutes Fresh Cause for Review—Ten-Month Delay by Department Condoned to Prevent Conflicting Benami Orders
Background of the proceedings
The Tribunal had earlier decided the connected Benami appeals by an order dated 15.12.2022, relying upon the Supreme Court’s judgment in Union of India v. Ganpati Dealcom Pvt. Ltd., reported in (2022) 447 ITR 108.
The original Ganpati Dealcom judgment had held, broadly, that the substantive and penal provisions introduced by the Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Amendment Act, 2016 could not be applied retrospectively to transactions entered into before 01.11.2016.
While disposing of the appeals, the Tribunal had granted liberty to seek review if the Supreme Court subsequently reconsidered its judgment.
The Supreme Court thereafter recalled the Ganpati Dealcom judgment by an order dated 18.10.2024 and permitted parties affected by orders based upon that judgment to pursue appropriate review proceedings.
The Department filed review applications before the Tribunal only on 12.09.2025, giving rise to a delay of approximately ten months even after excluding the period until the Supreme Court’s recall order.
Department’s explanation for the delay
The Department contended that there was no occasion to seek review until the Supreme Court recalled the judgment on 18.10.2024. Therefore, the cause for filing the review applications arose only on that date.
It was submitted that review applications were required to be filed in more than 600 appeals. Collection of records, identification of affected cases, changes in the concerned officers and completion of administrative formalities consumed considerable time.
The Department argued that several similar review applications had already been allowed and the original appeals restored. Rejection of the present applications on limitation would result in inconsistent treatment of similarly situated cases.
Objection by the affected parties
The non-applicants contended that the recall order might explain the period up to 18.10.2024 but could not justify the subsequent delay of nearly ten months.
Other review applications were filed within a reasonable time after the recall. The Department had not provided a satisfactory or case-specific explanation showing why these applications could not similarly have been filed promptly.
It was therefore argued that the applications should be dismissed as time-barred.
Administrative explanation not very cogent
The Tribunal accepted that the relevant starting point for examining the delay was the Supreme Court’s recall order dated 18.10.2024. Until then, the original Ganpati Dealcom decision remained operative and there was no effective cause for review.
However, once the judgment was recalled, the Department was expected to file the review applications within a reasonable period, preferably by December 2024.
The applications filed in September 2025 were therefore substantially delayed. The reasons based on transfer of officers, collection of voluminous records and routine administrative processing were described by the Tribunal as not very cogent.
Despite this, the Tribunal declined to dismiss the applications on limitation.
Merits should not be defeated by limitation
The Tribunal observed that refusal to condone the delay would allow the non-applicants to continue enjoying the benefit of a judgment which had been recalled by a three-judge Bench of the Supreme Court.
Similar orders passed in other cases on the strength of Ganpati Dealcom had already been reviewed and recalled. Dismissal of the present applications would therefore place identically situated cases on different legal footings merely because of administrative delay in filing some review applications.
Relying upon decisions such as Collector (LA) v. Katiji, Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, Special Tahsildar v. K.V. Ayisumma and State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani, the Tribunal held that limitation should not ordinarily defeat a matter deserving consideration on merits.
The real test was not the mere physical passage of time, but whether the delay showed abandonment of the claim, gross negligence or creation of intervening third-party rights.
Governmental delay viewed pragmatically
The Tribunal also referred to the practical difficulties involved in governmental decision-making. State action ordinarily passes through several administrative levels involving record collection, legal examination, approvals and movement of files.
Although the law of limitation does not formally prescribe separate standards for the State and private litigants, some degree of latitude may be permissible because the State represents the collective public interest and functions through an impersonal administrative machinery.
The Tribunal therefore preferred a pragmatic, justice-oriented approach over a strict or technical application of limitation.
Review allowed—merits yet to be decided
The Tribunal treated the case as an exceptional one and condoned the delay.
