Section 260A Appeal Delay Condoned as Departmental Process Held Bona Fide: Bombay HC

PCIT Vs JS Capital LLC (Bombay High Court)

Summary: The Bombay High Court allowed the Revenue’s application seeking condonation of 156 days’ delay in filing an appeal under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 against the ITAT order dated 26.02.2024.

The ITAT order was received by the Income Tax (International Taxation) Department on 10.05.2024. The scrutiny report was submitted by the CIT (International Taxation) to the Chief Commissioner on 30.08.2024. After consideration and obtaining clarifications, approval for filing the High Court appeal was granted on 30.09.2024. Relevant records were thereafter collected and forwarded to panel counsel, the appeal memorandum was settled and received on 14.01.2025, final approval was obtained on 22.01.2025, and the appeal was filed on 10.02.2025.

The assessee opposed condonation, contending that limitation had expired on 04.09.2024 and that the departmental chronology did not constitute sufficient cause. It also relied upon CBDT Instruction No. 7/2011 dated 24.05.2011 and argued that the application appeared cyclostyled or stereotyped because certain dates had been subsequently inserted by hand.

The High Court rejected these objections. It held that “sufficient cause” cannot be determined by a rigid or pedantic formula. The material consideration is whether the explanation demonstrates a bona fide reason preventing filing within limitation. The length of delay is not by itself determinative; the sufficiency of the explanation and bona fides of the conduct are relevant.

The Court also held that handwritten insertion of certain dates did not by itself render the application mechanical or stereotyped, particularly when the substantive contents disclosed the actual procedural steps resulting in the delay. The assessee had also not established that the departmental steps narrated in the application were false or fictitious.

Accordingly, the Court held that the Revenue had sufficiently explained the delay through departmental scrutiny, clarifications, administrative approvals, collection of records, drafting and finalisation of the appeal. The delay was bona fide and neither intentional nor wilful. The application was allowed and the appeal was directed to be numbered after removal of office objections within three weeks.

Ratio / Takeaway: Government departments are not entitled to automatic condonation of delay merely because of governmental functioning. However, where a specific chronology establishes a bona fide administrative process and satisfactorily explains the delay, a liberal and justice-oriented approach may be adopted. The length of delay is secondary to the sufficiency and bona fides of the explanation.

