Wearing Headscarf Not Essential Part of Islamic Faith: Allahabad HC

Summary: The Allahabad High Court in Sukaina Rizvi vs State of U.P. and Others, Writ-C No. 31172 of 2026, Neutral Citation No. 2026:AHC:176816-DB, decided on August 21, 2026, dismissed a writ petition filed by a minor student through her mother seeking a mandamus directing a private unaided CBSE-affiliated school in Prayagraj to permit her to wear a headscarf in addition to the prescribed uniform. The petitioner had studied in Classes VI to X wearing a headscarf and relied upon identity cards and group photographs, but the School refused admission to Class XI on the ground that the headscarf violated its uniform policy. The School maintained that its dress code applied uniformly to all students and that granting an individual exemption would affect institutional discipline. The Court considered the constitutional claim under Article 25, as well as the petitioner’s reliance upon Articles 14 and 19(1)(a). It held that the assertion that wearing a headscarf was an essential religious practice was unsupported by the necessary pleadings, authoritative religious text or other material establishing that the practice was obligatory and that its non-observance would alter the fundamental character of the faith. The Court also found that the School’s uniform policy was religion-neutral and uniformly applied. In considering precedent, the Bench relied upon the persuasive value of the Karnataka Full Bench judgment in Smt Resham Vs State of Karnataka. It noted that Aishat Shifa (Hijab Case-2 J.) v. State of Karnataka and others, (2023) 2 SCC 1, resulted in a split verdict and that no authoritative Supreme Court pronouncement had finally settled the issue. The Court also considered Zainab Abdul Qayyum Choudhary and others v. Chembur Trombay Education Society’s, N.G. Acharya and D.K. Marathe College of Art, Science and Commerce and others, 2024 SCC OnLine Bom 1925, noting the Supreme Court’s interim order staying the relevant prohibition but holding that an interim order without reasons is not a binding precedent. The Court held that the School was requiring conformity to institutional discipline, of which a uniform forms an essential part, rather than curtailing the petitioner’s freedom of faith. The writ petition was dismissed, with no order as to costs.

Allahabad HC Holds Headscarf Not Essential Religious Practice, Upholds School Uniform

Writ Petition Seeking Permission to Wear Headscarf with School Uniform

It is undoubtedly beyond a straw of doubt in the fitness of things that the Allahabad High Court in a most learned, laudable, landmark, logical and latest judgment titled Sukaina Rizvi vs State of U.P. and Others in Writ – C No. – 31172 of 2026 and cited in Neutral Citation No.: 2026:AHC:176816-DB that was pronounced just recently on August 21, 2026 has dismissed a writ petition which sought a mandamus directing a private unaided school to permit a minor student to wear a headscarf in addition to its prescribed uniform, holding that conformity to institutional discipline, of which a uniform forms an essential part cannot be diluted by an individual student’s preference absent a demonstrated violation of enforceable rights. We need to note that the petition had been filed by a minor student through her mother against the State of U.P. and a private school in Prayagraj affiliated to the Central Board of Secondary Education. It must be also noted that the Court further held that the petitioner had failed to lay the necessary factual and legal foundation to establish that wearing a headscarf constitutes an essential religious practice under Article 25 of the Constitution of India observing specifically that a bare assertion, unsupported by pleadings or religious text, cannot sustain such a claim, and that the school’s uniform policy, being religion-neutral and uniformly applied, did not amount to discrimination under Articles 14 and 19(1)(a). Absolutely right!
At the very outset, this brief, brilliant, bold and balanced judgment authored by Hon’ble Mr Justice JJ Munir for a Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court comprising of himself and Hon’ble Mr Justice Indrajeet Shukla sets the ball in motion by first and foremost putting forth in para 1 that, “Sukaina Rizvi, a minor and a student of the Tagore Public School, Attarsuiya, Prayagraj, who has passed High School and seeks admission to Class-XI in the same institution, has moved this Court through her mother, asking us to issue a mandamus, directing the School Authorities to permit the petitioner to wear a headscarf, in addition to the uniform prescribed by the School for all their students.”

