St. Mary’s Charity Fund Vs Union of India (Kerala High Court)
Summary: The Kerala High Court in St. Mary’s Charity Fund v. Union of India examined whether the Income Tax Department could reopen the charitable society’s completed assessment for Assessment Year 2009–10 on a matter already investigated during scrutiny proceedings. The petitioner, registered under Section 12AA, had filed a nil-income return claiming exemption under Section 11. The dispute concerned accumulated income of ₹50 lakh, originally earmarked for construction of buildings but subsequently utilised for acquiring land after the society had sold its existing landed properties. The society had applied for permission under Section 11(3A) to change the purpose of utilisation. The Court considered both the statutory limitation on reopening and the doctrine prohibiting reassessment on a mere change of opinion.
During the original scrutiny proceedings, the department issued a notice dated 30 November 2011 expressly asking the petitioner to explain why money accumulated for building construction had been applied towards land purchase and whether the necessary permission had been sought. In its reply, the society disclosed the original Form No. 10, its application dated 18 September 2009 seeking approval for the revised purpose, and the fact that approval remained pending. The scrutiny assessment was completed on 30 December 2011, determining total income at ₹15,93,77,761, without a detailed discussion of this particular explanation. The department subsequently issued a reopening notice dated 30 March 2016 and communicated reasons alleging improper utilisation of the accumulated amount without approval.
The petitioner objected that the reassessment was time-barred and that all material particulars had already been disclosed in the original proceedings. The Court examined Sections 147, 148 and 149 as they stood at the relevant time. Since the ordinary four-year period had expired, the department could invoke the extended period only where income had escaped assessment because of the assessee’s failure to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for assessment. The Court found that the department itself had identified the disputed utilisation in its original scrutiny notice and had received the petitioner’s explanation in 2011. Consequently, there was no failure of disclosure that could justify resort to the extended limitation period.
The Court separately considered whether the proposed reassessment was an impermissible change of opinion. Applying Commissioner of Income Tax v. Kelvinator of India Ltd., Marico Ltd. v. ACIT and G K N Sinter Metals Ltd. v. Ramapriya Raghav, it explained that an Assessing Officer cannot use reassessment powers merely to review an issue previously examined. The absence of an express discussion in the final assessment order did not negate the fact that a specific query had been raised and answered. The Court also examined the Revenue’s reliance on Techspan India Pvt. Ltd. and Innovative Foods Ltd., distinguishing those authorities in light of the documented query and reply. It further referred to the principles stated by the Delhi High Court Full Bench in CIT v. Usha International Ltd.
On the facts, the High Court held that the reasons for reopening substantially repeated the issue considered during the original assessment, namely the proposed change in utilisation of accumulated charitable funds. The reassessment was therefore barred by the requirement of full and true disclosure governing the extended period and was also founded on a mere change of opinion. By judgment dated 30 August 2024, Justice Harisankar V. Menon allowed W.P.(C) No. 29203 of 2016 and quashed Ext. P10, the order rejecting the petitioner’s objections to reopening. The decision addresses the validity of reassessment proceedings; it does not finally adjudicate the substantive permissibility of the land purchase under Section 11(3A).
Cases Discussed
- Commissioner of Income Tax v. Kelvinator of India Ltd. — (2010) 320 ITR 561 (SC)
- Income Tax Officer v. Techspan India Private Ltd. — (2018) 404 ITR 10 (SC)
- Innovative Foods Ltd. v. Union of India — (2018) 409 ITR 415 (Ker.)
- Marico Limited v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax — (2020) 425 ITR 177 (Bom.)
- G K N Sinter Metals Ltd. v. Ramapriya Raghav — (2015) 371 ITR 225 (Bom.)
- Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax v. Marico Ltd. — (2020) 16 SCC 354 (SC)
- Khoday Distilleries Limited v. Sri Mahadeshwara Sahakara Sakkare Karkhane Limited — (2019) 4 SCC 376 (SC)
- Commissioner of Income-tax v. Usha International Ltd. — (2012) 348 ITR 485 (Delhi HC FB)
FULL TEXT OF THE JUDGMENT/ORDER OF KERALA HIGH COURT
The petitioner has filed this writ petition, challenging Ext.P10 order issued by the 3rd respondent and also seeking a writ of mandamus restraining the respondents from proceeding further with the proposal for reassessment under Section 147 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Act’, for short), with respect to the assessment year 2009-10. The petitioner has also sought a declaration that the re-assessment steps initiated for the assessment year 2009-2010 are without jurisdiction.
