Police Officers In UP Are More Loyal Towards Ruling Dispensation Than Constitution: Allahabad HC
It has to be taken most seriously that none other than the Allahabad High Court which is the biggest High Court in not only just India among all the States, in not only just Asia, in not only just few continents but also in all the continents all over the world in a most learned, laudable, landmark, logical and latest judgment titled Rajendra Tyagi And 2 Others Vs. State of U.P. And Another in Application u/s 482 No.- 6547 of 2025 and cited in Neutral Citation No.: 2026:AHC:125175 that was reserved on 2702.2026 and then finally pronounced on 03.06.2026 has in a hard hitting observation minced absolutely just no words to hold in no uncertain terms while being highly critical of the functioning of UP police that police officers in Uttar Pradesh are more loyal towards the ruling dispensation than the Constitution. While catching the bull by the horns, the Single Judge Bench comprising of Hon’ble Mr Justice Vinod Diwakar who authored this notable judgment was most unequivocal in holding that “feudal mindset of politicians and bureaucrats” has long reduced constitutional governance to an instrument of personal dominion rather than public service. It is high time that police are freed from political control and the landmark recommendations on police reforms made in Prakash Singh vs Union of India case made 20 years ago be implemented most promptly to ensure better functioning of the police in an independent manner!
Now the moot question that arises here is: “Who will bell the cat?” It is Apex Court which must now itself definitely make sure that its own landmark judgment in Prakash Singh case is most strictly implemented in all the States in India! The earlier this is done, the better it shall be in the longer run to ensure that police functions more independently!
At the very outset, this brief, brilliant, bold and balanced judgment sets the ball in motion by first and foremost putting forth in para 1 that, “Heard Shri Ronak Chaturvedi, learned counsel for the applicants, Shri Anoop Trivedi, learned Additional Advocate General assisted by Shri Paritosh Kumar Malviya, learned A.G.A.-I for the State-respondent, and perused the material available on record.”
To put things in perspective, the Bench while elaborating on the prosecution’s case then envisages in para 2 that, “In brief, the prosecution’s case is that Rajendra Tyagi, son of Siyanand, presently residing at House No. A-30E, Nandgram, Police Station Nandgram, Ghaziabad, and permanent resident of Village Kakanda, Police Station Muradnagar, Ghaziabad, is the leader of an organized gang, of which his son Deepak Tyagi is also a member. Both, acting together for their financial, material, and personal gains, are alleged to have committed acts of fraud worth crores of rupees, forgery, and criminal intimidation in the name of providing plots/land in the districts of Ghaziabad and Jalaun. The offences committed by this gang fall under Chapter XVII of the Indian Penal Code, 1860. It is further alleged that no member of the public has the courage to testify or file a complaint against this gang and that their free movement is not in the interest of the general public. The gang leader and gang members are stated to be not physically disabled. The crimes recorded in the gang chart, comprising previously committed anti-social activities by the gang leader and gang members, fall within the definition of Section 2(Kha)(1) of the U.P. Gangsters and AntiSocial Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘the Act of 1986’), and it is accordingly submitted that in order to control the criminal activities of gang leader Rajendra Tyagi and the members of his gang, it is necessary to take action under Section 3(1) of the Act of 1986.”
As we see, the Bench then discloses in para 3 that, “On the basis of the aforesaid facts, FIR No. 0101 of 2023 was registered on 12.02.2023 under Sections 2 and 3 of the Act of 1986, at Police Station Nandgram, District Ghaziabad, against (i) Rajendra Tyagi, (ii) Deepak Tyagi, and (iii) Lalita Tyagi, the applicants herein. Applicant No. 1 has been shown as the gang leader, applicant no. 2 is the son of applicant no. 1 and has been shown as a gang member, and applicant No. 3 is the daughter-in-law of applicant no. 1, a homemaker, who has also been shown as a gang member. Aggrieved by the registration of the said FIR, the applicants have filed the present application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, challenging the invocation of the provisions of the Act of 1986 against them.”
In hindsight, the Bench then points out in para 4 that, “The case was initially listed on 22.02.2025, when the learned counsel for the applicants raised the specific issue of alleged misuse of police powers, contending that the gang chart pertaining to the applicants was approved by the Commissioner of Police, Ghaziabad, in contravention of Rule 5(3)(a) of the U.P. Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Rules, 2021 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Rules’). The primary grievance was that no joint meeting had been held between the Commissioner of Police and the District Magistrate before according such approval, and that the police authorities proceeded against the applicants without the requisite subjective satisfaction being arrived at in the manner prescribed by law, and procedure established by law. The applicants placed reliance upon Vinay Kumar Gupta v. State of U.P. and Others 2025 SCC OnLine All. 3026.”
