Medway Educational Consultant P. Ltd. Vs Commissioner, CGST Commissionerate, Delhi-West (CESTAT Delhi)
Summary: The Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi, in Medway Educational Consultant P. Ltd. Vs Commissioner, CGST Commissionerate, Delhi-West, examined whether services supplied by an Indian educational consultancy to overseas universities constituted export of services or taxable intermediary services under the Place of Provision of Services Rules, 2012. The appellant had entered into agreements with educational institutions in Australia and New Zealand to recruit prospective Indian students for courses conducted abroad. The consultancy promoted the institutions, assisted students with admission procedures, explained tuition fees and accommodation arrangements, and provided visa-related and travel guidance. The foreign universities paid the appellant commission in convertible foreign exchange. The Revenue treated these activities as intermediary services and confirmed a service tax demand of ₹2,49,93,147 for the period from 1 July 2012 to March 2016, together with applicable interest and penalty. The Tribunal allowed the appeal and set aside the impugned order.
The appellant argued that its services had been treated as exports under the earlier Export of Service Rules, 2005, and that the introduction of the Place of Provision of Services Rules, 2012 did not alter the fundamental character of its transactions. It emphasised that the overseas universities were the contractual recipients, the benefit of recruitment accrued to those universities outside India, and payment was received in convertible foreign exchange. The consultancy did not charge the Indian students any consideration. According to the appellant, it supplied recruitment and promotional services to foreign educational institutions on its own account, rather than merely arranging a separate service between independent parties. The Revenue maintained that the appellant facilitated admission of students to foreign universities, whereas the universities themselves provided the principal educational service. On that reasoning, the Revenue invoked Rule 2(f) and Rule 9(c) of the 2012 Rules, treating the place of provision as the appellant’s location in India.
The Tribunal examined the statutory framework governing exports and intermediary services. It considered the Export of Service Rules, 2005, the transition to the Place of Provision of Services Rules, 2012, and Rule 6A of the Service Tax Rules, 1994. Rule 6A required, among other conditions, that the recipient be located outside India, the place of provision be outside India, payment be received in convertible foreign exchange, and the supplier and recipient not merely be establishments of the same person. The Tribunal also examined Rule 2(f), which defined an intermediary as a person arranging or facilitating the provision of a main service between two or more persons, while excluding a person providing the main service on its own account. It observed that the appellant’s contractual obligations and the actual nature of the transactions were central to determining the recipient and character of the service.
The Tribunal analysed the agreement with New Zealand Management Academics (NZMA), under which the appellant was required to promote the institution, assist in achieving enrolment targets, screen prospective students, explain admission policies, submit commission invoices to the institution, provide follow-up assistance and help students with visa procedures. Similar obligations existed under agreements with other overseas institutions. The Tribunal found that the appellant performed these activities pursuant to its contracts with the foreign universities and that the relationship between the consultancy and the overseas institutions operated on a principal-to-principal basis. The universities were the recipients of the contracted recruitment services and were responsible for paying the commission. The Tribunal concluded that the appellant satisfied the requirements of Rule 6A and that the services qualified as exports.
In reaching this conclusion, the Tribunal relied upon the destination-based nature of service tax recognised by the Supreme Court in All India Federation of Tax Practitioners Vs Union of India. It also considered the Delhi High Court’s decision in Verizon Communication India Private Limited Vs Assistant Commissioner, Service Tax, which explained that the recipient of a service must be identified by reference to the contractual arrangement, the party requiring the service and the party responsible for payment, rather than merely the persons affected by its performance. The Tribunal drew support from Paul Merchants Ltd. and Study Overseas Global (P) Ltd., the latter involving promotion of foreign universities and recruitment of students. These authorities supported the distinction between performing activities in India and supplying services whose contractual recipient and commercial benefit were situated abroad.
