Marino Dredgeco Limited Vs Board of Trustees of the Port of Kolkata (Supreme Court of India)
High Court Cannot Slash an Arbitral Award Merely Because the Amount Appears Excessive, Holds Supreme Court
Summary: The Supreme Court restored an arbitral award after the Calcutta High Court reduced the amount payable by 50% and lowered interest to 6%. The High Court had accepted that the award was supported by evidence and was neither perverse nor patently illegal. It nevertheless held that the claim for additional dredging, which exceeded 70% of the original contract value, shocked its conscience. The Supreme Court held that the size of a claim, by itself, supplies no ground for interference under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996.
Why Additional Dredging Became Necessary
The Port Trust engaged Marino Dredgeco to dredge an approach channel and basin for a shore-based pilot station at Sagar Island. The original work was valued at ₹2,86,56,200, of which ₹2,79,32,865 had been paid. The arbitration concerned payment for additional dredging.
Adverse weather and a mismatch between the actual soil conditions and the data supplied by the Port Trust led to further siltation and necessitated re-dredging. The Port Trust’s letter dated 19 July 2000 evidenced the entrustment of the additional work. The Chairman of the Port Trust inaugurated the pilot station on 17 April 2001, using the dredged channel.
The arbitrator relied on measurements, including pre-work and post-work levels, and the contractor’s invoices to quantify the amount payable. A Single Judge declined to set aside the award under Section 34. On appeal under Section 37, the Division Bench reduced the award to half the amount quantified by the arbitrator and reduced interest to 6% on the principal from 8 February 2002.
When Can an Award Be Said to Shock the Court’s Conscience?
The Supreme Court applied Ssangyong Engineering & Construction Co. Ltd. v. NHAI (2019) 15 SCC 131. An award may be interfered with where it conflicts with the most basic notions of morality or justice. Invoking that ground requires a substantive reason showing how the award crosses that threshold.
Here, the Division Bench itself accepted that the documents were relevant, that the award was supported by evidence and that the additional dredging had become necessary. Its objection to the quantum rested on the percentage alone. The original work involved dredging to create a channel and basin. The additional work involved dredging again to keep them operational. In those circumstances, the comparison with the original contract value gave the court no basis to substitute its own figure.
The Supreme Court also distinguished Batliboi Environmental Engineers Ltd. v. HPCL (2024) 2 SCC 375, which dealt with quantification of damages. Marino Dredgeco’s claim was for payment against invoices for additional work actually carried out.
A Flat 50% Reduction Is Outside the Power of Severance
In Gayatri Balasamy v. ISG Novasoft Technologies Ltd., 2025 INSC 605, the Constitution Bench recognised a limited power to modify an arbitral award. A court may sever an invalid portion where it is legally and practically separable from the valid portion. That power does not permit a fresh assessment of the merits.
In the present case, the measurements and invoices related to the same additional re-dredging work. The Division Bench identified no distinct invalid component that could be severed. Reducing the award by an across-the-board percentage simply substituted the court’s estimate for the arbitrator’s quantification.
The Court also relied on Pam Developments Pvt. Ltd. v. State of West Bengal (2019) 8 SCC 112 to underline equal treatment of parties in arbitration. The fact that the award debtor was a State entity supplied no additional ground to reduce an award supported by evidence.
Author’s Comments
The most useful distinction is between identifying a legally defective part of an award and choosing a figure that appears more reasonable. The former can justify limited judicial intervention. The latter reopens the dispute on merits. Once the Division Bench accepted the evidence supporting the additional work and its measurement, the fact that the bill exceeded 70% of the original contract could not explain why precisely half the amount should be disallowed.
The ruling also has practical significance for claims where the employer has withheld a completion certificate. Here, the Port Trust’s own letter, the joint measurements and the invoices supported the finding that the work had been carried out. The evidentiary lesson for contractors is to preserve written instructions, measurement records and invoices. Those documents can establish what was commissioned, what was performed and how the claim was quantified.
The Supreme Court allowed the contractor’s appeal, set aside the Division Bench judgment and restored the arbitral award. The Port Trust’s appeal was disposed of.
Cases Discussed:
- Ssangyong Engineering & Construction Co. Ltd. Vs NHAI (Supreme Court); (2019) 15 SCC 131; AY: Not Applicable. Narrow scope of public policy and conscience-shocking awards.
- Gayatri Balasamy Vs ISG Novasoft Technologies Ltd. (Supreme Court); 2025 INSC 605; 30/04/2025; AY: Not Applicable. Limited modification and severability.
- Batliboi Environmental Engineers Ltd. Vs Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. (Supreme Court); (2024) 2 SCC 375; AY: Not Applicable. Distinguished: damages rather than payment for completed additional work.
- Somdatt Builders–NCC–NEC (JV) Vs NHAI & Ors. (Supreme Court); (2025) 6 SCC 757; 2025 INSC 113; AY: Not Applicable. Section 37 court cannot interfere merely by invoking public-policy formulae.