It followed its earlier orders in Abdullah Ali Balsharaf v. Initiating Officer and Vikas Kasliwal v. Initiating Officer, where similar review applications arising from the recall of Ganpati Dealcom had been allowed.
The review applications were accordingly allowed and the original appeals were directed to be listed before the regular Bench on 02.11.2026.
Importantly, the order does not decide whether the underlying transactions were benami. It merely reopens the appeals for adjudication in light of the changed legal position.
Author’s comments
The ruling draws a distinction between an ordinary change in law and the recall of the very judgment forming the foundation of an earlier order. Once the foundational judgment was recalled, the Tribunal considered it inappropriate to preserve isolated orders based exclusively upon it.
However, condonation was granted despite the Tribunal expressly finding that the administrative explanation was not very cogent. The decision therefore represents a notably liberal application of limitation principles in favour of the Department.
The proposition that governmental delay deserves special latitude must be applied cautiously. Administrative file movement or transfer of officers should not become a routine justification for prolonged inaction. The State is equally bound by limitation and must demonstrate bona fide efforts to act promptly.
The limited nature of the relief is nevertheless important. Allowing review does not establish that the properties are benami; it merely removes the procedural finality of the earlier orders and restores the appeals for a fresh decision on merits.
Cases Discussed
- Union of India & Anr. Vs. M/s. Ganpati Dealcom Pvt. Ltd.
- Abdullah Ali Balsharaf & Ors. Vs. The Initiating Officer, BPU, Delhi
- Inder Singh Vs. State of Madhya Pradesh
- Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar v. State of Maharashtra, (1974) 1 SCC 317
- Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi, (1969) 1 SCC 110
- Sheo Raj Singh v. State of Manipur
- State of Manipur v. Kotin Lamkang, (2019) 10 SCC 408
- A B Govardhan v. P Ragothaman, (2024) 10 SCC 613
- Collector, Land Acquisition v. Mst. Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107
- Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, (2013) 12 SCC 649
- N.L. Abhyankar v. Union of India, 1994 SCC OnLine Bom 574; (1995) 1 Mah LJ 503
- Dehri Rohtas Light Railway Co. Ltd. v. District Board, Bhojpur, (1992) 2 SCC 598
- Municipal Council, Ahmednagar v. Shah Hyder Beig, (2000) 2 SCC 48
- Mool Chandra v. Union of India, (2025) 1 SCC 625
- Special Tehsildar, Land Acquisition, Kerala v. K.V. Ayisumma
- State of Haryana v. Chandra Mani & Ors., AIR (1996) 3 SCC 132
- Vikas Kasliwal vs. The Initiating Officedr, BPU, Mumbai
FULL TEXT OF THE JUDGMENT/ORDER OF APPELLATE TRIBUNAL UNDER SAFEMA
We have heard the application for condonation of delay in filing the review application. The review applicant has filed application for condonation of delay specifying the reasons, but subsequently the better application to seek condonation of delay was filed with the leave of the court. It is submitted that the order sought to be reviewed was passed by this Tribunal on 15.12.2022 while the review application was filed on 12.09.2025 with the delay. However, the same has been explained.
2. The learned counsel for the review applicant has submitted that the order dated 15.12.2022 passed by this Tribunal was based on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of Union of India & Anr. Vs. M/s Ganpati Dealcom Pvt. Ltd. reported in (2022) 447 ITR 108. It was, however, with the liberty that if the Apex Court reviews its order, then the review applicant would be at liberty to file a review application. It is looking to the fact that a review petition had been admitted by the Apex Court in the case of Union of India & Anr. Vs. M/s Ganpati Dealcom Pvt. Ltd. (Review Petition (C) No. 000359/2023) and was pending consideration. Since the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of M/s Ganpati Dealcom (supra) was operating, there was no occasion for the review applicant to file review application, rather occasion arose when the judgment in the case of M/s Ganpati Dealcom (supra) was recalled by the Apex Court vide its order dated 18.10.2024. Detailed reasons for recalling the judgment were given. It is with the liberty to the parties to file a review application if any order or judgment has been passed based on the judgment in the case of M/s Ganpati Dealcom (supra). The cause for filing review application arose to the applicant thereupon and the review application should have been filed after obtaining copy of the order passed by the Apex Court dated 18.10.2024. In fact, many review applications were filed immediately or within a reasonable period. The process of filing the review applications continued because it was to be filed in more than 600 appeals and, therefore, collection of the data and other formalities took time.