Most forthrightly, the Bench while taking a rap on the knuckles of both the police and the political establishment propounds in para 61 holding that, “Uttar Pradesh, by virtue of its demographic magnitude and political significance, has historically been a crucible of political hegemony, driven by the feudal mindset of politicians and bureaucrats. It has long reduced constitutional governance to an instrument of personal dominion rather than public service. The administrative machinery of the State has, over successive regimes, been susceptible to deep political penetration. This court has no hesitation in observing that transfers, postings, and promotions of officers have frequently been instruments of political patronage rather than merit-based governance, barring a few. Officers perceived as loyalists are rewarded with preferred postings- urban Commissionerates, lucrative districts- while those demonstrating independence are transferred punitively to inconsequential assignments, a well-known fact.”
While continuing in the same vein, the Bench minces absolutely just no words to hold indubitably in para 62 that, “A systemic and deeply entrenched culture has emerged wherein a considerable section of the officer cadre treats the rule of law not as a constitutional obligation but as an operational inconvenience. Arrests are effected without due process, many times FIRs are registered or suppressed with ulterior motives, and preventive detention provisions are invoked arbitrarily, at the whims of officers. The procedural safeguards under the Code of Criminal Procedure, and now the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, are routinely bypassed. Judicial orders are complied with in form but defeated in substance.”
Most significantly, the Bench encapsulates in para 63 what constitutes the cornerstone of this notable judgment postulating precisely that, “The vertical loyalty of officers runs not toward the Constitution but toward the ruling dispensation. Field officers, acutely conscious of the transfer-posting economy, calibrate their conduct to satisfy political superiors. Encounter killings, selective crackdowns, and targeted use of the Gangsters Act against inconvenient individuals have periodically attracted judicial notice. The High Court has, on numerous occasions, deprecated this tendency and reminded officers that their posts are constitutional in character and must not be reduced to instruments of individual convenience.”
It is worth noting that the Bench notes in para 64 that, “It is apposite to recall that the police officer, who was entrusted with the supervision of the entire operation in the Bikru massacre- wherein a gangster and his associates ambushed a police team that had arrived to effect his arrest, brutally killing eight policemen, including a Deputy Superintendent of Police- was, upon conclusion of the departmental enquiry, visited with nothing more than a ‘formal caution’. This Court finds it difficult to reconcile such a disproportionately lenient outcome with the gravity of the supervisory failure involved, and it is precisely this culture of institutional impunity that emboldens those in authority to remain unaccountable, perpetuating the feudal and politically patronised administrative ecosystem that this Court has adverted to hereinabove.”
Most alarmingly, the Bench points out in para 65 that, “With deep constitutional concern, this Court concludes that the Home Secretary, as the senior-most bureaucratic authority in the Home Department, occupies a pivotal position in this ecosystem. Rather than functioning as an independent constitutional authority charged with implementing the government’s vision, policies, and programmes through impartial executive action. Certain officers who rose to the post of Home Secretary have, in practice, served as conduits for self-serving interests. Recommendations on postings, approvals of departmental proceedings, and responses to court proceedings have, in such instances, reflected considerations driven by personal or extrinsic calculations rather than dispassionate and constitutionally informed administrative judgment. This fundamentally compromises the institutional integrity that the position demands.”
It would be instructive to note that the Bench hastens to add in para 66 noting that, “It is within this precise context that this Court’s observation- that the Home Department must independently evaluate the suitability and operational effectiveness of its officers- carries profound constitutional significance. It is a solemn judicial reminder that constitutional governance cannot be held hostage to individual expediency or an individual’s convenience, and that the State apparatus must remain answerable to the law and to the Constitution, and not to any ruling establishment.”
Do note, the Bench notes in para 67 that, “On the merits of the present case, it’s established that the proceedings under the Gangsters Act have been invoked on the basis of two FIRs: (i) FIR No. 912 of 2022, registered under Sections 406 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code at P.S. Nandgram, District Ghaziabad, pursuant to the FIR dated 02.09.2022 lodged by informant Pankaj Tyagi; and (ii) FIR No. 703 of 2021, registered under Sections 406, 504, and 506 of the Indian Penal Code at P.S. Chandpur, District Bijnor, lodged by informant Sapna Agarwal.”
Do also note, the Bench then notes in para 68 that, “In FIR No.912 of 2022 (supra), there are two accused- Rajendra Tyagi and Deepak Tyagi, whereas in FIR No.703 of 2021 (supra), there are four accused- Deepak Tyagi, Dinesh alias Babli Tyagi, Rajendra Tyagi and Lalita Tyagi.”
It merits noting that the Bench notes in para 69 that, “Admittedly, both FIRs pertain to financial transactions and payment of money in connection with the purchase of land, and the accused also issued certain cheques in favour of the complainant. Accused Rajendra Tyagi, Deepak Tyagi, and Lalita Tyagi are family members. Lalita Tyagi is the wife of Deepak Tyagi, who was aged about 35 years at the time of his arrest. On perusal of the entire charge-sheet, not a single averment has been made particularly against accused Lalita Tyagi, or cumulatively against the other two accused, which could satisfy the ingredients of Section 2 of the Gangsters Act. The accused may have committed offences of cheating and forgery; however, the same does not amount to, and cannot be construed as, running an organised gang.”
