Neeraj Pradhan Vs High Court of Chhattisgarh & Ors. (Chhattisgarh High Court)
Summary: The Chhattisgarh High Court in Neeraj Pradhan Vs High Court of Chhattisgarh & Ors. allowed a writ petition challenging the selection of a Translator in the High Court establishment. Justice Narendra Kumar Vyas held that preference or additional weightage in competitive recruitment cannot automatically override comparative merit. Where a preference provision is framed to operate between otherwise equally placed candidates, it cannot be used to select a lower-scoring candidate ahead of a higher-scoring applicant. The Court nevertheless protected the appointment of the selected employee because he had served for over six years without any finding of fraud or misrepresentation. The recruitment arose from an advertisement dated 29 December 2016 inviting applications for five Translator posts in the Chhattisgarh High Court. One post was unreserved, one was reserved for Scheduled Castes, two for Scheduled Tribes (including one for women), and one for Other Backward Classes. The prescribed minimum qualification was a law degree from a recognised university. The advertisement, read with the Chhattisgarh High Court Establishment (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 2003, stated that weightage would be given to Legal Assistants attached to the Chief Justice or a Judge who had successfully discharged their duties.
Neeraj Pradhan participated in the recruitment and secured 317 marks out of 400 in the written examination and interview. Deepak Kumar Yadav, respondent No. 5, secured 315 marks. Despite Pradhan having the higher score, the recruitment authorities granted an additional 10% weightage to Yadav and selected him for appointment. Pradhan challenged the decision, asserting that the preference provision could not be invoked to supersede a candidate who had already obtained higher marks on merit. The petitioner further argued that Yadav did not meet the particular condition for preference at the relevant time. The High Court administration acknowledged in its reply that Yadav was not discharging the duties of a Legal Assistant when the advertisement was issued, although he had previously served in that capacity in the Registry. The petitioner accordingly sought cancellation of Yadav’s appointment and consideration of his own candidature with consequential benefits.
The High Court administration defended the recruitment, stating that weightage had been applied according to the governing rules and similarly situated candidates had been treated alike. It also contended that a candidate who had participated in the selection process could not subsequently challenge that process. Yadav submitted that he had been appointed in 2017, had served for more than six years and had subsequently been promoted. Removing him after that period would impose substantial hardship on him and his family. The Court examined the Supreme Court’s decisions in Sanjay Ahlawat v. Maharishi Dayanand University, Abdul Hamid v. Union of India, and The Chairman, TANGEDCO v. Priyadarshini. These decisions were considered for the proposition that, in a competitive merit-based process, preference for an additional qualification or experience generally acts as a deciding factor where candidates are otherwise equal in relevant merit and suitability. It is not a mechanism for granting blanket priority to one class of candidates regardless of their comparative performance.
Applying that reasoning, the Court found that the petitioner’s 317 marks exceeded Yadav’s 315 marks and that the two candidates therefore were not equally placed in the merit assessment. The additional weightage had been used to deny the petitioner appointment despite his higher marks. The Court found the selection authority’s approach irregular and held that the decision to grant preference in that manner could not be sustained. On the question of relief, the Court considered Vikas Pratap Singh v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2013) 14 SCC 494, in which the Supreme Court protected innocent appointees from disproportionate consequences of errors attributable to recruiting authorities. The judgment reproduced passages discussing Union of India v. Narendra Singh, Gujarat State Deputy Executive Engineers’ Association v. State of Gujarat, Buddhi Nath Chaudhary v. Akhil Kumar, M.S. Mudhol v. S.D. Halegkar, and Tridip Kumar Dingal v. State of West Bengal. The Court applied the equitable principle that established service should not be unnecessarily disturbed when the appointee was not responsible for the recruitment defect.
Cases Discussed
- Vikas Pratap Singh & Ors. v. State of Chhattisgarh & Ors. — (2013) 14 SCC 494 — Protection of innocent appointees affected by recruitment errors. (Linked page discusses the precedent; it is not the original judgment.)
- Union of India v. Narendra Singh — (2008) 2 SCC 750 — Equitable protection of a long-serving employee near retirement.
- Gujarat State Deputy Executive Engineers’ Association v. State of Gujarat — 1994 Supp (2) SCC 591 — Length of service considered when declining to disturb appointments.
- Buddhi Nath Chaudhary v. Akhil Kumar — (2001) 2 SCR 18 (as quoted in the judgment) — Equitable consideration for persons who have served for years.
- M.S. Mudhol v. S.D. Halegkar — (1993) II LLJ 1159 SC (as quoted) — Long service in the context of appointment defects.
- Tridip Kumar Dingal v. State of West Bengal — (2009) 1 SCC 768 — Equitable relief for existing appointees.