On the intermediary issue, the Tribunal held that the appellant was not merely arranging the provision of another service but was performing its own contracted recruitment and promotional services for the foreign universities. It relied upon Sunrise Immigration Consultants Private Limited, where similar services to overseas educational institutions and banks were held not to constitute intermediary services. The Tribunal also referred to the rulings in Universal Services India Pvt. Ltd. and GoDaddy India Web Services Pvt. Ltd., concerning services supplied on the provider’s own account. It further considered Genpact India Pvt. Ltd. Vs Union of India and Ernst & Young Vs Additional Commissioner, CGST, in which the High Courts examined the corresponding intermediary provisions under the IGST Act, 2017. The Tribunal noted the substantial similarity between the pre-GST and GST definitions of intermediary services.
The Revenue’s contention that the appellant supplied two separate services—consultancy services to Indian students and recruitment services to foreign universities—was also rejected. The Tribunal observed that tuition fees were remitted directly to the universities and the appellant did not charge students any consideration. There was no contractual relationship under which the Indian students were recipients of a taxable service supplied by the appellant. The Tribunal also referred to the Delhi High Court’s decision in Indian Association of Tour Operators Vs Union of India, concerning the territorial limits of service tax. Although the appellant alternatively invoked the exemption for specified educational services under Notification No. 25/2012-ST, as amended, the Tribunal considered it unnecessary to adjudicate that alternative plea after deciding the principal issue in the appellant’s favour.
Held: The Tribunal concluded that the appellant provided services to foreign universities on its own account, received payment from those institutions in convertible foreign exchange, and satisfied the conditions governing export of services. The services were therefore not taxable intermediary services under Rule 2(f) of the Place of Provision of Services Rules, 2012. The impugned order was set aside and the appeal was allowed. The ruling underscores the importance of examining the actual contractual obligations, identity of the service recipient, consideration and nature of the supplier’s independent activities when distinguishing an export of services from an intermediary arrangement. The decision concerns the service tax regime applicable to July 2012–March 2016; its reasoning may be relevant to GST intermediary disputes, but applicability under the IGST Act must be assessed under the governing GST provisions and the particular contractual facts.
Cases Discussed:
- All India Federation of Tax Practitioners Vs Union of India (Supreme Court) — 2007 (7) STR 625 (SC). Service tax is a destination-based consumption tax.
- Verizon Communication India Private Limited Vs Assistant Commissioner, Service Tax, Delhi (Delhi High Court) — 2018 (8) GSTL 32 (Del.). The contractual relationship and responsibility for payment determine the recipient of services.
- Paul Merchants Ltd. Vs CCE, Chandigarh (CESTAT Larger Bench) — 2012 (12) TMI 424. Services supplied to an overseas principal may constitute exports even where performance involves persons in India.
- Vodafone Essar Cellular Ltd. Vs CCE (CESTAT) — Discussed through the quotation reproduced in Verizon Communication India; the customer of the contractual recipient is not automatically the supplier’s customer.
- Study Overseas Global (P) Ltd. Vs Commissioner of Service Tax, Delhi (CESTAT New Delhi) — 2017 (3) GSTL 443 (Tri.-Del.). Student recruitment and promotional services supplied to foreign universities were treated as exports.
- Indian Association of Tour Operators Vs Union of India (Delhi High Court) — 2017 (5) GSTL 4 (Del.). Discussed in relation to the territorial limits of service tax and the validity of delegated provisions.
- Sunrise Immigration Consultants Private Limited Vs Commissioner of Central Excise and Service Tax, Chandigarh (CESTAT Chandigarh) — 2018-TIOL-1849-CESTAT-CHD. Commission-based promotional services supplied to overseas institutions were distinguished from intermediary services.
- Universal Services India Pvt. Ltd. (Authority for Advance Rulings) — 2016 (42) STR 585 (AAR). Referred to in the quoted reasoning in Sunrise Immigration Consultants.
- GoDaddy India Web Services Pvt. Ltd. (Authority for Advance Rulings) — 2016 (46) STR 806 (AAR). Services supplied on one’s own account were distinguished from intermediary arrangements.
- Evaluation SEZ (P) Ltd. Vs Commissioner of Customs (CESTAT) — 2018 (12) TMI 1242. Cited concerning consideration received from an overseas client and intermediary classification.
- Genpact India Pvt. Ltd. Vs Union of India (Punjab and Haryana High Court) — 2023 (68) GSTL 3 (P&H). Examined the intermediary definition under Section 2(13) of the IGST Act.