3. The learned counsel for the applicant further submitted that in the instant case, there was change of officer and collection of the record took time thus further delay was occasioned and thereby the review application could be filed in the month of September, 2025. Prayer was made to condone the delay as similar review applications have already been decided on merits and thus dismissal of the review application would stand in isolation.
4. The application for condonation of delay has been seriously opposed by the counsel for the non-applicant. It is submitted that many review applications have been allowed after condoning the delay, but the delay therein was reasonable after the order dated 18.10.2024 was passed by the Apex Court recalling the judgment in the case of M/s Ganpati Dealcom (supra). In the instant case, the review application has been filed in the month of September, 2025. It is with inordinate delay of around 10 months after the order dated 18.10.2024 passed by the Apex Court. The prayer was thus made to dismiss the review application as it does not offer plausible excuse.
5. We have considered the rival submissions of the parties and perused the record carefully.
6. The better application to seek condonation of delay was filed by the review applicant pursuant to the leave granted by the Tribunal. The explanation of delay has been given mainly in reference to the order dated 18.10.2024 passed by the Apex Court recalling its judgment in the case of M/s Ganpati Dealcom (supra). It was with the liberty to file a review application in those cases where an order or judgment has been passed relying on the judgment in the case of M/s Ganpati Dealcom (supra). The review applicant was expected to file review application within the reasonable time thereupon but in this case, there is a delay of almost 10 months after eliminating the statutory period for filing the review application after the order dated 18.10.2024 because till the aforesaid date, there remains justification for the delay. It was for the reason that till the date of recalling of the judgment in the case of M/s Ganpati Dealcom (supra), there was no occasion for the review applicant to file the review application, rather occasion arose when the judgment was recalled vide the order dated 18.10.2024 with liberty to file a review application in case any order has been passed relying on the judgment in the case of M/s Ganpati Dealcom (supra). The review application should have been filed preferably in the month of December, 2024 but it has been filed in the month of September, 2025. The explanation of delay has been given with reference to the administrative reasons, such as transfer of the officer, involvement of the voluminous record thus required its collection and other reasons. We do not find reasons to be very cogent.
7. The learned counsel for the review applicant has prayed for condonation of delay despite the aforesaid for the reason that if the application is dismissed, the order impugned by the review applicant would stand in isolation to benefit the non-applicant based on the judgment of the Apex Court in the case of M/s Ganpati Dealcom (supra) despite its recall. It should not stand on a technical objection. We do not find it to be simply technical but we agree with the review applicant that if the application for condonation of delay is dismissed, the non-applicant would be having benefit of lapse of the review applicant and would get benefit in conflict of the order of three judges Bench of the Supreme Court dated 18.10.2024 recalling its judgment in the case of M/s Ganpati Dealcom (supra). The limitation is to be taken into consideration but while condoning the delay in similar applications, we have made reference of catena of judgments holding that limitation should not defeat the merit of the case and in the present case, it would cause discrimination among similarly placed if we dismiss the application for condonation of delay to benefit the review applicant as against others. Similar orders have been reviewed and recalled by this Tribunal with remand of case.
