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Delhi HC Upholds ₹21.75 Crore Arbitration Award Against NHAI for Demonetisation Toll Loss

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TaxGuru Citation
2026 taxguru.in 19200
Case Name
National Highways Authority of India (NHAI) Vs GVK Jaipur Expressway Pvt. Ltd. (Delhi High Court)
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National Highways Authority of India (NHAI) Vs GVK Jaipur Expressway Pvt. Ltd. (Delhi High Court)

Summary: The Delhi High Court, in National Highways Authority of India (NHAI) Vs GVK Jaipur Expressway Pvt. Ltd., dismissed a petition filed by the National Highways Authority of India under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, challenging an arbitral award dated 6 February 2020 passed by a three-member Arbitral Tribunal. The tribunal had awarded ₹21,75,45,640 to GVK Jaipur Expressway Pvt. Ltd., along with arbitration costs of ₹44,76,775, as compensation for the loss suffered due to suspension of toll collection during the demonetisation period in November–December 2016. The principal controversy concerned whether the suspension of toll collection pursuant to governmental directions constituted a change in law under the Concession Agreement or was governed by its force majeure provisions. NHAI also questioned the methodology adopted for calculating compensation. Justice C. Hari Shankar held that the tribunal’s interpretation of the contractual provisions was reasonable, that the compensation methodology could not be characterised as perverse or patently illegal, and that no ground existed for interference within the limited jurisdiction conferred by Section 34.

The dispute originated from a Concession Agreement executed on 8 May 2002 between NHAI and GVK for widening and developing the Jaipur–Kishangarh section of National Highway 8 on a build-operate-transfer basis. Following acceptance of the consortium’s bid, GVK was incorporated to undertake the project, including construction, financing, operation and maintenance of the highway. The Independent Consultant issued the Final Completion Certificate on 20 October 2005, certifying successful completion and readiness for commercial operations. Under the Concession Agreement, GVK was entitled to levy and collect toll charges from highway users during the concession period, extending until 17 March 2023. The agreement contained distinct provisions governing concession fees and excess revenue sharing under Article VII, force majeure events under Article XXIX, compensation for material default under Clause 31.2, and change in law under Article XXXVI. Clause 36.1 specifically provided financial protection where a change in law resulted in increased costs, reduced net after-tax returns or another financial burden exceeding ₹1 crore in an accounting year.

On 8 November 2016, the Department of Economic Affairs, Ministry of Finance, issued Notification S.O. 3407(E) under Section 26(2) of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934, declaring that existing ₹500 and ₹1,000 denomination banknotes would cease to be legal tender with effect from 9 November 2016. Following the notification, the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways initially permitted toll operators to accept the specified notes for a limited period but subsequently directed the complete suspension of toll collection at highway toll plazas. The directions were communicated to GVK through NHAI, and toll collection was suspended from 6 p.m. on 9 November 2016. The suspension was extended through successive governmental communications, with toll collection eventually resuming from midnight on 2 December 2016. Importantly, the Ministry’s communication dated 9 November 2016 contemplated suitable compensation for toll operators affected by the suspension. NHAI also informed concessionaires that arrangements for interim compensation were being worked out and requested submission of invoices.

GVK submitted invoices quantifying its losses and subsequently claimed compensation for the toll revenue that it would have earned during the suspension period. The dispute arose when the parties disagreed over the contractual basis and method for determining compensation. GVK maintained that the demonetisation notification and consequential suspension directions constituted a change in law within the meaning of Article XXXVI of the Concession Agreement. According to GVK, the notification changed the legal status of specified currency notes, while the subsequent governmental directions prevented it from exercising its contractual right to collect toll charges. Since the resulting financial burden exceeded the contractual threshold of ₹1 crore, GVK contended that Clause 36.1 required NHAI to restore it financially to the position it would have occupied had the change in law not occurred. GVK further argued that Clause 29.4(i) expressly excluded the application of the political force majeure provisions where Article XXXVI was applicable.

