Ashok Kumar Palresha Vs DCIT (ITAT Mumbai)
ITAT Mumbai allowed the appeal of Ashok Kumar Palresha for Assessment Year 2022-23 by holding that an assessment completed under section 143(3) after a search under section 132, without issuance of the mandatory jurisdictional notice under section 148, was bad in law and without jurisdiction. The assessee had filed his return of income on 03.11.2022 declaring total income of ₹1,17,49,740. A search and seizure action was subsequently conducted on 31.01.2023 in the case of the Cipla Group and connected persons, including the assessee. During search, cash of ₹4,08,000 and jewellery weighing 4,372.97 grams valued at ₹2,32,49,991 were found. The Assessing Officer thereafter selected the return for scrutiny by issuing notice under section 143(2), without issuing any notice under section 148, and completed assessment under section 143(3) on 25.06.2024. Cash and jewellery aggregating to ₹2,36,57,991 were treated as unexplained money/assets under section 69A. In appeal, the CIT(A) accepted the explanation relating to jewellery after considering wealth-tax returns, earlier search records, assessment proceedings, jewellery previously released by the Department and CBDT Instruction No. 1916, and consequently deleted the addition of ₹2,32,49,991. However, the cash addition of ₹4,08,000 was sustained.
Before the Tribunal, the assessee raised additional grounds challenging the jurisdiction of the Assessing Officer. The contention was that once a search under section 132 had taken place on 31.01.2023, the assessment for AY 2022-23 could not be initiated merely through section 143(2). Since the search was initiated after 01.04.2021 but before 01.09.2024, the statutory regime introduced by the Finance Act, 2021 governed the case. The Tribunal examined sections 147, 148 and Explanation 2 to section 148 and held that Parliament had shifted search-related assessments during this intermediate period into the reassessment framework. Explanation 2 created a statutory fiction under which initiation of a search under section 132 resulted in the Assessing Officer being deemed to possess information suggesting that income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment. Consequently, the search was not merely information that the Assessing Officer could choose to use either in ordinary scrutiny proceedings or reassessment proceedings. The statutory consequence attached to the search required jurisdiction to be assumed in the manner prescribed under sections 147 and 148.
The Tribunal further distinguished section 148 from section 148A. In the assessee’s own search case, the proviso to section 148A dispensed with the preliminary enquiry contemplated by that provision. However, exemption from section 148A did not eliminate the jurisdictional requirement of issuing notice under section 148. Section 148A governed the preliminary procedure before issuance of notice, whereas section 148 was the provision through which reassessment jurisdiction itself was assumed. Therefore, although the preliminary enquiry was unnecessary in specified search cases, the section 148 notice remained mandatory.
An important feature of the case was that when the search took place on 31.01.2023, the limitation period for issuing a section 143(2) notice on the return filed on 03.11.2022 had not expired. The Tribunal nevertheless held that this did not give the Assessing Officer an option to choose between ordinary scrutiny under section 143(2) and the special search-related reassessment mechanism under sections 147 and 148. Section 143(2) formed part of the general machinery for scrutiny of an existing return, whereas Explanation 2 to section 148 specifically dealt with the jurisdictional consequence of a search. The fact that a section 143(2) notice could still have been issued within limitation merely established that an ordinary scrutiny notice was not time-barred; it did not permit that notice to replace the jurisdictional mechanism mandated once the Department proceeded consequent to the search.
The Tribunal also emphasised that the additions in the present case were directly connected with the search. The Assessing Officer had made additions for the very cash and jewellery found during the search. Therefore, the Department could not rely upon the search for making additions while simultaneously disregarding the statutory jurisdictional consequence attached by Parliament to that search. The Tribunal followed its Coordinate Bench decision in Rajesh Kumar Jain v. DCIT, which arose from the same Cipla Group search dated 31.01.2023, involved the same AY 2022-23 and concerned the same jurisdictional issue. That decision had held that a notice under section 143(2) could not substitute the statutory notice under section 148 where Explanation 2 to section 148 applied. The Tribunal also followed the Delhi Bench ruling in Rajesh Bansal v. DCIT / Malwa Packaging v. DCIT / ACIT v. Malwa Packaging, where assessments completed under section 143(3) following search were held to require compliance with sections 148 and 148B.