8. We otherwise find that the similar applications were allowed by this Tribunal on 10.07.2025 in Review Application No.MP-FPA-PBPT/1553/DLI/2024 in Appeal No. FPA-PBPT-1113/DLI/2020 titled as Abdullah Ali Balsharaf & Ors. Vs. The Initiating Officer, BPU, Delhi. Relevant paras of the said order are quoted hereunder for ready reference:
50. “Reference of judgment of the Supreme Court is to be given wherein it has been held that limitation should not come in the way of the merit. The judgment of the Apex Court in Inder Singh Versus the State of Madhya Pradesh has been cited. The relevant paras of said judgement are quoted hereunder:-
14. There can be no quarrel on the settled principle of law that delay cannot be condoned without sufficient cause, but a major aspect which has to be kept in mind is that, if in a particular case, the merits have to be examined, it should not be scuttled merely on the basis of limitation.
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16. The Court in Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar v State of Maharashtra, (1974) 1 SCC 317 held:
‘10. …There was a delay of more than ten or twelve years in filing the petition since the accrual of the cause of complaint, and this delay, contended the respondents, was sufficient to disentitle the petitioners to any relief in a petition under Article 32 of the Constitution. We do not think this contention should prevail with us. In the first place, it must be remembered that the rule which says that the Court may not inquire into belated and stale claims is not a rule of law, but a rule of practice based on sound and proper exercise of discretion, and there is no inviolable rule that whenever there is delay, the Court must necessarily refuse to entertain the petition. Each case must depend on its own facts. The question, as pointed out by Hidayatullah, C.J., in Tilokchand Motichand v. H.B. Munshi [(1969) 1 SCC 110, 116 :(1969) 2 SCR 824] “is one of discretion for this Court to follow from case to case. There is no lower limit and there is no upper limit …. It will all depend on what the breach of the fundamental right and the remedy claimed are and how the delay arose”.’ (emphasis supplied)
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17. No doubt, Ramchandra Shankar Deodhar (supra) relates to a writ petition, but the statement of law laid down is clear. Sheo Raj Singh (supra) has also considered the impersonal nature of the functioning of the State, taking note of what was observed in State of Manipur v Kotin Lamkang, (2019) 10 SCC 408. In A B Govardhan v P Ragothaman, (2024) 10 SCC 613, the Court considered as under:
‘37. In Collector (LA) v. Katiji [Collector (LA) v. Katiji, (1987) 2 SCC 107], the Court noted that it had been adopting a justifiably liberal approach in condoning delay and that “justice on merits” is to be preferred as against what “scuttles CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2025 a decision on merits”. Albeit, while reversing an order of the High Court therein condoning delay, principles to guide the consideration of an application for condonation of delay were culled out in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy [Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, (2013) 12 SCC 649: (2014) 1 SCC (Civ) 713: (2014) 4 SCC (Cri) 450: (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 595]. One of the factors taken note of therein was that substantial justice is paramount [Para 21.3 of Esha Bhattacharjee [Esha Bhattacharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academy, (2013) 12 SCC 649: (2014) 1 SCC (Civ) 713: (2014) 4 SCC (Cri) 450: (2014) 2 SCC (L&S) 595]].
38. In N.L. Abhyankar v. Union of India [N.L. Abhyankar v. Union of India, 1994 SCC OnLine Bom 574: (1995) 1 Mah LJ 503], a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court at Nagpur considered, though in the context of delay vis-à-vis Article 226 of the Constitution, the decision in Dehri Rohtas Light Railway Co. Ltd. v. District Board, Bhojpur [Dehri Rohtas Light Railway Co. Ltd. v. District Board, Bhojpur, (1992) 2 SCC 598], and held that: (N.L. Abhyankar case [N.L. Abhyankar v. Union of India, 1994 SCC OnLine Bom 574: (1995) 1 Mah LJ 503], SCC OnLine Bom para 22) “22. … The real test for sound exercise of discretion by the High Court in this regard is not the physical running of time as such, but the test is whether by reason of delay there is such negligence on the part of the petitioner, so as to infer that he has given up his claim or whether before the petitioner has moved CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2025 the writ court, the rights of the third parties have come into being which should not be allowed to be disturbed unless there is reasonable explanation for the delay.” (emphasis supplied)
39. The Bombay High Court’s eloquent statement of the correct position in law in N.L. Abhyankar case [N.L. Abhyankar v. Union of India, 1994 SCC OnLine Bom 574: (1995) 1 Mah LJ 503] found approval in Municipal Council, Ahmednagar v. Shah Hyder Beig [Municipal Council, Ahmednagar v. Shah Hyder Beig, (2000) 2 SCC 48] and Mool Chandra v. Union of India [Mool Chandra v. Union of India, (2025) 1 SCC 625: 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1878].