- Ernst & Young Vs Additional Commissioner, CGST, Delhi (Delhi High Court) — 2023 (73) GSTL 161. Services independently supplied to overseas entities were distinguished from intermediary services.
FULL TEXT OF THE ORDER OF CESTAT NEW DELHI
1. Challenge in the present appeal is to the order dated 25.09.2017 passed by the Commissioner where it has been held that the services provided by the appellant are in the nature of “intermediary services” as per Rule 2(f) of the Place of Provision of Service Rules, 2012 (referred to as Rules, 2012) and do not qualify as “export of service” in terms of Rule 6A of the Service Tax Rules, 1994 and thereby upheld the demand of service tax.
2. The issue for our consideration is whether the service rendered by the appellant to overseas universities/colleges amounts to “export of service” or “intermediary service” as claimed by the Revenue?
3. The appellant is engaged in rendering services to overseas educational universities by enrolling prospective students for overseas admissions for which they had executed agreements with different foreign universities, located in Australia and New Zealand, for getting the students from India. The appellant received commission for their services from these foreign universities in convertible foreign exchange. The recipient of service (foreign universities) are located outside India and the benefit of service also accrues outside India. The appellant was authorised by the foreign universities for recruitment of students in various courses. The appellant assisted the students to get admission in these foreign universities and also advised them regarding the payment of tuition fees and associated fees required for study and also provided information as to the options available for their accommodation in these countries and about their departure from their home, country and arrival in the country of destination etc.
4. Show cause notice dated 25.09.2017 was issued to the appellant for the period 1.07.2012 to March 2016 treating the services rendered by the appellant as “intermediary services” which is defined under Rule 2(f) of Rules, 2012, as they were acting as an intermediary between the students and the foreign universities and in terms of rule 9(c) of the Rules, 2012 the place of provision of intermediary service is the location of service provider and as the appellant is located in India, the place of provision of service is in the taxable territory and hence they are liable to pay service tax amounting to Rs. 2,49,93,147/- under Section 68 of the Finance Act, 1994, read with Rule 6 of Service Tax Rules, 1994 along with statutory interest and penalty. On adjudication, the demand was confirmed by the adjudicating authority. Hence the present appeal before this Tribunal.
5. Shri Sudhir Malhotra, the learned counsel for the appellant has vehemently argued that the services rendered by them have been treated as export of service prior to 1.07.2012 and therefore, they were under the bonafide belief that their services are export of services as per Rule 6A of the Service Tax Rules, 1994 on which no service tax is payable by them. Referring to the scheme of the statute the learned Counsel submitted that they fully satisfy the criteria for treating any service as export of service as the recipient of the service is located outside India and the benefit of service accrues outside India and the consideration for the service rendered is in convertible foreign exchange. They did not provide any “intermediary service” as they have not charged any amount from the students in India as they act as independent consultant.
6. The learned authorized representative for the Revenue submits that the appellant is only facilitating and arranging the recruitment of the Student to Foreign University and in lieu of that they were getting commission but they did not provide the main service i.e. education which was rendered by the Universities. From the agreement submitted by the appellant, it appears that they were providing Overseas Education Consultancy, whereby the various course of foreign universities are promoted in India among prospective students and assist them to get admission. They have agreements with various Foreign Universities. These universities engage entities like the appellant for promotional and marketing activities for promotion of the courses taught by them making the prospective students aware about the course fee and other associated costs and ensuring payment of the requisite fees to the Universities if the propsective students decide upon pursuing any course so promoted by them.
7. Having heard the parties at length we need to consider the applicability of the provisions of “export of service” and “intermediary service.”
“Export of Service”
8. The appellant in support of his submission that prior to 1.07.2012 the services rendered by them were treated as export of service referred to the provisions of Export of Service Rules, 2005 (ESR, 2005) issued by the Central Government in exercise of powers under Section 93 and 94(2)(f) of the Act. Rule 3(2) of ESR, 2005 provided that the provisions of any taxable service specified in sub rule (1) shall be treated as “export of service” when the conditions are satisfied that such service is provided outside India and the payment for such service is received by the service provider in convertible foreign exchange. Rule 4 provided that any service which is taxable under clause 105 of Section 65 of the Act may be exported without payment of service tax. The issues regarding taxability of services provided from India and used outside India were clarified by the CBIC wide Circular No. 111/05/2009 dated 24.02.2009 to the effect that the export of services takes place even when all the relevant activities take place in India so long as the benefit of these services accrued outside India. In terms of the said rules, the services rendered by the appellant were treated as export of service and the appellant was not required to make the payment of service tax.