NHAI acknowledged that GVK had suffered losses because of the suspension of toll collection and accepted that compensation was payable. However, it disputed GVK’s reliance on Article XXXVI and contended that the claim should instead be determined under Article VII, governing concession fees and excess revenue sharing, or alternatively under Article XXIX dealing with force majeure. NHAI also questioned the amount claimed, describing the calculation as speculative because GVK had relied on traffic and toll collection figures from October 2016 rather than actual traffic data for the suspension period. GVK responded that vehicles were allowed to pass through toll plazas without stopping or slowing down during the suspension, making accurate recording of traffic movements impracticable. It therefore used average daily traffic figures from October 2016, the immediately preceding month, to estimate the revenue that would otherwise have been collected. GVK maintained that this was a reasonable and commercially appropriate methodology, particularly when NHAI had not identified a more reliable alternative.

After the parties failed to resolve their differences, GVK invoked arbitration through a notice dated 10 May 2017 under Section 21 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. A three-member Arbitral Tribunal was constituted under the auspices of the Indian Council of Arbitration. GVK claimed ₹21,75,45,640 towards lost toll revenue, together with interest, and also raised alternative claims concerning operation and maintenance expenditure and interest paid to lenders. The tribunal considered the Concession Agreement, the statutory notification, governmental communications, correspondence between the parties and the evidence concerning computation of loss. By its award dated 6 February 2020, it accepted GVK’s principal compensation claim and awarded arbitration costs. The alternative claims were not separately adjudicated because they had been raised as alternatives to the principal claim. NHAI thereafter approached the Delhi High Court under Section 34, challenging the tribunal’s interpretation of the contractual provisions and its assessment of compensation.

Examining the contractual framework, the High Court agreed with the tribunal that the notification dated 8 November 2016 constituted a change in law. The notification had been issued in exercise of statutory powers under Section 26 of the Reserve Bank of India Act and altered the legal status of the specified currency notes. The directions issued by the Ministry of Road Transport and Highways were consequential to that statutory change, and NHAI was bound by governmental policy directions under Section 33 of the National Highways Authority of India Act, 1988. The Court observed that the definition of Indian law under Clause 1.2(b) of the Concession Agreement included statutory notifications having the force of law. Since the change in the legal position directly resulted in suspension of toll collection and financial loss exceeding ₹1 crore, the tribunal had correctly applied Article XXXVI. The Court further accepted that Clause 29.4(i) treated change in law as a political force majeure event only when Article XXXVI could not be applied. Accordingly, the force majeure mechanism could not displace the specific contractual provision dealing with compensation for change in law.

The High Court also rejected NHAI’s attempt to invoke Article VII of the Concession Agreement. That article regulated the sharing of excess toll revenue actually received by the concessionaire over projected collections. Its purpose was fundamentally different from Article XXXVI, which addressed the financial consequences of changes in law affecting the concessionaire’s contractual position. The projected revenue mechanism under Article VII assumed normal highway operations and did not contemplate a government-directed suspension of toll collection for a substantial period. Consequently, the tribunal’s conclusion that Article VII did not restrict GVK’s entitlement under Article XXXVI was consistent with the contractual scheme. The Court emphasised that contractual provisions must be interpreted harmoniously, giving effect to specific provisions intended to govern particular contingencies. It found that the tribunal had examined the competing provisions and adopted a coherent interpretation that could not be characterised as unreasonable or contrary to the express terms of the agreement.

Regarding the calculation of compensation, the High Court upheld the tribunal’s reliance on October 2016 traffic figures as a reasonable basis for estimating the loss. The Court recognised that the suspension of toll collection itself prevented the generation of ordinary toll transaction records during the relevant period. In such circumstances, the tribunal was entitled to adopt a rational method based on available historical data, particularly where the immediately preceding month’s figures provided the closest available indication of normal traffic and revenue patterns. NHAI had not demonstrated a more reliable method for assessing the loss. The Court referred to established arbitration jurisprudence, including Associate Builders Vs Delhi Development Authority and NHAI Vs Oriental Pathways (Nagpur) Pvt. Ltd., recognising that an arbitrator may adopt a reasonable formula for computing compensation where the contract does not prescribe a particular methodology. The adoption and application of such a formula ordinarily involve factual assessment and cannot be reopened merely because the unsuccessful party disputes the resulting amount.