Accordingly, ITAT Mumbai held that the absence of a section 148 notice was not a mere procedural irregularity but a defect going to the root of the Assessing Officer’s jurisdiction. The assessment order dated 25.06.2024 passed under section 143(3) was therefore quashed as bad in law and without jurisdiction. Once the assessment itself was quashed, the surviving addition of ₹4,08,000 relating to cash could not stand and was consequently deleted. As the appeal succeeded on the jurisdictional issue, the remaining grounds concerning the merits of the additions did not require adjudication and were dismissed as not pressed. The assessee’s appeal was thus allowed on the jurisdictional ground. The order was pronounced on 27.08.2026.
Cases Discussed
- Rajesh Kumar Jain v. Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax, Central Circle-1(2), Mumbai, ITA No. 4768/Mum/2026, A.Y. 2022-23, order dated 18.08.2026 (ITAT Mumbai, “D” Bench) — Directly followed. The decision arose from the same Cipla Group search dated 31.01.2023, involved the same AY 2022-23 and the same issue of assessment under section 143(2)/143(3) instead of section 148. It held that once the case fell within Explanation 2 to section 148, jurisdiction had to be assumed under sections 147 and 148 and section 143(2) could not substitute the mandatory section 148 notice.
- Rajesh Bansal v. DCIT, Central Circle-19, Delhi; Malwa Packaging v. DCIT, Central Circle-19, Delhi; and ACIT, Central Circle-19, Delhi v. Malwa Packaging, ITA Nos. 6115/Del/2025, 5756/Del/2025 & 7586/Del/2025, A.Y. 2022-23, order dated 21.05.2026 (ITAT Delhi, “C” Bench) — Relied upon for the proposition that the Assessing Officer was mandatorily required to follow the special post-search mechanism under sections 148 and 148B and that an assessment under section 143(3), without compliance with those provisions, was without jurisdiction.
FULL TEXT OF THE ORDER OF ITAT MUMBAI
This appeal is filed by the Assessee against the order of Ld. COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, APPEAL – 47 vide DIN: ITBA/APL/S/250/2025-26/1086840926(1) dated 04-Mar-2026 for the Assessment Year 2022-23. The assessee has raised the following grounds of appeal:
1. On the facts and circumstances of the appellant’s case and in law the Ld. CIT(A) erred in confirming the action of the ld. AO in considering the cash found during the search as unexplained money, for the reason stated in the impugned order and otherwise.
2. On the facts and circumstances of the appellant’s case and in law the Ld. CIT(A) erred in confirming the action of the ld. AO in making addition of Rs. 4,08,000/- by invoking the provision of section 69A of the Act, for the reason stated in the impugned order and otherwise.
3. The Appellant craves leaves to alter, amend, withdraw or substitute any ground or grounds or to add any new ground or grounds of appeal on or before the hearing.
2. The brief facts of the case are that the assessee, Shri Ashok Kumar Palresha, is an individual who filed his return of income for A.Y. 2022-23 on 03.11.2022 declaring total income of ₹1,17,49,740/-. The Department processed the return under section 143(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 (“the Act”). Thereafter, the Department conducted a search and seizure action under section 132 on 31.01.2023 in the case of the Cipla Group and connected persons, including the assessee. Thus, the search took place during F.Y. 2022-23 relevant to A.Y. 2023-24, whereas the assessment year before us is A.Y. 2022-23, being the assessment year immediately preceding the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the search took place.
3. During the course of search, the search party found cash of ₹4,08,000/- and jewellery weighing 4,372.97 grams valued at ₹2,32,49,991/-. After the search, the Assessing Officer selected the assessee’s return for scrutiny and issued notice under section 143(2) of the Act. The Assessing Officer did not issue any notice under section 148 of the Act. The Assessing Officer thereafter completed the assessment under section 143(3) on 25.06.2024 and treated the cash of ₹4,08,000/- and jewellery valued at ₹2,32,49,991/- as unexplained money/assets under section 69A of the Act. The Assessing Officer accordingly made additions amounting to ₹2,36,57,991/-.
4. The assessee challenged the assessment before the learned CIT(A). As regards the jewellery, the learned CIT(A) examined the wealth-tax returns of the assessee and his family members, the records relating to earlier search, the assessment proceedings for A.Y. 2015-16, the jewellery earlier released by the Department and CBDT Instruction No.1916. The learned CIT(A) found merit in the assessee’s explanation regarding the source of jewellery and deleted the addition of ₹2,32,49,991/-. However, the learned CIT(A) sustained the addition of ₹4,08,000/- relating to cash obtained.
