ITO Vs Deep Raheja (ITAT Delhi)
Third-Party Search Material Cannot Bypass Reassessment Procedure: Delhi ITAT Quashes ₹3.05 Crore Assessment
Regular Scrutiny Route Held Invalid Under the Applicable Post-2021 Search Regime
In ITO v. Deep Raheja, ITA No.4330/Del/2026, concerning AY 2022–23, the Delhi ITAT quashed an assessment involving an addition of ₹3,04,62,816 based on material arising from a search on another business entity.
The Tribunal accepted the assessee’s jurisdictional objection that the Assessing Officer should have followed the reassessment mechanism under Sections 147–148, instead of completing the assessment through the ordinary scrutiny route.
The order was pronounced on 6 November 2026 by Vikas Awasthy, Judicial Member, and Amitabh Shukla, Accountant Member. The concluding administrative date is 11 November 2026.
Background: Alleged Purchases Identified Through Third-Party Search
The assessee’s case was selected for scrutiny through CASS, based on information available through the Department’s CRIU module. A notice under Section 143(2) was issued on 1 June 2023.
The information arose from a search conducted on the J.M. Jain Group on 28 May 2022. According to the assessment findings, the searched entity maintained parallel accounts and used software-related techniques for concealing transactions.
The Investigation Wing reported purchase transactions of ₹3,04,62,816 involving the assessee.
The assessee denied those transactions, admitting dealings of only ₹1,41,969. Nevertheless, the Assessing Officer relied upon the investigation report and made the disputed addition.
CIT(A) Directed Fresh Assessment; Revenue Challenged the Remand
The CIT(A) set aside the assessment and directed the Assessing Officer to undertake de novo adjudication.
The Revenue challenged this direction, arguing that it exceeded the appellate powers available under Section 251. It also contended that sufficient opportunities, including video conferencing, had been provided during assessment.
Another departmental objection concerned the description of the assessment. While the order was identified as one passed under Section 144 read with Section 144B, the Revenue maintained that it had effectively been completed under Section 143(3) read with Section 144B after considering the available material.
The Tribunal ultimately decided the matter on a more fundamental issue: whether jurisdiction had been assumed through the correct statutory route.
Assessee Raised Additional Jurisdictional Grounds
During the Revenue’s appeal, the assessee raised additional legal grounds challenging the assessment itself.
The principal argument was that Explanation 2(iv) to Section 148, in the framework applicable to the search, required the Assessing Officer to proceed under Sections 147–148.
The assessee also raised objections concerning approvals, the use of electronic evidence, the addition under Section 69C and the treatment of its books and trading results.
The Tribunal admitted the additional legal grounds, referring to NTPC Ltd., 229 ITR 383 (SC) and Jute Corporation of India Ltd., 187 ITR 688 (SC).
It took up the first jurisdictional ground because it went to the root of the assessment’s validity.
Special Search-Related Procedure Preferred Over Ordinary Scrutiny
The assessee argued that the search-derived information constituted deemed information suggesting escapement of income under the relevant statutory framework.
Consequently, the Department could not simply use that material to complete an ordinary scrutiny assessment without following the prescribed reassessment procedure.
The Tribunal accepted this contention by following Gas Supply Co. Pvt. Ltd., ITA No.5036/Del/2025, decided on 10 April 2026.
That decision had relied upon Montage Enterprises Pvt. Ltd., Homelife Buildcon (P.) Ltd. v. DCIT, (2025) 176 taxmann.com 614, and Jamna Das Nikkamal Jain Saraf Pvt. Ltd., ITA No.403/Chd/2025.
The adopted reasoning treated the search-related mechanism as the special statutory route, carrying safeguards that could not be bypassed through ordinary assessment proceedings.
Assessment Quashed Without Deciding Purchase Allegations
The Tribunal found no material distinction warranting departure from the cited decisions.
It accordingly quashed the assessment dated 12 March 2024, passed under Section 144 read with Section 144B, which had originated from the notice under Section 143(2).
The assessee’s first additional legal ground was allowed, and the Revenue’s appeal was dismissed.
Importantly, the Tribunal did not independently determine whether the alleged ₹3.05 crore purchases were genuine or unrecorded. The relief followed from the jurisdictional defect, rather than a factual acceptance of the assessee’s explanation concerning those purchases.
Author’s Comments
The decision highlights that information supporting an addition and jurisdiction to assess that information are separate requirements. Even substantial investigation material does not dispense with the statutory procedure applicable to the proceedings.