Background and School’s Uniform Policy

To put things in perspective, the Bench envisages in para 2 stating that, “The petitioner says that she has passed her Class-X from the Tagore Public School, Attarsuiya, Prayagraj (for short, ‘the School’) and sought admission in Class-XI there, but the School Authorities have refused her admission in Class-XI on ground that she is not welcome with her headscarf. She says that she has read from Class-VI to Class-X regularly and wore a scarf on her head, ever-since she was a student of Class-VI. No objection was raised by the School Authorities in this regard. In support of her claim that she wore a headscarf during time when she was reading in the lower classes, she has appended her ID Cards and group photographs relating to Classes VIII, IX & X, all of which show her in School uniform with the headscarf super-added to her attire.”

Briefly stated, the Bench while elaborating on the facts of the case in para 3 observes that, “The petitioner says that she requested the School Authorities to permit her to wear her headscarf, but they denied her admission to Class-XI on that ground. There is no written order about it, but the stand is indeed that. At this stage, the petitioner moved an application to that believed plenipotentiary of the district, called the District Magistrate. The applications are more than one. There are two – one dated 14.05.2026 and the other 10.06.2026. The applications carry the same complaint against the School and that is denying the petitioner admission to Class-XI with her headscarf. The petitioner requested the District Magistrate to look into the matter and take necessary action, so that she could continue her education without discrimination. The District Magistrate lived up to the reputation of his office, and, though not in any manner possessed of jurisdiction over the School, a private unaided institution affiliated to the Central Board of Secondary Education (for short, ‘CBSE’), he called for a report from the District Inspector of Schools (‘DIOS’ for short) in the matter. The DIOS caused the School Principal’s statement regarding the petitioner’s grievance to be recorded by the Assistant DIOS and made a report dated 13.07.2026 to the District Magistrate. We would think that neither the DIOS had anything to do with the School, a private and unaided institution, affiliated to the CBSE nor was he answerable to the District Magistrate. Nonetheless, he made his report after causing the School Principal’s statement to be recorded, as the report of the DIOS would show. The Assistant DIOS, Prayagraj summoned both the Principal of the School and the petitioner on 08.09.2027at 3 p.m., requiring them to appear before him and produce whatever evidence they wished in support of their respective claims. The Assistant DIOS, after hearing both parties, made a report to the DIOS through a letter of his dated 10.07.2026 recording the stand of both parties. The relevant part of the Assistant DIOS’s report figures in the report of the DIOS dated 13.07.2026, submitted to the District Magistrate. The Assistant DIOS has recorded the stand of parties.”

As it turned out, the Bench enunciates in para 4 mentioning that, “It is evident from a perusal of the Assistant DIOS’s report that the stand of the School Principal was clear, which was placed on record through a letter dated 10.07.2026. The Principal said that the School is a co-education institution, where students from all communities read. There is a uniform policy regarding the dress code for all children reading in the School. It is adhered to by all boys and girls. The Principal said that because of the petitioner wearing a scarf and sitting in the class, the dress code of the School is violated. It was emphasized that other girls from the same religious community follow the dress code prescribed by the School. It was also said that in the circumstances, granting exemption to one student, affects the administration of the School. The Principal then clearly said that insistence by the petitioner to wear a headscarf to class and pursue her studies wearing it, compelled the School to deny her admission.”

School’s Freedom to Enforce Internal Discipline

Do note, the Division Bench notes in para 5 that, “We notice that in the report made by the Assistant DIOS, it is remarked that the School is affiliated to the CBSE and is self-financed. The School has the freedom to enforce their internal discipline and determine the dress code. The Assistant DIOS added that in the circumstances, it does not appear feasible that a particular student be permitted to violate the dress code and by exerting pressure, secure admission. The DIOS endorsed the said report and submitted it to the District Magistrate, as already said.”

Judicial Precedents on Hijab and Essential Religious Practice

Be it noted, the Bench notes in para 20 that, “The validity of the judgment of the Full Bench in Resham came up for consideration before the Supreme Court in Aishat Shifa (Hijab Case-2 J.) v. State of Karnataka and others, (2023) 2 SCC 1. The two Hon’ble Judges, comprising the Bench, delivered a split verdict, and, whereas Hemant Gupta, J. dismissed the appeal, Sudhanshu Dhulia, J. allowed them. In view of the difference of opinion, the matter was directed to be placed before the Hon’ble the Chief Justice for the constitution of an appropriate Bench. There is no authoritative pronouncement as yet by the Supreme Court, finally settling the issue, arising from the judgment of the Karnataka Full Bench. We are of opinion that the Karnataka Full Bench, like the other Courts, is nevertheless persuasive authority of great value and there is no reason for us to take a different view.”

