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Department Cannot Challenge Implemented GST Registration Restoration: GSTAT Hyderabad

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Timmasarti Venkateswara Rao Vs ARQ Electricals (GSTAT Hyderabad)
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Timmasarti Venkateswara Rao Vs ARQ Electricals (GSTAT Hyderabad)

GST Registration Restored and Business Resumed: Can the Department Challenge the Very Order It Has Implemented?

Hyderabad GSTAT protects the taxpayer against reopening an implemented restoration order, but reiterates the limits on condonation of delay.

A taxpayer obtains a favourable appellate order. The outstanding dues are paid, the Department restores the GST registration, and the taxpayer resumes business and files returns. Thereafter, the Department challenges the appellate order on the ground that the taxpayer’s appeal should not have been admitted because it was filed beyond the permissible time.

Can the Department succeed in such circumstances?

In Timmasarti Venkateswara Rao v. ARQ Electricals, the Hyderabad Bench of the GST Appellate Tribunal held that, in the circumstances before it, the Department’s appeal had become infructuous and was not maintainable. The Department had already implemented the appellate order by restoring registration, and the taxpayer had continued business on the strength of that restoration. At the same time, the Tribunal expressly held that the First Appellate Authority had exceeded its statutory power by condoning delay beyond the permissible period. These two findings must be read together to understand the judgment correctly.

The decision is important not because it permits taxpayers to disregard appeal deadlines—it does not—but because it recognises the commercial consequences of disturbing a registration that the Department itself has restored.

These particulars and the operative result appear in the supplied order.

2. What Happened in the Case?

ARQ Electricals was a registered taxpayer. According to the Tribunal’s factual narration, it failed to furnish GST returns for a continuous period of six months during financial year 2023–24. Its registration was subsequently cancelled with retrospective effect.

The taxpayer challenged the cancellation before the First Appellate Authority. However, the appeal was filed not only beyond the ordinary limitation period but also beyond the additional period for which delay could be condoned under Section 107(4).

The First Appellate Authority nevertheless admitted the appeal by relying upon decisions of the Telangana High Court, including Southern Enterprises v. State of Telangana and Chenna Krishnama Charyulu Karampudi v. State of Telangana. The relief was conditional upon payment of outstanding liabilities, including the applicable interest, penalties and late fees.

Thereafter:

  • The taxpayer discharged the liabilities payable by it.
  • The Department restored the GST registration.
  • The taxpayer continued its business and filed GST returns.
  • The registration showed an active status on the GST portal.
  • The departmental representative acknowledged the active registration status before the Tribunal.

Despite having implemented the appellate order, the Department approached the Tribunal to challenge the First Appellate Authority’s jurisdiction to condone the delay.

The dispute, therefore, was no longer confined to whether the original appeal was late. It also concerned what should happen after the Department had implemented the relief and the taxpayer had acted upon it.

3. The Department’s Objection Was Legally Substantial

The Department argued that Section 107(1) provides three months for a taxpayer to file an appeal from the date of communication of the order. Section 107(4) permits condonation for a further period of one month upon sufficient cause being shown. According to the Department, the First Appellate Authority could not entertain an appeal beyond that statutory outer limit merely by relying upon relief granted by the High Court in other cases. The Tribunal accepted this objection in principle.

This is an important part of the judgment.

The Tribunal did not hold that payment of tax cures every procedural defect. Nor did it hold that a business difficulty, by itself, gives the appellate authority unrestricted power to condone delay.

It held that the First Appellate Authority must remain within the jurisdiction conferred by the statute.

Why Reliance on a High Court Judgment Was Not Sufficient

The Tribunal distinguished between:

  • The constitutional jurisdiction exercised by a High Court under Article 226; and
  • The limited statutory jurisdiction exercised by the First Appellate Authority under Section 107.

As explained in the earlier common order followed by the Bench, a High Court’s intervention in the particular circumstances of a writ petition does not automatically enlarge the powers of the statutory appellate authority in every other case. The First Appellate Authority cannot assume a power that the legislation has not conferred upon it.

Accordingly, the Tribunal answered the limitation issue against the taxpayer.