2. Short facts necessary for the disposal of this writ petition are as under: The petitioner, an assessee under the Income Tax Act, is a registered Charitable Society, having obtained registration under Section 12AA of the Act as a charitable institution. It is stated to be an assessee on the rolls of the 3rd respondent. The petitioner has filed its return with respect to the assessment year 2009-10, declaring total income as NIL, claiming the benefit of exemption under Section 11 of the Act. The petitioner had been accumulating funds under the provisions of Section 11(3A) for the purchase of landed property for pursuing its objects as a charitable trust. By Ext.P1, the petitioner applied with the Deputy Commissioner of Income Tax (Exemption) – the 3rd respondent herein, pointing out that though it had filed an application in Form No.10 dated 30.12.1999, regarding the accumulation of Rs.50 lakhs for construction of buildings etc., insofar as the entire landed properties of the trust were already sold on 22.05.2008, there cannot be any construction and so much so that, the amount of Rs.50 lakhs is utilized for the purchase of certain landed property. It was prayed that permission may be granted for the application of the accumulated amounts for the above purpose.
3. The department has initiated scrutiny proceedings with respect to the assessment year 2009-10, through Ext.P2 notice dated 30.11.2011. One of the points, upon which the scrutiny was initiated as recorded in Ext.P2 is as under:
“A sum of Rs.50 lakhs was accumulated by you from AY 19992000 onwards. Please furnish proof that permission has been sought for accumulating this amount for purchase of land and in view of the fact that the accumulation permitted was originally for construction of building.”
In response to Ext.P2, the petitioner submitted Ext.P3 reply, wherein it was pointed out with respect to the query referred to above, as under:
“An amount of Rs. 50 lakhs was accumulated from AY 20092010 for which Form No. 10 was filed on 30.12.1999. The said accumulation was for construction of Building etc. We met your predecessor seeking permission to use the accumulated funds for purchase of land. He advised to file a formal application is this regard. As per our letter dt. 18.09.2009 we sought permission u/s. 11 (3A) for utilizing this amount for purchase of land. The application is pending for action. We humbly pray for granting us permission in this regard. Copy of the said application is enclosed herewith.”
The assessment initiated as above is finalized by Ext.P4 order dated 30.12.2011, issued by the Joint Director of Income Tax (05D) (Exemption), Range – 4, Kochi.
4. It may straight away be noticed that in Ext.P4, there is no much discussion about the afore reply filed by the petitioner. Assessment has been finalized by fixing the total income at Rs.15,93,77,761/-.
5. Later, the 3rd respondent issued Ext.P5 notice invoking the powers under Section 147 of the Act. On receipt of the said notice, the petitioner sought the reasons for the initiation of proceedings as above, in response to which, the department issued Ext.P7 letter dated 26.04.2016. In this letter, the following is stated to be the reason for the initiation of the assessment proceedings;
“It was later seen that the assessee Trust accumulated an amount of Rs. 50 lakhs from AY 1999-00 for which Form No.10 was filed on 30-12-1999 (as per the assessee’s letter dated 14/12/2011) for construction of building. According to section 11(3)(c) the accumulated income had to be utilized during the 10 year period of accumulation or in year immediately following the expiry thereof for specific purpose. Therefore, in this case, the accumulated income should have been utilized before 31/03/2009. In Form No.10B enclosed with the Return of Income for AY 2009-10, it was stated that the amount accumulated was for construction of building. However, the entire landed property of the trust was sold during the FY 2008-09 relevant to AY 2009-10 and it had been impossible to construct the building. The trust utilized the accumulated income of Rs.50 lakhs for purchase of land. According to s.11(3A) of the IT Act, when the income accumulated could not be spent for the specific purposes for which it was accumulated but utilized with permission of the AO for any other charitable or religious purposes in conformity with the object of the trust, an application should be made to the AO specifying such purposes. However, the assessee utilized the accumulated income of Rs.50 lakhs for purchase of land, which was other than specific purposes earmarked in Form No.10, without permission of the AO which is violation of s.11(3A) of the IT Act. The application for seeking permission u/s 11(3A) for purchase of land had been submitted only on 18/09/09 ie., after expiry of the maximum period of accumulation. However, no permission has been granted so far.”