Cases Discussed

1. Sheo Raj Singh (Deceased) Through Legal Representatives & Ors. vs. Union of India & Anr., (2023) 10 SCC 531 — Considered regarding the settled principles governing condonation of delay and a liberal, justice-oriented approach.
2. Raheem Shah & Anr. vs. Govind Singh & Ors., (2023) 18 SCC 764 — Reiterated that the approach towards condonation should be justice-oriented rather than hyper-technical.
3. Huchanagouda vs. Assistant Commissioner and Land Acquisition Officer & Anr., (2020) 19 SCC 236 — Applied the principle that substantive rights should not ordinarily be defeated by a hyper-technical approach to limitation.
4. Dhiraj Singh (Dead) Thr. Lrs. & Ors. vs. State of Haryana & Ors., (2014) 14 SCC 127 — Recognised a pragmatic rather than pedantic approach while balancing substantive rights and limitation.
5. Hemlata Verma vs. M/s. ICICI Prudential Life Insurance Co. Ltd. & Anr., 2019 SCC OnLine SC 2451 — Applied the principles favouring substantial justice while considering condonation of delay.
6. State of Nagaland vs. Lipok AO & Ors., (2005) 3 SCC 752 — Held that sufficiency of the cause, rather than merely the length of delay, is material while recognising practical difficulties of governmental functioning.
7. State of Haryana vs. Chandra Mani & Ors., (1996) 3 SCC 132 — Considered the practical realities of governmental functioning while examining sufficient cause.
8. Special Tahsildar, Land Acquisition, Kerala vs. K. V. Ayisumma, (1996) 10 SCC 634 — Recognised that sufficient cause should not be reduced to a rigid formula and requires a justice-oriented approach.
9. Ramegowda, Major & Ors. vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore, (1988) 2 SCC 142 — Considered the relevance of procedural and bureaucratic difficulties in explaining governmental delay.
10. N. Balakrishnan vs. M. Krishnamurthy, (1998) 7 SCC 123 — Reiterated that the length of delay is not decisive and the acceptability of the explanation is material.
11. Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. vs. Mst. Katiji & Ors., (1987) 2 SCC 107 — Relied upon for liberal construction of sufficient cause and preference for substantial justice over technical considerations.
12. Esha Bhattacharjee vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy & Ors., (2013) 12 SCC 649 — Considered principles governing bona fides and judicial discretion in condonation matters.
13. The State of Manipur & Ors. vs. Koting Lamkang, (2019) 10 SCC 408 — Considered the need for a realistic assessment of governmental functioning while examining delay.
14. University of Delhi vs. Union of India & Ors., (2020) 13 SCC 745 — Considered the principles governing condonation where sufficient cause is demonstrated.
15. Balwant Singh (Dead) vs. Jagdish Singh & Ors., (2010) 8 SCC 685 — Considered among the precedents governing the meaning of sufficient cause and exercise of discretion in condonation matters.
16. Lanka Venkateswarlu (Dead) Thr. Lrs. vs. State of A.P. & Ors., (2011) 4 SCC 363 — Considered among the precedents reviewed on the principles governing condonation of delay.
17. Basawaraj & Anr. vs. The Spl. Land Acquisition Officer, (2013) 14 SCC 81 — Relied upon by the assessee for the requirement that sufficient cause must adequately explain the failure to approach the Court within limitation.
18. Office of the Chief Post Master General & Ors. vs. Living Media India Ltd. & Anr., (2012) 3 SCC 563 — Relied upon by the assessee for the proposition that Government departments are not entitled to automatic indulgence in limitation matters.
19. Principal Commissioner of Income Tax-2 vs. Bank of Baroda, SLP (C) Diary No. 24889 of 2024 — Relied upon by the assessee regarding mechanical or cyclostyled applications for condonation of delay.
20. Ornate Traders Pvt. Ltd. vs. Income-tax Officer, (2009) 312 ITR 193 (Bom.) : 2008 SCC OnLine Bom 1465 — Cited by the assessee in opposition to condonation, although detailed submissions based upon the decision were not advanced.
21. Ramlal vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 361 — Referred to in Hemlata Verma while applying the principles governing sufficient cause and condonation of delay.
22. New India Insurance Co. Ltd. vs. Shanti Misra, (1975) 2 SCC 840 — Referred to for the proposition that discretion under Section 5 of the Limitation Act should not be crystallised into a rigid rule.
23. Brij Indar Singh vs. Kanshi Ram, ILR (1918) 45 Cal 94 : AIR 1917 PC 156 — Referred to for the principle that reasonable diligence in prosecuting the proceeding is relevant while considering sufficient cause.
24. Shakuntala Devi Jain vs. Kuntal Kumari, (1969) 1 SCR 1006 : AIR 1969 SC 575 — Referred to for the principle that delay should ordinarily not be refused condonation unless want of bona fides or culpable inaction is established.
25. Prabha vs. Ram Parkash Kalra, 1987 Supp SCC 339 — Referred to for the principle that courts should not adopt an injustice-oriented approach while deciding applications for condonation of delay.

FULL TEXT OF THE JUDGMENT/ORDER OF BOMBAY HIGH COURT

1. This is an application filed by the Applicant/Revenue praying for condonation of delay of 156 days in filing the aforesaid Appeal under Section 260A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (“ITA”).