Its particular significance lies in applying the cited search-related reasoning to material arising from a search on another person, whereas portions of the reproduced precedents concern searches on the assessees themselves.
The ruling should therefore be cited with attention to the search date, applicable statutory wording, assessment year and conditions governing third-party material. It should not be expanded into an unrestricted proposition covering every search regime.
Equally, the Revenue’s challenge to the CIT(A)’s remand powers was not the operative basis of disposal. The decisive finding was that the assessment itself could not survive because the prescribed jurisdictional route had not been followed.
Cases Discussed
- Jute Corporation of India Ltd. v. CIT — (1991) 187 ITR 688 (SC). Additional legal grounds may be admitted in appellate proceedings.
- NTPC Ltd. v. CIT — (1998) 229 ITR 383 (SC). A pure question of law arising from facts on record may be considered in appeal.
- Homelife Buildcon (P.) Ltd. v. DCIT — (2025) 176 taxmann.com 614. Cited concerning the applicable search-related reassessment route.
- Jamna Das Nikkamal Jain Saraf Pvt. Ltd. — ITA No. 403/Chd/2025; decision date not verified. Cited concerning jurisdiction and search-related assessment procedure.
- Gas Supply Co. Pvt. Ltd. — ITA No. 5036/Del/2025; decided 10 April 2026. Coordinate Bench decision relied upon for the statutory reassessment route.
- Montage Enterprises Pvt. Ltd. — ITA Nos. 5458 and 5906/Del/2025; decision date not verified. Decision reproduced in the order on the effect of a post-2021 search.
FULL TEXT OF THE ORDER OF ITAT DELHI
This appeal filed by the Revenue is directed against the order of Ld. Commissioner of Income Tax(Appeals)/NFAC, New Delhi, dated 24.02.2026, arising out of assessment order dated 12.03.2024 passed u/s 144 r.w.s. 144B of the IT Act, 1961 of the Act for the Assessment Year 2022-23. The word ‘Act’ herein this order would mean Income Tax Act, 1961.
2. The Revenue has raised following grounds of appeal:-
1. Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, the Ld. CIT(A) is justified in setting aside the assessment order and directing the Assessing Officer to frame the assessment de novo, which is beyond the scope of powers conferred under Section 251 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, as applicable to the present case.
2. Whether the Ld. CIT(A) is justified in treating the assessment as one passed under section 144, whereas the assessment was in fact completed under section 143(3) read with section 144B, after considering the submissions and material available on record.Such mischaracterization has vitiated the impugned appellate order.
3. Whether the Ld. CIT(A) is justified in not appreciating the fact that the assessment was completed in full compliance with the procedure prescribed under Section 144B of the Income Tax Act, 1961, after issuing statutory notices, show cause notices, and granting adequate opportunity of being heard, including through video conferencing.
4. Whether the Ld. CIT(A) is justified in invoking the principles of natural justice without any factual basis, ignoring that sufficient and reasonable opportunities were provided during the course of assessment proceedings.
5. Whether the Ld. CIT(A) is justified in not appreciating the fact that the addition made by the Assessing Officer was based on credible and specific information received from the Investigation Wing relating to systematic and organised unaccounted transactions, indicative of organised tax evasion which falls under exception laid down in clause 3.1(h) of Circular 05 /2024 dated 15.03.2024 and therefore required adjudication on merits.
3. The assessee has also raised following legal additional grounds of appeal challenging jurisdictional efficiency:-
1. The Ld. A.O./NaFAC has erred both in law and on facts in framing assessment u/s 143(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The assessment in the present case was required to be framed under section 147, and consequently, the addition made under section 143(3) is without jurisdiction and bad in law, in view of Explanation 2(iv) to section 148 of the Act.
2. The Ld. A.O./NaFAC has erred both in law and on facts in relying on documents seized during a search conducted on another person for making additions in the hands of the assessee, without obtaining the prior approval of the Principal Commissioner of Income Tax (PCIT), thereby rendering the assessment illegal, void ab initio, and without jurisdiction.
3. The Ld. A.O./NaFAC has erred both in law and on facts by not obtaining mandatory approval under section 148B of the Income- tax Act, 1961 and as such proceedings are vitiated.
4. The Ld. A.O./NaFAC has erred both in law and on facts in making the addition u/s 69C without doubting the source of expenditure and solely on the presumption that expenditure is not found recorded in the books.