9. Coming to the two competing services, we need to consider Notification No. 28/2012 dated 20.06.2012 issued in exercise of power under Section 66C(1) read with Section 94(2)(hhh) of the Act introducing the Place of Provision of Service Rules, 2012 effective from 1.07.2012. Rule 3 to 12 of Rules, 2012 provide different category of place of provision. The provisions of Rules, 2012 as are relevant for the present controversy are set out below:
2(f) “intermediary” means a broker, an agent or any other person, by whatever name called, who arranges or facilitates a provision of a service (hereinafter called the ‘main’ service) or a supply of goods, between two or more persons, but does not include a person who provides the main service on his account.;3. Place of provision generally.- The place of provision of a service shall be the location of the recipient of service: Provided that in case “of services other than online information and database access or retrieval services”(Inserted vide Notification 46/2012- Service Tax) where the location of the service receiver is not available in the ordinary course of business, the place of provision shall be the location of the provider of service.
6. Place of provision of services relating to events – The place of provision of services provided by way of admission to, or organization of, a cultural, artistic, sporting, scientific, educational, or entertainment event, or a celebration, conference, fair, exhibition, or similar events, and of services ancillary to such admission, shall be the place where the event is actually held.
9. Place of provision of specified services – The place of provision of following services shall be the location of the service provider:-
(a) Services provided by a banking company, or a financial institution, or a non-banking financial company, to account holders;
(b) “ ****;” omitted vide Notification 46/2016-Service Tax
(c) Intermediary services;
(d) Service consisting of hiring of means of transport other than, –
(i) aircrafts, and
(ii) vessels except yachts up to a period of one months.”
Rule 3 of PPSR 2012, provides the place of provision of a service as the location of the recipient of service. Rule 6 provides the place of provision of service relating to events as the place where the event is actually held. In terms of rule 9 the place of provision of specified service shall be the location of the service provider and under sub rule (c) refer to “intermediary service”. The said rules do not describe export of service. The provision for export of service was separately provided by Notification No. 36/2012 dated 20.06.2012 whereby Rule 6A was introduced by the Service Tax (Second Amendment) Rules, 2012 by replacing ESR, 2005. Rule 6A reads as under:
“Rule 6A – Export of Services(1) The provision of any service provided or agreed to be provided shall be treated as part of service when,-
(a) The provider of service is located in the taxable territory,
(b) The recipient of service is located outside India,
(c) The service is not a service specified in Section 66D of the Act,
(d) The place of provision of the service is outside India,
(e) The payment for such service has been received by the provider of service in convertible foreign exchange, and
(f) The provider of service and recipient of service are not merely establishments of a distinct person in accordance with item (b) of Explanation 2 of Clause (44) of Section 65B of the Act.”
10. In the present case we are concerned with the period post July 2012 and in view of the provisions of ESR, 2005 and the subsequent Notifications of 2012 what emerges is that the intent of the legislature was that taxes and duties cannot be exported. We need to examine the role played by the appellant for providing the services to their clients. The undisputed fact is that the appellant had entered into agreement with various foreign universities whereby the appellant was required to provide services to the universities which implies that the service provider is located in India and the recipients of service were located outside India. It is also an undisputed fact that the appellant was receiving the consideration for the service rendered by way of convertible foreign exchange. The nature of service provided by the appellant was to recruit students in the courses conducted by these universities/institutes. It would be relevant to set out the contents of one such agreement between the appellant and one of the university New Zealand Management Academics (NZMA) (here ‘Consultant’ stands for the appellant and ‘Principal’ stands for NZMA) which stipulated as under:
“Consultant‘s Obligations (Under para-4 of the Agreement)
The Consultant will:
a. Use his /her best endeavors to promote the Principal and in so doing assist the Principal in its student enrolment targets, as communicated to the Consultant from time to time. The consultant shall not at any time by any actions or omissions bring the name or reputation of the Principal into disrepute or prejudice the interests of the business of the Principal.”