- Sanjay Ahlawat v. Maharishi Dayanand University — (1995) 2 SCC 762 — Scope of preference and additional weightage.
- Nidamarti Mahesh Kumar v. State of Maharashtra — (1986) 2 SCC 534 — Referenced within the quoted discussion in Sanjay Ahlawat.
- Abdul Hamid v. Union of India — (2017) 16 SCC 346 — Preference between candidates otherwise equal in merit.
- U.P. State Road Transport Corporation v. U.P. Parivahan Nigam Shishukhs Berozgar Sangh — Citation not specified in supplied order — Apprentice preference discussed in the quoted passage.
- The Chairman, TANGEDCO v. Priyadarshini — 2021 (4) SCT 426; MANU/SC/1164/2021 — Preference cannot displace comparative merit.
Five Alternative SEO Titles
Recruitment Weightage Cannot Defeat Higher Merit: Chhattisgarh HC
Translator Recruitment: Higher-Scoring Candidate Entitled to Appointment
Preference Is Tie-Breaker, Not Blanket Advantage in Recruitment: HC
HC Protects Existing Employee While Correcting Translator Selection Error
Translator Gets Seniority from 2017 but No Back Wages: Chhattisgarh HC
FULL TEXT OF THE JUDGMENT/ORDER OF CHHATTISGARH HIGH COURT
1. The petitioner has filed the present writ petition assailing the selection process initiated by the High Court of Chhattisgarh/respondent No.1 for appointment on the post of Translator by which the petitioner’s claim for appointment has not been considered and respondent No. 5 has been appointed as translator.
2. The brief facts as reflected from the record are that the High Court of Chhattisgarh issued an advertisement on 29-12-2016 (Annexure P/3) for appointment on the post of Translator. According to the advertisement, five have to be filled up and qualification for appointment on the post of Translator has been prescribed in the advertisement which reads as under.
| Name of Post :- Translator
Pay Band :- Rs. 9300-34800 + 4200 G.P. Total No. of Posts :- 05 |
QUALIFICATION :-
Must be a Law Graduate from any recognised University. Weightage shall be given to Legal Assistants attached to the Hon’ble Chief Justice or the Hon’ble Judge, successfully discharging their duties. |
||
|---|---|---|---|
| Category | Total | ||
| Unreserved | 01 | – | |
| SC | 01 | – | |
| ST | 02 | Including 01 for Women | |
| OBC | 01 | – | |
| Total | 05 | ||
3. The advertisement further provides that the weightage shall be given to legal assistant attached to the Hon’ble Chief Justice or Hon’ble Judge, successfully discharging their duties. It is pertinent to mention here that the services of the employees are governed by Chhattisgarh High Court Establishment (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 2003. Part-V of the said Rules provides method and minimum qualification for appointment to the various class-III posts. The post of translator is at serial No. 4 of the list. The minimum qualification and experience in the Schedule is the candidate must be a Law Graduate from any recognised University *Weightage shall be given to legal assistants attached to the Hon’ble Chief Justice or the Hon’ble Judge successfully discharging their duties.
4. In pursuance of the selection proceeding initiated by the High Court of Chhattisgarh, the petitioner who is law graduate and being eligible to participate in the selection process along with respondent No.5 have participated in the selection process. In pursuance of the selection process common merit list (Annexure P/5) was published by the High Court wherein the name of the petitioner is at Serial No.3 and the marks obtained by him including the marks of written examination and personal interview, total marks comes to 317 out of 400 whereas respondent No.5 secured 315 marks as reflected from the common merit list.
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner would submit that the High Court has committed illegality in granting weightage of 10% of the total marks obtained to respondent No. 5 as the petitioner has secured higher marks than the respondent No. 5 therefore, they are unequal as such weightage should not be given to respondent No. 5, therefore, the appointment of respondent No.5 is bad-in-law. He would further submit that the weightage will be given to the candidate if they are at par with them, then only weightage will be given. He would further submit that at the relevant time, respondent No.5 was not working in the High Court, as such also grant of weightage of 10% marks to respondent No. 5 is illegal. To substantiate this submission he would refer to the paragraph No.9.12, 9.19 of reply of respondents No. 1 to 4 wherein the respondents No. 1 to 4 have pleaded as under :
“The Sub-committee was very well considered the fact that the respondent No. 5 was not discharging the duties of Legal Assistant at the time of advertisement to the post of translator, but he has discharged the duties of Legal Assistant in the Registry for a considerable period.”
6. As such also, grant of weightage of 10% marks to respondent No.5 is erroneous consideration, therefore, he would submit that the appointment order of respondent No.5 may be set aside and since he was in merit position in the merit list his candidature for appointment on the post of Translator be considered with all consequential benefits, when the respondent No. 5 was appointed.
7. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondents No. 1 to 4 would submit that selection process has been conducted in accordance with law and governing rules, the weightage to respondent No. 5 and other candidates who are similarly situated they have been given weightage. He would further submit that the petitioner has participated in the selection process, therefore, he cannot subsequently challenge the selection process and would pray for dismal of the writ petition.
8. On the other hand, learned counsel for respondent No.5 would submit that in pursuance of the selection, respondent No.5 was appointed on 11-42017 and since then he is working on the post of translator and subsequently he has been promoted on 10-11-2022 on the post of AG-I and more than six years have lapsed, therefore, appointment of respondent No.5 may not be disturbed as no prejudice would be caused to the petitioner even if respondent No. 5 is allowed to continue in the service. To substantiate his submission he would refer to the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Vikas Pratap Singh and others vs. State of Chahttisgarh and others and other connected matters, reported in (2013) 14 SCC 494 wherein Hon’ble the Supreme Court has held in para 24 to 28 which read as under:
“24. In Union of India (UOI) and Anr. v. Narendra Singh, (2008) 2 SCC 750 this Court considered the age of the employee who was erroneously promoted and the duration of his service on the promoted post and the factor of retiring from service on attaining the age of superannuation and observed as follows:
“35. The last prayer on behalf of respondent, however, needs to be sympathetically considered. The respondent is holding the post of Senior Accountant (Functional) since last seventeen years. He is on the verge of retirement, so much so, that only few days have remained. He will be reaching at the age of superannuation by the end of this month i.e. December 31, 2007. In our view, therefore, it would not be appropriate now to revert the respondent to the post of Accountant for very short period. We, therefore, direct the appellants to continue the respondent as Senior Accountant (Functional) till he reaches the age of superannuation i.e. upto December 31, 2007. At the same time, we hold that since the action of the Authorities was in accordance with Statutory Rules, an order passed by the Deputy Accountant-General canceling promotion of the respondent and reverting him to his substantive post of Accountant was legal and valid and the respondent could not have been promoted as Senior Accountant, he would be deemed to have retired as Accountant and not as Senior Accountant (Functional) and his pensionary and retiral benefits would be fixed accordingly by treating him as Accountant all through out.
36. For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is partly allowed. Though the respondent is allowed to continue on the post of Senior Accountant (Functional) till he reaches the age of retirement i.e. December 31, 2007 and salary paid to him in that capacity will not be recovered, his retiral benefits will be fixed not as Senior Accountant (Functional) but as Accountant. In the facts and circumstances of case, there shall be no order as to costs.”
25. This Court in Gujarat State Deputy Executive Engineers’ Association v. State of Gujarat and Ors., 1994 Supp (2) SCC 591 although recorded a finding that appointments given under the `wait list’ were not in accordance with law but refused to set aside such appointments in view of length of service (five years and more).
26. In Buddhi Nath Chaudhary and Ors. v. Akhil Kumar and Ors., (2001) 2 SCR 18, even though the appointments were held to be improper, this Court did not disturb the appointments on the ground that the incumbents had worked for several years and had gained experience and observed: “6.”We have extended equitable considerations to such selected candidates who have worked on the posts for a long period.” (See:S. Mudhol (Dr.) and Anr. v. S.D. Halegkar and Ors., (1993) II LLJ 1159 SC andTridip Kumar Dingal and Ors. v. State of West Bengal and Ors., (2009) 1 SCC 768)
27. Admittedly, in the instant case the error committed by the respondent-Board in the matter of evaluation of the answer scripts could not be attributed to the appellants as they have neither been found to have committed any fraud or misrepresentation in being appointed qua the first merit list nor has the preparation of the erroneous model answer key or the specious result contributed to them. Had the contrary been the case, it would have justified their ouster upon re-evaluation and deprived them of any sympathy from this Court irrespective of their length of service.
28. In our considered view, the appellants have successfully undergone training and are efficiently serving the respondent-State for more than three years and undoubtedly their termination would not only impinge upon the economic security of the appellants and their dependants but also adversely affect their careers. This would be highly unjust and grossly unfair to the appellants who are innocent appointees of an erroneous evaluation of the answer scripts. However, their continuation in service should neither give any unfair advantage to the appellants nor cause undue prejudice to the candidates selected qua the revised merit list”.
9. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.
10. It is not in dispute that the petitioner has secured 317 marks which is higher than 315 marks obtained by the respondent No.5, as such, they are unequal and it is also not in dispute that respondent No.5 was not attached with the Hon’ble Chief Justice or Hon’ble Judges as admitted by the High Court in the return also, still he has been granted weightage which is not the criteria for granting weightage or preference to the candidates as weightage can be given only when claims of all the candidates who are eligible are taken for consideration and when anyone or more of them are found equal positioned by using the additional weightage as a tilting factor in their favour, vis-a-vis versa, others in the matter of actual selection.