Related TaxGuru decisions: The distinction between statutory limitation and extraordinary writ relief has also been examined in GST Registration Restoration Makes Departmental Appeals Infructuous: GSTAT Hyderabad and Restored GST Registrations Render Departmental Appeals Infructuous: GSTAT Hyderabad.

4. Why Did the Department Still Fail?

The Tribunal then examined the second and ultimately decisive issue: the Department’s own implementation of the appellate order.

The registration had already been restored. The taxpayer had paid its dues, resumed business and continued filing returns. These were admitted facts, not merely claims made by the taxpayer.

The Bench followed its earlier Common Order Nos. 04–19/COURT-II/HYD/2026 dated 18 September 2026. The reasoning reproduced in the present judgment recognised that setting aside the implemented orders could expose the restored registrations to cancellation again, including retrospective cancellation, and place genuine intervening transactions in difficulty.

In paragraph 11.2, the Tribunal stated:

“In these circumstances, allowing the Department to attack an order it implemented would be unfair and would run counter to established principles of estoppel and orderly administration.”

The words “in these circumstances” are significant. The finding arose from the combined effect of implementation, restoration and the taxpayer’s subsequent business conduct.

The Tribunal concluded that no effective relief could be granted to the Department in the appeal. It therefore held the appeal infructuous and disposed of it as not maintainable.

5. The Judgment Contains Two Findings—not One

A hurried reading may suggest that the Tribunal approved the delayed appeal. That would be incorrect.

The actual position is:

Question Tribunal’s Finding
Could the First Appellate Authority condone delay beyond the permissible period under Section 107(4) on the basis relied upon? No. The authority exceeded its statutory jurisdiction.
Could the Department obtain the relief sought after implementing the order, restoring registration and allowing the taxpayer to continue business on that basis? Not in the circumstances of this case. The departmental appeal had become infructuous.

Both findings form part of the Tribunal’s decision. The taxpayer succeeded in the ultimate outcome, but the Tribunal did not approve the excessive condonation of delay.

The distinction matters to every taxpayer and adviser. A favourable result on the peculiar facts of one case should not be treated as permission to file future appeals beyond limitation.

6. Illustration: A Restored Registration Followed by Fresh Uncertainty

Consider the following hypothetical example.

M/s. Mysuru Electrical Traders fails to file returns for several months, and its GST registration is cancelled. It files a delayed appeal. The appellate authority grants relief subject to compliance.

The trader then:

  • Pays outstanding tax and applicable dues of ₹4,80,000;
  • Completes the required return compliance;
  • Obtains restoration of registration from the Department; and
  • Resumes business.

Over the next six months, the trader makes supplies of ₹35 lakh, issues invoices and files returns. Its customers deal with it on the basis that its registration has been restored.

The Department subsequently challenges the appellate order, arguing that the appeal was filed beyond the statutory condonable period.

The figures are illustrative and are not facts of the ARQ Electricals case.

The concern addressed by the Tribunal becomes clear in this situation. The Department’s objection concerns the appellate authority’s power, but the relief sought could disturb business conducted after the Department itself restored the registration. The Hyderabad Bench treated these intervening consequences as material when deciding whether effective relief could be granted in the departmental appeal.

This does not mean that every invoice or every customer’s input tax credit stands conclusively protected by this judgment. Those were not the issues finally adjudicated in the present appeal. The Tribunal’s concern was that reopening the restored registration could place genuine intervening transactions in jeopardy.

7. Illustration: Why Taxpayers Must Still Observe Appeal Deadlines

Now consider another hypothetical situation.

A taxpayer receives a cancellation order but does not take timely action. Much later, the taxpayer files an appeal and submits:

“The High Court has granted relief to other taxpayers. Therefore, the First Appellate Authority must condone my delay also.”

The present judgment does not support that proposition.

The Tribunal expressly rejected the view that fact-specific relief granted in writ proceedings gives the First Appellate Authority a general power to condone delay beyond Section 107(4). A taxpayer cannot rely upon the favourable final outcome in ARQ Electricals while ignoring the adverse finding on limitation.

Related decision on GST appeal limitation. The practical message is straightforward: protect the appeal deadline first. Do not make a delayed appeal part of the compliance strategy.

