Samtex Fashions Ltd. Vs CIT (Supreme Court of India)
CBDT Office Memorandum Cannot Override Section 80HHC Statutory Scheme; Export Quota Premium Not Covered by Sections 28(iiia) to 28(iiic); Export Quota Sale Premium Cannot Be Equated with Export Incentives; CBDT Circular Binds Revenue Officers, Not Courts Interpreting Income-tax Law: Supreme Court
Core Issue: Whether premium realised by an assessee on the transfer of export quota could be treated, in accordance with the CBDT Office Memorandum dated 23 February 1998, as export incentive income falling within sections 28(iiia) to 28(iiic) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, and consequently qualify for deduction under section 80HHC; and whether the administrative clarification issued by the CBDT was binding upon the courts while interpreting the statutory provisions.
Facts of the Case
The assessee, M/s. Samtex Fashions Ltd., filed appeals before the Supreme Court arising from the judgment of the Delhi High Court dated 23 May 2017 in ITA Nos. 32 of 2005 and 1057 of 2008, concerning Assessment Years 2000-01 and 2001-02. In the return for AY 2001-02, the assessee declared Rs. 90,43,061 as proceeds from the sale of export quota and Rs. 16,72,286 as interest earned on margin money deposits, and claimed deductions under the Income Tax Act.
The Assessing Officer rejected the deduction claimed in respect of the export quota premium, observing that the entitlement to export quota arose from past export performance and that its subsequent transfer to third parties did not constitute export activity of the industrial undertaking. The assessee’s claim was also considered in the context of section 10A and the statutory requirement of income being derived from the industrial undertaking. The dispute ultimately reached the Supreme Court in relation to the assessee’s claim for deduction under section 80HHC in respect of the export quota premium.
Findings of the Assessing Officer, CIT(A) and ITAT
The Assessing Officer rejected the assessee’s claim for deduction in respect of the export quota premium. The CIT(A), however, allowed the claim by relying upon the CBDT Office Memorandum dated 23 February 1998, which equated the premium on transfer of export quotas with export incentives referred to in sections 28(iiia), 28(iiib) and 28(iiic). The CIT(A) considered the assessee eligible for deduction under section 80HHC, particularly in view of the assessee’s export turnover, and deleted the addition relating to the quota premium.
The Tribunal upheld the CIT(A)’s decision, treating the sale of export quota as analogous to the sale of import licences and relying upon the retrospective amendment introduced by the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 2005. The Revenue challenged the Tribunal’s decision before the Delhi High Court, which answered the substantial questions of law in favour of the Revenue and against the assessee, relying upon the decisions in CIT v. Nagesh Knitwears P. Ltd., CIT v. Mereena Creations and CIT v. Shri Ram Honda Power Equip.
Submissions Before the Supreme Court
The assessee contended that the CBDT Office Memorandum dated 23 February 1998, issued under section 119, was binding upon the Revenue authorities and required export quota premium to be treated in the same manner as the export incentives specified in sections 28(iiia) to 28(iiic). It was argued that the Revenue could not disregard its own administrative clarification while determining the assessee’s eligibility for deduction under section 80HHC.
The Revenue submitted that the CBDT Office Memorandum could not bind the constitutional courts or prevail over the statutory provisions as interpreted by the courts. It contended that the assessee’s claim was inconsistent with the statutory scheme governing the computation of export profits and the treatment of receipts under section 28 and Explanation (baa) to section 80HHC.
Decision and Reasoning of the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court observed that the controversy was confined to the legal effect of the CBDT Office Memorandum and whether it could be used to equate premium received on the transfer of export quota with the receipts specifically covered by sections 28(iiia) to 28(iiic). The Court reiterated the settled principle that administrative circulars and instructions are binding upon the departmental authorities administering the statute, but do not bind the courts in the interpretation of statutory provisions.
Relying upon the Constitution Bench decision in Commissioner of Central Excise, Bolpur v. Ratan Melting & Wire Industries, the Court held that an administrative circular cannot prevail over the statutory text or a judicial declaration of law. Once a constitutional court has interpreted a statutory provision, an inconsistent executive circular cannot be given effect in preference to that interpretation. The executive’s understanding of a statute does not possess the force of judicial interpretation, and a circular contrary to the statute or the law declared by the courts has no legal force to that extent.