5. The Ld. A.O./NaFAC has erred both in law and on facts in passing the impugned assessment order u/s 143(3) as same is made in violation of section 65B of evidence law (admissibility of electronic evidence) and CBDT digital evidence manual as to manner of use of digital evidence, thus vitiating the impugned assessment.
6. The Ld. A.O./NaFAC has erred both in law and on facts in violating mandate of section 145(3) where without doubting assessee books impugned additions are made in arbitrary and unlawful manner.
7. The Ld. A.O./NaFAC has erred both in law and on facts by ignoring the impugned assessment order u/s 143(3) is hit by doctrine of aprobate and reprobate where assessee trading results have been accepted and still impugned additions are made in returned income of assessee.
8. The Ld. A.O./NaFAC has erred both in law and on facts in making impugned addition on a/c of alleged non genuine purchases where sales are never doubted and books are never doubted.
9. That the above grounds of appeal are without prejudice to one another and the Appellant craves leave to add, alter, amend, delete or modify any of the above grounds of appeal.
4. Heard rival parties, perused the material on records.
5. Brief facts of the case as culled out from the assessment order is that the case of the assessee was selected for scrutiny under CASS module on account of information available to the ld. Assessing Officer through CRIU module. Accordingly, notice u/s 143(2) was issued on 01.06.2023. The ld. Assessing Officer had noted that the assessee had made transactions with J M Jain LLP in respect of whom a search was conducted alluding towards maintenance of parallel books of accounts, non-disclosure of income, etc. The said J M Jain LLP was found to be indulging in software related tax evasions techniques. Reports from the Investigation Wing revealed that the assessee has made purchase transaction of Rs.3,04,62,816/-. The assessee had denied the said transactions with J M Jain and admitted transaction worth Rs.1,41,969/-. Considering investigation report, the ld. Assessing Officer made impugned addition of Rs.3,04,62,816/-. The ld. CIT(A) set-aside the order of the ld. Assessing Officer directing re-adjudication de novo.
6. The ld. Counsel for the assessee submitted that its legal ground raised through additional ground of appeal, be adjudicated first as it tends to strike at the root of the matter. In respectful compliance to the decision of the Hon’ble Apex Court in NTPC Ltd. 229 ITR 383 and Jute Corporation of India Ltd. 187 ITR 688, we admit the additional legal grounds of appeal for adjudication.
7. The first issue raised through additional ground of appeal no.1 is regarding the action of the Assessing Officer in making addition through issuance of notice u/s 143(3). It was submitted that the ld. Assessing Officer ought to have framed assessment u/s 147 r.w.s. 148 within the meanings of Explanation-2(iv) of section 148 of the Act. The ld. Counsel for the assessee has submitted that it is an undisputed fact on records that the addition has been made with reference to search action u/s 132 on J. M. Jain Group on 28.05.2022. It was argued that in respect of searches conducted post 01.04.2021, Explanation-2(iv) of section 148 of the Act gets triggered and that therefore no assessment u/s 143(3) can be made. The ld. Counsel for the assessee submitted that the phrase ‘deemed information’ under Explanation-2(iv) of section 148 of the Act become relevant in the case. It was argued that these amendments explicitly include instances involving third party search material and therefore mandate the ld. Assessing Officer to follow in his favour the procedure u/s 148 of the Act. In support of his contentions, the ld. Counsel placed reliance upon a catena of judgments covering the matter claiming them to
8. The ld. DR placed reliance upon the order of the lower authorities.
9. We have noted that on identical facts, this tribunal in the case of Gas Supply Co. Pvt. Ltd in ITA No.5036/Del/2025, for Assessment Year: 2022-23’ dated 10.04.2026 has held as under:-
“….3. It is seen from the above grounds of appeal that the assessee has challenged the order under section 143(3) dated 31.03.2024, which was confirmed by the order of ld. CIT(A) under section 250 vide order dated 07.08.2025 raising both legal grounds as well as on merits of the addition. As the legal ground strikes at the very root of the assessment order challenging the validity of assessment proceedings, we have decided to address the same first. Through the ground of appeal no.3, the assessee has submitted that the notice issued under section 143(2) of the Act dated 28.06.2023 was invalid. Explaining the brief factual matrix, it was explained that Return of Income under section 139(1) declaring income of Rs.4,05,810/- was filed on 03.10.2022 which was processed under section 143(1) of the Act on 31.03.2022 accepting the returned income. Thereafter, assessment proceedings under section143(2) were initiated through issue of notice dated 28.06.2023. The ld. AO passed order under section 31.03.2024 making additions under section 56(2)(x) of Rs.3,65,22,719/- and under section 45 of Rs.71,52,880/- so as to determine final income of Rs.4,40,81,409/-. While making the impugned additions, the ld. AO referred in para-2 of his order to a search and seizure action under section 132 in the case of Goyal Group of cases dated 10.01.2023 in which assessee was also a searched party. The ld. AO has recorded in para-3 of his order that the case was selected for compulsory scrutiny under CBDT guidelines dated 24.05.2023.