On receipt of the above, the petitioner submitted Ext.P8 dated 29.06.2016, pointing out that the reason stated for the initiation of the assessment proceedings under Section 147 has already been pointed out by the assessing authority, explained by the petitioner, and the assessment completed also as evidenced by the assessment order at Ext.P4. The petitioner also relied upon the judgment of the Apex Court in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Kelvinator of India [(2010) 320 ITR 561 (SC)] to contend that there is a vast difference between the power to review and the power to re-assess. It was pointed out that in the case at hand, going by the assessment proceedings culminating in the issue of Ext.P4 order, the present proceedings initiated can only be treated as a case of review on the basis of a mere change of opinion on the part of the assessing authority concerned. The petitioner also pointed out that, insofar as the assessment year in question is 2009-10, the normal period for initiating assessment proceedings being four years has already come to an end by 31.03.2014. It is further pointed out that the extended period of six years is not attracted insofar as the department has no case that there is suppression on the part of the petitioner herein. The petitioner further pointed out that, even if the period of six years is adopted as applicable to the case at hand, though the notice is dated 30.03.2016, the same having been served on the petitioner, only by 16.04.2016, the proceedings are barred by limitation.
6. The 3rd respondent thereafter issued Ext.P9 communication, directing the petitioner to file a return in response to the notice issued at Ext.P5. This is followed by Ext.P10 issued by the 3rd respondent, adjudicating on Ext.P8 objection filed by the petitioner. In Ext.P10, the 3rd respondent has found that the permission sought for the purpose of accumulation was for the purpose of building construction and not utilized within the ten-year period. The officer also states that, in the assessment order at Ext.P4, there is no mention regarding the petitioner’s plea regarding the utilization of Rs.50 lakhs, and there is no correspondence on the issue that seems to have been taken into account. The officer further concludes the issue by holding that the objections raised by the petitioner against the reopening under Section 147 cannot be accepted.
7. It is challenging Ext.P10 order issued by the 3rd respondent that the captioned writ petition has been filed.
8. A statement has been filed on behalf of the respondents by the learned Standing Counsel. In the statement, it is pointed out that the notice was issued from the office of the 3rd respondent on 30.03.2016 itself and therefore, within the prescribed period of six years, that the petitioner violated the conditions for accumulation of income and therefore, notice under the Act is issued in the matter, that the petitioner did not alert the assessing authority about the permission to change the utilization of the accumulated amounts. It is further pointed out in the statement that the case at hand is not one of review, and therefore, the assessment proceedings initiated are perfectly legal.
9. I have heard Sri. Kuryan Thomas, the learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri. Jose Joseph, the learned Standing Counsel for the respondents herein.
10. Kuryan Thomas, learned counsel for the petitioner, contends that the proceedings initiated are barred by limitation, insofar as the assessment steps were taken by issuing the notice at Ext.P2, beyond the period of six years without satisfying the twin conditions prescribed under Section 149 of the Act as it stood then. He further submits that the proceedings are nothing but a 2024:KER:66024 case of “change of opinion” by the 3rd respondent on the issue at hand, as is clear from a perusal of the notice for assessment in the scrutiny proceedings, the reply submitted by the petitioner, and the final assessment order at Ext.P4. He prays that Ext.P10 impugned in the writ petition may be set aside. The counsel relies on a catena of decisions to buttress his submissions.
11. Per contra, Jose Joseph, the learned Standing Counsel for the respondents, contends that the steps taken cannot be considered to be a case of “change of opinion” insofar as the reasons highlighted under Ext.P7 are different from the reasons stated in Ext.P2 notice in the scrutiny proceedings. He relies on a judgment of the Apex Court in Income Tax Officer v. Techspan India Private Ltd. and Another [(2018) 404 ITR 10] and of this Court in Innovative Foods Ltd. v. Union of India and Others [(2018) 409 ITR 415], in support of his contentions.
12. I have considered the respective submissions and also perused the connected records.
13. The first issue arising for consideration in this writ petition is as to whether Ext.P5 notice issued by the department and the order issued at Ext.P10, are barred by limitation or not.