5. The assessee is in appeal before us against the order passed by the learned CIT(A) to the extent the learned CIT(A) dismissed the assessee’s grounds and sustained the assessment and the addition of ₹4,08,000/-.
6. During the course of hearing before us, the learned Counsel for the assessee raised additional grounds challenging the very jurisdiction of the Assessing Officer to frame an assessment under section 143(3)of the Act. The learned Counsel submitted that once the Department conducted the search under section 132 of the Acton 31.01.2023, the Assessing Officer could not initiate assessment proceedings for A.Y. 2022-23 merely by issuing notice under section 143(2) of the Act. According to the learned Counsel, the Assessing Officer had to mandatorily follow the statutory mechanism contained in sections 147 and 148 applicable to searches initiated on or after 01.04.2021 and before 01.09.2024. The learned Counsel further submitted that the Assessing Officer had also not complied with section 148B of the Act.
7. The learned Counsel relied upon the decision of the Coordinate Bench of the Delhi Tribunal in Rajesh Bansal v. DCIT, Central Circle-19, Delhi; Malwa Packaging v. DCIT, Central Circle-19, Delhi; and ACIT, Central Circle-19, Delhi v. Malwa Packaging, ITA Nos. 6115/Del/2025, 5756/Del/2025 and 7586/Del/2025, A.Y. 2022-23, order dated 21.05.2026 (ITAT Delhi, “C” Bench).
8. We have heard the rival submissions and perused the material available on record. Since the additional grounds raised by the assessee challenge the very jurisdiction of the Assessing Officer and do not require investigation of any fresh facts, we admit the additional grounds and proceed to decide the same.
9. The short question before us is whether, after the search under section 132 conducted on 31.01.2023, the Assessing Officer could proceed for A.Y. 2022-23 by issuing notice under section 143(2) of the Act and thereafter frame a regular assessment under section 143(3) of the Act, or whether the Assessing Officer was mandatorily required to invoke the reassessment process contained in sections 147 and 148 of the Act.
10. For deciding the controversy, it is first necessary to analyze the law applicable to a search conducted on 31.01.2023. Prior to 01.04.2021, sections 153A to 153C of the Act contained the special machinery for assessment consequent to a search. However, the Finance Act, 2021 changed this scheme. For searches initiated on or after 01.04.2021, the Legislature shifted search- related assessments into the reassessment framework contained in sections 147 to 151 of the Act. The block assessment provisions subsequently introduced by the Finance (No.2) Act, 2024 apply to searches initiated on or after 01.09.2024 and, therefore, have no application to the present search dated 31.01.2023.
11. Thus, the present search falls within the intermediate statutory regime applicable to searches initiated on or after 01.04.2021 but before 01.09.2024. Section 147, as relevant to assessment year under consideration, reads as under:
“147. If any income chargeable to tax, in the case of an assessee, has escaped assessment for any assessment year, the Assessing Officer may, subject to the provisions of sections 148 to 153, assess or reassess such income or recompute the loss or the depreciation allowance or any other allowance or deduction for such assessment year…”
12. The words “subject to the provisions of sections 148 to 153” are important. They make it clear that once the Assessing Officer exercises jurisdiction under section 147, he must follow the jurisdictional requirements prescribed in section 148 and the connected provisions. Section 148, insofar as relevant, read as under
“148. Before making the assessment, reassessment or recomputation under section 147, and subject to the provisions of section 148A, the Assessing Officer shall serve on the assessee a notice… requiring him to furnish… a return of his income…”
13. More importantly, Explanation 2 to section 148, which specifically dealt with searches initiated on or after 01.04.2021, provided as under:
“Explanation 2.—For the purposes of this section, where,—
(i) a search is initiated under section 132 or books of account, other documents or any assets are requisitioned under section 132A, on or after the 1st day of April, 2021, in the case of the assessee; or
(ii) a survey is conducted under section 133A, other than under sub-section (2A) of that section, on or after the 1st day of April, 2021, in the case of the assessee; or
(iii) the Assessing Officer is satisfied, with the prior approval of the Principal Commissioner or Commissioner, that any money, bullion, jewellery or other valuable article or thing, seized or requisitioned under section 132 or section 132A in case of any other person on or after the 1st day of April, 2021, belongs to the assessee; or
(iv) the Assessing Officer is satisfied, with the prior approval of Principal Commissioner or Commissioner, that any books of account or documents, seized or requisitioned under section 132 or section 132A in case of any other person on or after the 1st day of April, 2021, pertains or pertain to, or any information contained therein, relate to, the assessee, the Assessing Officer shall be deemed to have information which suggests that the income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment…”
14. The legal effect of this provision is important. The Parliament itself created a statutory fiction. Once a search under section 132 was initiated on or after 01.04.2021, the Assessing Officer was deemed to have information suggesting that income chargeable to tax had escaped assessment.