4. We have heard rival submissions in the light of material placed on record. The ld. Counsel for the assessee submitted that the Appellant filed its return of income for Assessment Year 2022-23 on 03.10.2022. Subsequently, a search under Section 132 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (the Act) was conducted on 10.01.2023. It was argued that consequently the present year was not closed/ concluded year on the dated of search. It was submitted that as per Explanation 2 to Section 148 of the Act, once a search under section 132 is conducted in a case, assessment proceedings are to be initiated under Section 147 through the issue of notice under Section 148 of the Act. It was submitted that in the present case, however, the AO did not issue the mandatory notice under Section 148 of the Act but had only issued a notice under Section 143(2) without a notice under Section 148 of the Act. It was accordingly argued that the assessment order under section 143(3) dated 31.03.2024 was therefore based upon invalid assumption of jurisdiction by the ld. AO and hence liable to be quashed. The ld. Counsel placed heavy reliance on the decision of this Tribunal, in the case of Montage Enterprises Put. Ltd. v. DCIT (ITA No. 5458/Del/2025 & 5906/Del/2025. Reference was also made to the decisions of Chandigarh Tribunal in the case of Homelife Buildcon (P.) Ltd. Vs. DCIT, (2025) 176 taxmann.com 614 and Jamna Das Nikkamal Jain Saraf Pot. Ltd. Vs DCIT (ITA No. 403/Chd./2025).
5. We have noted that on the issue of validity of issuance of notice in cases where search has taken place, this Tribunal, in the case of Montage Enterprises Put. Ltd. (supra) has held as under:-
“….
2. We notice at the outset that there arises the first and foremost issue of validity of the impugned section 143(3) assessment itself framed by the learned DCIT, Central Circle-II, Noida as per the assessee’s pleadings in its appeal ITA No.5458/Del/2025. A combined perusal of both these case files indicates that the assessee/appellant is engaged in the business of manufacturing and sale of flexible packaging material etc. It has filed its return for the impugned assessment year 2022-23 on 29.10.2022, declaring loss of Rs.64,53,88,702/-. And the same was taken for scrutiny. The learned departmental authorities thereafter carried out section 132 search action as well as section 133A survey in its case on 21.02.2023. There is further no dispute that the learned Assessing Officer then proceeded to frame the impugned assessment on 30th March, 2024 in its case inter alia making various disallowances/additions etc., involving varying sums, which stand partly upheld in the CIT(A)’s lower appellate discussion.
3. It is in this factual backdrop that the assessee seeks to raise it’s precise question challenging validity of the impugned assessment for the sole reason that the same ought to have been framed under section 148 with approval under section 148B of the Act in light of Homelife Buildcon (P.) Ltd. Vs. DCIT, (2025) 176 taxmann.com 614 (Chandigarh – Trib.) as relied in Jamna Das Nikkamal Jain Saraf Pvt. Ltd. Vs DCIT (ITA No. 403/Chd./2025) decided on 04.11.2025, adjudicating the very issue against the department as under:
“11.4 In conclusion, it was submitted that since the year under appeal formed part of the three assessment years immediately preceding the year in which search was conducted, the assessment ought to have been framed under section 148 with approval u/s 148B. The framing of the assessment u/s 143(3) and approval taken only for the purposes of section 143(3) was thus asserted to be fundamentally defective, non- compliant with statutory mandate, and consequently void ab initio. On these grounds, following the ratio in Homelife Buildcon Pvt. Ltd., it was prayed that the impugned assessment be quashed.
12. The Ld. CIT-DR Shri Manav Bansal opposed the contention, stating that the return for A.Y. 2022-23 was filed prior to the date of search, and validly selected for scrutiny under CASS. The AO was competent to complete the assessment u/s 143(3).