The Court further observed that accepting the assessee’s contention would effectively prevent the Revenue from challenging an interpretation that it considered contrary to the statute merely because an administrative circular had been issued. Such a position would impair the judicial process and the authority of the law declared by the Supreme Court under Article 141 of the Constitution.
On the substantive issue, the Court held that the CBDT Office Memorandum created an impermissible legal fiction by equating the premium from the transfer of export quota with the specified export incentive receipts under sections 28(iiia) to 28(iiic). The Court observed that the essential characteristics of those statutory receipts, including the requisite connection with foreign exchange, were not present in the domestic transfer of export quota. Consequently, the quota-sale premium could not be treated as income of the nature contemplated by those provisions merely by virtue of the administrative clarification.
The Supreme Court also referred to the reasoning in CIT v. Nagesh Knitwears P. Ltd., wherein it had been explained that the incidence of premium realised from the transfer of export quota could not be equated with the income specified under sections 28(iiia) to 28(iiie). The Court found that reasoning legally tenable and declined to undertake any further examination of the issue. It emphasised that treating an administrative memorandum as binding upon the courts would undermine the statutory and constitutional framework governing income-tax liability, including the interpretation of the expression “income derived” and the construction of statutory deductions.
Cases Relied Upon
The principal authority relied upon by the Supreme Court was Commissioner of Central Excise, Bolpur v. Ratan Melting & Wire Industries, (2008) 13 SCC 1, concerning the binding effect of departmental circulars and their inability to override statutory provisions or judicial interpretation. The Court also considered CIT v. Nagesh Knitwears P. Ltd., (2012) 345 ITR 135 (Delhi), which addressed the treatment of export quota premium under sections 28 and 80HHC.
The assessee had also relied upon K.P. Varghese v. ITO, State of Tamil Nadu v. India Cements Ltd., and other authorities concerning the binding effect of administrative circulars upon the Revenue. The judgment refers to the broader line of authorities governing the distinction between the binding effect of circulars upon departmental authorities and their non-binding character upon constitutional courts.
Outcome
The Supreme Court found no reason to interfere with the judgment of the Delhi High Court. Civil Appeal Nos. 11063 of 2017 and 12449 of 2017 were dismissed, thereby sustaining the denial of the assessee’s claim for deduction under section 80HHC in respect of the export quota premium. Pending applications, if any, were directed to be disposed of accordingly.
Cases Discussed
- Commissioner of Central Excise, Bolpur v. Ratan Melting & Wire Industries, (2008) 13 SCC 1.
- CIT v. Nagesh Knitwears P. Ltd., (2012) 345 ITR 135 (Delhi).
- CIT v. M/s Mereena Creations, (2011) 330 ITR 199 (Delhi).
- CIT v. Shri Ram Honda Power Equip, (2007) 289 ITR 475 (Delhi).
- CIT v. Sterling Foods, (1999) 237 ITR 579.
- K.P. Varghese v. ITO, (1981) 4 SCC 173.
- State of Tamil Nadu & Anr. v. India Cements Ltd. & Anr., (2011) 13 SCC 247.
FULL TEXT OF THE SUPREME COURT JUDGMENT/ORDER
1. The Assessee is the Appellant in both the Appeals. The Civil Appeals arise from the Order dated 23.05.2017 in ITA No. 32 of 2005 and ITA No. 1057 of 2008, passed by the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi. The controversy in the subject Appeals pertains to the Returns filed by the Assessee for the Assessment Years (“A.Y.”) 2000-2001 and 2001-2002. The Appeals have been tagged and heard with Civil Appeal Nos. 143-144 of 2013 and the batch. For convenience, and noting the distinguishing considerations between the clubbed matters, we find it convenient to pronounce separate Judgments in the bunch of Appeals heard together. To complete the narrative, we observe that in Civil Appeal Nos. 143-144 of 2013 and batch, though the substantive issue between the Revenue and the Assessee is under Sections 28(iiia) to 28(iiie) and 80HHC (Deduction in respect of profits retained for export business) of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (“The Act, 1961”), the arguments in Civil Appeal Nos. 143-144 of 2013 and batch have been advanced on the exercise of power by the C.I.T. under Section 263 of the Act, 1961. Further, the impugned judgments refer to and rely upon the decision of the Delhi High Court in CIT v. Nagesh Knitwears P. Ltd.1, which considered and decided issues arising under both Section 80HHC and Section 263 of the Act, 1961. Vide a separate judgment of the even date in Civil Appeal Nos. 143-144 of 2014 and batch, we affirm the view taken in Nagesh Knitwears P. Ltd. (supra) on the exercise of power by the C.I.T. under Section 263 of the Act, 1961. Therefore, the issue raised by the Assessee under Sections 28(iiia) to 28(iiie) and 80HHC of the Act, 1961, in these Appeals is examined by the present Judgment.
