Summary: The first appellate authority under GST occupies a dual position: it is part of the tax department, yet exercises a quasi-judicial function that requires independent judgment. This article examines the statutory structure of appeals under Section 107 of the CGST Act, 2017, the obligation to frame points for determination and record reasons, and the limits on departmental influence. Drawing on Supreme Court rulings concerning judicial discipline, reasoned orders and disciplinary accountability, it explains why an appellate officer cannot mechanically confirm the adjudicating officer’s findings or disregard binding precedents. It also considers the consequences of non-speaking orders, the effect of the doctrine of merger, and the availability of constitutional remedies where statutory appellate proceedings fail to provide effective adjudication. The central argument is that an effective first appeal is essential not only to protect taxpayers against unlawful demands but also to translate judicial decisions into consistent departmental practice.
The First Appellate Authority Under GST: A Judicial Duty In a Departmental Chair, And The Missing Bridge To The Courts
- The question
- Who sits in the first appeal
- The judicial duty the statute imposes
- Independence of mind within the department
- The plea of departmental loyalty
- The pattern of the non-speaking appellate order
- A safe haven for unlawful orders
- Consequences in law
- The judicial parameter: the missing bridge
- Conclusion
The question
Every taxpayer who loses before the adjudicating officer is told that the law gives him an appeal. Under Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and the corresponding State Acts, that appeal lies to the Appellate Authority. The question which practitioners now ask, more often and more openly than before, is a simple one. Is the first appellate forum a free forum of adjudication, or is it a departmental chair in which the outcome is settled before the hearing begins?
The answer the statute gives is that it is both. The officer who hears the first appeal is a departmental officer by appointment, and a quasi-judicial authority by function. The difficulty arises when the first character is allowed to swallow the second. This article examines what the law requires of the first appellate authority, why departmental loyalty is no defence to a failure of that duty, why the fear of an inquiry, often expressed in hearings, has no foundation in law, and why the first appeal is the bridge through which the law declared by the courts must reach the revenue administration.
Who sits in the first appeal
Section 2(8) defines the Appellate Authority as the authority appointed or authorised to hear appeals under Section 107. Rule 109A of the CGST Rules and the corresponding State notifications place the appeal, depending on the rank of the adjudicating officer, before the Additional Commissioner or Joint Commissioner (Appeals) or the Commissioner (Appeals). In Uttar Pradesh, under the State Act, the first appeal is heard by the Additional Commissioner Grade 2 (Appeal) or the Joint Commissioner (Appeal) posted in the judicial divisions of the Commercial Tax Department.
Three features of this arrangement deserve notice.
(a) The appellate officer is a cadre officer of the same department. He is posted to the appeal wing and may, on transfer, return to assessment, enforcement or administration.
(b) He works under the administrative control of the Commissioner. Under Section 107(2) the same Commissioner may direct an appeal against an order of the adjudicating officer, so that the department itself can be the appellant before him.
(c) He is bound, as an officer, by the instructions and circulars issued under Section 168, while a court or tribunal is not. In Commissioner of Central Excise, Bolpur v. Ratan Melting and Wire Industries, (2008) 13 SCC 1, the Supreme Court held that circulars bind the department but not the courts.
The statute also gives the appellate authority narrower powers than a court. The proviso to Section 107(11) removes the power to remand. Section 107(4) allows delay to be condoned only for one further month. Because the authority is not a court, Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not extend that period, as the Supreme Court held under the Central Excise law in Singh Enterprises v. Commissioner of Central Excise, (2008) 3 SCC 70, a view the High Courts have since applied to GST.
None of this makes the forum independent in the sense in which a tribunal with judicial members is independent. The Goods and Services Tax Appellate Tribunal under Section 112 is the first forum of that kind. But the absence of institutional independence does not mean the absence of a judicial duty. The law places that duty on the officer personally.
The judicial duty the statute imposes
Section 107(12) is the core of the appellate function. It reads:
“(12) The order of the Appellate Authority disposing of the appeal shall be in writing and shall state the points for determination, the decision thereon and the reasons for such decision.”