12.1 He contended that section 148B applies only to “re- assessment” and not to “regular assessments.” The AO’s approval from Addl. CIT, being in line with the CBDT Instruction No. 7/2022 dated 15.07.2022, fulfils the supervisory requirement. The DR also submitted that Homelife Buildcon is distinguishable, as the AO therein relied on third-party search data, whereas the present case is based on assessee’s own seized material.
13. We have carefully considered the rival submissions and perused the record. It is undisputed that search u/s 132 was conducted on 24.11.2022, relevant to A.Y. 2023-24. Thus, A.Y. 2022-23 is one of the three preceding years under Explanation 2(iv) to section 148. The Explanation reads that if a search is initiated, “the Assessing Officer shall be deemed to have information suggesting escapement of income for the three assessment years immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the search is initiated.”
13.1 Therefore, the only permissible statutory course was to issue notice u/s 148 and obtain prior approval u/s 148B before passing assessment order.
13.2 As the Assessing Officer completed the assessment under section 143(3) of the Act without issuing the notice under section 148 of the Act. Therefore, the question before us is whether the assessment proceedings initiated under section 143(3) of the Act can be validly continued and completed after a search under section 132 has been conducted in the case of the same assessee, without following the procedure prescribed under section 148 (Explanation 2) of the Act.
13.3 In our considered opinion, the answer lies in the scheme of the Act itself. Section 143 provides the general framework for regular assessment, whereas sections 147–148 (post-2021 regime) deal with reassessment based on information suggesting escapement of income, including that unearthed during a search.
13.4 A plain reading of section 143(2) shows that such notice can be issued only when a return of income is furnished under section 139 or in response to a notice under section 142(1). It empowers the Assessing Officer to scrutinize that return if he considers that income has been understated or tax underpaid. However, when a search under section 132 takes place and materials are found indicating possible escapement of income, the statute envisages a different route for carrying out assessment or reassessment under section 147 read with section 148, which is the special mechanism for bringing to tax the income discovered in consequence of a search.
13.5 Although section 148 (inserted w.e.f. 01.04.2021) does not begin with a non-obstante clause similar to the erstwhile section 153A, its context and Explanation 2 make it clear that where a search is initiated, the jurisdiction thereafter must flow through this special channel, subject to prior satisfaction and approval of the Principal Commissioner or Commissioner. The legislative intent is to ensure that when a search is carried out, the assessment is framed under the specific provisions meant for such cases and not under the general provision of section 143(3). Further we may mention that no notice under section 143(2) could have been issued after 3 months from the from the end of the financial year in which the return is furnished. In the present case the original return of income was filled on 4/11/2022 for the assessment year 202223 and 143 (2) was issued on 21/6/2023 , therefore also the assessment was framed under 143(3) of the Act is not sustainable. In other words the time required for issuing the notice under 143(2) had already expired, and the revnue can not be allowed to issued issue 143(2) on 21.6.2023 after the search was carried out and notice had been issued on 21.6.2023 and assessment was framed under 143(3) of the Act. The relevant portion of section 143(3) reads as under:-
143(2) Where a return has been furnished under section 139, or in response to a notice under sub-section (1) of section 142, the Assessing Officer or the prescribed income-tax authority, as the case may be, if considers it necessary or expedient to ensure that the assessee has not understated the income or has not computed excessive loss or has not under- paid the tax in any manner, shall serve on the assessee a notice requiring him, on a date to be specified therein, either to attend the office of the Assessing Officer or to produce any evidence on which the assessee may rely in support of the return:
Provided that no notice under this sub-section shall be issued after the expiry of three months from the end of the financial year in which the return is furnished.
13.6 This position finds substantial support from the ratio of various decisions of Hon’ble High Court and Hon’ble Supreme Court. The Courts unanimously held that once a search has been conducted and proceedings are triggered under section 153A, the Assessing Officer cannot continue parallel proceedings under section 143(3) or section 147 for the same assessment year, because the entire assessment for that year stands merged in the search assessment. The Courts emphasized that the existence of a special procedure for assessment consequent to a search is a complete code in itself; therefore, ordinary assessments abate and cannot coexist with the search-based assessment.
13.7 Drawing this analogy to the current regime, it is evident that when a search takes place and information is unearthed suggesting escapement of income, the Assessing Officer must act under section 148 (which now performs the role formerly assigned to section 153A) rather than continuing with a pending section 143(3) proceeding. The legislative intent remains the same — to prevent multiplicity of proceedings and ensure that only one comprehensive order is passed, factoring in both the pre-search and postsearch materials.