The assessment year concerned is 2009-10. Ext.P5 is issued under Section 148 of the Act. It is under Section 147 of the Act, the assessment of income that has escaped assessment is provided for. Section 148 of the Act provides for the issue of a notice where income has escaped assessment, which attracts the provisions of Section 147. The time limit for issuance of a notice under Section 148 is provided under Section 149 of the Act. Under the above provisions, the notice has to be issued within a period of four years from the end of the assessment year, unless it falls under Clause (b). Here the period of four years with respect to 2009-10 is admittedly over. However, the notice would be within limitation, if the case falls under Clause (b) of Section 149(1). So as to attract Clause (b), the twin conditions prescribed under proviso to sec. 147 have to be satisfied, which reads as under:
“147. Income escaping assessment.- If the Assessing Officer [has reason to believe] that any income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for any assessment year, he may, subject to the provisions of sections 148 to 153, assess or reassess such income and also any other income chargeable to tax which has escaped assessment and which comes to his notice subsequently in the course of the proceedings under this section, or recompute the loss or the depreciation allowance or any other allowance, as the case may be, for the assessment year concerned (hereafter in this section and in sections 148 to 153 referred to as the relevant assessment year):
Provided that where an assessment under sub-section (3) of section 143 or this section has been made for the relevant assessment year, no action shall be taken under this section after the expiry of four years from the end of relevant assessment year, unless any income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment for such assessment year by reason of the failure on the part of the assessee to make a return under section 139 or in response to a notice issued under subsection (1) of section 142 or section 148 or to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for his assessment for that assessment year:”
Thus, firstly, the officer should have a “reason to believe” that income had escaped assessment to tax. Secondly, the officer should also have “reason to believe” that the escape from assessment is on account of the failure on the part of the assessee to disclose fully and truly all material facts necessary for the assessment. Unless the above conditions are satisfied, the six year extended period of limitation cannot be availed of by the assessing authority. In the case at hand, the notice at Ext.P5 and the preliminary order at Ext.P10 are issued mainly with respect to the accumulation of Rs.50 lakhs for the purpose of purchase of land as against the objectives of the petitioner trust and utilization of the said amounts for a different purpose. The question to be considered is, is there any failure on the part of the petitioner to disclose the above aspects earlier.
14. In this connection, a reference to Ext.P2 notice, issued by the department under Section 142(1) would be required. As already noticed, the said notice had directed the petitioner to furnish explanations regarding the accumulation of Rs.50 lakhs from assessment year 1999-2000 onwards and the permission obtained for accumulating this amount for the purchase of land, when the original accumulation was for a different purpose. The petitioner offered explanations through Ext.P3. It was pointed out that, though the accumulation was for construction purposes, the same was sought to be utilized for the purchase of land. The petitioner pointed out that the petitioner was advised to file a formal application, and such an application is also filed, upon which orders are not issued. The fact that such a reply is filed to the notice is not disputed. It might be that, in the order issued at Ext.P4, there is no consideration of these issues at the hands of the assessing authority.
15. However, a perusal of Exts.P2 and P3 makes it clear that, as early as in the year 2011 itself, such details regarding accumulation for one purpose and utilization for another purpose have come to the attention of the department. The time limit of six years can be utilized by the department only in a situation where the department has a case that the assessee did not disclose fully and truly all the material facts necessary for the purpose of assessment. Such satisfaction should be with reference to the date of the notice. Notice at Ext.P5 has been issued on 30.03.2016. Almost four years back, all the above details were furnished before the assessing authority. Further, a perusal of the notice at Ext.P2 would make it clear that, even the department has noticed the above discrepancy, and that is why Ext.P2 was issued pursuant to a scrutiny assessment. In such circumstances, it cannot be said that the petitioner herein withheld certain information from the department. When that be the position, the department cannot be expected to have recourse to the extended period of six years for issuing the notice under Section 149.