The provision is not a matter of form. It requires three things in sequence: the points which arise for determination, a decision on each point, and reasons for each decision. An order which reproduces the grounds of appeal over several pages and then disposes of the appeal in a paragraph, without framing a single point, does not satisfy it. Form GST APL-04, in which the order is communicated, is built on the same structure.
Sections 107(8) to 107(11) complete the picture. The authority must hear the appellant, may allow additional grounds, may make further inquiry, and may confirm, modify or annul the order under appeal. Section 75(4), which requires an opportunity of hearing where any adverse decision is contemplated, and Section 75(7), which forbids confirming a demand on grounds other than those in the notice, apply with equal force when the appellate authority confirms an adverse order.
The duty to give reasons is also a principle of natural justice in its own right. In Kranti Associates Pvt. Ltd. v. Masood Ahmed Khan, (2010) 9 SCC 496, the Supreme Court surveyed the law and held that every quasi-judicial authority must record reasons, that reasons are the link between the material and the conclusion, and that a decision without reasons, or with reasons that are a mere ritual, is not a decision the law recognises.
Independence of mind within the department
The departmental position of the appellate officer was considered long before GST. In Orient Paper Mills Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 1498, the Supreme Court held that an authority exercising quasi-judicial power must exercise it according to its own judgment, and that a superior officer cannot direct how a particular case is to be decided. An order passed under the dictation of a superior, or to conform to his wishes, is no exercise of the power at all.
The same principle governs the relationship between the appellate officer and the officer whose order is under appeal. The appeal exists precisely so that the order of the subordinate officer may be examined by someone other than its author. An appellate officer who approaches the appeal with the settled object of supporting the subordinate officer has not heard an appeal. He has endorsed an order.
Judicial discipline is the second limb. In Union of India v. Kamlakshi Finance Corporation Ltd., 1992 Supp (1) SCC 443, the Supreme Court censured departmental appellate officers who declined to follow the decisions of higher appellate authorities because the department had not accepted them. The Court held that the principles of judicial discipline require the orders of higher appellate authorities to be followed unreservedly by subordinate authorities, and that the mere fact that the department has challenged a decision is no reason not to follow it. A decision of the Supreme Court or of the jurisdictional High Court under the GST law itself cannot be set aside by an appellate officer as having no relevance.
The plea of departmental loyalty
In hearings it is not unusual to hear, in substance, that the appellate officer is a departmental officer, that he must support the officer below, and that an order against the department will expose him to an inquiry. The plea deserves an answer in law, because it describes the very failure which Section 107(12), Orient Paper Mills and Kamlakshi Finance were meant to prevent.
The answer begins with the law on disciplinary action for quasi-judicial orders. In Union of India v. K.K. Dhawan, (1993) 2 SCC 56, the Supreme Court held that an officer exercising quasi-judicial power is not immune from disciplinary action, but that such action is warranted only in defined cases: where the officer has acted in a manner which reflects on his integrity or good faith, where he has acted recklessly or in disregard of the conditions prescribed by the statute, where he has acted to unduly favour a party, or where he has been actuated by corrupt motive. An honest order, even an erroneous one, is outside that list.
In Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar v. Union of India, (1999) 7 SCC 409, the Court went further and held that a wrong interpretation of law, or an error of judgment in a quasi-judicial order, cannot by itself be a ground for disciplinary proceedings, because the remedy for such an error lies in appeal or revision. The later decision in Union of India v. Duli Chand, (2006) 5 SCC 680 reaffirmed K.K. Dhawan on the point that negligence and recklessness can attract action; it did not suggest that an honest order allowing an appeal is misconduct.
The statute is to the same effect. Section 157 protects anything done or intended to be done in good faith under the Act. The department, moreover, has its own remedies against an appellate order it considers wrong. The Commissioner may revise it under Section 108, and the department may appeal against it to the Appellate Tribunal under Section 112(3). The scheme thus assumes that appellate officers will sometimes decide against the department, and provides the means of correction. It does not assume that they will decide for the department in order to be safe.