- Pam Developments Private Ltd. Vs State of West Bengal (Supreme Court); (2019) 8 SCC 112; AY: Not Applicable. Equality of State and private parties in arbitration.
FULL TEXT OF THE JUDGMENT OF THE SUPREME COURT
Leave granted.
2. The two appeals are at the instance of the awarder and the contractor against the judgment under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (for short, ‘the Act’); which appeal was filed by the awarder. The impugned judgment overturned the judgment under Section 34 of the Act which affirmed the arbitration award and modified the award quantifying the amounts payable by the awarder to 50% of that quantified by the Arbitrator and reduced the interest to 6% on the principal sum from 08.02.2002. The modification was made on the ground that the amounts claimed for additional works carried out was more than 70% of the amounts as per the original contract, which according to the Division Bench of the High Court of Calcutta shocked the conscience of the Court. This was despite the Division Bench having recorded that the award passed by the Arbitrator cannot be described as one based on ‘no evidence’ or ‘insufficient evidence’ nor can it be termed as perverse or patently illegal or against the fundamental policy of Indian law. According to the Division Bench, the shock rendered to its conscience makes it fall within the ambit of conflict with the basic notions of morality or justice.
3. Mr.R.Anand Padmanabhan and Mr.Amitava Mukherjee, learned Senior Counsel appeared for the Contractor; one in the appeal filed by the Contractor and the other in the appeal of the Port Trust. The learned Senior Counsel argued that the original contract itself was for dredging of the river bed and shores at the Sagar Island to make a channel and basin, which was put in use from 17.04.2001 when it was inaugurated by the Chairman of the awarder, Port Trust of Calcutta. As on 19.07.2000, there was a letter issued by the Port Trust, entrusting additional work which occurred due to 100% siltation, requiring dredging of the area repeatedly, more by reason of the Port Trust having not provided correct data of the soil constitution and having failed to construct protective walls. It was argued that the Court under Section 37 had limited powers of interference as has been held by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Gayatri Balasamy v. M/s ISG Novasoft Technologies Limited<sup>1</sup>. The modification made based on the bills being shockingly high was without looking at the material relied on by the Arbitrator. Thus, causing interference on a subjective presumption that the additional work cannot in its value reach a substantial percentage of the value of the original work. It is on a mere surmise that such a decision was arrived at without looking at the nature of the work carried out and the additional work necessitated.
4. Mr. Siddharth Bhatnagar, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent awarder Port Trust, in tune with its decision to file an appeal against the impugned judgment seeks for setting aside the entire arbitral award. Alternatively, it is prayed that if at all the additional work is found to have been carried out by the contractor, then the impugned judgment has to be sustained at 50% with reduced interest of 6%. Gayatri Balasamy1 is relied on to point out that, in fact, the entire award ought to have been set aside since the award is against public interest.
5. It is pointed out that no completion certificate was issued and there was no additional work entrusted to the contractor. In fact, the work entrusted was terminated and the appellant failed to procure the certificate of completion, as is provided under the General Conditions of Contract (GCC). Reliance is also placed on Batliboi Environmental Engineers Ltd. v. Hindustan Petroleum Corporation Ltd. (HPCL)2 to argue that the quantification of amounts should not be whimsical and absurd, resulting in a windfall or bounty. We should immediately notice that the cited decision has no application since it dealt with damages and not with respect to invoices validly raised for additional work.
6. We also looked at the judgement of the Single Judge under Section 34 of the Act which application prayed for setting aside of the award dated 03.11.2003. Admittedly, the award was for dredging/evacuation of the approach channel and basin project of shore-based pilot station at Sagar Island. The work was to be completed within 18 months and admittedly there was delay due to the adverse force majeure conditions, not attributable to the contractor. The learned Single Judge found that admittedly the work was completed by 17.04.2001 when the Chairman of the Port Trust inaugurated the pilot station using the channel dredged by the appellant. That there was additional work required to be done is also evident from the letter dated 19.07.2000, addressed by the Port Trust to the contractor, produced as Annexure A35 along with the application to file additional documents. The learned Single Judge affirmed the award.
7. It was also an admitted position that insofar as the original work is concerned, the total amount payable was Rs.2,86,56,200/- out of which Rs.2,79,32,865/- had been paid. The arbitration was initiated specifically for the additional work carried out which is evident from the letter dated 19.07.2000. The additional work was necessitated due to the force majeure weather conditions and due to non-compliance of the soil character with the data supplied by the Port Trust itself. As has been rightly submitted by the contractor, the work itself was dredging of river bed and shores to make a channel and basin up to a specified depth with dumping and disposal of dredged materials. The specific contention is that re-dredging was required due to the mismatch of the data supplied with respect to the soil conditions and the failure to construct protective walls to avoid further siltation. The work of re- dredging is identical to that of the original contract, is the contention raised, which by the nature of the work, is found to be perfectly valid. Hence, the modification of the award merely for reason of the Court’s conscience having been shocked also for the sole ground of the amount claimed for the additional work having exceeded 70% of the original contract cannot at all be sustained.