2. The memo of the application sets out that the order dated 26.02.2024 passed by the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal is sought to be challenged by the Applicant. It is contended that the substantial questions of law are set out in the Appeal. The impugned order was received in the Office of the Income Tax (International Taxation) on 10.05.2024. It is contended that the scrutiny report was called for and was submitted by the Commissioner of Income Tax (International Taxation) to the Chief Commissioner of Income Tax, Mumbai on 30.08.2024. After considering the report and after obtaining clarifications, it is stated that the Chief Commissioner of Income Tax (International Taxation), Mumbai, vide letter dated 30.09.2024, directed the filing of the aforesaid Appeal before this Court. In pursuance thereto, it is the case of the Applicant/Revenue that all the relevant documents were called for and were forwarded to the panel counsel for drafting of the Appeal. This process was completed by 30.12.2024. It is stated that subsequently the Appeal memo which was forwarded to the Commissioner of Income Tax (International Taxation) was settled and received on 14.01.2025. Further, as the procedure required, approval of the competent authority and finalization of the Appeal Memo was received on 22.01.2025 and thereafter, the Appeal was filed on 10.02.2025. In these circumstances, it is submitted that there is a bona fide delay of 156 days in filing of the Appeal. It is contended by the Applicant/Revenue that the delay was neither intentional nor willful and it was because of the said reasons as mentioned and the process which was required to be followed for filing the Appeal, the prescribed period of limitation could not be adhered, hence the present application for condonation of delay is filed. It is contended that in the event the application is not allowed, it would cause a serious prejudice to the Revenue, whereas, on the other hand, if the application is allowed, no prejudice would be caused to the Respondent. In support of this contention, the learned counsel for the Applicant/Revenue has placed reliance on the decisions as follows:

a. State of Odisha & Ors. vs. Saroj Kumar Pradhan¹

b. Sheo Raj Singh (Deceased) Through Legal Representatives & Ors. vs. Union of India & Anr.²

c. Raheem Shah & Anr. vs. Govind Singh & Ors.³

d. Huchanagouda vs. Assistant Commissioner and Land Acquisition Officer & Anr.⁴

e. Hemlata Verma vs. M/s. ICICI Prudential Life Insurance Co. Ltd. & Anr.⁵

f. State of Nagaland vs. Lipok AO & Ors.⁶

g. State of Haryana vs. Chandra Mani & Ors.⁷

h. Special Tahsildar, Land Acquisition, Kerala vs. K. V. Ayisumma⁸

i. Ramegowda, Major & Ors. vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore⁹

j. Balakrishnan vs. M. Krishnamurthy¹⁰

k. Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. vs. Mst. Katiji & Ors.¹¹

3. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the Respondent has opposed this application by filing the reply affidavit on behalf of the Respondent to contend that the application does not disclose sufficient or cogent cause explaining or justifying the delay. It is submitted that it is an abject delay in filing the Appeal and in fact, the limitation as per the provisions of Section 260A of the ITA, expired on 04.09.2024, whereas the Appeal was filed on 10.02.2025 with the delay of 156 days. The contention is that the sufficient cause has not been furnished by the Applicant/Revenue. Such contentions are supported by relying on the decision of the Supreme Court in Basawaraj & Anr. vs. The Spl. Land Acquisition Officer decided in Civil Appeal No. 6974 of 2013, wherein the Supreme Court has held 2026:BHC-OS:18466-that the Applicant would be required to explain as to what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough reason which prevented him to approach the court within limitation and if the Applicant is not found to be having a sufficient cause, the court would not condone the delay. On behalf of the Respondent, reliance is also placed on the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in Ornate Traders Pvt. Ltd. vs. Income-tax Officer.¹² Although, it is referred to in the reply affidavit, however, during the course of submissions, no submission is made on the basis of this judgment.

4. Thus, the contention of the Respondent as seen from the reply affidavit is primarily that the reasons which are set out in the memo of the Interim Application do not provide sufficient cause and that what has been set out as the dates on which various procedural steps preceding the filing of the Appeal, cannot be taken as a sufficient explanation for condoning the delay. The reply affidavit explains that even the dates set out by the Applicant to demonstrate substantial and unexplained delay at each stage, when considered in light of instructions issued by the CBDT Instruction No. 7 of 2011 dated 24.05.2011, which prescribes the detailed instructions regarding standard operating procedure on filing of Appeals to High Court under Section 260A and related matters, does not justify the delay. It is contended that the instructions prescribe a step-wise timeline for the various stages preceding the filing of an appeal before the jurisdictional High Court and applying such timeline, which is set out in Paragraph No.4.1(f), it is clear that the step-wise delay is not justified.

