Making Certain Remarks on Police Action on Facebook not Sufficient to Amount to Obstruction of Duty: HP HC
It is most significant to note that while ruling on a very key legal point, the Himachal Pradesh High Court in a most learned, laudable, landmark, logical and latest oral judgment titled Sita Ram Sharma vs State of HP & Anr in Cr.MMO No.363 of 2023 that was pronounced as recently as on 19.06.2024 has minced just no words to hold that a mere protest or use of intemperate language, without any overt act, would not amount to the criminal offence of obstructing an official in the discharge of public functions. It must be mentioned here that the Single Judge Bench comprising of Hon’ble Mr Justice Sandeep Sharma made the observation while dealing with the case of a driver who had gone live on Facebook and had made certain remarks when the police during traffic duty had asked him to show vehicle-related documents. It must be noted that the driver had been booked under Section Section 186 (obstructing public servant in discharge of public functions) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC). He then moved the Himachal Pradesh High Court challenging the proceedings that had been initiated before a Magistrate in Shimla. Consequently, the High Court very rightly quashed the proceedings against the petitioner.
Truly speaking, the Himachal Pradesh High Court very rightly ruled that, “Once there is no allegation that the accused had used physical force to cause any obstruction to the police official, no case under Section 186 of IPC could have been initiated.” It was also very rightly pointed out that, “There is nothing on record to suggest that the petitioner stopped Police from challaning him, rather police, after having noticed certain discrepancies, challaned him under Sections 177 and 179 of the Act. Making certain remarks, if any, on Facebook may not be sufficient to conclude obstruction, if any, caused by the petitioner.” The High Court further observed that even otherwise, the remarks allegedly made by the petitioner on Facebook nowhere indicated that there was an attempt to dissuade the police officials from doing their duty. It was also pointed out by the High Court that, “Rather, by making post, petitioner attempted to state that he is being unnecessarily harassed.”
At the very outset, this brief, brilliant, bold and balanced oral judgment authored by the Single Judge Bench comprising of Hon’ble Mr Justice Sandeep Sharma sets the ball in motion by first and foremost putting forth in para 1 that, “By way of instant petition filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, prayer has been made on behalf of the petitioner for quashing of Kalandra under Section 186 of Indian Penal Code filed by the Police Station Sunni, District Shimla, H.P., as well as consequent proceedings pending adjudication in the court of learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No. I, Shimla, District Shimla, HP in Kalandra No.1 of 2020 titled as State Vs. Sita Ram Sharma.”
To put things in perspective, the Bench envisages in para 2 that, “For having bird’s eye view, facts relevant for adjudication of the case at hand are that on 24.08.2019, respondent No. 2, who at the relevant time was Station House Officer, Police Station Sunni, was on traffic checking duty at Basantpur near Sunni alongwith other police officials. At around 02:30 p.m. a vehicle bearing registration No. – – being driven by the petitioner came from Basantpur side. Since, driver of the vehicle was not wearing seat belt, he was signaled to stop, but allegedly vehicle was not stopped. However, after having finished traffic checking at Basantpur, respondent No. 2 alongwith other officials went towards Sunni and found vehicle bearing registration No. HP-03C-1920 parked near Rinku Bhojnalya/Eatery at Sunni. Respondent No. 2 inquired about the driver of the said vehicle, on which the person came out from the Dhaba and disclosed that he is owner of the vehicle. Respondent No. 2 told the person concerned i.e. petitioner herein that why he failed to stop despite signal. However, allegedly petitioner besides misbehaving with the Police official also went live on Facebook by making remarks that “I am Sita Ram Sharma, posted as Superintendent in the Himachal Pradesh Secretariat. My father was a freedom fighter and I am going to meet my old age mother. I stopped here to take tea and tea is in my hand. The Police is doing challan of my parked vehicle for no reason.””
As it turned out, the Bench enunciates in para 3 that, “Having taken note of aforesaid misbehaviour and obstruction in duty, respondent No. 2 after having obtained necessary permission from the Magistrate under Section 195 Cr.P.C prepared Kalandra under Section 186 of the Indian Penal Code and presented the same in the court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No. I, Shimla, District Shimla, HP, however, before doing aforesaid exercise, respondent No. 2 also challaned the petitioner under Sections 177 and 179 of Motor Vehicles Act for his having plied vehicle without wearing seat belt and disobeying the Police signal. Before aforesaid Kalandra could be taken to its logical end, petitioner has approached this court in the instant proceedings for quashing of FIR on the ground that no case much less under Section 186 of the Indian Penal Code is made out.”
Do note, the Bench notes in para 11 that, “Hon’ble Apex Court in Asmathunnisa (supra) has categorically held that where discretion exercised by the Magistrate in issuing process is capricious and arbitrary having been based either on no evidence or on materials which are wholly irrelevant or inadmissible; and where the complaint suffers from fundamental legal defects, such as, want of sanction, or absence of a complaint by legally competent authority and the like, High Court would be justified in exercise of its powers under S. 482 CrPC.”