THE CIVIL APPEAL NO. 11063 OF 2017
2. The circumstances set out in Civil Appeal No. 11063 of 2017 are referred to and relied upon for convenience and to dispose of both Appeals.
3. On 21.10.2001, the Assessee filed the Return for AY 2001-02. The Assessee declared Rs. 90,43,061/- (Ninety Lakhs Forty-Three Thousand and Sixty-One) towards proceeds from the sale of export quota and Rs. 16,72,286/- (Sixteen Lakhs Seventy-Two Thousand Two Hundred and Eighty-Six) towards interest earned on the margin money deposit. The Assessee claimed a deduction under Section 80HHC of the Act, 1961. The Assessing Officer (Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, Central Circle-6, New Delhi) (“AO”) under Section 143(3) of the Act, 1961, on 24.03.2004, rejected the claim under Section 80HHC of the Act, 1961, and assessed the total taxable income of the Assessee at Rs. 1,07,15,350/- (One Crore Seven Lakh Fifteen Thousand Three Hundred and Fifty). The AO recorded the reasons for rejecting the deduction of both the sums claimed by the Assessee, and the reasoning of the AO is summarised as follows: –
A. On Sale of Export Quota: Section 10A of the Act, 1961 applies strictly to profits and gains “derived by” an industrial undertaking from the export of articles or things. The export quota entitlements were granted under the Garment Export Entitlement Policy, based on past export performance. Monetising such quotas by selling them to third parties did not constitute export activity of the industrial undertaking. While relying on this Court’s Judgment in CIT v. Sterling Foods2, it held that quota sale income had only an incidental, commercial connection rather than a direct nexus with the industrial undertaking. It rejected the assessee’s alternative computation under Section 10A(4) of the Act, 1961, noting that because the Assessee exported 100% of its manufactured goods and had no domestic sales, the statutory proportional formula did not apply.
B. On Interest earned on Margin Money: The interest earned on fixed deposits pledged with banks to secure credit facilities had no direct nexus to the undertaking’s manufacturing and export activities. It reclassified the interest receipts as “Income from Other Sources” under Section 56 rather than as business profits under Section 28, relying on CIT v. Pandyan Chemicals Ltd.3, North East Gases Pvt. Ltd. v. CIT 4, and CIT v. Paras Oil Extraction Ltd.5
4. The Assessee, assailing the Order dated 24.03.2004, filed Appeal No. 174/2004-05 before the C.I.T. (Appeals)-III (“the CIT(A)”). On 13.02.2006, the CIT(A) allowed the Assessee’s Appeal, holding that quota-sale proceeds are deductible under Section 80HHC of the Act, 1961, and that interest on margin money is exempt under Section 10A of the Act, 1961, and allowed both claims in full. The findings of the CIT(A) are as follows:
A. On Sale of Export Quota: The CIT(A) relied on the CBDT Instruction/Office Memorandum dated 23.02.1998 (“CBDT O.M.”), which provided that the premium on the transfer of export quotas is equated with export incentives under Sections 28(iiia), (iiib), and (iiic), i.e., profits on the sale of import licences, cash assistance, and duty drawback of the Act, 1961. Where income is considered for exemption under Section 10A, then it is eligible for deduction under Section 80HHC because Section 10A(4)(iii) omits Section 80HHC from the list of prohibited Chapter VI-A deductions under the Act, 1961. Reliance is placed on CIT v. Mahalaxmi Textile Mills Ltd.6 and CIT v. P. Surendra Prabhu7 to hold that an Assessee is entitled to relief under an alternative eligible provision if denied under another. The ruling in IPCA Laboratory Ltd. v. DCIT8 was superseded by the Taxation Laws (Amendment) Act, 2005 (“Act 55 of 2005”) with retrospective effect from 01.04.1992,
B. On Interest on Margin Money: The ITAT’s decision in the Assessee’s own case for AY 2000–01 (ITA No. 4803/Del/03) was followed to endorse the principle that placing fixed deposits was a mandatory condition precedent imposed by the lending bank to provide operational credit facilities for running the export unit. The fixed deposits were merely the “foster mother” of the interest income, whereas the “real mother” was the industrial undertaking itself. Hence, the interest income has a direct nexus with the industrial undertaking and qualifies for exemption under Section 10A of the Act, 1961. Accordingly, the addition of Rs. 16,72,286/- made by the AO is reversed.