13.8 The rationale is further reinforced by the well-settled principle of generalia specialibus non derogant — the special provision overrides the general. Section 148 (as a special provision triggered by search information) must prevail over section 143 (the general provision for regular scrutiny). Allowing the Assessing Officer to continue and conclude proceedings under section 143(3) after a search would defeat this legislative scheme and render the safeguards, such as prior approval of the Principal Commissioner, redundant.
13.9 Accordingly, we hold that once a search is initiated under section 132 and material is found relating to the assessee, the pending assessment under section 143(3) cannot validly continue, as the time for issuing the 143(2) in response to original return of income had already expired, therefore the Assessing Officer must necessarily proceed in accordance with the special provisions contained in section 148 of the Act.”
4. Learned CIT(DR) representing the Revenue vehemently supports the impugned assessment that the Assessing Officer had rightly finalized the same under the normal provision once the entire issue was pending before him as on the date of search.
5. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the assessee’s and the Revenue’s foregoing vehement submissions. We find merit in the assessee’s legal ground herein once the impugned search had taken place in its case, no normal assessment under section 143(3) of the Act could have been framed in light of the tribunal’s foregoing twin decisions going against the department. We thus adopt the above extracted reason mutatis mutandis to quash the impugned assessment framed by the learned Assessing Officer on 30th March, 2024 in very terms.
6. We next notice with the able assistance coming from both the parties that the learned CIT(A)’s impugned estimation has considered the assessee’s average GP @ 11.84% in AYs 2012-13 to AY 2021-22 alongwith the flexible packaging material industry’s comparable instances having the GP rate @ 6.96% (pages 122-123) in the lower appellate discussion to arrive at the “mean” profit rate of 9.40% i.e. 11.84% + 6.96%÷ 2, which is challenged by both the parties. That being the case, the assessee takes us to case law CIT Vs. K.Y. Pilliah & Sons (1967) 63 ITR 411 (SC), CIT Vs. Surjeet Singh Mahesh Kumar (1994) 210 ITR 83 (Del.), Bimal Kumar Anant Kumar Vs. CIT (2007) 159 TAXMAN 402 (All.), Salem Steel Co. Vs. CIT (2010) 322 ITR 349 (Mad.), Telelinks & Ors. Vs. CIT (2015) 377 ITR 158 (P&H), quoted in the lower appellate discussion at page 125 onwards that even such an estimation is not to be an unbridled and unguided one but to be based on the very sector’s book results at this relevant point of time. We thus reject the Revenue’s vehement contentions seeking to assess the assessee @ 18% and direct the learned Assessing Officer to estimate it’s GP @ 6.96% going by the segmental trends only. Ordered accordingly.
All other remaining issues between the parties stand rendered academic in forgoing terms.
7. This assessee’s appeal ITA No.5458/Del/2025 is allowed and the Revenue’s cross appeal ITA No. 5906/Del/2025 is dismissed. A copy of this common order be placed in the respective case files…”
6. Upon consideration of the matter, we also find merit in the assessee’s legal ground herein that once the impugned search had taken place in its case, no normal assessment under section 143(3) of the Act could have been framed in light of the tribunal’s foregoing twin decisions going against the department. The ld. DR placed heavy reliance upon the order of lower authorities, however, could not satisfactorily controvert the arguments of the appellant assessee on this issue. We thus adopt the above extracted reason mutatis mutandis to quash the impugned assessment framed by the learned Assessing Officer on 31.03.2024 in very terms. The ground of appeal no.3 raised by the assessee qua invalid assumption of jurisdiction is therefore allowed. ….”
10. We have noted that the facts of the present case are identical to those in the judicial precedents cited hereinabove and no distinguishment of facts could be discerned. Accordingly, upon consideration of the matter, we find sufficient merit in the assessee’s legal ground that once the impugned search had taken place after 01.04.2021, no normal assessment under section 143(3) of the Act could have been framed in light of the aforesaid judicial analysis. We therefore quash and set aside the order dated 12.03.2024 passed by the ld. Assessing Officer u/s 144 r.w.s. 144B, which is based upon notice u/s 143(2) dated 01.06.2023. The legal additional ground of appeal no.1 raised by the assessee is allowed.
11. In the result, the appeal of the revenue is dismissed.
Order pronounced in the open court on 06th November, 2026.