16. The second issue for consideration in this writ petition is as to whether the notice issued at Ext.P5 can be considered as a case of “mere change of opinion on the part of the assessing authority”. In this connection, the Apex Court in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Kelvinator of India [(2010) 2 SCC 723], while considering the scope of reassessment under the provisions of the Income Tax Act has found as under;
“5. On going through the changes, quoted above, made to Section 147 of the Act, we find that, prior to the Direct Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 1987 reopening could be done under the above two conditions and fulfilment of the said conditions alone conferred jurisdiction on the assessing officer to make a back assessment, but in Section 147 of the Act (with effect from 1-4-1989), they are given a go-by and only one condition has remained viz. that where the assessing officer has reason to believe that income has escaped assessment, confers jurisdiction to reopen the assessment. Therefore, post 1-4-1989, power to reopen is much wider. However, one needs to give a schematic interpretation to the words “reason to believe” failing which, we are afraid, Section 147 would give arbitrary powers to the assessing officer to reopen assessments on the basis of “mere change of opinion”, which cannot be per se reason to reopen.
6. We must also keep in mind the conceptual difference between power to review and power to reassess. The assessing officer has no power to review; he has the power to reassess. But reassessment has to be based on fulfilment of certain precondition and if the concept of “change of opinion” is removed, as contended on behalf of the Department, then, in the garb of reopening the assessment, review would take place.
7. One must treat the concept of “change of opinion” as an in-built test to check abuse of power by the assessing officer. Hence, after 1-4-1989, the assessing officer has power to reopen, provided there is “tangible material” to come to the conclusion that there is escapement of income from assessment. Reasons must have a live link with the formation of the belief. Our view gets support from the changes made to Section 147 of the Act, as quoted hereinabove. Under the Direct Tax Laws (Amendment) Act, 1987, Parliament not only deleted the words “reason to believe” but also inserted the word “opinion” in Section 147 of the Act. However, on receipt of representations from the companies against omission of the words “reason to believe”, Parliament reintroduced the said expression and deleted the word “opinion” on the ground that it would vest arbitrary powers in the assessing officer.”
17. In Marico Limited v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax [(2020) 425 ITR 177], the Bombay High Court was called upon to consider the case of reassessment under the Act when the assessee claimed deduction and offered explanations in response to an enquiry. In the original assessment, the assessing authority extended the deductions claimed for by the assessee. Later, notice was issued for reassessment, proposing to withdraw the deduction granted. Considering the above circumstances, the Court held as under;
“It is undisputed position before us, that a query was raised on the very issue of reopening during regular assessment proceedings. The parties have responded to it and assessment order dated January 30, 2018, makes no reference to the above issue at all. However, once a query has been raised by the Assessing Officer during the assessment proceedings and the assessee has responded to that query, it would necessarily follow, as held by our court that the Assessing Officer has accepted the petitioner’s/ assessee’s submissions, so as to not deal with that issue in the assessment order”
18. Again, in G K N Sinter Metals Ltd. v. Ramapriya Raghav [(2015) 371 ITR 225], the Bombay High Court considered an identical situation, where the department took the stand that in the original assessment proceedings, there were no discussions on the point so that the subsequent steps can be stated as a case of change of opinion, finding as under;
“10. According to the Revenue, it could only be when the assessment order contains a discussion with regard to a particular claim can it be said that the Assessing Officer had formed an opinion with regard to the claim made by the assessee.
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In the above view, it is clear that once a query has been raised during the assessment proceedings and the petitioner has responded to the query to the satisfaction of the Assessing Officer as is evident from the fact that the assessment order dated March 9, 2005, accepts the petitioner’s claim for deduction under section 80-IA/80-IB of the Act. It must follow that there is due application of mind by Assessing Officer to the issue raised.”
19. Again, it is noticed that the judgment of the Bombay High Court in Marico Limited (supra), has been upheld by the Apex Court in the judgment reported as Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax v Marico Ltd. [(2020) 16 SCC 354]. Even though the above judgment was one rejecting the special leave petition, there are observations on the merits of the matter, with reference to the query raised by the department, the reply given by the assessee, etc. Therefore, as held by the Apex Court in Khoday Distilleries Limited (now known as Khoday India limited) v Sri Mahadeshwara Sahakara Sakkare Karkhane Limited, Kollegal [(2019) 4 SCC 376], the said judgment has precedential value.