5. The Revenue filed ITA Nos. 1625-1627/DEL/2006, and on 15.05.2007, the said Appeals filed by the Revenue were dismissed. The Tribunal’s view is stated as follows: –
A. On Sale of Export Quota: The Tribunal affirmed the CIT(A)’s finding that the sale of export quota is analogous to the sale of import licences and is accorded identical statutory treatment under Section 28 read with Section 80HHC of the Act, 1961. It upheld the view that the retrospective amendment by Act 55 of 2005 entitled the Assessee to deductions under Section 80HHC of the Act, 1961 in respect of export incentives.
B. On Interest on Margin Money: Following its own precedent in the Assessee’s case for AY 2000–01, the Tribunal affirmed the CIT(A)’s finding that interest earned on margin money deposits had a direct operational nexus with the business of the industrial undertaking. Accordingly, it upheld the Assessee’s alternate eligibility to claim a deduction under Section 80HHC and dismissed the Revenue’s Appeal.
6. Under Section 260A of the Act, 1961, the Revenue filed ITA No. 1057 of 2008 before the High Court of Delhi. The Appeal was admitted on the following substantial questions of law: –
“Whether ITAT was correct in law in deleting the addition made by the Assessing Officer by disallowing Assessee’s claim under Section 10A of the Act out of income earned on sale of export/import quota holding that the assessee was alternatively entitled to deduction under Section 80HHC of the Act?
Whether ITAT was correct in law in deleting the addition made by the Assessing Officer by disallowing Assessee’s claim under Section 10A of the Act on interest on margin money by holding that the assessee was alternatively entitled to deduction under Section 80HHC of the Act?”
7. The impugned Judgment, referring to the decisions in CIT v. Nagesh Knitwears P. Ltd.(supra), CIT v. M/s Mereena Creations9 and CIT v. Shri Ram Honda Power Equip10, answered the questions in favour of the Revenue and against the Assessee.
8. Hence, the Civil Appeals.
9. Mr. Santosh Krishnan, learned Counsel for the Assessee, argues that the Assessee’s case has been rejected by reference to Nagesh Knitwears P. Ltd. (supra). Therefore, the Assessee must assail the reasoning in Nagesh Knitwears P. Ltd. (supra) to substantiate the deductions claimed under Section 80HHC, amounting to Rs.90,43,061/-.
9.1 The CBDT O.M. provides that a quota sale is treated as profit on the sale of an import licence, cash assistance, and duty drawback, as per the items in Section 28(iiia), (iiib), and (iiic) of the Act, 1961. The export quota the Assessee received from the Apparels Export Promotion Council (“AEPC”) is transferable. The Assessee transferred the available surplus quota and realised a premium. By operation of the CBDT O.M., the premium is treated as eligible for deduction under Section 80HHC of the Act, 1961, in accordance with the description in Section 28(iiia) to (iiic). The CBDT O.M. is clothed with Section 119 of the Act, 1961, and binds the Department. A reading of Nagesh Knitwears P. Ltd. (supra) does not show that the CBDT O.M. deviates from or violates any provisions of the Act, 1961. The CIT(A) and ITAT have appreciated the binding nature of the CBDT O.M. and have properly allowed a deduction under Section 80HHC of the Act, 1961, in favour of the Assessee.