As things stands, the Bench deems it fit to hold in para 70 that, “The activities and the material placed on record do not satisfy the ingredients of Section 2(b) of the Uttar Pradesh Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986. There is no material on record which could establish the use of violence, intimidation, coercion, or any other means with the object of disturbing public order or of gaining any undue temporal or pecuniary advantage.”
Plainly speaking, the Bench puts forth in para 71 that, “This Court, vide order dated 03.03.2025, directed the Commissioner of Police, Ghaziabad, to place on record the material available with the Commissioner of Police and the Deputy Commissioner of Police before approving the gang-chart, and the methodology adopted to quantify the alleged earnings of the gang. No such material has been produced before this Court, except bald assertions. On the basis of mere assertions, the provisions of the Gangsters Act cannot be invoked.”
Be it noted, the Bench notes in para 72 that, “The record suggest, the incumbent Commissioner of Police has not followed the directions issued by the Supreme Court in Gorakhnath Mishra v. State of Uttar Pradesh SLP(Crl) No. 007453/2025; Diary No. 2673 of 2023, and this Court in Vinay Kumar Gupta (supra) while approving the gang-chart. The guidelines issued vide Office Memorandum No. 4080/Six-Pu-9-2024-1842633 dated 24.09.2024 has also not been adhered to, the charge-sheet suggests.”
Most rationally, the Bench points out in para 73 that, “There is yet another aspect of the present case that warrants serious consideration, namely, the arrest of co-accused Lalita Tyagi- a young lady aged about 35 years, a homemaker- on the day immediately following the registration of the impugned FIR. No material whatsoever has been placed on record to justify or sustain her arrest, and on the face of it, the said arrest was patently illegal, arbitrary, and wholly unwarranted in law. The Investigating Officer exercised the power of arrest in a manifestly unjustified and high-handed manner, betraying a complete non-application of mind to the settled legal principles governing the necessity of arrest.”
Quite forthrightly, the Bench observes in para 74 that, “The Commissioner of Police has failed to supervise the investigation; in such nature of cases, all directions are flowed from the office of the Commissioner of Police. Government Order No. 3421/Ch-Pu-9-22- 31(43)/2013 TC dated 24.07.2023, issued by the Additional Chief Secretary (Home), records that the officer concerned shall be personally responsible for dereliction of duty and misuse of authority. Office Memorandum No. 4619/6-50-9-2024-1867437 dated 02.12.2024 records a comprehensive checklist of 29 points, along with instructions for strict action against negligent officers.”
As it turned out, the Bench enunciates in para 76 that, “However, this Court is of the considered view that it cannot examine or assess the behavioural attributes and officer-like qualities of an individual officer unless and until some concrete and credible material is placed before it. Moreover, judicial wisdom and institutional propriety restrain this Court from taking cognizance of, or placing reliance upon, unsubstantiated submissions advanced at the Bar. It is, therefore, for the Home Department, Government of Uttar Pradesh, to independently consider and evaluate the suitability and operational effectiveness of its officers insofar as field postings are concerned.”
As a corollary, the Bench then holds in para 77 that, “In view of the aforesaid deliberations, the entire proceedings of Special Sessions Trial No. 3072 of 2023, titled State v. Rajendra Tyagi and Others, arising out of Case Crime No. 101 of 2023 under Sections 2/3 of the Uttar Pradesh Gangsters and Anti-Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 1986, registered at P.S. Nandgram, District Ghaziabad, and pending before the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Ghaziabad, are hereby quashed. The application is, accordingly, allowed.”
Most pin-pointedly, the Bench points out in para 78 that, “Shri Ajay Kumar Mishra, the then Commissioner of Police, Ghaziabad, failed to exercise supervisory control over his subordinates, and the actions in question occurred under his authority and watch as Commissioner of Police, Ghaziabad. On account of the approval of proceedings under the Gangsters Act, 1986, a young lady aged about 35 years remained in judicial custody for approximately 80 days. The case neither satisfies the ingredients of the Act of 1986 nor fulfils the parameters justifying arrest.”
Most pragmatically, the Bench then directs and holds in para 79 that, “Taking a lenient view and having regard to the future career prospects of the officer, this Court considers it just and appropriate to direct Shri Ajay Kumar Mishra, Inspector General of Police, Prayagraj, to remain vigilant and circumspect in the discharge of his official functions, befitting the responsibilities of a position that demands balanced judgment, institutional restraint, and scrupulous adherence to law.”
Finally, the Bench then aptly concludes by directing and holding in para 80 that, “This Court places on record its appreciation for the valuable assistance rendered by Shri Roopak Chaubey, learned A.G.A-I, and Shri Paritosh Malviya, learned A.G.A.-I.”
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