Read together, these authorities point in the opposite direction from the plea. The risk which the K.K. Dhawan test identifies is the risk of acting in disregard of the conditions prescribed by the statute. An appellate officer who confirms an order passed after the period of limitation, or under Section 74 without any finding of fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression, or without hearing the taxpayer, comes closer to that description than an officer who allows a deserving appeal on a reasoned order.
The pattern of the non-speaking appellate order
A recurring pattern can now be seen in appellate orders in several divisions. The order reproduces the grounds of appeal and the written submissions at length. It then records the departmental report. The concluding part, often shorter than the narration, has some or all of the following features.
(a) No point for determination is framed, so that no ground is decided.
(b) The objections which go to jurisdiction, such as limitation, the invocation of Section 74, the absence of a hearing and the bar of Section 75(7), are not mentioned at all.
(c) The argument of the appellant is restated in a weaker form, which is then rejected, while the argument actually advanced is left unanswered.
(d) The demand is sustained on a footing which appears neither in the show cause notice nor in the order under appeal.
(e) Binding judgments are set aside in a single sentence as having no relevance.
(f) Interest and penalty are confirmed even where the reasoning of the order itself points the other way.
Each of these features is a breach of a specific legal requirement. The first two breach Section 107(12). The third is a failure to decide the appeal which was filed. The fourth breaches Section 75(7) and the principle in Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commissioner, (1978) 1 SCC 405, that an order must stand on the reasons stated in it and cannot be supported by fresh reasons later. The fifth breaches the rule in Kamlakshi Finance. The sixth renders the order internally inconsistent, which is itself a ground for setting it aside.
What unites these features is that they allow the appellate officer to confirm the order without ever writing a finding against the subordinate officer. Silence on the jurisdictional objection is safer, from the departmental point of view, than a finding on it. That is precisely why the law insists on points for determination and reasons. The requirement exists so that silence is not available.
A safe haven for unlawful orders
The pattern described above has a consequence which goes beyond the individual case. When the first appeal routinely confirms what comes before it, the forum stops being a check on the adjudicating officer and becomes a shelter for him. An order which could not survive scrutiny is passed up to the appellate authority, and comes back carrying the authority of an appellate order. The appeal, designed to correct unlawful orders, becomes the means by which they are protected.
The doctrine of merger gives this shelter its legal force. When an appellate authority confirms an order after hearing the appeal, the order of the lower authority merges in the appellate order, and it is the appellate order which thereafter operates in law: Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala, (2000) 6 SCC 359. An unlawful order which is mechanically confirmed is therefore not merely left standing. It is converted into the order of a higher authority, and the officer who passed it is placed beyond question within the department.
The danger is greatest with ex parte orders. A large share of adjudication orders under Sections 73, 74 and 74A are now passed without the taxpayer being heard, on a notice uploaded on the portal, often on the strength of a single sentence of non-payment. For such a taxpayer the first appeal is not a second hearing. It is the first and only hearing he will ever receive within the statutory scheme. If the appellate officer records the objections and then decides none of them, the result is two orders and no hearing. The ex parte order, which the law treats as the weakest kind of adjudication, emerges from the appeal as the strongest, with the full weight of an appellate confirmation behind it.
There is also a revenue consequence, and it is one the law does not permit. Article 265 of the Constitution provides that no tax shall be levied or collected except by authority of law. A demand raised after the period of limitation, or under Section 74 without any foundation of fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression, or on grounds outside the notice, is not a levy by authority of law. The pre-deposit taken under Section 107(6), and the recovery which follows the dismissal of the appeal under Sections 78 and 79, are then collections of money which the State has no authority to collect. When the appellate forum confirms such demands without examining them, it does not protect the revenue. It produces revenue which is not lawfully due, and which the State will in the end be obliged to return, with interest, once a court examines the order. Collection of that kind serves neither the treasury nor the rule of law.
The purpose of the provision and the result it now produces have parted ways. Section 107 exists so that the department can correct its own errors before they reach the courts, cheaply and quickly, through an officer senior to the adjudicating officer and familiar with the law. That is the purpose. The result, in the pattern described above, is different: the appeal is decided not by asking whether the order is right, but by asking what a finding would do to the officer who passed it.