8. In fact, the Division Bench dealing with the matter under Section 37 clearly recorded a finding that the completion certificate was not available since it was not issued by the Port Trust. Merely for reason of refusal to issue completion certificate, it cannot be said that the contractor would not be entitled to the amounts in the bill raised for the work carried out, was the finding. It was also found that the contractor himself had produced the measurements and the award was based on the pre and post work levels. The Division Bench also found that the documents relied on for the purpose of quantification of the amounts due cannot be termed to be irrelevant for the purpose of such determination, by no stretch of imagination. The reliance placed on the documents produced by the contractor to substantiate the work carried out was found to be quite valid even in the context of the absence of a completion certificate issued under the GCC. The Division Bench also found that the additional work was necessitated because of the force majeure conditions and the mismatch of the actual soil character from that disclosed in the data made available by the Port Trust. Having found that the arbitration award was based on adequate evidence and by no stretch of imagination it can be termed as perverse or patently illegal, we find the modification on the ground of ‘shocking the conscience’ to be not coming within the contours of the jurisdiction conferred under Section 37 and it cannot at all the be said to be in conflict with the basic notions of morality or justice.
9. The Division Bench had relied on Ssangyong Engineering & Construction Co. Ltd. v. National Highways Authority of India (NHAI)3 to cull out the principles for interference of an arbitration award. The cited decision held that there can be no interference with an award on the ground that the Arbitrator has not adopted a judicial approach since then, the interference would be on the merits of the award, which cannot be permitted post the Amendment of 2015. True, the Court also declared that the conflict with the most basic notions of morality or justice brought in after the Amendment, substituting the “interest of India”; which was the provision pre-amendment, can only be applied where the arbitral award shocks the conscience of the Court. However, the words are not to be applied on a mere lip service and there should be a substantive reason which blatantly and patently brings forth the conflict with the most basic notions of morality or justice, resulting in the conscience of the Court being shocked.
10. Somdatt Builders–NCC–NEC (JV) v. National Highways Authority of India & Ors.4 held that the High Court exercising extremely limited jurisdiction under Section 37 of the Act cannot set aside an arbitral award by merely using expressions like ‘opposed to the public policy of India’; ‘patent illegality’ and ‘shocking the conscience of the Court’ (sic paragraph 51). As has already been held the impugned order has merely used the words on the sole ground of the bills for the additional work having exceeded 70% of the original contract; without looking at the nature of the additional work involved.
11. Gayatri Balasamy1 while putting forth the proposition that awards, definitely can be set aside in part, which power is encompassed in the power to set aside the award in its entirety, made a caveat that setting aside an award partially would not be feasible when the ‘valid’ and ‘invalid’ portions are legally and practically inseparable. It was emphasised that the ‘valid’ and ‘invalid’ portions should not be inter- dependent or intrinsically intertwined.
12. In the present case, there is no question of severance of the award into separate silos since the quantification was made in accordance with valid measurements and the invoices raised by the contractor. The Division Bench considering the application under Section 37 has not looked into the measurement or the invoices, which in any event, would be an exercise of adjudication on merits, clearly prohibited under the Act of 1996. The measurements and invoices raised are of one character, based on the additional work of re- dredging which cannot be compartmentalised as ‘valid’ and ‘invalid’.
13. The impugned judgment also expressed shock by reason merely of the enormity of the quantification for additional works exceeding 70% of the original contract for reason of the awarder being a State entity. Pam Developments Private Ltd. v. State of West Bengal5 required the parties to an arbitration to be treated with equality; without any special treatment being given to the Government entity while even considering the application for grant of stay of a money decree in proceedings under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act. There can hence be no interference caused to the quantum of claim decided by the Arbitrator, based on valid material, merely for the reason that the award debtor is a Government entity and that the quantum appears to be excessive without any substantiation for such a ground being raised against the award itself.
14. At the cost of repetition, we have to observe that the original contract was for dredging to build a channel and the additional work was also for dredging to keep the channel and basin operational. We find the reasoning of the Division Bench under Section 37 to be not in consonance with the grounds provided under the Act to set aside an arbitral award, especially, when the Arbitrator had looked into the documents produced by the petitioner on joint measurements carried out of the additional work entrusted with the contractor.
15. The order impugned is set aside and the appeal of the contractor is allowed. The arbitral award stands restored.
16. The appeal of the Port Trust is disposed of since already the order impugned is set aside in the other appeal.
17. Pending application (s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
Notes:
1 2025 INSC 605.
2 (2024) 2 SCC 375.
3 (2019) 15 SCC 131.
4 (2025) 6 SCC 757.
5 (2019) 8 SCC 112.