9.2 The learned Counsel, by referring to the expression in the CBDT O.M. dated 23.02.1998, argues that the premium is treated as export earnings because it falls within Section 28(1) of the Act, 1961, namely profit on the sale of a licence under Section 28(iiia); cash assistance against exports under Section 28(iiib); and duty drawback under Section 28(iiic). The decisions in KP Varghese v. ITO11, Vijay Krishnaswami v. DDIT12, and State of TN & Anr. v. India Cements Ltd. & Anr.13 are relied upon to support the proposition that statutory Circulars, instructions, and guidelines are binding on the Revenue Department and its subordinate Officers in administering and executing tax Statutes. The Revenue cannot repudiate, challenge, or take a stance contrary to its own valid Circulars. The Department cannot, by arguing that a Departmental Circular is inconsistent with the Statute or deviates from its strict terms, assail the Orders of the CIT(A) and ITAT. The Circulars bind the executive and adjudicating Authorities; they do not bind the courts in interpreting statutory provisions, nor can they impose on taxpayers a burden greater than what the Statute itself envisages.
10. Arijit Prasad, learned Senior Counsel for the Revenue, argues that the Claim is substantially based on the CBDT O.M. The binding nature of the CBDT O.M. on the Courts of law is no longer res integra. The relied-upon Judgment has considered the scope and application of Sections 28(iiia) to (iiic) and 80HHC of the Act, 1961. The findings in the relied-upon Judgment are not open to challenge and strictly follow the literal construction of the relevant provisions. The Act, 1961 deals with total income derived, as per the Act, 1961, and tax payable thereon. The Appellant’s argument runs counter to the basic scheme for deriving or determining the Assessee’s total taxable income.
11. It is apposite to refer to the findings of the relied-upon Judgment by the High Court as follows:
A. In classifying the consideration earned from the transfer of export quota rights, it was held that such receipts do not fall within any clause of Sections 28(iiia) to (iiie) of the Act, 1961. Quota permits allocated by the AEPC are not import licences issued under the Imports (Control) Order, 1955, thereby excluding Section 28(iiia). Nor do they constitute Government cash compensatory support under Section 28(iiib), customs/excise duty drawback under Section 28(iiic), or DEPB/DFRC duty remission credits under Sections 28(iiid) and (iiie). Instead, the export quotas allocated by the AEPC represent a general commercial right, and the premium realised on their domestic transfer to a third party constitutes an incidental business advantage, falling residually under Section 28(iv) as a benefit arising from the exercise of business.
B. This residual classification disentitles the Assessee from claiming the deduction under the First Proviso to Section 80HHC(3) of the Act, 1961. Because quota premium falls under Section 28(iv), it would be covered as an “other receipt of a similar nature” under Explanation (baa), thereby subjecting it to a 90% reduction from the business profit base. However, because Section 28(iv) is not included in the First Proviso to Section 80HHC(3), no corresponding addition back to export profit will occur.
C. The Assessee sought to overcome this statutory barrier by relying on CBDT O.M., which stated that quota premiums technically equate to Section 28(iiia) and (iiic) items and should “statutorily receive the same treatment”. The High Court rejected this argument by referring to the Constitution Bench decision in Ratan Melting & Wire Industries14, which held that administrative Circulars cannot override statutory text or tie the hands of a Court interpreting the law.
12. We have heard the parties and perused the record.
13. The controversy falls within a very narrow compass, and further consideration of the availability of deductions under Section 80HHC of the Act, 1961 would depend on the meaning the Court would attach to the CBDT O.M. for technically equating it with Sections 28(iiia) to 28(iiic) of the Act, 1961. This Court, in Ratan Melting & Wire Industries (supra), laid down the following principles on the scope and binding nature of the CBDT circulars:
A. Departmental Circulars and instructions issued by the Central Board of Excise and Customs (CBEC) are binding on the subordinate Authorities functioning under the respective Statutes. However, once the Supreme Court or a High Court declares the law on a question arising for consideration, it is impermissible for any Court or Tribunal to direct that the Executive Circular be given effect in preference to the view expressed by the Constitutional Court.
B. Administrative Circulars and clarifications issued by the Central or State Governments merely reflect the Executive’s understanding of statutory provisions. Such Circulars are not binding on the courts. Under the constitutional framework, only the Judiciary can interpret statutory provisions. The Executive does not have this power.
C. Any Administrative Circular or clarification that runs contrary to statutory provisions or to the judicial declaration thereof has no force in the eyes of the law.