b. …………
c. At all times promptly to the Principal (in such manner as the Principal may request), all information, explanations and assistance, as it may require, in connection with the services;
d. ……………..
e. Assist with the screening and selection of appropriate students who meet the entry criteria of the Principal.
f. Inform students of the enrolment, refund and withdrawal policy of the Principal.
g. ………..
h. ………..
i. …………
j. Invoice the Principal for each student the Consultant is claiming commission for
k. Provide follow-up support service and liaison with student’s families as requested by the Principal.
l. Assist students in applying for relevant student visas and ensure all necessary information is provided to the New Zealand Immigration Service.
m. Ensure that students arrive in New Zealand prior to their course start date.”
11. The agreements with other universities are broadly similar in material aspects for providing service of recruitment of prospective students interested in enrolling in various programmes/courses conducted by the foreign universities. In furtherance of providing the service as enumerated above, the appellant makes the prospective students aware about the course fee and other associated cost and ensures payment of the requisite fees to the universities. If the prospective students decide upon taking admission to any course, the appellant provides all necessary information and assistance in completing the forms and submitting them to the respective universities. That all these activities performed by the appellant are part of its contract with the foreign universities located outside India. The various clauses of the agreement clearly points out that the service provider, the appellant and the recipient of service, the foreign university was working on principal to principal basis. Considering the conditions specified under section 6A for categorizing a service to be export of service, we find that the appellant fully satisfies the said conditions and therefore the service rendered by the appellant being “export of service” are not liable to be taxed under the provisions of the Act.
12. The view taken by us gain support from the earlier decisions, which we would like to take note of. The fundamental principle enunciated by the Apex Court in All India Federation of Tax Practitioners Vs. Union of India – 2007 (7) STR 625 (SC) is that service tax is a destination based consumption tax, leviable only on services provided within the country. The provision of Section 66B of the Act, explicitly provides that for service tax to be levied in terms of Chapter V of the Act, the service had to be provided within the taxable territory. But in case where services are provided outside the ‘taxable territory’, where the service provider is in India and the recipient of service is located outside India, in normal parlance it would be export of service.
13. Coming to “export of service” post 1st July, 2012, the basic principle to be seen is who is the recipient of the service, whether the place of provision of service is outside India and the party abroad is deriving benefit from the service in India. The High Court of Delhi in Verizon Communication India Private Limited Vs Assistant Commissioner, ST, Delhi – 2018 (8) GSTL 32 (Del.) observed that the recipient of the service is determined by the contract between the parties and who has the contractual right to receive the service and who is responsible for the payment for the service and the department has lost sight of this essential difference. The High Court of Delhi then considered the decision of the Larger Bench of the Tribunal in Paul Merchants Ltd. Vs. CCE, Chandigarh – 2012 (12) TMI 424-CESTAT-DEL.-LB which was rendered with reference to ESR, 2005 where the assessees were intermediary agents, providing money transfer services to foreign travellers, who were the end user on behalf of their principals and the contention of the department that this did not qualify as export of service was rejected referring to the CBEC clarification letter no. 334/1/2019-TRU dated 26.02.2010 that as long as the party abroad is deriving benefit from service in India, it is an export of service. The relevant paras of the decision in Verizon Communication India Private Limited (supra) is quoted as under:-
“51. In the considered view of the Court, the judgment of the CESTAT in Paul Merchants Ltd. v. CCE, Chandigarh (supra) is right in holding that “The service recipient is the person on whose instructions/orders the service is provided who is obliged to make the payment from the same and whose need is satisfied by the provision of the service.” The Court further affirms the following passage in the said judgment in Paul Merchants Ltd. v. CCE, Chandigarh (supra) which correctly explains the legal position :
“It is the person who requested for the service is liable to make payment for the same and whose need is satisfied by the provision of service who has to be treated as recipient of the service, not the person or persons affected by the performance of the service. Thus, when the person on whose instructions the services in question had been provided by the agents/sub-agents in India, who is liable to make payment for these services and who used the service for his business, is located abroad, the destination of the services in question has to be treated abroad. The destination has to be decided on the basis of the place of consumption, not the place of performance of Service.”