5. It is next contended in the reply affidavit that the law of limitation applies equally to both the Applicant and Respondent, and merely because Applicant is the department of the Government of India, delay cannot be condoned in the absence of sufficient cause explained by the Applicant. In support of this contention, reliance is placed on the decision of the Supreme Court in Officer of The Chief Postmaster General vs. Living Media India Ltd. & Anr.¹³ It is next contended that the nature of the Interim Application has certain dates which are kept blank and which were later on filled up and hence, it is required to be presumed that the application is merely a cyclostyled and stereotyped proforma whereby condonation of delay is prayed for. In such context, reliance is placed on an order passed by the Supreme Court in the case of Principal Commissioner of Income Tax-2 vs. Bank of Baroda (Special Leave Petition (Civil) Diary No(s). 24889 of 2024), wherein the Supreme Court has observed that the Court is not satisfied with the manner in which the application for condonation of delay in filing a Special Leave Petition under Article 136 of the Constitution of India has been drafted, inasmuch as it gave an impression that a cyclostyled and stereotyped form of application has been made, to insert certain dates so as to adjust to the date of filing of the Special Leave Petition. In these circumstances, the Court refused to condone the delay in the Special Leave Petition and accordingly dismissed the application as also the Special Leave Petition. It is on such contentions, the present application for condonation of delay is opposed on behalf of the Respondent.

6. We have given our anxious consideration to the contentions urged on behalf of the Applicant. At the outset, we need to observe that it is a settled principle of law that it would be permissible for this Court to condone the delay in terms of what would be provided by Section 5 of the Limitation Act, in the event, sufficient cause has been made out. The term “sufficient cause” as set out in Sections 4 and 5 of the Limitation Act has been jurisprudentially considered in several decisions of the Supreme Court. The recent decisions in this regard, although not cited on behalf of the Respondent, are placed for our consideration on behalf of the Applicant.

7. The question is as to whether the reasons which are set out by the Applicant, seeking condonation of delay of 156 days, which in our opinion, is not an extremely gross period of delay, need to be accepted. We find that the Courts have consistently taken a view that a liberal approach is required to be adopted by the Court in matters of condonation of delay. In Saroj Kumar Pradhan (supra), the Supreme Court referring to the celebrated decision in the case of Katiji (supra) and also in the case of Lipok AO (supra), observed that the Courts cannot lose sight of the fact that bureaucratic lethargy at times exhibited should not entail in dismissal of matter on the ground of delay and in such circumstances the cause espoused by the State cannot be rejected, or in other words liberal approach has to be adopted. It was also observed that while considering an application for condonation of delay, it is not the length of delay but the cause for delay which will be of paramount consideration and if the cause shown is sufficient and would fall within the four corners of the Section 5 of the Limitation Act, namely, ‘sufficient cause ’, such delay deserves to be condoned. In such case, the delay of 162 days h_as2026:BHC-OS:18466- been condoned observing that it has been explained on the ground of the file being pushed from table to table or in other words, administrative delay. It was observed that in such circumstances, the delay deserved to be condoned by accepting the cause shown. The relevant observations as made by the Supreme Court are required to noted, which read thus:

“4. We are reminded of the judgment of this court in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. v. Mst. Katiji & Ors., reported in AIR 1987 SC 1353 and also in the case of State of Nagaland v. Lipok AO & Ors., reported in (2005) 3 SCC 752, whereunder it has been held that the Courts cannot lose sight of the fact that bureaucratic lethargy at times exhibited should not entail in dismissal of matter on the ground of delay and in such circumstances the cause espoused by the State cannot be rejected or in other words liberal approach has to be adopted.

5. While considering an application for condonation of delay, it is not the length of delay but the cause for delay which will be of paramount consideration. If the cause shown is sufficient and would fall within the four corners of the Section 5 of the Limitation Act, namely, ‘sufficient cause’, such delay deserves to be condoned.

6. In the instant case, the delay of 162 days has been explained namely on the ground of file being pushed from table to table or in other words, administrative delay. In such circumstances, we are of the considered view that delay deserves to be condoned by accepting the cause shown.”