11. Granting of the weightage or preference has been considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in which circumstances weightage to a candidate can be granted in the case of Sanjay Ahlawat vs. Maharishi Dayanand University, Rohrtak and others, reported in (1995) 2 SCC 762 wherein Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in para 11 which reads as under.
“11. Strong reliance was placed by the appellant on the case of Nidamarti Mahesh Kumar v. State of Maharashtra and others, (1986) 2 SCC 534. In that case, Rule B(2) framed by the State Government on December 21, 1984 for admission of Students to the MBBS Course was under challenge. Rule B(2) provided:-
“Students who have passed HSC (10+2) 12th standard examination of the Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education from Schools/Colleges situated within the jurisdiction of one university are not eligible for admission to medical college or colleges situated in the jurisdiction of another university. The seats at the Government Medical Colleges in Maharashtra State except those earmarked for nominees of the Government of India and nominees of Miraj Medical Center and these mentioned in Rule D(4) below are reserved for the students of the respective university area.”
12. Hon’ble the Supreme Court has also considered the same issue in the case of Abdul Hamid and others vs. Union of India and others, reported in (2017) 16 SCC 346 wherein it has been held in para 11 as under.“
11. Reliance has been placed by learned counsel appearing for the Railways trained apprentices on the judgment of this Court passed in the case of U.P. State Road Transport Corporation and Another v. U.P. Parivahan Nigam Shishukhs Berozgar Sangh and Others,1. In Para 12 of the judgement it has been held that all other things being equal, the trained apprentices should be given preference upon direct apprentices. This judgment does not help the appellants at all. What has been held is that if the non-Railway trained apprentice is equal to the Railways trained apprentice on merit, then preference can be given to the Railways trained apprentice. The word “preference” does not mean that the Railways trained apprentice will have an exclusive right to the exclusion of all others to be considered for appointment. Both the Tribunal and the High Court were justified in deciding this issue against the Railways and in favour of the original applicants”.
13. Again the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of The Chairman, Tangedco and others vs Priyadaarshini reported in 2021 (4) SCT 426: Manu/SC/1164/2021 has held at para 11 as under:-
11. Whenever, a selection is to be made on the basis of merit performance involving competition, and possession of any additional qualification or factor is also envisaged to accord preference, it cannot be for the purpose of putting them as a whole lot ahead of others, dehors their intrinsic worth or proven inter se merit and suitability, duly assessed by the competent authority. Preference, in the context of all such competitive scheme of selection would only mean that other things being qualitatively and quantitatively equal, those with the additional qualification have to be preferred. There is no question of eliminating all others preventing thereby even an effective and comparative consideration on merits, by according en bloc precedence in favour of those in possession of additional qualification irrespective of the respective merits and demerits of all candidate’s to be considered.
14. In the light of above legal position, it is quite vivid that weightage can be given when both the candidates are equal in obtaining marks and they are equal in all other aspects, then only weightage can be given to the candidates who have been working in the High Court as per recruitment rules and as per advertisement. Therefore, prima facie, it is required for grant of weightage, if the candidate should be equal in all aspects, in the facts and circumstances of the case, it is quite clear that the petitioner has secured 317 marks whereas respondent No.5 has secured 315 marks which are less than the marks obtained by the petitioner. Therefore, the High Court has committed illegality in granting weightage to the petitioner to decline the claim of the petitioner. This clearly reflects irregularity on the part of the High Court which deserves to be set aside. Accordingly, it is set aside, but, this Court can mould the relief by not cancelling the appointment of respondent No. 5 who has already been appointed in the High Court of Chhattisgarh on 8-9-2017 and more than six years have lapsed and also considering that subsequently he has been promoted on 26-08-2021 and after lapse of six years, cancellation of his appointment will be not only harmful to him but to his family and also considering the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Vikas Pratap (Supra), the appointment of respondent No. 5 is not cancelled or annulled.
15. During midst of argument it has been informed by the learned counsel for the respondents No. 1 to 4 under instructions that 12 posts of Translator are still lying vacant, as such, without cancelling or annulling the appointment of respondent No. 5 it is directed that the respondent No. 1 to 4 shall issue appointment order to the petitioner on the post of Translator within a period of four weeks from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. He will be granted seniority from 11-4-2017 on the post of translator in the High Court. But no monetary benefits shall be granted to the petitioner as the petitioner is already practising in the High court. It is made clear that on issuance of appointment order in favour of the petitioner, appointment of respondent No.5 shall not be disturbed and he will be allowed to continue with the respondent.
16. With the aforesaid observation and direction the instant writ petition is allowed.
17. Pending interlocutory applications, if any, also stand disposed of.