52. In Vodafone Essar Cellular Ltd. v. CCE (supra), the CESTAT explained the arrangement lucidly in the following words :
14. On similar issue where commission was received from foreign universities for promotion and marketing of universities, the Tribunal in Study Overseas Global (P) Ltd Vs. Commissioner of Service Tax, Delhi, 2017 (3) GSTL 443 (Tri.-Del.), observed:
“8. Thus, the Export of Services being destination based is subject to Tax. Further, mere fact that the appellant has been promoting and marketing foreign universities within India and then getting prospective students enrolled for various courses in those universities does not mean that services to foreign universities were consumed within India. There is no dispute that service recipients are foreign universities and they are located outside India and payment for such services has been received in foreign currency. From the totality of facts and circumstances, there is no doubt that these services were provided from India and used outside India.
15. Lastly, we would like to refer to the decision of the Delhi High Court in Indian Associaton of Tour Operators Vs. Union of India – 2017 (5) GSTL 4 (Delhi) holding that service provided by Indian Tour Operator to Foreign Tourists during the period 01.07.2012 to 01.07.2017, which has been paid for in convertible foreign exchange would not be amenable to service tax. While holding Rule 6-A(1) and (2) of the Service Tax Rules as ultra vires and invalid, in so far as it seeks to describe export of tour operator services to include non-taxable services provided by tour operators, it has been held that services rendered outside taxable territory of India are not amenable to service tax by virtue of Section 66B read with Section 65(51), 65(52) and 64(1) and 64(3) of the Finance Act, 1994, the relevant para is quoted below:
“48 As already noticed since by virtue of Section 64(3) the whole of Chapter V applies only to taxable services, and Section 66C of the FA falls in that very Chapter, the rules made by the Central Government under Section 66C has to necessarily be only in relation to taxable service viz. services provided in the taxable territory of India. The legal fiction of treating service rendered outside India to be a service rendered in India cannot be introduced by way of rules. That too would partake the character of an essential legislative function, which cannot be delegated to the Central Government. In fact, such service cannot be brought to tax without amending Section 64(3) of the FA.”
The above principle relating to tour operators would equally apply to the instant case. Though the revenue has challenged the judgement of the Delhi High Court before the Apex Court, where leave has been granted but there is no stay of the impugned order.
16. Needless to mention, as per the agreement between the appellant and the foreign university the services were delivered outside India as the recipient of service is the foreign universities who are located outside India and the benefit of service rendered by the appellant also accrued outside India, coupled with the fact that the appellant received the payment against the services in convertible foreign exchange and the appellant and the recipient of service are independent legal identities and are not merely establishment of distinct person. It is thus evident that the appellant met the criteria under Rule 6A(1) of the ST Rules and therefore being “export of service” was not amenable to service tax.
“Intermediary Service.”
17. We may now consider the stand of the department that the services rendered by the appellant has to be treated as “intermediary services” defined under Rule 2(f) of the Rules, 2012. From the definition of “intermediary services”, we find that activity between two parties cannot be considered as an intermediate service as intermediary essentially arranges or facilitates the main supply between two or more persons, which is not the case here. Further, the definition of intermediary service excludes any person who has provided the service on their own account. Here from the facts, it is evident that the appellant has provided the service on his own account to the recipient of service, i.e. the foreign university placed beyond the taxable territory of India. Referring to Rule 6 of Rules, 2012, the learned Counsel submitted that they were providing services relating to specific event, i.e. recruitment of students for admission in educational institution/universities, i.e. recipients located outside India and therefore the place of provision of service shall be the place where the event is actually held. On the other hand, “intermediary services” are broader category and is not applicable to specific category. We find force in the submission of the learned counsel.