8. Also, on reading of the decision in case of Sheo Raj Singh (Deceased) Thr. Lrs. (supra), it is clearly apparent that the Court has taken a review of the entire law referring to the 16 earlier decisions on the point of condonation of delay and the well settled principles in that regard. Paragraphs 16 to 28 of the decision are the precedents which are discussed by the Court. These are the decisions in:

i. Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. vs. Mst. Katiji & Ors. (supra)

ii. State of Nagaland vs. Lipok AO & Ors. (supra)

iii. Balwant Singh (Dead) vs. Jagdish Singh & Ors.¹⁴ 2026:BHC-OS:18466-

iv. Lanka Venkateswarlu (Dead) Thr. Lrs.vs. State of A. P. & Ors.¹⁵

v. Office of The Chief Postmaster General vs. Living Media India Ltd. & Anr. (supra)

vi. Esha Bhattacharjee vs. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy & Ors.¹⁶

vii. The State of Manipur & Ors. vs. Koting Lamkang¹⁷

viii. University of Delhi vs. Union of India & Ors.¹⁸

ix. Ramegowda, Major & Ors. vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore (supra)

x. State of Haryana vs. Chandra Mani & Ors.¹⁹

xi. Special Tahsildar, Land Acquisition, Kerala vs. K. V. Ayisumma (supra)

9. In conclusion, the Supreme Court has observed that the decisions reflect that there cannot be any quarrel that the Court has stepped in to ensure that substantive rights of the parties and the State are not defeated at the threshold simply due to technical considerations of delay. Although, the power to condone the delay is a discretionary power, the delay in the said case is of 479 days in presentation of the appeal. The Supreme Court also observed on the approach, the Court would be required to adopt in exercising its discretion. The emphasis has been made that the exercise of discretion by the High Court has to be tested on the anvil of the liberal and justice-oriented approach expounded in the decisions. The Court in condoning the delay made the following significant observations:

“41. Having bestowed serious consideration to the rival contentions, we feel that the High Court’s decision²⁰ to condone the delay on account of the first respondent’s inability to present the appeal within time, for the reasons assigned therein, does not suffer from any error warranting interference. As the aforementioned judgments have shown, such an exercise of discretion does, at times, call for a liberal and justice-oriented approach by the courts, where certain leeway could be provided to the State. The hidden forces that are at work in preventing an appeal by the State being presented within the prescribed period of limitation so as not to allow a higher court to pronounce upon the legality and validity of an order of a lower court and thereby secure unholy gains, can hardly be ignored. Impediments in the working of the grand scheme of governmental functions have to be removed by taking a pragmatic view on balancing of the competing interests.”

10. Also, in a recent decision in Raheem Shah (supra), the Supreme Court reiterated several principles that what ought to be paramount is to adopt an approach which is justice-oriented rather than a hyper-technical approach and thereby set aside the orders which were passed by the High Court in dealing with the appeal where the delay was not condoned.

11. Also, the Supreme Court in Huchanagouda (supra) following the decisions in Dhiraj Singh (Dead) Thr. Lrs. & Ors. vs. State of Haryana & Ors.²¹ and Katiji (supra) has made the following observations:

“6. We further take note that this Court in Dhiraj Singh v. State of Haryana has considered the issue relating to condonation of delay in land acquisition matters and the manner in which the equities are to be balanced. It is held therein as hereunder: (SCC pp. 131-32, paras 15-16)

“15. Equities can be balanced by denying the appellants’ interest for the period for which they did not approach the Court. The substantive rights of the appellants should not be allowed to be defeated on technical grounds by taking hypertechnical view of self-imposed limitations. In the matter of compensation for land acquisition, we are of the view that approach of the court has to be pragmatic and not pedantic.

16. The principles regarding condonation of delay particularly in land 2026:BHC-OS:18466- acquisition matters, have been enunciated in LAO v. Katiji, wherein it is stated in para 3 as under: (SCC p. 108)

3. The legislature has conferred the power to condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 in order to enable the courts to do substantial justice to parties by disposing of matters on “merits”. The expression “sufficient cause” employed by the legislature is adequately elastic to enable the courts to apply the law in a meaningful manner which subserves the ends of justice that being the life-purpose for the existence of the institution of courts. It is common knowledge that this Court has been making a justifiably liberal approach in matters instituted in this Court. But the message does not appear to have percolated down to all the other courts in the hierarchy. And such a liberal approach is adopted on principle as it is realised that:

1. Ordinarily a litigant does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late.

2. Refusing to condone delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the very threshold and cause of justice being defeated. As against this when delay is condoned the highest that can happen is that a cause would be decided on merits after hearing the parties.