20. In the light of the above discussions, the notice issued by the 3rd respondent under Section 148 of the Act is to be evaluated. The said notice proposes to reopen the petitioner’s assessment under Section 147. The reasons for such steps are informed through Ext.P7. The said reason is with reference to the accumulation and mobilization of amounts for different purposes. The contention of Sri. Jose Joseph, that the said reason at Ext.P7 is a different one cannot be accepted. A cursory glance at Ext.P2 notice, Ext.P3 reply, and Ext.P7 would show that the reasons highlighted for initiation of the steps under the act are one and the same. The reliance made by the standing counsel on the judgment of the apex court in Techspan India (supra), is not apposite. True, in the afore judgment, the apex court cautioned against interference with reassessment steps under the Act, as under:
“12. Before interfering with the proposed reopening of the assessment on the ground that the same is based only on a change in opinion, the court ought to verify whether the assessment earlier made has either expressly or by necessary implication expressed an opinion on a matter which is the basis of the alleged escapement of income that was taxable. If the assessment order is non-speaking, cryptic or perfunctory in nature, it may be difficult to attribute to the Assessing Officer any opinion on the questions that are raised in the proposed reassessment proceedings. Every attempt to bring to tax, income that has escaped assessment, cannot be absorbed by judicial intervention on an assumed change of opinion even in cases where the order of assessment does not address itself to a given aspect sought to be examined in the reassessment proceedings.”
However, the above principles were applied to the facts of the said case as the apex court concluded the issue, in the following lines:
“13. However, a bare perusal of notice dated March 9, 2004 which was issued in the original assessment proceedings under section 143 makes it clear that the point on which the reassessment proceedings were initiated, was well considered in the original proceedings. In fact, the very basis of issuing the show-cause notice dated March 9, 2004 was that the assessee was not maintaining any separate books of account for the said two categories and the details filed do not reveal proportional allocation of common expenses be made to these categories. Even the said show-cause notice suggested how proportional allocation should be done. All these things lead to an unavoidable conclusion that the question as to how and to what extent deduction should be allowed under section 10A of the Income-tax Act was well considered in the original assessment proceedings itself. Hence, initiation of the reassessment proceedings under section 147 by issuing a notice under section 148 merely because of the fact that now the Assessing Officer is of the view that the deduction under section 10A was allowed in excess, was based on nothing but a change of opinion on the same facts and circumstances which were already in his knowledge even during the original assessment proceedings.”
Thus, the issue raised in the case at hand is also to be decided against the revenue, in view of the fact that same issue was raised in Ext. P2 and clarified by the petitioner through Ext. P3. Similarly, the judgment of the division bench of this court in Innovative Foods (Supra), would not apply to the case at hand since in that case, this court found that:
“8. We have noticed that, definitely, the aforesaid issue was placed before the Assessing Officer by the assessee by way of exhibit P1 communication which we have also found in the records. However, it is not an answer to a query.”
Thus that was a situation where the department did not raise any query in the matter. However, in the case at hand, query was sought for and clarified by the assessee also.
21. Again, the division bench of this court while rendering the judgment in Innovative Foods, also referred to the judgment of the Full Bench of the Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Income-tax vs Usha International Ltd. (2012) 348 ITR 485, wherein the following propositions were laid down:
“7. It is, therefore, clear from the aforesaid position that:
(1) Reassessment proceedings can be validly initiated in case return of income is processed under section 143(1) and no scrutiny assessment is undertaken. In such cases there is no change of opinion;
(2) Reassessment proceedings will be invalid in case the assessment order itself records that the issue was raised and is decided in favor of the assessee. Reassessment proceedings in the said cases will be hit by the principle of ‘change of opinion’.
3) Reassessment proceedings will be invalid in case an issue or query is raised and answered by the assessee in original assessment proceedings but thereafter the Assessing Officer does not make any addition in the assessment order. In such situations it should be accepted that the issue was examined but the Assessing Officer did not find any ground or reason to make addition or reject the stand of the assessee. He forms an opinion. The reassessment will be invalid because the Assessing Officer had formed an opinion in the original assessment, though he had not recorded his reasons.”
Applying the propositions at SI. Nos. (2) & (3), this court in Innovative Foods found that since no query was raised, there cannot be any change of opinion also. However, in the case at hand as stated afore, there was a query raised by the department and answered by the assessee. Therefore, the case at hand is a clear case of “change of opinion”.
Resultantly, the captioned writ petition is allowed and Ext.P10 order issued by the 3rd respondent is quashed.