The reason lies in the nature of the objections which are passed over. An error on merits, such as a wrong rate or a mistaken valuation, can be corrected without embarrassment to anyone. An error of jurisdiction cannot. If the appellate officer records that the order was passed after the period of limitation had expired, or that Section 74 was invoked without a single fact of fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression, or that the taxpayer was never heard, he records in writing that his subordinate acted in disregard of the conditions prescribed by the statute. That is the very category which, under Union of India v. K.K. Dhawan, (1993) 2 SCC 56, can expose an officer to disciplinary action. A finding on such a question is therefore lethal for the officer below. An honest error of judgment is protected; a recorded disregard of the statute is not.
This explains why the jurisdictional grounds are the ones that go unanswered. The appellate officer does not hold that the order was within time, or that Section 74 was rightly invoked, because he cannot hold so on the record. Nor does he hold the contrary, because that finding would fall on his subordinate. He says nothing, and confirms. The appeal no longer filters out unlawful demands; it certifies them, and the price of protecting one officer is paid by the taxpayer in the form of a demand the State had no authority to raise. A remedy enacted by Parliament for the taxpayer against the department cannot be administered as the department’s right choice for securing that revenue. A statutory power exercised for a purpose other than the one for which it was conferred, here to shield an officer rather than to decide an appeal, is a colourable exercise of power, and it offends Article 14 as much as Article 265. A remedy so administered ceases to be a remedy at all, and the constitutional courts are entitled to treat it so.
Consequences in law
An appellate order of this kind does not merely risk reversal on merits. It is vulnerable on grounds which do not depend on the merits at all. A decision taken in breach of natural justice, or without the reasons the statute requires, is one of the recognised exceptions to the rule of alternative remedy. In Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trade Marks, (1998) 8 SCC 1 and Radha Krishan Industries v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2021) 6 SCC 771, the Supreme Court held that a writ petition lies despite an alternative remedy where the order is wholly without jurisdiction or has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice.
There is a further consequence which is less often noticed. Where a taxpayer has already availed the first appeal, raised every objection in writing, and received an order which decides none of them, the statutory remedy has in substance been tried and found empty. The argument that the taxpayer must exhaust the departmental remedy loses much of its force when the departmental remedy has been exhausted without any adjudication. The constitutional courts have shown increasing readiness to examine such orders directly, and to call for the personal explanation of the officers concerned where the pattern is clear.
The cost of the pattern therefore falls on the department as much as on the taxpayer. Every non-speaking appellate order generates a second round of litigation, either before the Tribunal or before the High Court, which a reasoned order would often have avoided. It also erodes the confidence on which a self-assessment regime depends.
The judicial parameter: the missing bridge
The failure described in this article is usually seen as a quarrel between the trader and the officer. Seen from the judicial side, it is something more serious. It is a failure to build trust between the judiciary and the revenue administration, and the first appellate authority stands exactly at the point where that trust is either built or lost.
The constitutional position leaves no room for doubt. Article 141 makes the law declared by the Supreme Court binding on all courts within the territory of India, and Article 144 requires all authorities, civil and judicial, to act in aid of the Supreme Court. The decisions of a High Court bind every authority and tribunal functioning within its territorial jurisdiction: East India Commercial Co. Ltd. v. Collector of Customs, AIR 1962 SC 1893. The appellate officer who sets aside a judgment of the Supreme Court or of the jurisdictional High Court as having no relevance is therefore not merely in breach of judicial discipline. He is acting contrary to a constitutional command.
In practice the command is not reaching the field. The Supreme Court decides G.R. Infra Projects Limited v. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2026 LiveLaw (SC) 852 and Tata Steel Limited v. Union of India, 2026 INSC 920. The High Court quashes order after order for invoking Section 74 without foundational facts, for deciding ex parte, and for disregarding limitation. Yet in the following month notices issue in the same words, orders are passed on the same footing, and appellate orders describe the same judgments as irrelevant. A judgment is meant to settle the law for all cases of its kind. Here it settles only the case it decides, and each ruling remains an isolated event which leaves the practice of the department unchanged.