3. “Every day’s delay must be explained” does not mean that a pedantic approach should be made. Why not every hour’s delay, every second’s delay? The doctrine must be applied in a rational common sense pragmatic manner.

4. When substantial justice and technical considerations are pitted against each other, cause of substantial justice deserves to be preferred for the other side cannot claim to have vested right in injustice being done because of a non-deliberate delay.

5. There is no presumption that delay is occasioned deliberately, or on account of culpable negligence, or on account of mala fides. A litigant does not stand to benefit by resorting to delay. In fact he runs a serious risk.

6. It must be grasped that judiciary is respected not on account of its power to legalise injustice on technical grounds but because it is capable of removing injustice and is expected to do so.’”

(emphasis in original)

Further, even if the consideration is made on merits after condoning the delay, the determination of the market value will in all event relate back to the date of preliminary notification and as such there is no prejudice to the acquisition authority nor added advantage to the landloser. The aspect relating to interest can be taken care by denying it to the landloser for the period of delay.”

12. In Hemlata Verma (supra), the Supreme Court, following the decision in Ramlal vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd.²² as also the decision in Mst. Katiji (supra), condoned the delay of 207 days. In Lipok AO (supra), the Supreme Court reiterated that what counts is not the length of the delay but the sufficiency of the cause and shortness of the delay is one of the circumstances to be taken into account in using the discretion. The relevant observations in that regard are required to be noted, which read thus:

“8. The proof by sufficient cause is a condition precedent for exercise of the extraordinary restriction (sic discretion) vested in the court. What counts is not the length of the delay but the sufficiency of the cause and shortness of the delay is one of the circumstances to be taken into account in using the discretion. In N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy it was held by this Court that Section 5 is to be construed liberally so as to do substantial justice to the parties. The provision contemplates that the court has to go in the position of the person concerned and to find out if the delay can be said to have resulted from the cause which he had adduced and whether the cause can be recorded in the peculiar circumstances of the case as sufficient. Although no special indulgence can be shown to the Government which, in similar circumstances, is not shown to an individual suitor, one cannot but take a practical view of the working of the Government without being unduly indulgent to the slow motion of its wheels.

9. What constitutes sufficient cause cannot be laid down by hard-and-fast rules. In New India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shanti Misra²³ this Court held that discretion given by Section 5 should not be defined or crystallised so as to convert a discretionary matter into a rigid rule of law. The expression “sufficient cause” should receive a liberal construction. In Brij Indar Singh v. Kanshi Ram²⁴ it was observed that true guide for a court to exercise the discretion under Section 5 is whether the appellant acted with reasonable diligence in prosecuting the appeal. In Shakuntala Devi Jain v. Kuntal Kumari²⁵ a Bench of three Judges had held that unless want of bona fides of such inaction or negligence as would deprive a party of the protection of Section 5 is proved, the application must not be thrown out or any delay cannot be refused to be condoned.

13. Experience shows that on account of an impersonal machinery (no one in charge of the matter is directly hit or hurt by the judgment sought to be subjected to appeal) and the inherited bureaucratic methodology imbued with the note-making, file-pushing, and passing-on-the-buck ethos, delay on its part is less difficult to understand though more difficult to approve. The State which represents collective cause of the community, does not deserve a litigant-non-grata status. The courts, therefore, have to be informed with the spirit and philosophy of the provision in the course of the interpretation of the expression of sufficient cause. Merit is preferred to scuttle a decision on merits in turning down the case on technicalities of delay in presenting the appeal. Delay as accordingly condoned, the order was set aside and the matter was remitted to the High Court for disposal on merits after affording opportunity of hearing to the parties. In Prabha v. Ram Parkash Kalra²⁶ this Court had held that the court should not adopt an injustice-oriented approach in rejecting the application for condonation of delay. The appeal was allowed, the delay was condoned and the matter was remitted for expeditious disposal in accordance with law.