40. In the wake of the authorities abovementioned, taking a liberal approach subserving the cause of justice, we condone the delay and allow IA No. 16203 of 2019, subject to payment of costs of Rs 20,000 (Rupees twenty thousand) by the appellant to the respondent.’ (emphasis supplied)
51. In the judgement supra, the apex Court has referred its earlier judgement on the issue holding that if a case has merit, it should not be scuttled on limitation. It is even finding delays to be of years together but for that also it can be condoned other than for stale claim but therein also it was not held to be a rule of law but a rule of practice.
52. It is not that whenever there is delay, the Court must necessarily refuse to entertain the petition.
53. In the case of Collector (LA) v. Katiji (1987) 2 SCC 107 the apex Court held that justifiable and liberal approach is to be adopted in condoning delay. The “justice on merits” has to be preferred against “scuttles a decision on merits”.
54. In the case of Esha Bhattercharjee v. Raghunathpur Nafar Academic (2013) 12 SCC 649, the Apex Court held that one of the factors to be taken into consideration for condonation of delay is to be for substantial justice. It should be paramount consideration. The sound tests to exercise distinction in Condonation of Delay is not in reference to physical running of the time but test should be whether the reason of the delay is in utter negligence and the party had literally given up his claim. In the light of the aforesaid, if the present case is taken into consideration, we have recorded our observations on Review Application and found merit therein and if we dismiss the application for condonation, it would have serious repercussion which includes to cause discrimination between similarly situated in a given case if finally, apex Court decides the case of Ganpati Dealcom (supra) holding Amending Act of 2016 to have even retrospective application. In any case the recall of the order while accepting the Review Application is not a final determination of the right of the either party, but to reopen the proceedings to address it on merits.
55. Ld. Counsel for the non-applicant submitted that the period of delay after the order dated 18.10.2024 in Ganpati Dealcom (supra) in filing the Review Application has not been explained with satisfactory reasons. We have gone through the application and find that at the first instance the Review Application has referred to Section 40 of the Act of 1988 to state that it does not provide limitation for filing of the Review Application. We are not in agreement to the aforesaid. At this stage, the Counsel for the Review Applicant submitted that the administrative process takes time and in the instant case it is not that the Review Application had given up the claim or was sitting tight on the matter for years together, rather, after order dated 18.10.2024 and the copy was obtained. The matter was thereupon processed for its decision to file review and thereafter preparation and filing of the review took some time. The fact aforesaid has not been mentioned in the application in so many so words but remain to be oral. If we dismiss the application of condonation of delay on that count, it would scuttle merit of the case for which we have already referred the judgment of the Supreme Court holding that the delay should not come in the way of merit.
56. Another judgment is in the case of Special Tehsildar, Land Acquisition, Kerala versuys K.V. Ayisumma reported in 1996(10 SCC 634. The litigant in the instant case is the Government. The issue has been settled by the Apex Court. Para 2 of the said judgment and is quoted hereunder:
It is now settled law that when the delay was occasioned at the behest of the Government, it would be very difficult to explain the day today delay. The transaction of the business of the Government being done leisurely by officers who had no or evince no personal interest at different levels. No one takes personal responsibility in processing the matters expeditiously. As a fact at several stages they take their own time to reach a decision. Even in spite of pointing at the delay, they do not take expeditious action for ultimate decision in filing the appeal. This case is one of such instances. It is true that Section 5 of the Limitation Act envisages explanation of the delay to the satisfaction of the Court and in matters of Limitation Act made no distinction between the State and the citizen. Nonetheless adoption of strict standard of proof leads to grave miscarriage of public justice. it would result in public mischief by skilful management of delay in, the process of filing the appeal. The approach of the Court would be pragmatic but not pedandic. Under those circumstances, the Subordinate Judge has rightly adopted correct approach and had condoned the delay without insisting upon explaining every day’s delay Sn filing the Review Application in the light of the law laid down by this Court. The High Court was not right in setting aside the order. Delay was rightly condoned.