Finally, the High Court reiterated that Section 34 proceedings are not appeals against arbitral awards. Judicial interference is permissible only where the statutory grounds for setting aside an award are established, including patent illegality or perversity in cases where those grounds are applicable. A court cannot substitute its own interpretation of contractual provisions merely because another interpretation is possible or because it might have assessed the evidence differently. The tribunal had considered the relevant contractual provisions, statutory framework, governmental communications and rival submissions before arriving at its conclusions. Its reasoning disclosed neither patent illegality nor perversity. The Court observed that interfering with such an award would undermine the sanctity of the arbitral process and the parties’ choice of arbitration as their dispute-resolution mechanism. Accordingly, the petition was dismissed on 11 December 2023, with no order as to costs, leaving undisturbed the arbitral award granting ₹21,75,45,640 in compensation and ₹44,76,775 towards arbitration costs. The judgment highlights the enforceability of change-in-law compensation provisions in infrastructure concession agreements and reinforces judicial restraint in reviewing reasoned arbitral awards.

Cases Discussed

  1. Ssangyong Engineering & Construction Co. Ltd. Vs National Highways Authority of India — (2019) 15 SCC 131 (Supreme Court). The Court referred to this decision while examining the limited scope of interference with arbitral awards under Section 34, particularly where an alleged error concerns contractual interpretation rather than a matter beyond the arbitral tribunal’s jurisdiction.
  2. PSA Sical Terminals Pvt. Ltd. Vs V.O. Chidambranar Port Trust — (2021) 18 SCC 716 (Supreme Court). Considered in relation to patent illegality, the limits of an arbitrator’s authority and the circumstances in which an award may be set aside for departing from the contractual framework.
  3. Delhi Airport Metro Express Pvt. Ltd. Vs Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. — (2022) 1 SCC 131 (Supreme Court). Cited regarding the restricted scope of judicial interference with arbitral awards and the distinction between patent illegality and mere disagreement with the tribunal’s factual or contractual conclusions.
  4. Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd. Vs National Highways Authority of India — 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1063 (Supreme Court). Relied upon for the principle that courts exercising jurisdiction under Section 34 must adopt an approach of minimal interference and cannot substitute their own contractual interpretation for a plausible interpretation adopted by the arbitrator.
  5. Associate Builders Vs Delhi Development Authority — (2015) 3 SCC 49 (Supreme Court). Applied for the principle that interpretation of contractual provisions primarily falls within the arbitrator’s jurisdiction and that a reasonable interpretation cannot be disturbed merely because another view is possible.
  6. National Highways Authority of India Vs Oriental Pathways (Nagpur) Pvt. Ltd. — (2016) 3 Arb LR 448 (DB) (Delhi High Court). Relied upon for recognising the arbitrator’s authority to adopt a reasonable formula for calculating compensation and the limited scope of interference with such factual assessments under Section 34.
  7. MSK Projects (I) (JV) Ltd. Vs State of Rajasthan — (2011) 9 SCR 402 (Supreme Court). Cited for the proposition that an arbitrator’s error in interpreting contractual provisions ordinarily remains an error within jurisdiction.
  8. McDermott International Inc. Vs Burn Standard Co. Ltd. — 2006 Supp (2) SCR 409 (Supreme Court). Referred to in the discussion concerning judicial restraint and the arbitrator’s authority to evaluate contractual disputes.
  9. Sudarsan Trading Co. Vs Government of Kerala — (1989) 2 SCC 38; AIR 1989 SC 890 (Supreme Court). Discussed regarding the arbitrator’s jurisdiction to interpret contractual provisions and the restrictions on judicial interference.
  10. State of Uttar Pradesh Vs Allied Constructions — 2003 Supp (2) SCR 55 (Supreme Court). Referred to in the discussion of the legal principles governing contractual interpretation by arbitrators.
  11. Shri Sitaram Sugar Company Ltd. Vs Union of India — (1990) 3 SCC 223 (Supreme Court). Discussed concerning the legal character of governmental action and the exercise of statutory powers.
  12. Jayantilal Amratlal Shodhan Vs F.N. Rana (Supreme Court). Referred to regarding governmental action undertaken pursuant to statutory authority. Complete citation requires verification.
  13. Umed Vs Raj Singh — (1975) 1 SCC 76 (Supreme Court). Referred to in the judgment’s discussion of principles of interpretation.
  14. Dilbagh Rai Jerry Vs Union of India — (1974) 3 SCC 554 (Supreme Court). Referred to alongside Umed Vs Raj Singh concerning interpretative principles.

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Author Info

CA Sandeep Kanoi
Qualification: Graduate, CA in Job / Business, DD
Company: Taxguru Consultancy
Location: Mumbai, Maharashtra
Articles Published: 24,845

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