D. Accepting the contention that the Revenue is precluded from challenging an interpretation contrary to its Circulars would extinguish the Revenue’s valuable right of appeal. Because an assessee who benefits from a Circular will not appeal, precluding the Revenue from appealing would prevent the High Courts and the Supreme Court from ever adjudicating the question. Such an outcome would directly undermine the law declared by the Supreme Court and compromise its binding force under Article 141 of the Constitution of India.
14. The CBDT O.M. is not binding on the Courts. The Assessee’s argument, for the reasons given in Nagesh Knitwears P. Ltd. (supra), does not merit further consideration in the subject Appeals. A Constitution Bench of this Court in Ratan Melting & Wire Industries (supra) held that Circulars issued by the CBDT bind only the Administrative Departmental Authorities. They merely represent the Executive’s understanding of a statutory provision and are never binding on the High Courts or the Supreme Court. When the High Court or Supreme Court interprets a statutory provision, a conflicting Administrative Circular has no legal existence before the Court. If a circular were binding on courts, the judiciary would have to follow an Administrative Memo even when it directly violates a Parliament enactment. Further, if the Revenue were permanently barred by its own Circular from questioning a legal interpretation in Court, the Department could never appeal an erroneous Tribunal decision. Since an assessee benefiting from a circular would never appeal, the true statutory meaning could never be adjudicated by the High Courts or the Supreme Court.
15. The CBDT O.M. is binding on Revenue Officers. The assessee can challenge it before the Court. The Revenue has availed of this remedy and has succeeded before the High Court. If accepted, the Assessee’s argument would effectively enforce the CBDT Circular, which is otherwise not in line with the Act, 1961 and the precedents of this Court. In essence, the CBDT O.M. creates a legal fiction by equating the export quota premium with the items mentioned in Section 28(iiia) to (iiic) of the Act, 1961. The application of a legal fiction contrary to the explicit statutory position is impermissible in law. Further, the scope for limiting legal fiction is well established in tax matters. Revenue from the sale of a quota generates horizontal revenue for the assessee but does not earn foreign exchange. The requisite for any of the revenues covered by Section 28(iiia) to (iiic) of the Act, 1961 is not present in the sale of the quota. Therefore, on a plain reading of Section 28, the sale of quota cannot be treated as business income.
16. Let us apply the same interpretative tool/standard to Sections 28(iiia) to 28(iiic) of the Act, 1961 and appreciate their meaning and scope. The result would be that the CBDT O.M. cannot come anywhere near the transactions covered by Sections 28(iiia) to 28(iiic) of the Act, 1961. It is difficult to equate something as “business income” unless the basic traits of the transaction, namely receipt of foreign exchange, etc., are satisfied.
17. Through a legal fiction, the CBDT circular has equated premium from quota sales with income under Sections 28(iiia), (iiib) and (iiic) of the Act, 1961. In Nagesh Knitwears P. Ltd. (supra), Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sanjiv Khanna, as he then was, speaking for the Bench, explained that the incidence of premium cannot be equated with the incomes covered by Sections 28(iiia) to (iiie) of the Act, 1961. The reason is legally tenable and hence does not warrant further examination.
18. Lastly, if a Court were compelled to treat an administrative CBDT Circular as binding on itself, it would undermine the entire constitutional and statutory framework governing income tax liability, including the standard of “income derived,” the strict construction of legitimate deductions, and the classification of permissible expenses.
19. In effect, the argument of the Assessee calls upon this Court to give effect to the CBDT O.M. We reject this argument. No other argument is canvassed. For the above reasons, we see no reason to interfere with the impugned Judgment. The Appeal fails and is dismissed accordingly.
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 12449 OF 2017
20. For the reasons discussed above, the Appeal fails and is dismissed.
21. Pending application(s), if any, shall be disposed of accordingly.
Notes:
1 (2012) 345 ITR 135.
2 (1999) 237 ITR 579.
3 (1998) 233 ITR 497.
4 (1996) 220 ITR 372.
5 (1998) 230 ITR 266.
6 (1967) 66 ITR 710.
7 (2005) 279 ITR 402.
8 (2004) 266 ITR 521.
9 (2011) 330 ITR 199.
10 (2007) 289 ITR 475.
11 (1981) 4 SCC 173.
12 2025 SCC Online SC 1843.
13 (2011) 13 SCC 247.
14 CCE, Bolpur v. Ratan Melting & Wire Industries, (2008) 13 SCC 1.