8. What Does “Infructuous” Mean in This Case?

In the context of this order, the appeal was treated as having lost its practical purpose because the Tribunal found that no effective relief could then be granted to the Department.

The Tribunal did not say that the Department’s limitation argument was wrong. It accepted that argument, but declined to disturb the implemented restoration in the circumstances before it. Paragraphs 12 and 13 record this basis for disposal.

Therefore, the result should not be described as an unconditional affirmation of everything done by the First Appellate Authority.

A more accurate description is:

The Tribunal found a jurisdictional defect in the condonation of delay, but held that the Department’s appeal had become infructuous after implementation of the restoration order and the taxpayer’s continuation of business.

9. What Taxpayers and Businessmen Should Take from the Decision

The judgment deserves attention for three connected reasons.

First, it recognises that restoration of registration has commercial consequences. Once the taxpayer resumes operations on the strength of the Department’s action, a later challenge cannot be examined without considering the position created in the meantime. That consideration was central to the Tribunal’s reasoning.

Second, the decision places importance on orderly administration. The Tribunal considered it unfair, on the facts before it, for the Department to implement an order and thereafter seek relief that would unsettle the restored position.

Third, it gives an equally clear warning about limitation. The Tribunal did not allow equitable considerations to enlarge the First Appellate Authority’s statutory power. Taxpayers should read the protection granted in the case together with this limitation, not separately from it.

Related GSTAT decision on interest, late fee and penalty. For a business, the lesson is not merely to obtain a favourable order. It is also to maintain a clear record of compliance, restoration and business conducted thereafter.

10. Documents That Become Important in a Similar Dispute

The admitted facts in ARQ Electricals show why documentary evidence matters. The Tribunal relied upon payment, restoration, active registration and continued return filing when examining the Department’s appeal.

For a taxpayer seeking to present a comparable factual position, a useful case record would include:

  • The cancellation order and evidence of its communication.
  • The appeal, delay-condonation application and appellate order.
  • Proof of payment of the liabilities required under the order.
  • The restoration or revocation order and related departmental communications.
  • Registration-status records showing restoration.
  • Returns filed after restoration.
  • Invoices and other business records showing transactions after restoration.
  • A dated chronology connecting the appellate relief, compliance, restoration and subsequent business activity.

This is an evidentiary checklist drawn from the facts that mattered in the judgment, not a separate list of statutory conditions prescribed by the Tribunal.

11. The Limits of the Decision Must Also Be Understood

The headline should not be stretched into a universal proposition that implementation of an order always extinguishes the Department’s right to challenge it.

The Tribunal repeatedly linked its conclusion to the circumstances of the case: restoration had taken place, the taxpayer had continued business, and no effective relief could then be granted in the appeal. Its operative reasoning should be presented with those qualifications.

The decision also does not establish that:

  • Every delayed registration appeal must be admitted;
  • Payment of dues automatically validates an appeal filed beyond limitation;
  • A restored registration can never face action for a separate subsequent default; or
  • Every input tax credit dispute involving a customer is settled by this order.

Those questions were not decided in this appeal. The case concerned the Department’s challenge to the particular appellate order after its implementation.

Conclusion

The Hyderabad GSTAT decision in ARQ Electricals conveys a balanced message.

The First Appellate Authority cannot exceed the statutory limits on condonation of delay merely because a High Court granted relief in other writ proceedings. On that issue, the Tribunal agreed with the Department. Nevertheless, the Department did not obtain relief because it had already restored the registration, and the taxpayer had continued business on the strength of that restoration. The appeal was therefore held infructuous and disposed of as not maintainable.

For taxpayers, the immediate lesson is to file returns and appeals within time and preserve complete evidence of compliance. For the administration, the judgment underlines the need to consider the consequences of its own implementation before seeking to unsettle a restored business position.

The importance of this decision lies in that distinction: statutory discipline remains necessary, but the commercial position created by an implemented restoration order cannot be ignored.

Editorial note: This article is based on the supplied signed Tribunal order. The accompanying summary form contains entries that do not fully align with the detailed judgment, including the description of the result and certain order particulars. The discussion above follows the reasoned findings and operative disposal in paragraphs 11–15 of the signed order.