15. Therefore, the search was not merely information which the Assessing Officer could use either in an ordinary scrutiny assessment or in reassessment according to his choice. The Legislature itself placed the search within the framework of section 148 of the Act.
16. We also consider it necessary to distinguish section 148 from section 148A of the Act. Under the law applicable to the present search, section 148A prescribed a preliminary procedure before issuance of notice under section 148 of the Act. However, the proviso to section 148A specifically excluded certain search cases. The relevant portion provided:
“Provided that the provisions of this section shall not apply in a case where,—
(a) a search is initiated under section 132 or books of account, other documents or any assets are requisitioned under section 132A in the case of the assessee on or after the 1st day of April, 2021…”
17. The consequence is that in an assessee’s own search case, the Assessing Officer was not required to first undertake the preliminary procedure under section 148A. However, dispensing with section 148A did not dispense with section 148 of the Act. Section 148A of the Act deals with the enquiry which precedes the jurisdictional notice. Section 148 of the Act is the section through which the Assessing Officer assumes reassessment jurisdiction. Therefore, the Legislature merely dispensed with the preliminary enquiry in the specified search cases; it did not dispense with the jurisdictional notice under section 148 of the Act.
18. We have also considered an important distinction in the present case. The assessee filed his return on 03.11.2022. Therefore, when the search took place on 31.01.2023, the statutory time available for issuing notice under section 143(2) had admittedly not expired. Section 143(2), insofar as relevant, provided:
“(2) Where a return has been furnished under section 139, or in response to a notice under sub-section (1) of section 142, the Assessing Officer or the prescribed income- tax authority, as the case may be, if, considers it necessary or expedient to ensure that the assessee has not understated the income or has not computed excessive loss or has not under-paid the tax in any manner, shall serve on the assessee a notice…”
“Provided that no notice under this sub-section shall be served on the assessee after the expiry of three months from the end of the financial year in which the return is furnished.”
19. Since the assessee filed the return on 03.11.2022, the period for issuing notice under section 143(2) was availed up to 30.06.2023. Accordingly, notice under section 143(2) was issued within the limitation period.
20. Therefore, the issue for consideration is not whether section 143(2) of the Act notice could have been issued on the date on which the Assessing Officer issued it. The question is whether, after a search under section 132 had already been conducted in the intervening period and the Department proceeded against the assessee for the preceding assessment year on the basis of that search, whether the Assessing Officer could choose the ordinary scrutiny route u/s 143(2) of the Act instead of the statutory route specifically prescribed for post-01.04.2021 searches.
21. In our view, the answer is in the negative.
22. Section 143(2) of the Act is part of the regular scrutiny machinery. It enables the Assessing Officer to scrutinise a return filed under section 139 of the Act. On the other hand, Explanation 2 to section 148 creates a Statutory mandate when a search under section 132 takes place. Parliament itself deems the Assessing Officer to possess information suggesting escapement of income. The two provisions therefore operate in different fields.
23. If the Revenue’s contention that both routes remain simultaneously available were accepted, the result would be that the Assessing Officer could decide, at his own discretion, whether to follow section 148 with its statutory safeguards or simply issue notice under section 143(2) of the Act. Nothing in the Act gives such an option to the Assessing Officer.
24. More importantly, in the present case, the additions are not ordinary scrutiny additions unrelated to the search. The Assessing Officer made the additions in respect of cash and jewellery found during the search itself. The Department cannot rely upon the search as the basis for making the additions and, at the same time, disregard the statutory jurisdictional consequence which Parliament attached to that very search.