15. It is axiomatic that decisions are taken by officers/agencies proverbially at a slow pace and encumbered process of pushing the files from table to table and keeping it on the table for considerable time causing delay – intentional or otherwise – is a routine. Considerable delay of procedural red tape in the process of their making decision is a common feature. Therefore, certain amount of latitude is not impermissible. If the appeals brought by the State are lost for such default no person is individually affected but what in the ultimate analysis suffers, is public interest. The expression “sufficient cause” should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in a justice-oriented approach rather than the technical detection of sufficient cause for explaining every day’s delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of the governmental conditions would be cognizant to and requires adoption of pragmatic approach in justice-oriented process. The court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-à-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause. The Government at appropriate level should constitute legal cells to examine the cases whether any legal principles are involved for decision by the courts or whether cases require adjustment and should authorise the officers to take a decision or give appropriate permission for settlement. In the event of decision to file appeal, needed prompt action should be pursued by the officer responsible to file the appeal and he should be made personally responsible for lapses, if any. Equally, the State cannot be put on the same footing as an individual. The individual would always be quick in taking the decision whether he would pursue the remedy by way of an appeal or application since he is a person legally injured while the State is an impersonal machinery working through its officers or servants.”

13. We do not intend to burden this order any further as the other decisions cited on behalf of the Applicant have been subject-matter of consideration which were already discussed by the Court.

14. We now come to the case as urged on behalf of the Respondent that sufficient cause has not been made out. We are not in agreement with the contentions as advanced on behalf of the Respondent, considering the aforesaid settled principles of law, as also for the reasons that we are of the opinion that the memo of the application would demonstrate sufficient cause and more particularly, on the ground that the contention of the Applicant/Revenue that the delay which has been caused and explained is not intentional nor willful, but was bona fide, and which has not been specifically denied as contended in Paragraph No.10. In our opinion, the whole attempt on the part of the Respondent to buttress its case, relying on the decisions noted herein-above, to contend that the application is required to be labeled as an mechanical application, does not appeal to us. Also, merely for the reason that some dates are filled up in hand would not label the application to be a cyclostyled and stereotyped application. It would not require any elaboration that is a usual practice at the Bar even on the part of private parties, that always when such applications are drafted, to avoid any error in the incorporation of the correct dates, the dates are subsequently inserted after verifying the entire record so that no mistake in regard to the dates takes place. Thus, in the present case, insertion of dates in hand writing cannot be labeled as a cyclostyled and stereotyped proforma when the contents of the application materially depict an explanation on delay.

15. Further, it is not the case of the Respondent that the reasons which are set out in the memo of the Interim Application are not bona fide or no such steps at the level of the department were ever taken by the Applicant. Once the department is required to follow a procedure and function in the manner as set out in the application of taking opinions and approvals and the nature of such impersonal steps which are required to be taken, certainly following the principles of law as laid down by the Supreme Court, the delay has been sufficiently explained and condoned.

16. In the aforesaid circumstances, we are of the clear opinion that the present Interim Application is required to be allowed and it is accordingly allowed in terms of prayer clause (a).

17. Let the Appeal be numbered by removing of office objections within a period of three weeks from today and the same be listed for admission thereafter.

18. Interim Application is disposed of in the aforesaid terms. No costs.

Notes:

¹ 2025 SCC OnLine Ori 3206

² (2023) 10 SCC 531

³ (2023) 18 SCC 764

⁴(2020) 19 SCC 236

⁵ 2019 SCC OnLine SC 2451

⁶ (2005) 3 SCC 752

⁷(1996) 3 SCC 132

⁸ (1996) 10 SCC 634

⁹(1988) 2 SCC 142

¹⁰ (1998) 7 SCC 123

¹¹(1987) 2 SCC 107

¹²(2009) 312 ITR 193 : 2008 SCC OnLine Bom 1465

¹³ (2012) 3 SCC 563

¹⁴2010 (8) SCC 685

¹⁵(2011) 4 SCC 363

¹⁶ (2013) 12 SCC 649

¹⁷ (2019) 10 SCC 408

¹⁸ (2020) 13 SCC 745

¹⁹ (1996) 3 SCC 132

²⁰ Union of India v. Sheo Raj, 2011 SCC OnLine Del 5511

²¹ (2014) 14 SCC 127

²² AIR 1962 SC 361

²³ (1975) 2 SCC 840

²⁴ ILR (1918) 45 Cal 94 : AIR 1917 PC 156

²⁵(1969) 1 SCR 1006 : AIR 1969 SC 575

²⁶ 1987 Supp SCC 339