The consequence is a loss of trust on both sides. The courts lose confidence in the departmental forum. When a Bench is shown appellate orders that decide nothing, the rule requiring exhaustion of the alternative remedy loses its moral foundation; writ petitions are entertained directly, personal affidavits of officers are called for, and costs are imposed. The officer is then treated less as a quasi-judicial authority entitled to deference and more as a litigant who must explain himself. The officers, for their part, come to see the court as an obstacle to revenue rather than as the authority which declares what revenue is lawful. A quashed order is received as a lost case and not as a statement of the law. Nothing in the system rewards an officer for applying a judgment that goes against the department, and an officer appears safer passing the demand and leaving it to the court to strike down than dropping it himself and having to explain why.
What is missing is a bridge. The first appellate officer is the departmental officer closest to the courts in function. His reasoned order is the means by which a judgment becomes practice inside the department, because the adjudicating officers who are reversed by him on the authority of a judgment learn to apply it. Union of India v. Kamlakshi Finance Corporation Ltd., 1992 Supp (1) SCC 443 contemplated exactly this when it insisted that the decisions of higher authorities be followed unreservedly by those below. Circular No. 258/04/2026-GST, by which the Board adopted the judgment in G.R. Infra and directed its officers to comply with it, is a rare instance of the bridge being built from the administrative side. Where no such step is taken, judgments arrive at the field office as defeats and not as law. And when the appellate officer shields the order instead of applying the judgment, the last bridge between the judiciary and the revenue administration collapses. The work which the first appeal should have done is then thrown upon the High Court, at a cost in time and money which the small trader can least afford.
The judicial parameters by which an appellate order is measured are, for this reason, not technicalities. They are the conditions on which the courts can continue to treat the first appeal as an efficacious remedy. An appellate order meets them when:
(a) it frames the points for determination and decides each of them, as Section 107(12) requires;
(b) it decides the objections going to jurisdiction, such as limitation, the invocation of Section 74 and the denial of hearing, before it turns to the merits;
(c) it applies the binding judgments of the Supreme Court and of the jurisdictional High Court, or distinguishes them with reasons, as Articles 141 and 144 and Kamlakshi Finance require;
(d) it confines itself to the grounds of the show cause notice, as Section 75(7) requires; and
(e) its reasons and its operative part are consistent with each other.
An order which meets these parameters builds trust between the department and the courts, because it shows that the law declared by the courts is being carried into the administration. An order which fails them tells the court that the departmental remedy has ceased to function, and invites the court to take the work upon itself.
Conclusion
The first appellate authority under GST is a departmental officer, and the law does not pretend otherwise. But the law does require that, when he sits in appeal, he decides the appeal. Section 107(12) requires points, decisions and reasons. Orient Paper Mills requires his own mind, not that of his superior or his subordinate. Kamlakshi Finance requires obedience to binding precedent. K.K. Dhawan, Zunjarrao Bhikaji Nagarkar and Section 157 protect him when he decides honestly, and the department’s remedies under Sections 108 and 112 ensure that an honest error can be corrected without any cost to him. Articles 141 and 144 make the law declared by the courts the law he must apply, and his reasoned order is the bridge by which that law reaches the officers below him.
The legal position is therefore the reverse of the one commonly assumed in the hearing room. The appellate officer is safest when he applies the statute and records his reasons. He is most exposed when he confirms an order he has not examined, in order to protect the officer who passed it. And a first appeal that shelters unlawful orders, and turns demands raised without authority of law into collected revenue, fails both the taxpayer and the Constitution. When the first appeal decides honestly, trust between the judiciary and the revenue administration is built one order at a time; when it shields, that trust is lost one order at a time. A departmental chair carries a judicial duty, and the duty does not change with the colour of the chair.
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Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are the author’s own thoughts. They are not binding on any person or authority and are not a statement of the statute. Readers should refer to the provisions of the Act, the Rules, the notifications and the judgments cited, in their authentic text, before relying on any proposition in this article.