25. The issue is directly covered by the Coordinate Bench decision in Rajesh Kumar Jain v. Deputy Commissioner of Income-tax, Central Circle-1(2), Mumbai, ITA No.4768/Mum/2026, A.Y. 2022-23, order dated 18.08.2026 (ITAT Mumbai, “D” Bench).
26. The importance of this decision is that it emanated from the same Cipla Group search conducted on 31.01.2023, related to the same A.Y. 2022-23, and concerned the same jurisdictional controversy arising from the Department proceeding under section 143(2)/143(3) instead of section 148 of the Act.
27. The Coordinate Bench examined the statutory transition from the erstwhile section 153A regime to sections 147 and 148 and held that, for searches initiated after 31.03.2021, Parliament had brought the preceding years within the reassessment framework. The Coordinate Bench further held that the jurisdictional conditions prescribed in sections 147 and 148 could not be treated as optional merely because the assessee had already filed a return or because such return could have been selected for scrutiny.
28. The Coordinate Bench further held that notice under section 143(2) and notice under section 148 of the Act perform different statutory functions. Section 143(2) of the Act scrutinises an existing return under the ordinary assessment machinery, whereas section 148 of the Act invokes the special jurisdiction to assess escaped income under section 147 consequent to the statutory fiction created by Explanation 2.
29. The relevant findings of the Coordinate Bench are reproduced hereunder: “We have carefully considered the rival submissions and perused the material available on record. The undisputed facts are that a search and seizure action under section 132 of the Act was carried out in the case of the assessee on 31.01.2023. The search therefore falls in the period after 01.04.2021 and before 01.09.2024. For searches falling within this period, the erstwhile provisions of section 153A were no longer applicable and the Legislature had brought such cases within the reassessment framework contained in sections 147 to 151 of the Act.”
“Explanation 2 to section 148 specifically provides that where a search is initiated under section 132 on or after 01.04.2021 in the case of an assessee, the Assessing Officer shall be deemed to have information which suggests that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment. Thus, the consequence of a search has itself been provided by the Legislature. Once the conditions contained in Explanation 2 are satisfied, the Assessing Officer is required to proceed in accordance with the machinery prescribed under sections 147 and 148 of the Act.”
“The provisions of section 143(2) and section 148 operate in different fields. A notice under section 143(2) is issued for scrutiny of a return already furnished by an assessee under the normal assessment procedure. Section 148, on the other hand, is the jurisdictional provision through which the Assessing Officer assumes jurisdiction under section 147 where income chargeable to tax is deemed to have escaped assessment. Therefore, a notice under section 143(2) cannot substitute the statutory notice contemplated under section 148 where the case is covered by Explanation 2 to section 148.”
“Merely because a return had already been furnished by the assessee and the time available for selection of such return for scrutiny had not expired would not permit the Assessing Officer to disregard the special statutory mechanism applicable consequent to the search. Once the search was initiated and the case fell within Explanation 2 to section 148, the jurisdiction had to be assumed in the manner prescribed by sections 147 and 148. The statutory conditions prescribed for assumption of such jurisdiction cannot be treated as optional.”
“It is settled law that where the Legislature requires an authority to exercise jurisdiction in a particular manner, the authority must exercise the jurisdiction in that manner alone. The Assessing Officer cannot substitute the procedure prescribed by the statute by adopting the general assessment procedure under section 143(3).”
“We therefore hold that the assessment framed under section 143(3), without issuance of notice under section 148, cannot be sustained. The defect goes to the root of assumption of jurisdiction and is not a mere procedural irregularity capable of being cured by participation of the assessee in the assessment proceedings.”
30. We respectfully follow the aforesaid decision. The search date is the same 31.01.2023; the assessment year is the same, viz A.Y. 2022-23; the original return had been filed before the search; and the Assessing Officer proceeded under section 143(2)/143(3) without issuing notice under section 148 of the Act.
31. The same view has been taken by the Delhi Bench of the Tribunal in Rajesh Bansal v. DCIT, Central Circle-19, Delhi; Malwa Packaging v. DCIT, Central Circle-19, Delhi; and ACIT, Central Circle-19, Delhi v. Malwa Packaging, ITA Nos.6115/Del/2025, 5756/Del/2025 and 7586/Del/2025, A.Y. 2022-23, order dated 21.05.2026, ITAT Delhi “C” Bench.