Cases Discussed

  • Chenna Krishnama Charyulu Karampudi Vs Additional Commissioner (Appeals) (Telangana High Court); W.P. No. 27071 of 2022; 27/06/2022. Relied upon by the First Appellate Authority; the GSTAT distinguished the High Court’s constitutional jurisdiction from the statutory appellate authority’s limited condonation powers. Judgment PDF.
  • Southern Enterprises Vs State of Telangana (Telangana High Court); W.P. No. 2471 of 2023; 31/01/2023. Relied upon by the First Appellate Authority for condoning delay. The Tribunal held that relief granted in a writ petition did not automatically enlarge the statutory power under Section 107(4).
  • APICTO Limited Vs Union of India & Ors. (Telangana High Court); W.P. No. 4401 of 2024. Referred to in the Department’s submissions concerning the limits of the First Appellate Authority’s jurisdiction.
  • Common Order Nos. 04–19/COURT-II/HYD/2026 (GSTAT Hyderabad); 18/09/2026. Followed by the Tribunal. The common order held that the FAA exceeded its condonation powers, but departmental appeals became infructuous after implementation of registration-restoration orders.

FULL TEXT OF THE ORDER OF THE GST APPELLATE TRIBUNAL, HYDERABAD

1. The Department has instituted the present appeal under Sections 112(3) and 112(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, impugning Order-in-Appeal No. HYD-GST-MD-AP2-289-2025-26 dated 29th August 2025, rendered by the First Appellate Authority. The term ‘Act’ or ‘Rules’, wherever referred to shall mean and include the State Goods & Services Tax Act, 2017 or State Goods & Services Tax Rules, 2017, respectively, since all the provisions of both the Acts & Rules are common and that the same shall apply equally and concomitantly.

2. The Appellant-Department (the Appellant), aggrieved by the impugned order, has preferred the present appeal. The Appellant’s main contention is that the First Appellate Authority (FAA) exceeded its jurisdiction under Sections 107(1) and 107(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 by condoning delay beyond the maximum period prescribed by law. It is therefore submitted that the impugned order is tainted by a clear error of jurisdiction, contrary to the statutory provision, and is liable to be set aside.

3. The respondent, M/s. ARQ Electricals, is registered taxable person who has been filing returns since the date of registration. However, during the financial year 2023–24 the respondent failed to furnish GST returns for a continuous period of six months. That persistent default falls squarely within Rule 21(h) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Rules, 2017 read with Rule 22(3) thereof and Section 29(2)(c) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, thereby justifying the suo motu cancellation of the respondent’s registration.

4. Under the statutory framework, the respondent was obliged to apply for revocation of the cancellation of registration within the prescribed period of thirty days, and only after discharging the admitted tax liability along with any applicable interest, late fee and penalty. The respondent neither filed an application for revocation nor submitted any reply seeking such relief within the stipulated period. Consequentially, the Adjudicating Authority proceeded to confirm the Show Cause Notice (SCN) and cancelled the respondent’s registration with retrospective effect.

4.1 The respondents subsequently instituted an appeal before the First Appellate Authority under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, after the expiry of the statutory period prescribed by Section 107(1) and beyond the further period which may be condoned under Section 107(4). Despite the clear bar of limitation, the FAA exercised its discretion to condone the delay, expressly placing reliance upon the judgment of the Hon’ble High Court of Telangana in M/s. Southern Enterprises v. State of Telangana, W.P. No. 2471 of 2023 dated 31.01.2023.

4.2 In M/s. Southern Enterprises v. State of Telangana (W.P. No. 2471 of 2023) the Hon’ble High Court of Telangana condoned the delay and directed the First Appellate Authority to admit and determine the writ-petitioner’s appeal on its merits. Purporting to follow that ratio, and having regard also to the decision in M/s. Chenna Krishnama Charyulu Karampudi v. State of Telangana, the FAA condoned the delay in the respondent’s appeal and admitted it for hearing. The admission was, however, expressly conditional: the FAA permitted the respondent to prosecute the appeal only upon payment of all outstanding tax liabilities, together with accrued interest, penalties and any applicable late fees.