57. The Apex court had an occasion to deal with the issue in reference to the litigation taken up by the Government. It is held that adoption of some standard to justify the delay may lead to miscarriage of public justice rather it may result in public mischief by skillful management of delay in the process of filing of appeal. The approach of the court should be pragmatic and not pedantic. In the instant case, Review Application has been filed by the government and therefore the parameters sought to be played by the non-applicant cannot be applied.
58. Another judgment is in the case of State of Haryana versus Chandra Mani and Ors. reported in AIR (1996) 3 SCC 132, para 11 and 12 of the said judgement are relevant thus quoted.
11. It is notorious and common knowledge that delay in more than 60 per cent of the cases filed in this Court – be it by private party or the State – are barred by limitation and this Court generally adopts liberal approach in condonation of delay finding somewhat sufficient cause to decide the appeal on merits. It is equally common knowledge that litigants including the State are accorded the same treatment and the law is administered in an even-handed manner. When the State is an applicant, praying for condonation of delay, it is common knowledge that on account of impersonal machinery and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file-pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on the part of the State is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve, but the State represents collective cause of the community. It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officers/agencies proverbially at slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on table for considerable time causing delay intentional or otherwise – is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression “sufficient cause” should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day’s delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the Governmental conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process. The Court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-a-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause. The Government at appropriate level should constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any legal principles are involved for decision by the cours or whether cases require adjustment and should authorise the officers take a decision or give appropriate permission for settlement. In the event of decision to file appeal needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal and he should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any. Equally, the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. The individual would always be quick in taking the decision whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while State is an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants. Considered from this perspective, it must be held that the delay of 109 days in this case has been explained and that it is a fit case for condonation of the delay.
12. On the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that it is a fit case for condoning the delay. The delay is accordingly condoned. The High Court is requested to dispose of the appeal as expeditiously as possible.
59. The Courts were directed to take pragmatic justice oriented approach rather than the technical for explaining the delay. The issue in reference to the State being the litigant to explain the delay cannot to be kept on the same footing as an individual.
60. Taking aforesaid judgements into consideration, we are unable to accept the objection raised by the non-applicant for condonation of delay and to pray for dismissal of the application. The delay till the order dated 18.10.2024 is justified, rather, the said order gave course of action for filing Review Application. If we reckon the period from the date of the order dated 18.10.2024 in Ganpati Dealcom (supra) for filing review, in majority of the cases delay is not alarming. Rather, it may be ranging from 30 days to 90 days. The Review Application has to be guided by one order, thus, we cannot take a view that while delay should be condoned in few application denying it in other connected Review Application.
61. In light of the above, we find a case for Condonation of delay and accordingly application is allowed”.
9. Looking to the facts aforesaid, we find a case of exceptional nature and accordingly we condone the delay in filing the review application and is allowed.
10. This Tribunal has decided similar Review Application and the application of Condonation of Delay vide its elaborate order dated 15.04.2026. It is covering all the arguments on the application of Condonation of Delay and Review Application. Both the applications have been allowed therein. Thus, the Review Application is ordered to be governed by the order of this Tribunal dated 15.04.2026 in the case of Vikas Kasliwal vs. The Initiating Officedr, BPU, Mumbai in Review Application No.MP-PBPT-847/MUM/2025 and in Appeal No. FPA-PBPT-1093/MUM/2020. The Review Application is allowed with the aforesaid.
11. List the appeal on 02.11.2026 before the regular bench.