It would be instructive to note that the Bench hastens to add in para 21 noting that, “Learned Counsel for the petitioner, at this stage, pointed out that a similar judgment of the Bombay High Court in Zainab Abdul Qayyum Choudhary and others v. Chembur Trombay Education Society’s, N.G. Acharya and D.K. Marathe College of Art, Science and Commerce and others, 2024 SCC OnLine Bom 1925, upholding the power of the institution to prescribe a dress code in the interest of discipline, uniformity and academics, was impugned before the Supreme Court, and their Lordships have passed an interim order in Special Leave Petition (Civil) Diary No(s). 34086/2024 on 09.08.2024, staying the clause to the extent it prohibits Hijab, Cap or Badge from being worn by the students, involved in that case. We must note that though the issue is pending examination before the Supreme Court, but the interim order by itself is not a binding precedent. It is only reasons, which bind. The interim order of the Supreme Court does not give any reasons and is provisional in nature. Therefore, we are of opinion that the consistent, preponderant and reasoned opinion, coming from different High Courts in the country, would have precedential value albeit persuasive.”

Article 25 Claim and Essential Religious Practice

Most significantly, most forthrightly and so also most rationally, the Bench then encapsulates in para 22 what constitutes the cornerstone of this notable judgment postulating precisely that, “It is to be noted that the assertion in the writ petition, that wearing a headscarf is an essential religious practice, is a bare assertion. There is no pleading or authoritative religious text or material placed on record, sufficient by itself to establish, that the practice asserted by the petitioner about the obligation to wear a scarf inside the classroom, is obligatory upon her and the nonobservance thereof would alter the fundamental character of her faith. A claim, placing reliance upon Article 25 of the Constitution, cannot be accepted for the sake of mere assertion, without the necessary factual and legal foundation laid for the purpose. A perusal of the writ petition shows that there are no pleadings to that effect by the petitioner, except that she has been doing it since she was a child and ever-since she joined the School in Class-VI.”

School Discipline and Freedom of Faith

Most remarkably and most commendably, the Bench propounds in para 23 holding aptly that, “We must remark here that the District Magistrate after all would have no control over the School, the School being private, unaided and affiliated to the CBSE. Nevertheless, we do not say that the School is not subject to our writ because after all education is in itself a public function, entrusted to private hands for the purpose of better and far reaching realization of the goal of education for a very big size of the population, particularly education upto Class-XII. The School in this case does not seek to curtail the petitioner’s freedom of faith at all. All that they require is conformity to institutional discipline, of which a uniform is an essential part. In the event, individual students were permitted to aid or depart, even a little bit from the prescribed uniform on subjective grounds, it would militate against the idea of a uniform. It would transfer the authority to determine School discipline from the institution to individual students.”

Uniform Policy and Equal Application

Most interestingly, it is worth noting that the Bench notes in para 24 that, “We have perused the photographs from various classes relating to the petitioner. Except for her, no other girl student is donning the headscarf, even those belonging to the same religious community, as the petitioner. Wherever this issue has arisen, the High Courts have been unanimous in opinion that wearing a headscarf is not essential part of the Islamic faith for a women to don, in the absence of which, faith would be jeopardized. Here, as already remarked, no such factual foundation has been laid or material placed on record to establish a case that the donning of a headscarf is an essential part of religion for a Muslim female, forsaking which, would oust the girl or woman concerned from the faith that she professes and practices. In the absence of this kind of a pleading and material, we are unable to hold for the petitioner on the facts obtaining here. The existing precedents would take care of the question, which go against her on this point.”

As a corollary, the Bench then directs and holds in para 25 that, “In the result, this writ petition fails and is dismissed.”

Finally, the Bench then concludes by directing and holding in para 26 that, “There shall be no order as to costs.”

Conclusion

In sum, we thus see that the Allahabad High Court has made it indubitably clear that headscarf is not essential part of Islamic faith. The Court deemed it fit refuse to permit hijab over prescribed school uniform. Very rightly so!