5. In compliance with the order impugned, the respondent has discharged tax liabilities payable by them and sought for revocation of the cancellation of the registration, thereby enabling them to resume and continue their business operations. It is an admitted fact that the registration has been restored consequent to such payments by the respondents. It is also an admitted fact that the respondent is carrying on their business and have been filing their GST returns. The present status of the respondent’s registration is active, a position acknowledged by the learned departmental representative and corroborated by the records on the GST portal.

5.1 The appellant has instituted the present appeal, primarily impugning the First Appellate Authority’s exercise of jurisdiction in condoning delay beyond the period prescribed by Section 107(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. It is urged on behalf of the appellant that Section 107(1) prescribes a statutory limitation of three months from the date of communication of the order appealed against, and that Section 107(4) confers a narrowly-circumscribed power on the FAA to condone delay for a further period of one month only, and that such power is exercisable solely upon satisfaction of sufficient cause.

6. The appellant contends that the power of condonation conferred upon the FAA is circumscribed by the express language of Sec. 107(4) of the Act and that the FAA has no jurisdiction to entertain, or condone the delay in, an appeal presented beyond the maximum period prescribed therein. It is further contended that the FAA could not, by relying upon the judgment of the Hon’ble High Court of Telangana in M/s. Southern Enterprises vs State of Telangana and M/s. Chenna Krishnama Charyulu Karampudi vs State of Telangana and also the case of APICTO Limited vs the Union of India and Ors, assume jurisdiction which has not been conferred upon it by the statute.

6.1 On the aforesaid premise, the appellant seeks the setting aside of the impugned orders on the ground that they have been passed without jurisdiction and in dis-regard of the statutory limitation prescribed u/s 107(1) and 107(4) of the Act.

7. On perusal of the grounds of appeal, pleadings, submissions and material placed on record, the following two questions arise for the determination in these appeals:

i) Whether the FAA was justified in condoning the delay in preferring the appeal beyond the maximum condonable period prescribed u/s 107(4) of the Act;

ii) Whether the appeals preferred by the department are maintainable, particularly when the department has already acted upon and implemented the impugned order by revoking the cancellation of the respondent’s registration?

8. The Respondent had neither submitted their cross objections nor appeared before this Bench.

9. Learned Department Representative, Shri. Mohammed Khalid, appearing for the Appellant fairly admits that the factual matrix in the present proceedings is indistinguishable from that considered by this Tribunal in its common orders Nos. 04-19/COURT-II/HYD/2026 dated 18.09.2026.

9.1 Having heard the learned representative for the Department and having perused the record, we are of the view that the question arising in the present appeal is substantially identical to the question or questions which this Tribunal has considered and determined in the common orders referred to above. In the circumstances, and for the reasons set out in those decisions, we find no substantial difference in the factual or legal background which would warrant a departure from the conclusions therein. Accordingly, this appeal shall be adjudicated in consonance with the principles and the outcome recorded in the said common orders. The operative extract from the aforementioned common order is reproduced below for convenient reference:

“18.2 …the exercise of such constitutional power by the High Court cannot, by any process of judicial osmosis, be transplanted into the jurisdiction of a statutory authority. The First Appellate Authority is a creature of the statute and must, therefore, act within the four corners of the enactment. Its jurisdiction is conditioned and circumscribed by the provisions of Section 107 of the CGST Act, and the limits prescribed therein are mandatory in nature.

18.3 The orders relied upon by the First Appellate Authority were rendered by the Hon’ble High Court in exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction under Article 226 and were founded upon the facts and circumstances peculiar to those proceedings. Those decisions cannot be construed as laying down that the First Appellate Authority possesses an inherent or plenary power to condone delay beyond the outer limit expressly prescribed under Section 107(4) of the Act…

18.4 …aequitas sequitur legem, meaning ‘equity follows the law’, cannot be invoked by a statutory authority to override an express legislative prescription. Where the statute prescribes both the ordinary period of limitation and the maximum period for which delay may be condoned, the authority vested with appellate jurisdiction cannot extend that period on considerations of hardship, equity or substantial justice.