32. In Malwa Packaging, the search under section 132 took place on 03.08.2022 during F.Y. 2022-23 relevant to A.Y. 2023-24. The assessment year before the Tribunal was A.Y. 2022-23. The Assessing Officer issued notice under section 143(2) of the Act on 12.06.2023 and thereafter completed the assessment under section 143(3) of the Act. The Tribunal specifically held that the Assessing Officer was mandatorily required to follow section 148 and section 148B and that the assessment framed under section 143(3), without complying with those provisions, was without jurisdiction. The Tribunal observed that section 143 provides the general framework for regular assessment whereas sections 147 and 148 under the post-2021 regime provide the special mechanism where escapement is statutorily deemed on account of a search. The Tribunal accordingly held that the special statutory procedure had to prevail over the general scrutiny provision.
33. Coming to the present case before us, the Department conducted a search under section 132 on the assessee on 31.01.2023. The search falls within the statutory regime governing searches initiated after 01.04.2021 and before 01.09.2024. The assessment year before us is A.Y. 2022-23, which precedes the assessment year relevant to the previous year in which the search took place. Further, the Assessing Officer made the impugned additions on the basis of the cash and jewellery actually found during the search. Thus, there is a direct connection between the search and the impugned assessment. Explanation 2(i) to section 148 of the Act created a statutory fiction upon initiation of the search. The Assessing Officer was deemed to possess information suggesting escapement of income. The statutory route available to the Assessing Officer was therefore to proceed under section 147 of the Act by issuing the jurisdictional notice prescribed under section 148. In the case of an assessee searched under section 132, the preliminary procedure under section 148A stood dispensed with, but the requirement of section 148 itself did not disappear. We therefore find no legal basis for the proposition that because time for issuing notice under section 143(2) of the Act was still available, the Assessing Officer acquired an option to choose between section 143(2) and section 148 of the Act. We are of the considered view that the Law did not confer such an option. The availability of time under section 143(2) merely means that an ordinary scrutiny notice would not have been barred by limitation. It does not mean that section 143(2) of the Act could replace the specific jurisdictional mechanism which became applicable once the Department proceeded consequent to the search.
34. We therefore respectfully follow Rajesh Kumar Jain v. DCIT, Central Circle-1(2), Mumbai, ITA No.4768/Mum/2026, A.Y. 2022-23, order dated 18.08.2026 (ITAT Mumbai, “D” Bench) and Rajesh Bansal v. DCIT / Malwa Packaging v. DCIT / ACIT v. Malwa Packaging, ITA Nos.6115/Del/2025, 5756/Del/2025 and 7586/Del/2025, A.Y. 2022-23, order dated 21.05.2026 (ITAT Delhi, “C” Bench).
35. Admittedly, in the case before us, the Assessing Officer did not issue any notice under section issued notice u/s 148 of the Act. of the Act. The Assessing Officer initiated the proceedings by issuing notice under section 143(2) of the Act and completed the assessment under section 143(3)of the Act.
36. In our considered view, the absence of notice under section 148 is not a mere procedural irregularity. It goes to the root of the jurisdiction of the Assessing Officer.
37. We accordingly hold that the Assessing Officer could not validly frame the impugned assessment for A.Y. 2022-23 under section 143(3) merely on the basis of the notice issued under section 143(2)of the Act, after the search under section 132 dated 31.01.2023, without invoking section 147 and issuing the mandatory notice under section 148 of the Act.
38. Accordingly, the additional grounds raised by the assessee challenging the jurisdiction of the Assessing Officer are allowed. We hold that the assessment order dated 25.06.2024 passed under section 143(3) of the Actis bad in law and without jurisdiction and is accordingly quashed.
39. Once the assessment itself stands quashed for want of jurisdiction, the addition of ₹4,08,000/- sustained by the learned CIT(A) cannot survive and the same is accordingly deleted.
40. Since the learned Counsel for the assessee confined his arguments before us only to the additional grounds challenging the jurisdiction of the Assessing Officer, and we have allowed the appeal on the said jurisdictional issue, the remaining grounds relating to the merits of the additions do not require adjudication. The same are accordingly dismissed as not pressed.
41. In the result, the appeal of the assessee is allowed on the jurisdictional issue.
Order pronounced in the open court on 27.08.2026.