Needless to say, the Bench then states in para 12 that, “From the bare perusal of aforesaid exposition of law, it is quite apparent that exercising its inherent power under Section 482 Cr.PC., High Court can proceed to quash the proceedings, if it comes to the conclusion that allowing the proceedings to continue would be an abuse of process of the law.”
As we see, the Bench observes in para 14 that, “As per own case of the prosecution, on the date of alleged incident, petitioner failed to stop his vehicle despite signal and thereafter, vehicle in question could only be located near Rinku Bhojnalya by the Police. As per case of Police, Police after having reached Rinku Bhojnalya called upon the petitioner to show the documents, but he failed to do so. It is also not in dispute that Police challaned the petitioner under Sections 177 and 179 of Motor Vehicle Act for his having plied the vehicle without wearing seat belt and for disobeying Police signal. Proceedings under Section 186 of the Indian Penal Code came to be initiated against the petitioner-accused on account of his having caused obstruction in discharge of public duty by respondent No. 2. As per case of prosecution, when Police demanded the documents, petitioner-accused went live on Facebook and made remarks, as detailed hereinabove.”
Be it noted, the Bench clearly notes in para 17 that, “Interestingly in the case at hand, Police official concerned challaned the petitioner under Sections 177 and 179 of Motor Vehicles Act, but no action, if any, ever came to be taken against him for his having not produced the documents of the vehicle. Since, petitioner had not produced the documents, police officials straightaway ought to have impounded the vehicle in question, which procedure was not adopted by them. Since, there is nothing on record to suggest that obstruction, if any, was ever caused by the petitioner while respondents No.2 was challaning him under Sections 177 and 179 of the Motor Vehicles Act, no proceeding, if any, under Section 186 of the Indian Penal Code could have been initiated against him. Since, basic ingredients of Section 186 of the Indian Penal Code are missing, chances of conviction of the petitioner-accused in a trial, if permitted to continue, are very remote and bleak. If it is so, no fruitful purpose would be served by permitting the trial to continue, rather continuance of trial would amount to sheer abuse of process of law.”
Notably, it cannot be lost sight of that the Bench then points out in para 19 that, “Once there is no allegation that accused used a physical force to cause any obstruction to the Police official, who admittedly after having noticed certain non-compliances on the part of the accused-petitioner, challaned him under Sections 177 and 179 of the Motor Vehicles Act, no case under Section 186 of the Indian Penal Code, could have been initiated against the petitioner. In order to make out an offence punishable under Section 186 of the Indian Penal Code, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to show that 1.) accused voluntarily obstructed a public servant and 2.) such obstruction was caused in discharge of public function of such public servant. The term “voluntarily” contemplate the commission of some overt act; mere passive conduct of a person would not amount to causing obstruction. In the present case, it is none of the case of the prosecution that petitioner obstructed the police officials from challaning him or impounding his vehicle. Rather, in the case at hand, police concerned challaned the petitioner under Sections 177 and 179 of Motor Vehicles Act.”
Most significantly, the Bench then mandates in para 21 observing that, “No doubt, expression “obstruction” does not unnecessarily mean physical obstruction, but in my view, any action accompanied by either show of force or threat or having the effect of obstructing the public servant from carrying out his duty, would constitute ‘obstruction’ for the purpose of Section 186 of the Indian Penal Code. In the case at hand, Police Officer was never obstructed in any manner in discharge of his duty, rather he after having taken note of the fact that petitioner was driving the vehicle without wearing seat belt, challaned him under Section 177 of Motor Vehicles Act, mere protesting or using intemperate language without an overt act, will not be an offence punishable under Section 186 of the Indian Penal Code. Passive conduct without disturbing a public servant in discharge of his functions or duties will not amount to voluntary obstructing a public servant within the meaning of Section 186 of the Indian Penal Code.”
It would be worth mentioning that the Bench specifies in para 22 that, “Reliance is placed upon judgment passed by this Court in Surinder Singh Chauhan v. State of Himachal Pradesh,2002 1 CurLJ 332.”
Finally, the Bench then concludes by directing and holding in para 23 that, “Consequently, in view of the aforesaid discussion as well as law taken note hereinabove, Kalandra under Section 186 of Indian Penal Code filed by the Police Station Sunni, District Shimla, H.P., as well as consequent proceedings, if any, pending adjudication in the court of learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Court No. I, Shimla, District Shimla, HP in Kalandra No.1 of 2020 titled as State Vs. Sita Ram Sharma, are quashed and set aside. Accused is acquitted of the charges framed against him. The petition stands disposed of in the aforesaid terms, alongwith all pending applications.”
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