18. Further, the Chandigarh Bench in Sunrise Immigration Consultants Private Limited Vs Commissioner of Central Excise and Service Tax, Chandigarh – 2018-TIOL-1849-CESTAT-CHD considered the issue whether the assessee is an intermediary with reference to the service to universities, colleges and banks and whether any service tax could be levied and answered the issue in favour of the assessee as under:
“10. We find that the appellant is nowhere providing services between two or more persons. In fact, the appellant is providing services to their clients namely banks/colleges/university who are paying commission/fees to the appellant. The appellant is only facilitating the aspirant student and introduced them to the college and if these students gets admission to the college, the appellant gets certain commission which is in nature of promoting the business of the college and for referring investors borrow loan from foreign based bank to the people who wishes settled in Canada on that if the deal matures, the appellant is getting certain commission. So the nature of service provided by the appellant is the promotion of business of their client, in terms, he gets commission which is covered under Business Auxiliary Service which is not the main service provided by the main service providers namely banks/university. As the appellant did not arrange or facilitate main service i.e. education or loan rendered by colleges/banks. In that circumstances, the appellant cannot be called as intermediary in the light of the judgment issued by the Advanced Ruling Authority in the case of Universal Services India Pvt. Ltd. reported in 2016 (42) STR 585 (AAR) and Godaddy India Web Services Pvt. Ltd. reported in 2016 (46) STR 806 (AAR) wherein it has been observed as under:
“10. The definition of “intermediary” as envisaged under Rule 2(f) of POS does not include a person who provides the main service on his own account. In the present case, applicant is providing main service, i.e. “business Support Service” to WWD US and on his account. Therefore, applicant is not an “intermediary” and the service provided by him is not intermediary service. Further, during arguments, applicant drew our attention to one of the illustration given under paragraph 5.9.6 of the Education Guide, 2012 issued by C.B.E. & C. Relevant extract is as under: Similarly, persons such as call canters, who provide services to their clients by dealing with the customers of the client on the client’s behalf, but actually provided these services on their own account’, will not be categorized as intermediaries. Applicant relying on above paragraph submitted that call centres, by dealing with customers of their clients, on client’s behalf, are providing service to their client on their own account. Similarly, applicant is providing business support service such as marketing and other allied services like oversight of quality of third party customer care centre operated in India and payment processing services, on behalf of GoDaddy US. Therefore, these services provided by the applicant to GoDaddy US cannot be categorized as intermediary or services, as intermediary service.”
19. Following the observations in Evaluation SEZ (P) Ltd VS Commissioner of Customs, 2018 (12) TMI 1242 – CESTAT (Tri.), that receipt of consideration from the overseas client excluded them from tax as intermediary, the appellant cannot be held to be providing intermediary service as it is an admitted position that the appellant had been receiving consideration in the form of commission from the recipients of service placed abroad.
20. The definition of “intermediary services” in Section 2(13) of Integrated Goods and Service Tax Act, 2017 is pari-materia with the definition of “intermediary services” in Rule 2 (f) of Rules, 2012 and the same has been considered by the decision of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana in Genpact India Pvt Ltd versus Union of India, 2023 (68) GSTL 3 (P&H) where the primary issue was whether the petitioner would be covered under the expression “intermediary” as defined under the provisions of the IGST Act and whether the services rendered by the petitioner under the agreement be treated as “intermediary services”. The observations of the High Court are clearly applicable in the present case and the relevant paras are quoted below :
“28. As per definition of “intermediary” under Section 2(13) of the IGST Act the following three conditions must be satisfied for a person to qualify as an “intermediary”;-
29. First, the relationship between the parties must be that of a principal-agency relationship. Second, the person must be involved in arrangement or facilitation of provisions of the service provided to the principal by a 3rd party. Third, the person must not actually perform the main service intended to be received by the service recipient itself. Scope of an “intermediary” is to mediate between two parties i.e. the principal service provider (the 3rd party) and the beneficiary (the agents principal) who receives the main service and expressly excludes any person who provides such main service “on his own account”.
30. A bare perusal of the recitals and relevant clauses of the MSA reproduced hereinabove do not in any manner indicate that petitioner is acting as an “intermediary” so as to fall within the scope and ambit of the definition of “intermediary” under Section 2(13) of the IGST Act. Such clauses cannot also be interpreted to conclude that the petitioner has facilitated the services. The said clauses are in relation to the modalities of how the actual work would be carried out and do not in any manner establish that the petitioner was required to arrange/facilitate a 3rd party to render the main service which has actually been rendered by the petitioner.