18.6 The First Appellate Authority, therefore, exceeded the bounds of its statutory jurisdiction and exercised a power ultra vires the provisions of Section 107 of the Act. The condonation of delay in the facts of the present cases was not an exercise of a discretion vested in the Authority, but an assumption of jurisdiction that was never available to it…

19.1 …the Hon’ble High Court exercised its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution and, having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances of those cases, directed that the delay be condoned and the matters be considered on merits. The orders cannot be construed as laying down any general proposition of law enlarging the jurisdiction of the First Appellate Authority under Section 107(4) of the Act…”

9.2 The said common order, however, proceeded further to hold as follows:

“20.1 It is undisputed that, after the impugned orders were passed, the Department acted upon them and restored the registrations of the concerned Respondents. Having implemented those orders and altered the Respondents’ legal and commercial position, the Department cannot now seek to invalidate the same orders without addressing the consequences of its own action.

20.3 In these circumstances, even if the Department’s objections regarding the statutory limitation period are accepted in principle, no effective relief can presently be granted to the Department through these appeals…

21.1 Having acted upon and implemented the impugned orders, the Department has, at this stage, sought to challenge their validity, thereby creating an anomalous and precarious situation. If these appeals were to be allowed, the restored registrations would once again become liable to cancellation, including with retrospective effect. Such a consequence would imperil the validity of the genuine transactions undertaken by the Respondents during the intervening period, through no fault attributable to them…

26…….we hold that the First Appellate Authority travelled beyond the statutory limits prescribed under Section 107(4) of the Act in condoning the inordinate delay in filing the appeals by the Respondents… At the same time, having implemented the impugned orders by restoring the Respondents’ registrations, the Department cannot, in the circumstances of the present case, assail the very orders upon which it has already acted… Consequently, the Department’s appeals have become infructuous and no effective relief can now be granted therein. The appeals are, therefore, disposed of as not maintainable.”

10. The facts of the present appeal are not shown to be distinguishable from those considered in the common order extracted above. The Respondent defaulted continuously for six months, its registration was cancelled under Section 29(2)(c) of the Act, the appeal before the FAA was filed grossly beyond the period condonable under Section 107(4), the delay was condoned by the FAA by reliance on the very same judgments of the High Court of Telangana, and, most significantly, the Department has already given effect to the impugned order by restoring the Respondent’s registration, upon which the Respondent has since continued to carry on business.

11. Applying the ratio of the said common order to the facts of the present case, it is held, first, that the FAA was not justified in condoning the delay in filing of the appeal before it beyond the period permissible under Section 107(4) of the Act, merely on the strength of the judgments of the High Court of Telangana relied upon, those judgments having been rendered in the exercise of writ jurisdiction on the facts peculiar to the cases before the High Court and not disclosing any general proposition enlarging the FAA’s statutory power of condonation. It is held, further, that notwithstanding the said infirmity, the Department, having itself implemented the impugned order by restoring the registration of the Respondent, and the Respondent having since continued to carry on business on the strength thereof, the present appeal has, for the same reasons as recorded in the common order extracted above, become infructuous, and no effective relief can be granted to the Department herein.

11.1 Having considered the matter, we find that the First Appellate Authority exceeded the limits of its power under Section 107(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 by condoning the clearly excessive delay in filing the respondent’s appeal. Accordingly, the first issue framed in paragraph 7 is answered against the respondent.

11.2 However, it is also clear that the Department, by giving effect to the impugned order and facilitating the restoration of the respondent’s GST registration, has itself acted on the relief it now seeks to challenge. In these circumstances, allowing the Department to attack an order it implemented would be unfair and would run counter to established principles of estoppel and orderly administration. Therefore, the second issue framed in paragraph 7 must be answered in favour of the respondent.

12. As a result, because the impugned order has been implemented and there is no practical relief this Bench can now grant, the Department’s appeal has become devoid of any effective remedy. For the reasons set out above, the appeal is disposed as not maintainable.

13. Accordingly, and following this Bench’s Common Order Nos. 04 to 19/COURT-II/HYD/2026 dated 18.09.2026, the present appeal is held to be infructuous and is disposed of as not maintainable.

ORDER

14. The appeal filed by the department, for the reasons stated supra, is disposed of.

15. No order is to costs.

(Order pronounced in open court on 18.11.2026 in the presence of the DR)

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S PRASAD
Name: S PRASAD
Qualification: Graduate
Company: S.PRASAD AND CO
Location: Mysuru, Karnataka
Articles Published: 199

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