36. In the pre-GST regime the term “intermediary services” was defined under Rule 2(f) of the Place of Provision of Service Rules, 2012. Under the 2012 Rules “intermediary services” were defined to mean a broker/an agent or any other person, by whatever name called, who arranges or facilitates a provision of a service (hereinafter called the ‘main’ service) or a supply of goods, between two or more persons, but does not include a person who provides the main service on his account.
37. A perusal of the definition of “intermediary” under the service tax regime vis-a-vis the GST regime would show that the definition has remained similar. Even as per circular dated 20-9-2021 issued by the Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, Central Board of Indirect Taxes and Customs (GST Policy Wing), the scope of “intermediary” services has been dealt in Para 2 thereof. In Para 2.2 it stands clarified that the concept of “intermediary” was borrowed in GST from the Service Tax Regime. The circular after making a reference to the definition of “intermediary” both under Rule 2(f) of the Place of Provision of Service Rules, 2012 and under Section 2(13) of the IGST Act clearly states that there is broadly no change in the scope of “intermediary” services in the GST regime vis-a-vis the service tax regime except addition of supply of securities in the definition of “intermediary” in the GST law.”
21. Similarly, the Delhi High Court in a recent decision in Ernest and Young Vs. Additional Commissioner, CGST, Delhi, 2023 (73) GSTL 161 considered the issue whether the services claimed are actually exported and convertible foreign exchange received by the party in lieu of the said export services and observed as under:
“33. In terms of sub-section (8) of Section 13 of the IGST Act, the place of supply of certain services would be the location of the supplier of the services. In terms of clause (b) of sub-section (8) of Section 13 of the IGST Act, the place of supply of intermediary services is the location of the supplier of services. In the present case, the place of supply of services has been held to be in India on the basis that the petitioner is providing intermediary services. As discussed above, the Services rendered by the petitioner are not as an intermediary and therefore, the place of supply of the Services rendered by the petitioner to overseas entities is required to be determined on basis of the location of the recipient of the Services. Since the recipient of the Services is outside India, the professional services rendered by the petitioner would fall within the scope of definition of ‘export of services’ as defined under Section 2(6) of the IGST Act.
34. There is no dispute that the recipient of Services – that is EY Entities – are located outside India. Thus, indisputably, the Services provided by the petitioner would fall within the scope of the definition of the term ‘export of service’ under Section 2(6) of the IGST Act.”
22. The stand of the department that the appellant was rendering two types of services, one by way of rendering consultancy services to the students who wanted to study abroad by assisting them and the second was service to foreign universities by way of recruitment of students for them, is not correct. Firstly, the fees deposited by the students is directly remitted to the universities. Secondly, the appellant is not charging any consideration from the students and there cannot be any taxable service without any consideration. Section 66B, the charging section, in effect provides that service tax shall be levied on the value of the services, other than those specified in the negative list. In other words there is no privacy of contract between the appellant and the prospective students as laid down by the Delhi High Court in Verizon Communications India, (supra):
“In the present case there is no privacy of contract between Verizon India and the customers of Verizon US. Such customers may be the ‘users’ of the services provided by Verizon India, but are not its recipients.“
23. The learned Counsel for the appellant has taken an alternate plea in terms of the exemption notification No. 25/2012 dated 20.06.2012 issued by the Central Government in exercise of power under section 93 of Finance Act, 1994, where at serial No. 9 services provided to or by an educational institution in respect of education has been exempted from service tax and subsequently by amendment vide Notification No. 06/2014 dated 11.07.2014 the exemption was provided to services relating to admission to, or conduct of examination by such institution and therefore the appellant was not liable to pay service tax. As we have already decided the main issue on merits in favour of the appellant, the consideration of the aforesaid contention is not really required at this stage.
24. We are in complete agreement with the principal enunciated in the above decisions which are squarely applicable in the facts of the present case and hence the issue stands decided in favour of the appellant. Consequently, the impugned order deserves to be set aside. The appeal is, accordingly allowed.
(Pronounced in open Court on 27.03.2024)


